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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
Case No: A23 /2025
In the matter between:
CITY OF CAPE TOWN Appellant
and
JOHANNES MICHAEL VAN ROOYEN First Respondent
ALL PERSONS WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO
UNLAWFULLY OCCUPY ERVEN 1212,1213,
1215 AND 21168 MITCHELL’S PLAIN Second Respondent
Neutral Citation: City of Cape Town v Johannes Rooyen and Another (Case No
A23/2025) ZAWCHC… (30 October 2025)
Corum: DA SILVA J, LEKHULENI J et NJOKWENI AJ
Heard: 25 July 2025
Delivered Electronically on: 31 October 2025
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Summary: Appeal- Appellant applied for an ex parte anti-intrusion interdict against
the first and second respondents . Second respondent s are ‘persons unknown ’.
Interim interdict granted against both respondents. Court a quo dismissing
application on return date, finding, inter alia, that the interdict is too wide and is
against an unknown class of persons, and that the City had carried out an eviction –
Appeal Court finding that the second respondent is an identifiable group that is
ascertainable. Appeal upheld - Court a quo order set aside. The appellant did not
carry out an eviction. Interim order confirmed.
JUDGMENT
LEKHULENI J: (DA SILVA-SALIE J et NJOKWENI AJ concurring)
1. Introduction
[1] This is an appeal against the whole judgment and order handed down by the
Nthambeleni AJ, on 15 January 2024, in which the Court dismissed an application to
make an anti -intrusion interim interdict (rule nisi) final on the return date. In
dismissing the interim order, the Court made extensive findings that significantly
impact the appellant and all other landowners' ability to obtain anti -land-intrusion
interdicts.
[2] Aggrieved by that decision, on 12 April 2024, the appellant (‘the City ’) applied
for leave to appeal the whole judgment and order of the Court a quo to the full Court
of this division. The Court a quo dismissed the appellant’s application for leave to
appeal on 31 July 2024, finding that there were no prospects of success on appeal.
The Court a quo also found that the appellant failed to meet the requirements for a
final interdict. The Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal with costs,
including counsel's costs on a party -and-party scale. Discontented by this order, the
City petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal (‘the SCA’) in terms of section 17(2)(b)
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of the Superior Court s Act 10 of 2013. On 15 October 2021, the SCA granted the
City leave to appeal to the full court of this division.
Factual background
[3] To fully comprehend the pertinent issues that must be determined in this
appeal and the view I take in this matter; it is necessary to set out in brief the factual
background which underpins the reasons for the order that I propose hereunder. On
Saturday, 5 September 2022, at approximately 08h30 in the morning, the Anti -Land
Invasion Unit of the City (ALIU) received a call from its emergency call centre
indicating that a land invasion was underway at the City ’s property in respect of Erf
1212, 1213, 21168 in Mitchell’s Plain. The ALIU officers also received a call from the
local Ward Councillor, Elton Jansen, reporting the ongoing land intrusion.
[4] The ALIU officers were promptly dispatched to the properties. Upon their
arrival, they found four partially built and unoccupied structures. They dismantled the
incomplete structures in question. The unlawful intruders identified themselves to the
ALIU officers as the Khoi -San group, and their leader was identified as Mr Van
Rooyen, the first respondent. The ALIU officers observed approximately 30 to 40
people at the property. According to the City, the four incomplete structures that were
dismantled were vacant and contained no personal belongings . The structures were
dismantled in a manner that allowed for the preservation and reuse of the building
materials. The City emphasised that no person was evicted from their homes nor
were homes demolished.
[5] The dismantled building materials were successfully removed from Erf 1212,
the site from which the structures were originally built . They were kept in safe
custody in the storage facility of the City ’s ALIU. After the incomplete structures were
removed, some of the invaders, following the first respondent's direction, moved into
two dilapidated buildings on the property. These buildings appear to be abandoned
two dilapidated buildings on the property. These buildings appear to be abandoned
homes. Occupiers in these structures were not evicted. The City stated that while the
ALIU officials were still at the scene, approximately at 10h00am, the first respondent
made a phone call wherein he indicated that they needed to get every Khoi -San
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person in Cape Town to descend on Erf 1212 and occupy all vacant erven
surrounding Erf 1212. The surrounding vacant erven owned by the City are
described as Erf 1213, 1215, and 21168.
[6] Approximately 30 minutes later, another 30 people arrived at the site. Given
the increased number of potential occupiers who subsequently arrived, the City
called for additional assistance, particularly from Metro Police TRU, the unit
specialising in crowd management.
[7] On the same day, the City approached the Court urgently. It sought an ex
parte interim interdict, inter alia , to restrain the respondents from unlawfully
occupying Erf s 1212, 1213, 1215 and 21168 Mitchells’ Pl ain. On 5 March 2022, a
rule nisi was granted by Justice Mangcu- Lockwood restraining and interdicting the
respondents from unlawfully occupying, erecting, or completing structures at Erf
1212, 1213, 1215, and 21168 in Mitchell’s Plain, with the return date set for 25 May
2022. In addition, the Court ordered that its order shall not be construed as an
eviction order and shall not entitle the City to demolish any occupied structures at the
properties as at the date of the order, or to use the provisions of this order for
evicting oc cupiers under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (‘the PIE Act’).
[8] The Court granted substituted service of the order. The Court ordered that
service of the order shall be effected on the respondents by the Sheriff by reading
the contents of the order by a loudhailer at each of the erven making up the
properties in English and Afrikaans. The Court also ordered that the Sheriff must
serve the order by affixing a copy of the order in English and Afrikaans to notice
boards that the applicant or the Sheriff will erect on each erven making up the
properties. In addition, the Court directed that the order be served by the Sheriff or
by the applicant delivering it on the SAPS at the nearest Police Station having
by the applicant delivering it on the SAPS at the nearest Police Station having
jurisdiction over the properties, namely the Strandfontein Police Station, who shall
serve it upon the respondents. The Court also ordered that the respondent may
anticipate the return date with 48 hours' written notice to the applicant’s attorneys of
record.
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[9] The application was accordingly served, and the r ule nisi was subsequently
extended on three occasions. Subsequent thereto, on 12 April 2022, the respondent
instituted an urgent mandament van spolie application and anticipated the interim
order. The application was set down for hearing on 14 April 2022. The crux of the
respondents’ application was that they had been unlawfully evicted from the property
and sought an order restoring their possession of the property. The respondents
claimed that they were unlawfully evicted from Erf 1212 and contested the assert ion
that the structures on the property they occupied were partially built. The basis of the
dispute was that the respondent s had been residing in these structures for 6 weeks
when they were evicted and the structures dismantled. The respondents also alleged
that they received consent from a counsellor in the area to reside on that property.
[10] The City opposed the respondents’ application and denied that the
respondents were in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property for a
period of six weeks, as alleged, or that they were in possession of the property at all.
The City asserted that it patrolled the area biweekly. The first time that the City
received any complaint in respect of the property was on the morning of 5 March
2022. Moreover, the City alleged that the demolished structures were partially built
and unoccupied. Given the dispute raised by the respondents in this regard, the City
attached photographs to dispel the respondents’ assertions . According to the City,
the photographs depict none of the demolished structures as capable of human
habitation, as they were evidently under construction. It was, accordingly, the City ’s
position that no person had been evicted from the property.
[11] The application was heard on 14 April 2022 by Carter AJ. Carter AJ gave an
ex tempore judgment and dismissed the respondents’ mandament van spolie
ex tempore judgment and dismissed the respondents’ mandament van spolie
application. Carter AJ found that the respondents had not made out a proper case for
peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property. The Court also found that the
City had not unlawfully despoiled the respondents through their conduct on 5 March
2022. The Court also ordered the City to return the building materials for the
demolished structures to the respondents by 19 April 2022.
[12] After an exchange of several correspondence between the City and the
respondents’ legal representatives, the building materials of the respondents were
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eventually delivered to the respondents on 25 April 2022. On 10 May 2022, the ALIU
officers of the City conducted a scheduled walkabout at the property. They noted a
renewed attempt by the respondents to invade the property, notwithstanding the
interim interdict. The respondents used the building material which had been
delivered to them on 25 April 2022. The respondents attempted to repair the roof of a
second dilapidated, unoccupied building using the building materials on site.
[13] The City avers that the ALIU officers removed the material used to repair the
roof of the second dilapidated building and, in doing so, acted in accordance with the
interim order it had secured in respect of the property. No persons were removed
from the premises, and the respondents continued to reside in the dilapidated
building.
[14] Subsequent thereto, certain of the respondents who had been identified as
occupiers in the mandament van spolie application, namely Michelle Hugus, Miche
Hughes, Shanaas Adams and Andiewine Merino, together with eight other unknown
applicants, instituted a second urgent application. The foregoing application was set
down for hearing before Honourable Binns -Ward J on 24 May 2022. In that
application, the applicants sought a broad range of relief against several
respondents. The respondent sought a second spoliation order regarding the events
that occurred on 10 May 2022. At the hearing of the referenced application, Binns -
Ward J struck the matter from the roll for lack of urgency. The main application
eventually appeared before Nthambeleni AJ, who gave judgment on 15 January
2024, dismissing the City’s application with costs and found that the City had carried
out an eviction.
Issues to be decided
[15] From the judgment of the Court a quo and from the respective heads of
arguments of the parties , this Court is enjoined to determine f ive disputed issues,
namely:
15.1 Whether the Court a quo was correct in its finding that the City conducted an
15.1 Whether the Court a quo was correct in its finding that the City conducted an
eviction of the respondents on 5 March 2022.
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15.2 Whether anti-land invasion interdicts are impermissible in law?
15.3 Whether the City can obtain an anti -land invasion interdict against one named
and the other unnamed persons attempting to unlawfully occupy land that it
owns?
15.4 Whether the Court a quo was correct in its finding that the City failed to meet
the requirements for a final interdict?
15.5 Whether the Court a quo was correct in finding that the City failed to place all
material facts before the Court that granted the ex -parte application on 5 March
2022?
Discussion
[16] For completeness, I propose to deal with these disputed issues in a
sequential manner.
Did the City carry out an eviction of the respondents on 5 March 2022?
[17] As foreshadowed above, the Court a quo found that the City had carried out
an eviction. The Court held that since it had found that an eviction had been carried
out, it was incumbent upon the City to have placed before the Court hearing the ex
parte application, that it had carried out an eviction. Ms Pillay, counsel for the
appellant, submitted that there are insurmountable difficulties with this finding. Ms
Pillay argued that the City ’s case before the Court a quo was to secure a final order
in respect of a rule nisi granted to it, restraining the respondents fr om intruding on
the properties.
[18] Counsel submitted that it was common cause that the persons who attempted
to construct structures on the properties were not removed from the properties but
continued to reside in the dilapidated building on the properties. Ms Pillay further
submitted that, in the circumstances, it could not be found that the City had carried
out an eviction. Ms Pillay further contended that the lower court committed two
critical errors: it failed to consider the evidence provided by the City and overlooked
a binding order previously issued by this court, as articulated by Carter AJ in the
spoliation application.
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[19] Mr Murphy, on the other hand, the legal representative of the respondents,
submitted that the City evicted four families in Erf 1212 on 05 March 2022. Mr
Murphy argued that, from the photographs provided by the City, if considered
reasonably, demonstrate that these homes were not being erected on the morning of
5 March 2022. Mr Murphy argued that the City did not engage with any of the
families, generally or regarding alternative accommodation, whether temporary or
emergency. Counsel submitted that, fr om the objective facts, there was an eviction
without a Court order.
[20] According to Mr Murphy, the City proceeded with the eviction of the families
and subsequently requested an ex-parte interim order from the urgent Court. In this
request, the families and the first respondent were characteri sed as violent invaders
posing a threat to the property in its entirety. The City approached the Court without
fully disclosing the eviction. Mr Murphy argued that the Court a quo was correct in its
finding in this regard.
[21] From the objective facts, it is common cause that the City sought to secure a
final order in respect of a rule nisi granted to prevent the respondents from intruding
upon the City's property. Furthermore, it is common cause that the people who
attempted to erect structures upon the erven in question were not removed from the
property but continue to reside in the dilapidated building on the property. The City ’s
version was that it removed incomplete and unoccupied structures, and that the
respondents immediately thereafter moved and occupied an already occupied,
dilapidated building on the same property. The City asserted that those currently
occupying the dilapidated building will be cited in a separate eviction application
which complies with the PIE Act.
[22] If the respondents’ version is accepted that they were evicted from the
premises, it follows that their remedy would have been to seek restitution. It is
premises, it follows that their remedy would have been to seek restitution. It is
common cause that on 12 April 2022, the respondents anticipated the rule nisi
issued by the Court on 5 March 2022 and launched a mandament van spolie
application seeking restitution. The respondents complained that they were
unlawfully evicted from the property. Carter AJ determined that the respondents did
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not establish that they were in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property.
Their application that they were despoiled was dismissed.
[23] Additionally, Carter AJ dismissed the respondent’s mandament van spolie
application on the basis that the respondents had not made out a proper case that
they were in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property. Simply put, Carter
AJ found that the respondents were not unlawfully evicted. Notwithstanding, the
Court ordered the return of the materials to the respondents. The respondents did
not appeal against that decision.
[24] Clearly, at the time that the application for the confirmation of the rule nisi was
heard by the Court a quo, the question whether there had been an unlawful
despoilment of the property had already been determined by Carter AJ. It was
therefore impermissible for the Court a quo to revisit that issue. The Court a quo was
bound by Carter AJ's decision. In short, the issue relating to the alleged eviction was
res judicata and could not be purged by the Court a quo. In my view, the Court a quo
erred in finding that the City carried out an eviction.
[25] The question of whether there had been any unlawful eviction or despoilment
had been determined when the matter was anticipated. The respondents' right not to
be evicted without a Court order was decided by Carter AJ, who found that they were
not in actual possession of the land in question. In other words, at the time when the
respondents were allegedly removed from Erf 1212 without a Court order, they did
not occupy the property in a manner contemplated by PIE. They therefore did not
enjoy the protection accorded under that Act.
[26] The Court a quo was bound by Carter AJ's decision and had only to determine
whether a final interdict restraining the respondents from invading the appellant’s
property should be granted. Even if I were to accept the respondents’ version that
property should be granted. Even if I were to accept the respondents’ version that
there was an eviction, such a finding, in my view, is not borne out by the objective
facts. It must be stressed that from both affidavits of the City and the respondents, it
was common cause that the people who attempted to construct structures on the
impugned properties were not removed from the properties in question but continued
to reside in the dilapidated building on the City’s property.
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[27] Despite the dismissal of the mandament van spolie application, the
respondents who sought to construct structures on the property remain in residence
within the dilapidated buildings on the site. The City explained in its ex -parte
application that it had removed structures which were unoccupied and in the process
of being constructed and some of the people who we're intending to occupy the
property moved into the two dilapidated buildings on the property. No one was
evicted from their home nor were any homes demolished. Accordingly, it could not be
found that an eviction had been carried out by the City . In my view, the finding of the
Court a quo that an eviction occurred is not borne out by the objective facts and must
be interfered with.
Whether anti-land invasion interdicts are impermissible in law?
[28] The Court a quo found that anti -land-invasion interdicts are impermissible, as
they authorise arbitrary evictions without Court oversight going forward and would
usurp the powers of the Courts. The Court also found that such orders abdicate the
constitutionally ordained role of the Courts in deciding when evictions should happen
and if so, how they are to be regulated within the confines of the law. The Court also
found that such interdicts permit the City to decide when and how to remove people
from the property, and that such orders transgress the basic principles of the rule of
law.
[29] It is common cause that the City ’s ownership of the impugned properties is
not in dispute. The respondents did not challenge the City’s’ ownership. The City has
a right to protect its properties. A landowner is entitled to protect its property from
being intruded upon by way of seeking an interdict. The interdict dismissed by the
Court a quo was intended to protect the clear right of ownership that vests in the
City. The City contended that the respondents’ conduct, if allowed to continue
unabated and in the absence of a Court order, will render it unable to utilise the
unabated and in the absence of a Court order, will render it unable to utilise the
properties in furtherance of its mandate, inter alia, to provide housing to its Citizens.
[30] Significantly, in his sworn evidence before the South African Human Rights
Commission, the first respondent stated that they are repossessing land for their
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people (the Khoi-San community). The first respondent further noted that on 5 March
2022, they repossessed a piece of land in Strandfontein to accommodate about 12
families who were completely destitute and had nothing. The repossession of the
land in question was Erf 1212, 1213. Mr Van Rooyen also stated that he was given a
mandate to get land for his people and that is what he did.
[31] This repossession of land l ed the City to apply for an anti -intrusion interdict
against the respondents. The first respondent seems to proceed from the
assumption that these erven belong to the Khoi -San people by virtue of an alleged
historical dispossession. I appreciate the respondents' plight; however, if the
respondents are allowed to continue repossessing land as they do, they are likely to
slow down, or even halt, the orderly planning and development of housing and the
provision of other services that the City is constitutionally mandated to provide.
[32] The City has a constitutional obligation to realise housing rights progressively,
subject to available resources. Self -help of this nature cannot be tolerated. The City
has a responsibility to identify beneficiaries for the housing opportunities in a fair and
equitable manner in accordance with its allocation.
[33] Importantly, for as long as the Ci ty’s properties remain threatened by unlawful
occupation, the City’s plans to develop the area and realise the rights to housing for
its citizens are accordingly at risk. The Court a quo's finding that interdicts of this
nature usurp the Court 's power is erroneous and unsustainable. Anti -intrusion
interdicts are granted by the Court s exercising judicial oversight in deserving cases.
Such interdicts aim to prevent further unlawful invasions. Crucially , such interdicts
can only be granted where the requirements of a final interdict have been
established.
[34] The order that the City sought did not authorise evictions. It explicitly
[34] The order that the City sought did not authorise evictions. It explicitly
prohibited the City from evicting any person or demolishing any occupied structures
after the order was granted. The purpose of the order was to protect a
constitutionally entrenched right to property. The Court ’s power is not usurped by
granting an anti -land intrusion interdict, nor does granting such an order undermine
constitutional protection. The Court a quo's finding that the order the City 's sought
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empowered it to evict without judicial oversight is completely misplaced and
untenable. The City approached the Court to protect its rights. Ownership of land is
protected by several common law remedies available to owners, including a
prohibitory interdict, which the City sought.
[35] In Chief Lesapo v Northwest Agricultural Bank and Another ,
1 Mokgoro J
pointed to some of the consequences that section 34 and the rule of law seek to
avoid when she stated:
‘The right of access to Court is indeed foundational to the stability of an orderly
society. It ensures the peaceful, regulated and institutionalized mechanism to resolve
disputes, without resorting to self-help. The right of access to Court is a bulwark
against vigilantism, and the chaos and anarchy which it causes. Construct in this
context of the rule of law and the principle against self-help in particular, access to
Court is indeed a cardinal importance. As a result, very powerful considerations will
be required for its limitation to be reasonable and justifiable’ (footnote omitted)
[36] Furthermore, the effect of the Court a quo’s finding that there is a fundamental
conceptual, legal and constitutional difficulty with anti -land-intrusion interdicts
effectively precludes any landowner from seeking to protect its property from
intrusion by way of an interdict. This finding, with respect, is at variance with the right
envisaged in section 25, read with section 34, of the Constitution. In the absence of
an anti-land invasion interdict, the owner will not have recourse against the arbitrary
deprivation of his property. If the City is denied the right to approach the Court s for
relief in similar circumstances, it would be denied the rights of access to the Court as
envisaged in the Constitution. Expressed differently, the City , as the owner of the
land, has the right to free and undisturbed possession and not to be deprived of
possession without a Court order.
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possession without a Court order.
2
[37] In summary, courts are routinely faced with urgent applications concerning
mass land invasions that significantly affect both state- owned and private land.
Addressing these issues is crucial for upholding property rights and ensuring the rule
1 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) at para 22.
2 City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Unknown Individuals Trespassing and Others [2023] 2
All SA 670 (GJ) para 38.
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of law. In such cases, Courts normally grant anti -land intrusion interdicts provided
that the requirements for interim or final interdicts have been established. The
applicant is the owner of the impugned properties. As owner, the applicant is entitled
to the exclusive use of its property and to provide housing in terms of its
constitutional obligations. This is a right not lightly to be interfered with by a Court ,
even where a statute authorises this.
3
[38] In my view, unlawful invasion of property results in a deprivation of property
under section 25(1). The preamble of the PIE Act underscores the provisions of
section 25(1) of the Constitution. It acknowledges that no one may be deprived of
property except in terms of law of general application and no law may permit
arbitrary deprivation of property. The preamble also recognises that no one may be
evicted from their home, or have their home demolished without an order of Court
made after considering all the relevant circumstances.
[39] Evidently, the rule nisi that was granted by the Court on an ex-parte basis is in
accord with what the law requires of the City . As correctly pointed out by the
appellant’s counsel, a judgment that seemingly prohibits any person from seeking an
anti-land-intrusion interdict effectively authorises self -help and the sort of
lawlessness that the Constitutional Court has cautioned explicitly against.4
Was the second respondent correctly cited?
[38] The Court a quo found that the order sought by the City is against an
unknown and unidentified class of persons, and that the citation of the second
respondent was impermissibly wide so that it was akin to a decree and was
unenforceable. The Court also found that the order purports to have a coercive effect
against persons who had no notice that it would be sought and who were not even
cited, yet their interest was clearly implicated by the order in clear breach of the
cited, yet their interest was clearly implicated by the order in clear breach of the
constitutional principle of legality. Even under the common law, the court a quo
reasoned, the order is invalid for non- citation. In addition, the Court found that the
order against unknown or unidentified persons, or against the public at large, as
3 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) at 390H-I.
4 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 CC at para 92.
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described in the second respondent in this matter, is akin to a decree and is not an
enforceable order.
[39] I will shortly return to consider these findings; however, I must stress the fact
that Mr Van Rooyen, the leader of the Khoi-San group that sought to occupy the land
in question, was cited as the first respondent. He is a natural person, and there was
nothing wrong with the citation of Mr Van Rooyen as the first respondent. His citation
was not disputed. The first respondent was the one who directed his group to occupy
the land owned by City. In my opinion, the City ought to have been entitled to an
interdictory relief against him. Notwithstanding, the Court a quo dismissed the City ’s
application against the first respondent without substantive reasons. It is my firm
view that the Court a quo erred in this regard. I turn to consider the citation of the
second respondent.
[40] An order of Court is operative only against persons to whom the order is
addressed. Only they are guilty of contempt of Court for failing to observe its terms.
5
And if the right of an applicant, established by a Court order, is again invaded by
someone who is not a party to the original proceedings, the applicant's only remedy
is to sue the new transgressor afresh. 6 Failure to identify defendants or respondents
offends against the notion that a Court order operates only inter partes.7
[41] There is a plethora of authorities dealing with the citation of unidentified or
unnamed persons. As demonstrated below, our Court s have frowned on granting
orders and/or interdicts against unnamed persons. The reason being that any Court
order issued by a Court must be capable of enforcement, particularly because wilful
non-compliance will result in an application for contempt of that order. 8 In City of
Cape Town v Various Occupiers and Another ,9 the Court observed that limiting the
interdict to named applicants was proper. The Court also noted that Court s should
interdict to named applicants was proper. The Court also noted that Court s should
generally not grant interdicts against unnamed persons, as it would be impossible to
5 Kayamandi Town Committee v Mkhwaso and Others 1991 (2) SA 630 (C) at 635E.
6 Kayamandi Town Committee v Mkhwaso and Others 1991 (2) SA 630 (C) at 635H.
7 Kayamandi Town Committee v Mkhwaso and Others 1991 (2) SA 630 (C) at 635H.
8 National Department of Public Works v Fani and 77 Others Collectively referred to as residents of
Farm Greydel (Airport Park)] and Another (2024) ZASCA (43) (8 April 2024).
9 2024 (5) SA 407 (WCC) para 31.
15
know who had been interdicted and who had not. I agree with the views expressed
by that court in this regard.
[42] The Court a quo relied on Kayamandi Town Committee v Mkhwaso and
Others,
10 in which the applicant’s town committee sought to evict 150 squatters from
land earmarked for residential development. The applicant named nine respondents
and alleged that it was impossible to identify all persons residing on the stands. The
applicant obtained a rule nisi calling upon 'any persons occupying the applicant's
premises without the applicant's permission' to show cause why they should not be
evicted. It was ordered that the Sheriff would effect service of the order by leaving a
copy of the rule nisi and supporting documentation at each dwelling on the affected
land.
[43] On the return day, the Court ruled that an order having a generalised
(legislative) effect is fundamentally objectionable. The Court observed that a failure
to identify defendants or respondents would seem to be destructive of the notion that
a Court's order operates only inter partes, not to mention questions of locus standi in
iudicio.
11The court also found that an order against respondents not identified by
name (or perhaps by individualised description) in the process commencing action,
or (in very urgent cases, brought orally) on the record, would have the generalised
effect typical of legislation. It would be a decree and not a Court order at all.
12
[44] Similar sentiments were echoed in Illegal Occupiers of various Erven, Phillipi
v Monwood Investment Trust Company (Pty) (Ltd) & Others, 13 (‘Monhood’), where
the Court found that the respondents had not taken adequate measures to identify
the persons occupying their land. The Court emphasised the need to grant an
effective judgment. One of the difficulties in granting judgment in favour of the
respondent on appeal in Manhood was the concern that it would be rendered
nugatory. This was so because the respondents had not persuaded the Court how
nugatory. This was so because the respondents had not persuaded the Court how
an order could be rendered effective if granted against a group of people, which, on
10 1991 (2) SA 630 (C).
11 At 634H.
12 At 634I.
13 [2002] 1 AII SA 115 (C).
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the respondent’s own version, were in constant motion. The Court found that one will
not find the same group of people at any given moment, for they are in transit.
[45] However, in Communicare v Persons whose identities are unknown to the
applicant but who unlawfully occupy the remainder of the Consolidated Farm Bardale
No 451, Division of Stellenbosch, better known as Fairdale & Others, 14 Rogers AJ,
as he then was, had to determine whether the first and second respondents were
properly cited. The first respondent’s citation appears from the name of the case.
The second respondent was described as ‘ the persons intending to unlawfully
occupy the property ’. In that matter, the applicant brought an application to evict
persons already occupying the property and to interdict anyone else from occupying
the land. A rule nisi was granted, calling upon the second respondent to show cause
why final interdictory relief should not be granted, as well as other ancillary relief.
[46] Rogers AJ referred to the Kayamandi and Monwood cases but did not believe
that these cases should be regarded as laying down an inflexible rule that an
application directed at unnamed respondents is always impossible. In his view, our
procedural law will be sadly lacking if that were the case. The learned justice stated
as follows:
‘Nevertheless, I do not believe that this case should be regarded as laying down an
immutable rule that an application directed at unnamed respondents is always
impermissible. It seems to me that our procedural law will be sadly lacking if that
were the case. What is an owner to do where his land is illegally occupied by persons
whose identities he cannot ascertain?... The persons in occupation of land can be
viewed as an ascertainable group even though their names might not be known.
Through the process of service more information concerning the identities of the
group may become known…’
15
[47] The Court concluded that there was an identifiable group of persons properly
15
[47] The Court concluded that there was an identifiable group of persons properly
before the Court, against whom an effective order could be made. After considering
the matter, the Court proposed making an order that the first respondent vacate the
14 (CPD case no.7970/03).
15 At para 9.
17
Fairdale by 16 January 2004, and that, if they did not do so, the eviction order be
carried out from 19 January 2004.16 However, the Court cautioned that one had to be
careful in framing the order to ensure that it did not purport to bind a wider range of
persons than had been properly drawn into those proceedings.17
[48] In City of Cape Town v Yawa & Others, 18 the applicant sought an eviction
order against the first to eighteenth respondents, who were identified by name and,
who were alleged to be unlawfully occupying erf 18332, Khayelitsha, Cape Town. 19
The applicant sought a similar relief against the nineteenth respondent, described as
the other occupier s, unknown to the applicant, who unlawfully occupies Erf 18332,
Khayelitsha. In addition, the applicant sought an interdict restraining the twentieth
respondent described as the persons intending to unlawfully occupy Erf 18332,
Kayelitsha, from erecting and/or occupying any structure of makeshift dwelling for
the purpose of unlawfully occupying or residing on the erf.20
[49] The Court found, with reference to the twentieth respondent, that this was not
an identified or identifiable group against whom an effective order could be made.
There was also no prospect that they would be identified during the proceedings.
The Court found that the persons who comprise the twentieth respondent, namely
persons intending to unlawfully occupy the erf, are not in any real sense an
ascertainable group. In the Court’s view, the identity of the members of the twentieth
respondent would also change from day to day.
21 The Court observed that some of
those currently intending to occupy the land may decide not to do so. The Court
accordingly dismissed the application for an interdict in respect of the twentieth
respondent.22
[50] The golden thread that flows from these decisions and others is that the
citation of a group in a generalised manner has the potential for creating uncertainty
citation of a group in a generalised manner has the potential for creating uncertainty
and can be prejudicial. In the Monwood case, the Court noted that parties in legal
16 At para 42.
17 At para 43.
18 2004] 2 AII SA 281 (C).
19 At p. 1.
20 P.2.
21 P.5.
22 P.8.
18
proceedings must be clearly identified. The Court noted that there are serious
difficulties when the applicant lacks the requisite details of the respondents.
Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that the citation of occupiers as an unknown group
occupying a particular property has become standard in our jurisprudence. The
names of cases coming before the Constitutional Court and the SCA attest to this.
23
[51] In part, this is understandable where the occupiers refuse to permit their own
access or where the occupants of the building have, on an urgent basis, launched an
application to stave off eviction, and the instructing attorney seeks to protect the
collective rights of numerous occupiers.
24
[52] I have considered the decisions discussed above, however, in my view, in a
constitutional dispensation, the need to enforce Court orders is paramount for
vindicating the authority of the Courts. Equally critical is safeguarding landowners'
rights to their property, ensuring protection against arbitrary deprivation. This
protection is a fundamental constitutional right that the Court s must jealously guard
to ensure that landowners are not arbitrarily deprived of their properties. It is
unfathomable to contemplate how our constitutional principles could permit a
situation in which property stand on the precipice of unlawful occupation, and in such
circumstances, the interdictory orders designed to safeguard property in terms of
section 25 of the Constitution from illegal invasion are not granted simply because
the identities of the respondents remain unknown.
[53] This troubling reality is particularly pronounced when the applicant has
provided a compelling and reasonable explanation for the challenges encountered in
identifying the respondents. This, in my view, offends the owners’ constitutional rights
to ownership and to peaceful, and undisturbed possession of the property which
cannot be justified in an open and democratic society based on human dignity ,
cannot be justified in an open and democratic society based on human dignity ,
equality and freedom, except for in terms of the law of general application.
[54] It is the harsh reality that the ever -increasing phenomena of land invasions
are generally carried out by large groupings of people who are, in the main,
23 Mtshali & Others v Masawi & Others, at para 190.
24 Mtshali & Others v Masawi & Others, at para 190.
19
unidentified. The courts must adopt a pragmatic approach to such matters, failing
which the rule of law will give way and acquiesce to anarchy and self-help. To require
each unlawful occupant to be identified and then served would be to ignore the
urgency that characterises the need for legal assistance to counter unlawful land
invasions.
[55] To this end, t he Courts, in my view, must balance the tension of rights
between those of the owner and the enforcement of interdict against unnamed
persons. Crisply, in balancing the right to enforce an interdict with the right to own
property, the starting point should always be that interdicts against land invasion
must be granted against named respondents where possible and that this ought to
be the general rule particularly because Court orders must be capable of
enforcement. To this end, I share the views expressed by the r espondent’s counsel,
Ms Pillay, that attendant thereon, a Court must commence the inquiry by determining
why it was not possible to cite the names of the respondents and assessing the
reasonableness of that explanation.
[56] In assessing the reasonableness of an applicant’s explanation, the Court may
have regard to, inter alia, the following non-exhaustive list of factors:
(a) the reasonableness of the reasons given by the applicant for not citing named
respondents.
(b) the urgency with which the matter has to be brought, and the consequences
of a landowner having failed to have instituted the claim with the requisite
promptitude by reason of seeking to ascertain the names and identities of the
respondents
(c) the competing rights at stake for both the landowner and the respondents.
The potential infringement of the landowner’s property rights and rights of
access to Courts requires careful consideration in this regard, with due regard
to the fact that unlawful land incursions often escalate with remarkable haste
and result in the arbitrary deprivation of landowners' rights.
and result in the arbitrary deprivation of landowners' rights.
(d) The consequences of dismissing an application on the basis that unnamed
respondents were not cited.
(e) whether the respondents may be viewed as an ascertainable group, even
though their names may not be known.
20
(f) If an order is to be granted, how it will be served on the respondent s so that
the terms of the order are made clear to those affected by it.
[57] The present matter concerns the competing interests between an owner’s
right to property, as entrenched in section 25 of the Constitution, and unknown
persons who threaten to occupy land unlawfully. In my view, in addition to the
domestic cases discussed above, it is instructive for this Court to briefly examine
foreign jurisprudence, particularly decisions from the United Kingdom, on how Courts
have handled cases involving unnamed or unidentified persons, as this could help us
better understand and address the issue at hand. Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution
provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a Court , tribunal or forum may
consider foreign law.
[58] In Birmingham CC v Afsar,
25 the High Court of Justice , Queen's Bench
Division, had to determine a claim for injunctions to restrict protests outside a
primary school that aimed to teach about LGBT issues. An interim relief was granted
against protesters following an ex parte application against four respondents. The
fourth respondent was ‘ Persons Unknown’ . The fourth defendant was a group of
unidentified individuals who had been sued with a view to preventing them from
taking part in the protests, organised by the first to third defendants, which were the
subject of the claim.
26
[59] At the start of the claim, the fourth defendant was designated as ‘ Persons
Unknown’. In the i nterim judgment, the Court concluded that this was too wide a
description and limited the injunction it granted to a group designated as ‘Persons
Unknown seeking to express opinions about the teaching at Anderton Park Primary
School’.
27 After reviewing a number of authorities and the decision of the Court of
Appeal in Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd and another v Persons Unknown and
another,28 the Court stated as follows:
25 (No 3) [2019] EWHC 3217 (QB).
26 At para 10.
25 (No 3) [2019] EWHC 3217 (QB).
26 At para 10.
27 At para 10.
28 [2020] EWCACiv 303.
21
‘As I understand the law, in principle, a protestor could be subject to a final injunction
against persons unknown, prohibiting participation in a protest, if (a) the originating
process contained a description of “ Persons Unknown” that was in line with the
requirement of identifiability, (b) the person (i) fell within that description at the outset,
or (ii) came within it later, as a “Newcomer”, (c) the person was duly served with the
proceedings, by a method prescribed by the CPR, or by an alternative method
authorised under CPR 6.15, and (d) it was at the outset and remained, at the time of
judgment impossible or at least impracticable to identify the person and join them as
a named defendant. Proof that a specified individual fell within these criteria might be
difficult in practice, but that would not be a principled objection to the grant of an
order.’
29 (emphasis added)
[60] In Cameron (Respondent) v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd (Appellant) ,30
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom referred to the general rule that
proceedings may not be brought against unnamed parties. 31 Having observed that
English judges had allowed some exceptions to the general rule, the Court stated
that the jurisdiction to grant actions and orders against unnamed wrongdoers has
been regularly invoked, particularly in the context of internet abuse, trespasses and
other torts committed by protestors, demonstrators and paparazzi. 32 After reviewing
a number of cases, the Court distinguished two categories of unnamed persons and
stated:
‘In approaching this question, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of case
in which the defendant cannot be named, to which different considerations apply. The
first category comprises anonymous defendants who are identifiable but whose
names are unknown. Squatters occupying a property are, for example, identifiable by
their location, although they cannot be named. The second category comprises
their location, although they cannot be named. The second category comprises
defendants, such as most hit and run drivers, who are not only anonymous but
cannot even be identified. The distinction is that in the first category the defendant is
described in a way that makes it possible in principle to locate or communicate with
him and to know without further inquiry whether he is the same as the person
29 At para 24.
30 [2019] UKSC 6.
31 At para 9.
32 At para 10.
22
described in the claim form, whereas in the second category it is not.’ 33 (emphasis
added)
[61] In summary, the Court found that, in the case of first category, defendants who
are anonymous but identifiable, can be served with the application or any other
originating process, if necessary by substituted service such as, in the case of
anonymous trespassers, attaching copies of the documents to the main door or
placing them in some other prominent place on the land where the trespassers are to
be found, and posting them if practical through the letterbox.
34 However, in the case
of the second category defendant, service is conceptually impossible. So, such a
person cannot be sued under a pseudonym or description.
35
[62] These cases, in my view, point to the fact that respondents who are
anonymous but identifiable can be served with the application or any other
originating process, if necessary, by various forms of substituted service. In this
regard, I find the approach opined by Rogers AJ, as he then was, on point and in
sync with the cases discussed above, particularly the first category identified in
Cameron (Respondent) v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd (Appellant) .
36 The
persons in occupation of land or who attempt to occupy land can be viewed as an
ascertainable group even though their names might not be known.
[63] Moreover, as the full Court found in Mtshali & Others v Masawi & Others ,
37
ideally where the identity of the persons is not easily identifiable at the time of the
bringing the application, an applicant should seek an order that the sheriff is required
to obtain the identity of all persons who are in occupation of the building or
attempting to occupy the building so that there is certainty as to who in fact is
affected particularly as others may come in later to claim that they fall within the
affected group.
33 At para 13.
34 At para 15.
35 At para 26.
36 [2019] UKSC 6.
37 2017 (4) SA 632 (GJ).
23
[64] In the present matter, the Court a quo found that the order sought by the City
was akin to an interdict against the public at large, as it prohibited all persons from
unlawfully occupying the property. This finding, in my view, is profoundly flawed and
cannot be correct. The persons attempting to occupy the land fall into the first
category and have been identified. They are being led by the first respondent. Some
of them filed an application for a mandament van spolie twice and are currently
occupying the depilated building.
[65] In addition, the target group sought to be interdicted by the City was clear: it
was those people who were attempting to unlawfully occupy four different properties
in Mitchell's Plain on 5 March 2022. This is an identifiable and ascertainable group of
people. The City’s evidence was that the City ’s ALIU officers were informed that a
land intrusion was underway on its property and that when they arrived at the scene,
the unlawful intruders identified themselves as a Khoi-San group from Mitchells Plain
and their leader was identified as Mr Van Rooyen, the first respondent. The Khoi-San
group from Mitchells Plain, under the leadership of the first respondent, purported to
occupy the land in question.
[66] It is my firm view that the City proffered a reasonable explanation for why the
second respondent could not be named: namely, that the matter was of such
urgency that the application was heard and granted on a Saturday, the same day it
was brought. Furthermore, within such a limited time, the City was not in a position to
identify the second respondent by name; the situation was transient and fluid, with
ongoing attempts at occupation, and it was therefore impossible to identify who was
engaged in the unlawful conduct. The evidence before the Court was that, despite
the City’s attempts to engage, it has not been able to obtain the names, identities,
and other details of any of the respondents, save for the first respondent, who
and other details of any of the respondents, save for the first respondent, who
identified himself as the leader of the group. Its ALIU officials were genuinely
concerned that seeking any information about the identities of those engaging in
unlawful conduct, such as intruding on the impugned property, would have inflamed
an already hostile and volatile situation.
[67] Most importantly, the first respondent, who is the leader of the second
respondent (the people who intended to intrude on the property), knew the names of
24
the people who wanted to occupy the premises. In fact, when the ALIU officers
arrived at the scene, they found 30 people led by the first respondent. The first
respondent asserted that on 5 March 2022, the City made no meaningful effort to
engage with the Khoisan families. According to him, the City ’s ALIU officers began
tearing their homes down. Mr Van Rooyen is the leader of the Khoi -San group that
sought to invade the property. He deposed to the answering affidavit in his capacity
as a member of the Mitc hells Plain Aboriginal Council. Mr Van Rooyen also deposed
to a further affidavit on behalf of the second respondent. According to him, he was
tasked to find land for these people. He has tried his utmost to support the Khoi -San
community of Mitchells Plain.
[68] Concerningly, Mr Van Rooyen did not provide the names of any other family
members, other than those already occupying the dilapidated building on the
property, who are not a target of the application. In my view, in a case like this, where
an application is brought on notice, it is instructive for Court s to consider the
information tendered by the respondents in their answering affidavit. For example,
when the respondent provides information about their names and identities in the
answering affidavit, the Court may use this information to refine the order concerning
the specified individuals. Furthermore, to ensure the effective identification of
unnamed individuals, video footage showing those identified as unlawful occupiers
or those attempting to occupy land may be utili sed to provide a clearer delineation of
the group involved.
[69] Simply put, the Court a quo could have carefully delineated its order to a
specific group, in this case, the Khoi -San group of Mitchells Plain led by the second
respondent, purporting to invade the City ’ property to ensure that the order does not
purport to bind a wider range of people than have been properly drawn into these
purport to bind a wider range of people than have been properly drawn into these
proceedings. In addition, to ensure the enforceability of the order, the Court ought to
have considered measures that could be put in place to ensure that people seeking
to occupy the property are aware of any order it grants. For instance, by having
noticeboards on the property and directing the City to ensure that the Court order is
displayed on those noticeboards which it checks on a regular basis . I now turn to
consider whether the Court a quo was correct in finding that the
25
Did the appellant meet the requirements for a final interdict?
[70] The quo found that the City had not met the requirements for interdictory
relief, effectively because it had an alternative remedy, a remedy of counter
spoliation or eviction. The requirements of a final interdict are well established in our
law. For the City to obtain a final interdict, it had to establish: (a) a clear right to the
relief sought; (b) an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and (c)
the absence of any other satisfactory remedy available to it.
38 To this, it must be
added that where a wrongful act has already occurred, it must be of a continuing
nature or there must be a reasonable apprehension that it will be repeated.
39
Whether the apprehension is reasonable is a factual, objective inquiry.40
[71] As foreshadowed above, the City had to establish a clear right to obtain a final
interdict. A clear right must be on a balance of probabilities.
41 Whether the applicant
has a right is a matter of substantive law, and whether the right is clear is a matter of
evidence. To establish a clear right, the applicant had to prove facts which, in terms
of the substantive law, establish the right relied on.
42
[72] On the facts of this matter, the City has demonstrated a clear right to the relief
sought. First, it is the owner of the properties. It has the right to ensure that no
unlawful conduct occurs thereon and that it can utilise the properties in the manner
intended, that is, for the progressive development of housing and provisions of other
services that the City is mandated to provide in terms of the Constitution. Second, it
is entitled to secure this objective through the Court s. Third, it is obliged in law to
take all steps necessary to protect the properties, ensuring that the development of
housing and the provision of services are not frustrated, in accordance with its
Constitutional obligations.
Constitutional obligations.
38 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; See also City of Cape Town v Those persons attempting and/or
intending to settle on the erven in District Six the details of which are identified in Annexure A to notice
of motion (7349/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 98 (19 May 2021) at para 21.
39 NCSPCA v Openshaw 2008 (5) SA 339 (SCA) at para 20.
40 Minister of Law-and-Order v Nordien 1987 (2) SA 894 (A) at 896G-I.
41 Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) para 8.
42 Diepsloot Residents & Landowners Association v Administrator, Tvl 1993 (3) SA 49 (T).
26
[73] If allowed to continue as the respondents propose, the respondents are likely
to slow down or bring the City ’s progressive housing development process to a
grinding halt. Land invasion is inimical to the systematic provision of adequate
housing on a planned basis. 43 This will deprive many residents to realise the right to
housing. Fourth, the respondents, under the leadership of the first respondent, may
have complaints about the way the City is delivering housing for the Khoi -San
community in Mitchells Plain; however, they are not entitled to take the law into their
own hands.
44
[74] Concerning the injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, the
applicant had to establish on a balance of probabilities that there are grounds for a
reasonable apprehension that its rights will be detrimentally affected. From the given
facts, it is evident that the Khoi -San group of Mitchells Plain, under the leadership of
the first respondent, have attempted to occupy the properties owned by the City to
the prejudice of the City. The City had a reasonable apprehension of an injury being
the unlawful occupation of its property.
[75] On the third requirement of having no alternative remedy, the Court a quo
held that the City had not met the requirements for interdictory relief because it had
an alternative remedy, namely a remedy of counter-spoliation or eviction. This finding
in my view, cannot be correct. As correctly observed by Ms Pillay, in the reasoning of
the Court a quo, a landowner will never be able to obtain interdictory relief to protect
an unlawful occupation of land that it owns. This, in my opinion, is against an owner’s
right to property as envisaged in the Constitution. As an owner of a property, the City
has the right to ensure that no unlawful conduct occurs thereon. It is entitled to
secure this objective through the Courts by seeking interdictory relief if there is a risk
of illegal occupation.
of illegal occupation.
[76] Significantly, it is crucial to distinguish between anti -land-intrusion interdictory
relief, counter -spoliation, and evictions. Counter -spoliation and evictions are
remedies which are permitted after an occupation has occurred. Once the act of
43 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 CC at para 92.
44 City of Cape Town v Those persons attempting and/or intending to settle on the erven in District Six
the details of which are identified in Annexure A to notice of motion (7349/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 98
(19 May 2021) at para 22.
27
spoliation is completed and the spoliator has perfected possession, the window
within which to invoke counter -spoliation is closed. 45 In other words, the remedy is
available where the occupier already has actual possession of the land. In contrast,
anti-land-intrusion interdicts are aimed at limiting further encroachment. It is a
remedy aimed at prospective conduct. In my opinion, the City satisfied all the
requirements for an interdict and Court a quo’s finding in this regard was wrong.
Did the City place all material facts before the Court a quo?
[77] It is trite that an ex parte applicant must disclose all material facts that might
influence the Court in determining the application. If the applicant fails in this regard
and the application is nevertheless granted in provisional form, the Court hearing this
matter on the return day has a discretion, when given the full facts, to set aside the
provisional order or confirm it . In exercising that discretion the latter Court will have
regard to the extent of non- disclosure; the question whether the first Court might
have been influenced by proper disclosure; t he reasons for non-disclosure and the
consequences of setting the provisional order aside.
46
[78] Mr Murphy submitted that the Court a quo was correct in finding that the City
had carried out an eviction. According to Mr Murphy, the City was required to place
all relevant evidence of its conduct before the urgent Court. It was submitted that had
the first C ourt been informed that the City conducted an eviction, the interim order
would not have been granted. In my view, for all the reasons enunciated above, I am
of the view that all the facts were placed before the Court that granted the ex parte
order when the order was sought and granted. The City asserted that it removed
incomplete and unoccupied structures, and it did not construe this as an eviction
because it did not remove persons from the property.
because it did not remove persons from the property.
[79] Most importantly, the City disputed that it had evicted any person from the
property and therefore could not allege on oath that an eviction had occurred when
in truth, and in fact, that was not the case. From the discussion foreshadowed above,
45 City of Cape Town v The South African Human Rights Commission and Others (1337/2022;
368/2023) [2024] ZASCA 110 (10 July 2024) para 6.
46 Phillips v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (6) SA 447 para 26.
28
I am of the view that the City met all the requirements of a final interdict and that the
Court a quo erred in its finding that the City had alternative remedies, namely,
evictions and counter-spoliation.
[80] I am also persuaded that the City has no alternative satisfactory remedy,
since it has no other remedy which is: (a) adequate in the circumstances; (b)
ordinary and reasonable; (c) lawful; and (d) affords similar protection.
47 It is
unrealistic for the City to content itself with subsequent eviction proceedings for new
land invaders. The City has a constitutional right to protect its property so that it can
discharge its obligations in terms of section 152 of the Constitution.
[81] It is perhaps apposite to remind ourselves that section 73(1) of the Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act ,
48 places a general duty on municipalities to
give effect to the provisions of the Constitution and to give priority to the basic needs
of the local community; promote the development of the local community; and
ensure that all members of the local community have access to at least the minimum
level of basic services.
49 Demonstrably, the Court a quo erred in dismissing the rule
nisi, and that decision must be set aside.
Order
[82] Given all these considerations, I would propose the following order:
1. The appeal is hereby upheld.
2. The order of the Court a quo dismissing the interim interdict is hereby set
aside.
3. The interim interdict is hereby confirmed.
4. The interdict shall apply against the first and second respondents specifically
those occupying the dilapidated building in the impugned property as well as
47 City of Cape Town v Those persons attempting and/or intending to settle on the erven in District Six
the details of which are identified in Annexure A to notice of motion (7349/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 98
(19 May 2021) at para 30.
48 32 of 2000.
49 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and
49 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and
Another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) at para 26.
29
all persons led by the first respondent who attempted to occupy erf 1212,
1213, 1215, and 21168 on 5 March 2022 and on 10 May 2022.
5. The City is directed to place copies of this Court order at visible and
prominent places in the said erven that are accessible to the properties and
would reasonably come to the attention of the respondents.
6. The City is directed to erect visible noticeboards on each erf and to ensure
that this order is displayed in both English and Afrikaans on those
noticeboards.
7. The City is directed to check the notice Boards on a regular basis to ensure
that the order remains displayed.
8. This Order shall not be construed as an eviction order. It shall not entitle the
City to demolish any occupied structures at the date of this order or to use the
provisions of this order for purposes of evicting occupiers from the property
save for under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.
9. No order is made as to costs.
________________________
JD
LEKHULENI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
I agree and it is so ordered:
________________________
G DA SILVA SALIE
JUDGE OF THE HIG H
COURT
I agree:
30
_________________________
P NJOKWENI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT