TAAMF and Another v Tau Global Construction (Pty) Ltd and Others (7336/2023) [2025] ZALMPPHC 210 (31 October 2025)

52 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Eviction — Unlawful occupation — Application for eviction of respondents from property — First applicant, a Communal Property Association, claims ownership of the farm and asserts that respondents occupy the property without authorization — Respondents contest eviction, asserting rights based on historical occupation and lease agreements — Court to determine legality of respondents' occupation and validity of lease agreements — Applicants' ownership rights upheld, leading to eviction order against respondents for unlawful occupation of the farm.

IN T HE HIGH CO UR T O F SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO D IVISION , POL OKWAN E
( 1) REPO RT AB LE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JU DGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED: YES/NO ........
s\ \ l o\':lD~S- ~
Date Signature
In the matter between:
TAAMF
SOUTHERN SPHERE PLATINUM (PTV) LTD
AND
TAU GLOBAL CONSTRUCTION (PTV) LTD
SPENCER PAILE
MMILONG TRANSPORT
MBONJOMANE PLANT AND TRANSPORT CC
CASE NO: 7336/2023
FIRST APPLICANT
SECOND APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
THIRD RESPONDENT
FOURTH RESPONDENT

KGOMO RESORT
KA MATETE TRANSPORT
MODIPADI NGWATO TRADING
UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS
THOBEJANE MOTLOKWA SOLOMON
THOBEJANE MAHUTSA ELSIE
2
JUDGMENT
NGOBENIJ
INTRODUCTION
FIFTH RESPONDENT
SIXTH RESPONDENT
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
EIGHTH RESPONDENT
NINTH RESPONDENT
TENTH RESPONDENT
[1] The first applicant is Tubatse African Agriculture Merging Farmers
Communal Property Association (TAAMF) , established under the
provisions of sections 1,2(b) and 8 of the Communal Property Association
Act 28 of 1996(CPAA), with its registered address at Portion 3 (a portion
of farm 1) of the Farm Grootboom, 336 K.T. Steelpoort, 1133 (Farm).
[2] The second applicant is Southern Sph ere Platinum (PTY) Ltd, a private
company, with its main registered place of business on the 1st Floor,
One-on-ninth, 23 Ninth Street, Melrose Estate, Johannesburg, 2198.

3
[3] The first respondent is Tau Global Construction (Pty) Ltd, a private
company duly registered according to the laws of South Africa, with a
registered address at 2192 Aloeridge East, Aloe Street, Burgersfort,
Limpopo, 1150, and who is currently trading at Portion 3 (a portion of
portion 1) of Farm Grootboom 336, Registration Division K.T. Limpopo.
[ 4] The second respondent is Spencer Pai le, an adult male person, whose
further particulars are unknown to the applicants and is currently running
a business from Portion 3 (a portion of portion 1) of the Farm
Grootboom336, Registration Division K.T. Limpopo.
[5] The third respondent is Mmilong Transport, a business whose further
particulars are unknown to the applicants and is currently trading from
portion 3 (a portion of portion 1) of the Farm Grootboom 336,
Registration Division K.T. Limpopo.
[6] The fourth respondent is Mbojane Plant and Transport Hire CC, A Close
Corporation duly registered in accordance with the laws of South Africa,
with its registered address at 17 Tukakgomo Village, Steelpoort,
Steelpoort, Limpopo, 1133, and who is currently trading at Portion3 (a
portion of portion 1) of the Farm Grootboom 336, Registration Division
K.T. Limpopo.

4
[7] The fifth respondent is Kgomo Resort, a business whose further particulars
are unknown to the applicants and is currently trading from Portion 3 (a
portion of portion 1) of the Farm Grootboom 336, Registration Division
K.T. Limpopo.
[8] The sixth respondent is Ka Matete Transport, a business whose further
particulars are unknown to the applicants and is currentl.y trading from
portion 3 (a portion of portion 1) of the Farm Grootboom 336,
Registration Division K.T. Limpopo.
[9] The seventh respondent is Modipadi Ngwato Trading, a business whose
further particulars are unknown to the applicants and is currently trading
from Portion 3 (a portion of portion 1) of the Farm Grootboom 336,
Registration Division K.T. Limpopo.
[10] The eighth respondent are all other illegal occupiers that are occupying the
said Portion 3 (a portion of portion 1) of the Farm Grootboom 336,
Registration Division K.T. Limpopo.
[11] The ninth and tenth respondents, in their capacities as the trustees of
Motlokwa Family Trust, applied to be joined in these proceedings as
intervening parties and on 16 May 2024, Acting Judge Deane granted that
application. The basis of the application is that Motlokwa Family Trust

5
concluded a lease agreement for 20 hectares with the first applicant on
20 May 2012, although the date that appears on the lease agreement is
29 May 2012, and that lease agreement was prepared by M.G. Phatudi
Inc. (Attorneys).
[12] The returns of service for the Notice of Motion are filed on pages 90 to 95
in the bundle that is titled "Updated Index 1 ". I could not find the returns
of service for the seventh to the tenth respondents. The explanation in
the preceding paragraph regarding the ninth and tenth respondents is
enough to explain why there are no returns of service for the ninth and
tenth respondents. Paragraph 55 of the Founding Affidavit of Stanley
Moyane makes mention of first to eighth respondents. However, the
seventh respondent was represented by Advocate Letsoalo during the
hearing of this matter in court.
[13] The application by the applicants is for the eviction of the respondents
from the Farm. In issue then between the applicants and the respondents
is whether the respondents have the right to occupy the Farm in
question. There is a document filed by the applicant which is titled
'TUBATSE AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL MERGING FAR M ERS "TAAMF"
COMMUNAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION (CPA), which states that on
investigation the first applicant came to the conclusion that the
businesses that are occupying and trading on the Farm do not have

6
authorization to occupy the Farm, hence the application before this court
for eviction.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[14] The first applicant, TAAMF, has ownership rights on portion 3 (a portion of
portion 1) of the Farm Grootboom 336, (Farm), held by Trust Deed
Tl7669/19999PTA (Trust). It is on the basis of the said ownership rights
that the first applicant entered into a lease agreement with the second
applicant as per the Lease Agreement (Agreement) which is attached to
the founding affidavit as Annexure C. The Agreement in the main allowed
the second applicant to operate mining activities on the Farm.
[15] The mining operations by the second applicant could include the
establishment of an open pit and underground mining operations and
other activities that are related to mining operations, which are not even
necessary to mention for purposes of this application. The allegation by
the second applicant is that when it was surveying the Farm for purposes
starting with its mining operations, it then came to the attention of the
second applicant that there are several businesses that are occupying and
trading on the Farm, whereas the second applicant holds mining rights in
the form of a lease on the Farm from the first applicant. The first
applicant investigated the businesses that were trading on the Farm and

7
came to the conclusion that they were all trading on the property illegally.
It is the basis upon which the first and second applicants approached this
court for eviction of the respondents.
[16] The eviction proceedings are launched on the basis of the founding
affidavit of one Stanley Moyane who states that he is the chairperson of
the first applicant.
[17] The first, third, fourth and sixth respondents, who are represented by Mr
Mahlaela of Malope D Mahlaela Inc. contend that the Farm in question
was occupied by their forefathers or grandparents who were forcefully
removed by the apartheid government, but after 1994 the land was
claimed and many beneficiaries got organized and formed TAAMF CPA
(first applicant). The respondents, even though they were the
beneficiaries of the first applicant, still entered into long-term lease
agreements and some entered into sale agreements with their own CPA,
being the first applicant. The said respondents allege that when Mr.
Stanley Moyane (Moyane) entered into an agreement with the second
applicant, he did not inform them . The said respondents contend that,
they are not occupying the Farm illegally as alleged by the applicants.
[18] The second, fifth, nineth and tenth respondents are represented by Mr.
Mmola of Mmola Attorneys who submitted that the said respondents have

8
been occupying the Farm in question for eight years by the fifth
respondent and eleven years by the second, nineth and tenth
respondents, and that their lease agreements were not cancelled by the
parties or any order of a court of law.
[19] The sixth respondent denies that it is an unlawful occupier on the basis of
the lease agreement of a renewal period of 99 years, which is attached to
the answering affidavit. The sixth respondent further states that because
of the fact that it entered into a lease agreement with the first applicant,
the approach of the first applicant should have been to terminate the
lease agreement and or declare it null and void, before it could embark on
the eviction proceedings. Attached to the answering affidavit is a lease
agreement between the first applicant and R. K. Petroleum (PTY) LTD,
which was prepared by Maile & Associates Attorneys and signed on behalf
of the first applicant on 29 September 2016. Subsequent to that, on the
date that appears to be 04 March 2020, the Director General on behalf of
the Minister signed for the extension of the duration from ten (10) years
to thirty (30) years ending on 10 March 2040.
[20] There is a lease agreement entered into between the first applicant and
Modipadi A Ngw ato Trading and Construction (PTY) (Ltd) (seventh
respondent), dated 01 September 2012, prepared by M.G. Phatudi
Inc. (Attorneys) attached to the confirmatory affidavit of Mahlatse

9
Mashigoane, on behalf of the seventh respondent, confirming what was
stated by one Richo Matete Mnisi about the existence of their businesses.
In reaction to this eviction application there is also a confirmatory
affidavit by one Mika Michael Mopane, who stated that he was the
chairperson of the first applicant at the time when lease agreements were
entered into between the first applicant and the sixth and seventh
respondents, and submits that those lease agreements are valid.
[21] The ninth and the tenth respondents were given leave to intervene in
these proceedings by Acting Judge Deane on 16 May 2024. The ninth and
tenth respondents are the Trustees of Motlokwa Family Trust and for
purposes of this proceedings Thobejane Mahutsa Elsie (Elsie) deposed to
an answering affidavit relating to both the ninth and the tenth
respondents, and Thobejane Motlokwa Solomon (Solomon) deposed to a
confirmatory affidavit to the answering affidavit of Elsie. Attached to the
two affidavits that I have already mentioned is the lease agreement that
was entered into between the first applicant and Motlokwa Family Trust,
dated 29 May 2012, prepared by M.G. Phatudi Inc. (Attorneys). In
addition to what I have already mentioned as having been attached,
there is also a letter from M.G. Phatudi Incorporated, dated 18 June
2013, addressed to Motlokwa Family Trust (MFT), requesting MFT to
make a payment as the first applicant was in a serious financial crisis.

IO
[22] There is also a meeting of the tenants that was called by M.G. Phatudi
Incorporated, which was to be held on 23 August 2013, and it appears
from the subsequent letter that Motlokwa Family Trust did not attend that
meeting and they were threatened with a letter dated 02 August 2013,
that if they did not attend the meeting that was supposed to be held on
12 August 2013, their lease agreements could be terminated since those
agreements were concluded with the former Executive Members of the
first applicant being Mr. Nkoana and Mr. Mohlala. It appears that such a
meeting was held on 12 August 2013, but the contents of the letter have
faded, and therefore not easy to read as to who was in that meeting. In a
turn of events, there is even a letter dated 02 August 2013 by M.G.
Phatudi Incorporated, asking for an update about a criminal case that was
opened against Mr. Jabu Mohlala and Mr. Daniel Nkoana .
[23] In reaction to the lease agreemen ts that were attached by the
respondents, the first applicant states that the property on which the
Farm is situated is what is agricultural land, which in terms of the law a
portion of that land cannot be leased for a period of ten years or longer.
The further submission is that because the lease agreements of the
respondents were longer than ten years, and no permission was sought
from the M inister of Agriculture, and they are therefore void.

I I
IN ISSUE
[24] On the basis of the allegations by the applicants that the respondents are
occupying the Farm without permission, the court must decide as to
whether they have to be evicted or not. The applicants further state that
even if the respondents were to rely on the lease or sale agreements or
contracts that were entered into with the respondents, those contracts
are void for failure to comply with provisions of section 3(d) of the
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 Of 1970, and therefore
unenforceable.
APPLICABLE LAW
[25] The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act1 (SALA) was enacted to control
the subdivision and, in connection therewith, the use of agricultural land.
Section 1 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Act2 was to
repeal the whole of SALA, but to date has not come into operation which
means that SALA is in effect still the law governing the subdivision of
agricultural land. There are plans underway to cure the impasse by
introducing a Bill, which I will not even delve into discussing the contents
because that is irrelevant for purposes of issues to be decided in this
case.
I 70 Of 1970.
2 64 of 1998.

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[26] The summary of the definition of agricultural land in terms of section 1 of
SALA is any land except for land located within the jurisdiction of various
municipal or local authorities and other specific areas like townships.
Agricultural land is not exclusively arable land or where land is used for
pasture. The meaning is broad in that it includes farm property which is
relevant for the discussion in the case at hand as the property in question
is a farm, and therefore agricultural land. For a transaction that involves
subdivision of agricultural land the consent of the Minister of Agriculture
(Minister) is mandatory. The consent of the Minister is also mandatory
when a lease contract for a period of more than 10 years is entered into,
or consecutive leases that add up to 10 years or more.
[27] Section 3(d) of Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (SALA) reads as
follows:
"3 Prohibition of certain actions regarding agricultural land
(a), (b), (c) ...
(d) no lease in respect of a portion of agricultural land of which the period
is 10 years or longer, or is the natural life of the lessee or any other
person mentioned in the lease, or which is renewable from time to time to
at the will of the lessee, either by the continuation of the original lease by
entering into a new lease, indefinitely or for periods which together with

13
the first period of the lease amount in all to not less than 1 o years, shall
be entered into;
(e), (f), (g) ... "
[28] Section 3(d) of SALA is better understood if it is read with provisions of
section 4(1)(a) of the same Act which reads as follows:
"4 Application for consent of Minister, and imposition,
enforcement or withdrawal of conditions by him
(1)(a) Any application for the consent of the Minister for the purposes of
section 3 shall: -
(i) in the case where any act referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e) of that
section is contemplated, be made by the owner of the land concerned,
(ii) be lodged in such place and be in such form and be accompanied by
such plans, documents and information as may be determined by the
Minister."
DISCUSSION
[29] The purpose of the Communal Property Associations Act (CPAA) is to
enable communities to form juristic persons, to be known as communal
property associations in order to acquire, hold and manage property on a

14
basis agreed to by members of a community in terms of a written
constitution.
[30] The preamble of the CPAA states that "whereas it is desirable that
disadvantaged communities should be able to establish appropriate legal
institutions through which they may acquire, hold and manage property
in common , and whereas it is necessary to ensure that such institutions
are established and managed in a manner which is non-discriminatory,
equitable and democratic and that such institutions be accountable to
their members , and whereas it is necessary to ensure that members of
such institutions are protected against abuse of power by other
members .. ,"
[31] The Constitutional Court in Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela Communal Property
Association v Bakgat/a-ba-Kgafela Tribal Authority and Others3 , restated
the purpose of the Communal Property Association Act (CPAA) in line with
wha t is stated in the preamble of the CPAA .
[32] The applicants in the case at hand, allege that the lease contracts that the
respondents entered into with the first applicant are void because they
are for lengthy periods of time without the permission of the Minister in
contravention of provisions of section 3(d) of SALA. Contracts must be
3
(CCT23 l/I4) [2015] ZACC 25; 201 5 (6) SA 32 (CC); 20 I 5 ( I 0) BCL R 1139 (CC) (20 August 2015).

15
distinguished. There are those that are illegal because they are contra
bonos mores, and there are those that are illegal because of non­
compliance with statutory formalities, and there are those that are illegal
because the contract is unenforceable.
[33] The first applicant was purchased for the people of Tubatse by the
Department of Land Affairs, and it was eventually registered on 24
February 1998, with a Title Deed with registration certificate number CPA
98/00041/A UNDER TAAMF as the legal owner. The people from the
community were given an opportunity to lease out property from the
Farm for business purposes. The land was not leased for residential
purposes but for business purposes, hence the application of The
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act
19 of 1998 (PIE Act) cannot find application in this case. An attorney was
appointed in order to facilitate and draw contracts between the first
applicant and members of the community who wanted to lease land on
the farm for business purposes. The contracts that were annexed by the
respondents in their answering papers show that the first applicant was
party to these contracts.

16
[34] In Hanekom and Another vs Lombard 4 it was made explicitly clear that:
"Nowhere in the Act (Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970-own
addition) is it stated that where a portion of agricultural land with
'agricultural capacity' is leased, that the lease of such a portion of the
property does not fall foul of the provisions of section 3(1)(d) of the Act.
The Act clearly seeks to prevent the fragmentation of agricultural land,
which in my view even includes arable or non-arable land"
[35] The contracts at hand are clearly invalid or void because they were
entered for ridiculously long periods of time. The contracts are void
because the Minister did not give consent for such leases. It is the law
that the maxim ex turpi non oritur actio prohibits the enforcement of
immoral or illegal contracts5 . The maxim in pari delicto potior est
condictio defendentis, curtails the right of delinquents to avoid the
consequences of their performance or past performance of such
contracts6 . The reality in the case at hand is that when these contracts
were entered into there were even attorneys who were involved in
drafting leases for them, and in my view if that aspect is reasonably
viewed, the respondents might not even have known that they are
entering into void contracts because of non-compliance with statutory
4 A ppeal (A33/2023) ZA W C H C 237; [2023) 4 A ll SA 38 1 (W CC) (7 Septemb er 2023).
5 Na thane v K hoatso (4643/2023) [2024) ZA FSH C I 00 (4 April 2024).
6 Ibid footnote 5.

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requirements. I believe that they robed lawyers in because they believed
that they would guide them in terms of the law and also act in terms of
what the law required in as far as the contracts or purported contracts in
question are concerned. The first applicant was party to these illegal
contracts.
[36] In my view this is a typical case where the principle as laid down in
Jajbhay v Cassim 7 , that while illegal contracts are discouraged, the court
can relax the strict rule of in pari delicto or par delictum rule (meaning in
equal fault) to do simple justice between the parties if public policy is not
affected. The concept of simple justice between man and man was
introduced suggesting that courts should consider the need for fairness
between the individuals involved.
[37] The Supreme Court of Appeal followed the same reasoning as in the
Jajbhay case, supra, in Klokow v Sullivan8 , where it was said on
paragraph 17 of the judgment that as a general rule, a plaintiff who was
found to be in pari delicto was hence unable to recover any money paid
or property handed over to a defendan t pursuant to it, and if a plaintiff
based his case on such a contract in formulating his pleading, he would
fail on this basis alone.
7 ( 1939) AD 537), Special Investigating U nit and A nother v Smi th and Others (1127/2017) (2018) ZAECGHC IO (20
February 2018).
8 ( 410/2004) [2005) ZASCA 99; 2006 (I) SA 259 (SCA) (29 Septem ber 2005).

18
[38] The need for relaxation of the pari delicto rule is necessary in this case
looking at the length of the period of time that the respondents have
been leasing the portions of the Farm and as submitted, the kind of
investments that have been made. It is not a simple case where the court
can order demolition of the structures from the land on which they might
be beneficiaries of that land looking at the circumstances surrounding this
case.
[39] The case at hand is distinguishable from the case of Hanekom and
Another v Lombard 9, supra, in that the land in the case belonged at hand
does not belong to individuals, but to the Community and the
respondents are members and or beneficiaries of that very land as
members of the community. In the founding affidavit of the first
applicant, on page 15 of 18, paragraph 48, it is stated that being the
beneficiaries of the first applicant does not entitle the respondents to
occupy any piece of property.
[ 40] In the case at hand, they are not just occupying any piece of property,
but they are according to the purported contracts occupying property
assigned to them by the first applicant. The first applicant is still the same
entity that initially entered into lease agreements with the respondents.
The only thing that changed is the Executive Committee of the first
9 Ibid footnote 4, MCC Bazaar v H arris [ I 954] 3 A ll SA I 07 (T).

19
applicant. The principle of public policy being justice between man and
man does not necessarily mean that the applicants must endorse the
illegal or void contracts, but rather to find a way to deal with the impasse
that face them.
[41] It is rightly submitted in my view, by the sixth respondent, on paragraph
21 of its answering affidavit that the first approach by the applicants
should have been to terminate the lease agreement and or declare it null
and void before the eviction application. That in my view would be the
simple justice between man and man as envisaged by the par delictum
rule in the Jhajbhay case, supra. In Msibi v Sadheo 10 , which involved a
claim for ejectment, the court on whether the issue of public policy should
be pleaded for the defence to succeed said the following:
" ... The Courts will come to to the rescue of one of the parties where such
a course is necessary in order to prevent injustice, or to satisfy the
requirements of public policy ... (It was) suggested that this question of
public policy should be specifically raised so that evidence could be led
upon it. But public policy does not rest upon the evidence of any party. It
exists as a fact just as much does air which a man breathes ... "
10 1946 NPD 787, Mamooj ee v Akoo 1947 (4) SA 733 (N) et 739.

20
[ 42] The difficulty with the institutions that are created in terms of the
Communal Property Associations Act is that the people that run these
institutions often forget that they are not there to carry out their own
personal interests, but they are elected or appointed to carry out the
interests of the community that appointed or elected them. These
institutions are mostly embroiled in this kind of litigation because people
forget the initial plan of the formation of such institutions, and the
administration of the resources, mostly financial resources of the
Associations, are the issues that members of the CPA's would often fight
about.
[ 43] This court believes that until viable methods of adm inistering these
institutions are found, the kind of litigation such as the one at hand will
be the order of the day. To mind comes the cases of Department of
Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development: Director General v
Barolong Boo Maiketso Communal Property Association and Others
(UM262/2023) [2024] ZANWHC 215 (11 September 2024), Mathebula
and Others v Nwandlamhari Communal Property Association and Others
(90356/16) [2019] ZAGPPHC 201 (9 May 2019), Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela
Communal Property Association v Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela Tribal Authority
and Others11 •
11 Bakgatla-ba-Kg afela Co mmun al Property A ssociation v Bakgatla-ba-K gafela Tribal A uthority (full citation on footnote
3).

21
[44] The principle that was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal, at the
time when it was still known as the Appellate Division in an old case of
Bhyat Department Store (Pty) Ltd v Dork/erk Investments (Pty) Ltd12,
was where the appellant in the appeal argued that the lease that was
entered into with the respondent was valid, alternatively the respondent
made itself a party to the illegal contract of lease and that the parties
were in pari delicto, and therefore the maxim in pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis et possidentis should operate to prevent the
respondent from obtaining an order of ejectment. But obviously the law
w ould not require the purchaser to recognise an illegal lessee13 .
[ 45] The relevance of reference to the Bhyat case, that I have quoted above,
is that the first applicant was in the first-place party to these contracts
that were entered into with the respondents. It is not clear as to whether
rental money was ever paid to the first applicant, and therefore the
applicability of the ma xim condictio ob turpem ve/ iniustam causam,
which is a principle that permits the recovery of mon ey which has been
paid over in terms of an illegal agreement may not find applicability14 .
12 1975 (4) SA (A); (293/74) [1975) ZASCA 84 (26 September 1975).
13 As stated in the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela case - Ibid footnote 3.
14 National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA I (CC); Afrisure v Watson (522/07) [2008) ZASCA
89 (11 Septem ber 2008).

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[46] Section 8(6)(d) of the Communal Property Associations Act 15 provides
that the association shall have perpetual succession regardless of changes
in its membership . Paragraph 31 and 32 of the Constitutional Court
judgment of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela, supra, is clothed with an aura of
fairness and equality in line with the Bill of Rights. The practice of
banishment orders that were issued by traditional leaders for political or
whatever reasons without hearings are curbed in terms of section 9 of the
CPAA.
[47] In the case at hand, where the Constitution of the first applicant was
changed and resolutions taken that the respondents be evicted without
giving them an opportunity for the purported contracts to be
interrogated, is in my view what section 9 of the CPAA prohibits, being
the banishment of the occupiers by the first applicant without giving them
a fair hearing at least with regard to their occupation, and why the
purported contracts should be revoked, and the circumstances thereof.
ORDER
[ 48] In application proceedings the applicant mu st make out its case for the
relief sought, and the applicants failed to make out a case for eviction.
The first applicant and the respondents are not before court with clean
15 28 of 1996.

23
hands, because of this entanglement of these contracts that they find
themselves in. It is for that reason that I will order that each party bear
its own costs.
[49] In the result the following order is made:
(i) the application is dismissed,
(ii) each party is ordered to pay its own costs.
J.T. NGOBENI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Appearances
Counsel for 1st and 2nd Applicants
Instructed by
24
Counsel for 1st ,3rd ,4th and 6th Respondents
Instructed by
Counsel for 2nd ,5th ,9th & 10th Respondents
Instructed by
Counsel for 7th respondent
Instructed by
Date of the hearing
Date of judgment
Judgment transmitted electronically
Mr . J. Moolmaan
Pratt Luyt & De Lange
Attorneys
Mr. Mahlaela
Malope D . Mahlaela Inc.
: Mr Mmola
: Mmola Attorneys
: Advocate Letsoalo
:JK Depanyekga Attorneys
: 28 July 2025
: 31 October 2025