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FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED Defendant
_________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_________________________________________________________________
LINDEQUE AJ
1. The respondent (“4 Bees Investments”) instituted action against the
applicant (Firstrand Bank”) for payment of damages in the amount of
R65 700 000.00 plus interest and cost of suit.
2. The Firstrand Bank then brought this application in terms of Rule 33(4) of
the Uniform Rules of Court to have its two special pleas raised against
the action, namely prescription (paragraphs 4 to 8 of its plea) and 4 Bees
Investments’ lack of locus standi (paragraphs 9 to 14 of its plea) as well
as 4 Bees Investments’ replication to the special plea of prescription
(paragraphs 1 and 2 of the replication) decided separately, prior to the
remaining issues in the pleadings.
3. Just after this application was brought, 4 Bees Investments amended its
replication to furnish a response to Firstrand Bank’s special plea of lack of
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locus standi by adding paragraphs 3.1 to 3.9 to its replication . It also
brought a counter -application similarly seeking a separation of the issue s
of prescription and locus standi as well as to include its amended
replication in respect of Firstrand Bank’s special plea of locus standi.
4. 4 Bees Investments furthermore seeks the separation of 3 additional
issues listed in paragraphs 1.5 to 1.7 of its counter -application (“the
additional issues ”) and is of the view that the separation of the additional
issues is convenient to both the parties and the court.
BACKGROUND
5. On 13 September 2021 Supply of Automotive Lubrication and
Transmission (Pty) Limited (“SALT”) was placed into winding -up in this
court.
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6. In April 2023 SALT’s liquidators concluded an agreement with 4 Bees
Investments in terms whereof SALT ceded and assigned an alleged
damages claim against Firstrand Bank to 4 Bees Investments. The
allegation is that Firstrand Bank unlawful terminat ed credit facilities
granted to SALT, resulting in SALT’s final winding-up.
7. 4 Bees Investments p urchased the damages claim for the sum of
R8 000,00, which amount is deemed to be in full and final settlement of
all further claims that 4 Bees Investments and SALT may have against
each other.
8. 4 Bees Investments relies upon this agreement as locus standi to claim
damages in the amount of R65 700 000,00 from Firstrand Bank.
9. 4 Bees Investments contend s in its particulars of claim that SALT relied
on the credit facilities in the carrying on of its day to day business and
that SALT duly complied with its obligations in terms of the credit
facilities.
10. During May and June 2016, Firstrand Bank terminated the credit facilities .
4 Bees Investments contends that as a result thereof, SALT was unable
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to secure credit facilities with other financial institutions and unable to
carry on its business , leading to its eventual ruin and winding -up.
SPECIAL PLEA OF PRESCRIPTION
11. In Firstrand Bank’s first special plea, it contends that 4 Bees Investments’
claim is founded upon damages allegedly suffered by SALT in
consequence of Firstrand Bank’s termination of SALT’s credit facilities
during May and June 2016, but that summons in the action was served
during June 2023, more than three years after the termination by
Firstrand Bank of SALT’s credit facilities and that consequently the claim
had prescribed in terms of the provisions of sections 11(b) and 12 of the
Prescription Act, 68 of 1969.
12. In 4 Bees Investments ’ replication to Firstrand Bank’s special plea of
prescription, it replicates that in January 2017 SALT caused a notice to
be delivered to the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission of
South Africa as contemplated under section 129(3)(b) of the Companies
Act 71 of 2008 (“the Companies Act”), that a business rescue practitioner
was appointed and that when SALT’s business r escue commenced,
SALT constituted a person under curatorship, as contemplated under
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section 3(1)(a) of the Prescription Act . It therefore contends that the
running of prescription in respect of any debt owed to SALT was
accordingly postponed as contemplated under section 3(1) of the
Prescription Act and that its claim did not prescribe prior to service of
summons.
SPECIAL PLEA OF LOCUS STANDI AND REPLICATION THERETO
13. In Firstrand Bank’s second special plea, it pleads that SALT was
precluded from ceding or encumbering any of its rights in terms of the
credit facilities without the prior consent of Firstrand Bank. It further
pleads that its written consent of the purported cession relied upon by 4
Bees Investments was neither s ought nor granted and that consequently,
the liquidators were not permitted contractually to cede any claim which
SALT may have had against Firstrand Bank in terms of the credit
facilities, wherefore 4 Bees Investments does not have the necessary
locus standi to pursue its claim.
14. In paragraph 3.1 of 4 Bees Investments’ amended replication, it denies
Firstrand Bank’s allegations that in terms of the credit facility agreements,
SALT was not permitted to cede, encumber, pledge, assign or in any
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other way alienate any of its rights, benefits and/or obligations without the
prior written consent of Firstrand Bank.
15. It then proceeds to replicate in paragraph 3.2 that in the event that it is
found that the relevant clauses in the facility agreements prohibit 4 Bees
Investments from relying upon the cession, that it pleads as follows as
per paragraphs 3.3 to 3.9 of the replication :
15.1 As a result of Firstrand Bank’s unlawful termination of SALT’s
facilities, SALT inter alia:
15.1.1 became financially distressed;
15.1.2 entered into business rescue; and
15.1.3 was placed into final winding -up.
15.2 Accordingly, as a result of the termination Firstrand Bank caused
the destruction of SALT and its business .
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15.3 4 Bees Investments seek s to vindicate the damages which SALT
has suffered as a result of the unlawful termination .
15.4 In invoking the relevant clauses of the credit facility agreements,
Firstrand Bank seeks to escape accountability for its unlawful
termination of SALT’s facilities .
15.5 The effect of the clauses evokes a sense of shock .
15.6 The clauses therefore fall to be struck down by the court because
they:
15.6.1 were exploitative of the weaker bargaining position that
SALT was placed in at the outset of the facilities;
15.6.2 are so unreasonabl e on their fac e that they are
contrary to public policy .
15.7 Alternatively, and in the event that the court finds that the clauses
are reasonable, the clauses ought not to be enforced by the court
because:
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15.7.1 to enforce the clauses would be to allow Firstrand Bank
to escape the consequences of its own unlawful
conduct and that is unconscionable;
15.7.2 to enforce the clauses would run contrary to the spirit
of Ubuntu;
15.7.3 to enforce the clauses would run contrary to public
policy.
16. The amended replication therefore firstly creates a factual dispute by
denying that Firstrand Bank’s prior written consent of the purported
cession relied upon by Firstrand Bank was neither sought nor granted.
17. Furthermore, the effect of the rest of the amended replication from
paragraph 3.2 to 3.9 is that if a court finds that 4 Bees Investments
cannot rely upon the cession, that there are facts in dispute relating to
Firstrand Bank ’s conduct upon which 4 Bees Investments reli es, inter alia
whether the credit facilities were unlawfully terminated, whether SALT
became financially distressed and entered into business rescue and was
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placed into final winding -up as a result thereof and whether Firstrand
Bank caused the destruction of SALT and its business.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN FIRSTRAND BANK’S APPLICATION FOR SEPARATION
IN RESPECT OF LOCUS STANDI
18. Firstrand Bank anticipated 4 Bees Investments’ replication to be amended
in its founding affidavit as it refers to the notice of amendment, the fact
that the amended pages have not been delivered and requests that in the
event that 4 Bees Investments eventually effect s the amendment, that
any portion thereof be included in the separation sought. Also, in
Firstrand Bank’s replying and answering affidavit , dated 29 July 2024, to
the counterapplication, the deponent states that it is common cause that
4 Bees Investments’ replication to Firstrand Bank’s special plea of locus
standi contained in paragraph 3 of 4 Bees Investments’ replication as
belatedly amended ought to be decided separately and that Firstrand
Bank does not object to the amendment .
RELIEF SOUGHT IN 4 BEES INVESTMENTS’ COUNTERAPPLICATION
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19. In the counter -application’s notice of motion, 4 Bees Investments also
seeks to separate the issue of Firstrand Bank’s special plea of
prescription as well as Firstrand Bank's special plea of lack of locus
standi, 4 Bees Investments’ amended replication to Firstrand Bank’s
special plea of lack of locus standi as set out in paragraphs 3.1 to 3. 9
thereof as well as the following additional issues :
19.1 The issue of whether SALT breached the facility agreement(s)
which existed between it and Firstrand Bank;
19.2 the issue whether Firstrand Bank was consequently entitled to
terminate the facility agreement(s) which existed between it and
SALT due to such breach as per a letter from Firstrand Bank to
SALT dated 6 May 2016 in terms whereof Firstrand Bank
demanded immediate repayment of all outstanding amounts or
that all facilities be repaid by 31 October 2016;
19.3 whether Firstrand Bank was entitled to unilaterally terminate the
facility agreement which existed between it and SALT absent any
breach as per a letter of Firstrand Bank’s attorneys of record to 4
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Bees Investments’ attorneys at the time, namely Itzikowitz
Attorneys, dated 7 June 2016.
20. Firstrand Bank t akes issue with these additional issues which 4 Bees
Investments also seeks to have decided separately. Firstrand Bank
contends in its answering and replying affidavit that the additional issues
cannot be separated due to them fundamentally forming part of the merits
of the action and being intertwined with other issues which form part of
the action. Furthermore, it contends that the additional issues are not
purely legal issues, such as that of prescription and lack of locus standi
and that in addition these issues will require evidence to be presented
which will ultimately amount to conducting a trial on the merits thus
duplicating the evidence in the event that such trial is heard in the future.
21. Firstrand Bank further contends that the separation of the additional
issues will defeat the purpose of the separation due to the voluminous
evidence to be presented in determining these additional issues, the
increased amount of legal costs to be incurred in preparing for and
arguing the additional issues and that the additional issues sought to be
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separated do not encompass the element of convenience which is central
to a separation as contemplated in Rule 33(4).
22. In 4 Bees Investments’ replying affidavit in support of its counter -
application, it contends that Firstrand Bank premises its application upon
the allegation that the separation it proposes will “ require little to no oral
evidence when being presented before the Court” and that the allegation
appears to have been made absent a proper analysis of the pleadings as
they now stand. 4 Bees Investments contends that i n particular, Firstrand
Bank does not consider the content of 4 Bees Investments replication as
amended. 4 Bees Investments further contends that it has to prove the
allegations in its replication when the matter is heard and hand -in-hand
with this is the question of the lawfulness of the termination of the
agreement(s) by Firstrand Bank. 4 Bees Investments therefore contends
that unless Firstrand Bank admits all of the allegations contained in the 4
Bees Investments’ replication, evidence will be required and that the
evidence will probably be substantial given the allegations at play. 4
Bees Investments further anticipates that Firstrand Bank would wish to
cross-examine any witnesses called and may also need to call its own
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witnesses to rebut any adverse testimony by 4 Bees Investments’
witnesses.
FIRSTRAND BANK’S SUBMISSIONS
23. In Firstrand Bank’s heads of argument, it is submitted that it is common
cause that the following issues should be decided separately:
23.1 Firstrand Bank’s special plea of prescription as set out in
paragraphs 4 to 8 of its plea;
23.2 Firstrand Bank’s special plea of locus standi contained in
paragraphs 9 to 14 of its plea;
23.3 4 Bees Investments’ replication to Firstrand Bank’s special plea of
prescription contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof;
23.4 4 Bees Investments’ replication to Firstrand Bank’s special plea of
lack of locus standi contained in paragraph 3 of 4 Bees
Investments’ replication as amended belatedly.
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24. In its heads of argument Firstrand Bank furthermore takes issue with the
additional issues which 4 Bees Investments also seeks to separate as
listed above.
25. At the hearing hereof, Firstrand Bank changed its stance somewhat, in
that Advocate Bham SC on behalf of Firstrand Bank, submitted that in
respect of Firstrand Bank’s special plea of locus standi as pleaded in
paragraphs 9 to 14 of Firstrand Bank’s plea and 4 Bees Investments ’
amended replication thereto, only paragraph 3.1 of 4 Bees Investments’
amended replication should be separated. An updated draft order to that
effect was also filed after the hearing.
26. Advocate Bham SC submitted that if the whole of paragraph 3 of 4 Bees
Investments’ amended replication is included in the separation, that the
purpose of separation of issues in terms of Rule 33(4) would be
undermined.
27. He further submitted that argument on the prescription and locus standi
issues will be less than a day on both points and as they are points of
law, no evidence will be needed.
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28. Advocate Bham SC also referred to paragraph 17.8 of 4 Bees
Investments’ particulars of claim where it pleaded one of the terms of the
credit facility agreement, namely that SALT would not cede or encumber
any of its rights in terms of the credit facilit y agreement and general terms
and conditions thereof without the prior consent of Firstrand Bank. He
submitted that 4 Bees Investments does not plead why it could go beyond
the provisions thereof.
29. Advocate Bham SC further submitted that in the event that I find that it is
not convenient to separate the lack of locus standi issue to be heard prior
to the remaining issues, that I only separate the prescription issue.
4 BEES INVESTMENTS’ SUBMISSIONS
30. Advocate Bosman on behalf of 4 Bees Investments, submitted that
whichever way the court may rule, that at some stage a court will have to
deal with prescription and that Advocate Bham SC’s submission that
prescription alone be separated, is a surprise . He submitted that a
separation on prescription only would not be convenient and that the
parties are ad idem that separation of both the special pleas will be
convenient.
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31. Advocate Bosman submitted that the parties depart from each other as to
precisely what issues should be separated and that the special plea in
relation to lack of locus standi is not as discreet as submitted by Firstrand
Bank. He submitted that Firstrand Bank’s attempt to now limit the
separation to paragraph 3.1 of the amended replication, which only
contains the denial in respect of the provisions of the facility agreements,
namely that SALT is not permitted to cede, encumber, pledge, assign or
otherwise alienate any of its rights, benefits, interests and obligations in
terms o f the facility agreements and the denial of the allegation that
Firstrand Bank’s prior written consent of the purported cession relie d
upon was neither sought nor granted, is an exception through the
backdoor.
32. Advocate Bosman submitted that as Firstrand Bank argue d that only
paragraph 3.1 should be separated from the remaining issues and that
the rest of paragraph 3 is an absurdity, that this court should therefore
have to decide that same is an absurdity in the event of only separating
paragraph 3.1 of the amended replication.
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33. Advocate Bosman referred me to Beadica 231 CC and Others v Trustees,
Oregon Trust and Others 2020 (5) SA 247 (CC), paragraphs 36 to 37
where the Constitutional Court refer red to the majority judgment in the
Supreme Court of Appeal discussing an indirect application of the Bill of
Rights to contractual terms where the majority stated that determining
fairness in the context of weighing the validity of contractual obligations
involves a two stage inquiry, the first being whether the clause itself is
unreasonable and, secondly, if the clause is reasonable, whether it
should be enforced in light of the circumstances which prevented
compliance with a time limitation clause. The first stage involves a
consideration of the clause itself. The question is whether the clause is
so unreasonable, on its face, as to be contrary to public policy. If the
answer is in the affirmative, the court will strike down the clause. If, on
the other hand the clause is found to be reasonable, then the second
stage of the inquiry will be embarked upon. The second stage involves
an inquiry whether, in all the circumstances of the particular case, it would
be contrary to public policy to enforce the clause. The onus is on the
party seeking to avoid the enforcement of the clause to ‘ demonstrate why
its enforcement would be unfair and unreasonable in the given
circumstances’. The majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal
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emphasised that particular regard must be had to the reason for non -
compliance with the clause.
34. Advocate Bosman also referred me to Molotlegi v Mok walase 2010 JDR
0360 (SCA) at paragraph 20 where it was held that there should be due
cognisance of whether separation is appropriate and fair to all the parties
and that the court is obliged in the interests of fairness to consider the
advantages and disadvantages which may flow from such separation.
Where there is a likelihood that such separation might cause the other
party some prejudice, the court may, in the exercise of its discretion,
refuse to order separation.
35. Advocate Bosman submitted that where Firstrand Bank has pleaded an
absolute defence of lack of locus standi to 4 Bees Investments’ claim, it
would not be fair to amputate a portion of its replication furnished in reply
thereto. He submitted that in finding that it is appropriate to only separate
the issues as proposed by Firstrand Bank, the court will in effect find that
an exception is good against the part of the replication not to be
separated prior to the hearing of the remaining issues.
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36. He submitted that 4 Bees Investments’ answer to the special plea of lack
of locus standi represents a significant overlap in respect of the broader
merits, insofar as the lawfulness of the termination of the credit facilities is
concerned and that it is at the heart of the merits of the action proper. He
submitted that this terrain will unavoidably need to be canvassed in
properly considering 4 Bees Investments’ answer to the special plea of
lack of locus standi.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
37. Rule 33(4) provides as follows:
“If, in any pending action, it appears to the court mero motu that there is a
question of law or fact which may conveniently be decided either before
any evidence is led or separately from any other question, the court may
make an order directing the disposal of such question in such manner as
it may deem fit and may order that all further proceedings be stayed until
such question has been disposed of, and the court shall on the
application of any party make such order unless it appears that the
questions cannot conveniently be decided separately. ”
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38. In Denel (Edms) Bpk v Vorster 2004 (4) SA 481 (SCA) at 484J -485B,
Nugent JA remarked that:
“Rule 33(4) of the Uniform Rules – which entitles a Court to try issues
separately in appropriate circumstances – is aimed at facilitating the
convenient and expeditious disposal of litigation. It should not be
assumed that that result is always achieved by separating the issues. In
many cases, once properly considered, the issues will be found to be
inextricably linked, even though, at first sight, they m ight appear to be
discrete. And even where the issues are discre te, the expeditious
disposal of the litigation is often best served by ventilating all the issues
at one hearing, particularly where there is more than one issue that might
be readily dispositive of the matter. It is only after careful thought has
been given to the anticipated course of the litigation as a whole that it will
be possible properly to determine whether it is convenient to try an issue
separately.”
39. In Consolidated News Agencies (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Mobile
Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd and Another 2010 (3) SA 38 2 (SCA),
paragraphs [89]-[90], the majority of the court held as follows:
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“[89] … Piecemeal litigation is not to be encouraged. Sometimes it is
desirable to have a single issue decided separately, either by way
of a stated case or otherwise. If a decision on a discrete issue
disposes of a major part of a case, or will in some way lead to
expedition, it might well be desirable to have that issue decided
first.
[90] This court has warned that in many cases, once properly
considered, issues initially thought to be discrete are found to be
inextricably linked. And even where the issues are discrete, the
expeditious disposal of the litigation is often best served by
ventilating all the issues at one hearing. A trial court must be
satisfied that it is convenient and proper to try an issue
separately.”
EVALUATION OF APPLICATION IN RESPECT OF SPECIAL PLEA OF
PRESCRIPTION
40. The issue of prescription is a crisp legal issue which is not linked to the
other issues to be determined in the action. The legal question is
whether in the circumstances where SALT commenced business rescue
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proceedings as contemplated under the Companies Act and a business
rescue practice practitioner was appointed, SALT constitute d a person
under curatorship, as contemplated under section 3(1)(a) of the
Prescription Act and whether the running of prescription in respect of any
debts owing to SALT was accordingly postponed, as contemplated under
section 3(1) of the Prescription Act.
41. In the event that Firstrand Bank succeeds with its special plea of
prescription, it would be dispositive of the matter, which would save a
lengthy trial to determine inter alia whether the termination of the credit
facilities was unlawful , the extent to which the termination of the credit
facilities prejudiced or ruined 4 Bees Investments , whether Firstrand
Bank’s prior written consent was sought or granted for the cession relied
upon by 4 Bees Investments and the damages suffered, if any.
42. Although an appeal against the ruling in respect of the special plea of
prescription may delay the trial on the remaining issues, which is a
disadvantage that may flow from the separation, Advocate Bham SC in
my view correctly submitted that the possibility of an appeal almost
always exists where there is a separation . It remains a possibility and not
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a certainty to be anticipated when considering an application for
separation of issues.
43. It will be fair and to the advantage of all the parties concerned if the issue
of prescription is separated from the remaining issues in that if it
succeeds it will obviate the need for a trial on the merits and save both
parties substantial legal costs. I do not agree with Adv Bosman’s
submission that it would be inconvenient if the special plea in respect of
prescription is separated on it own, without the other special plea of lack
of locus standi.
44. In the circumstances, I find that it will be convenient and expeditious to
separate the special plea of prescription to be adjudicated prior to the
remainder of the issues between the parties.
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EVALUATION OF APPLICATION IN RESPECT OF SPECIAL PLEA OF LACK
OF LOCUS STANDI
45. Although at first glance it seems as if the special plea for lack of locus
standi is a distinct discreet legal issue, some evidence would have had to
be led in respect of the factual dispute created in paragraph 12 of
Firstrand Bank’s special plea where it pleaded that its prior written
consent of the cession relied upon by 4 Bees Investments was neither
sought nor granted.
46. 4 Bees Investments further contends in its counter -application that
Firstrand Bank has admitted the content of the cession agreement ,
including clause 3.4 thereof, which records that the creditors of SALT had
consented to the sale of SALT’s damages claim against Firstrand Bank to
4 Bees Investments. It further contends that as Firstrand Bank is such a
creditor, it is impermissible for Firstrand Bank to deny such consent in the
face of its admission of the written cession and its terms. It further
contends that a Mr Reuben Miller, one of SALT’s liquidators, sought and
deemed to have received consent for such sale from the applicant.
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47. Wherefore, even if I only refer paragraph 3.1 of 4 Bees Investments’
amended replication to be adjudicated separately, it would not be pure
legal argument and some evidence and cross -examination would be
necessary to dispose of the issue.
48. In the event that a court finds that certain clauses in the credit facility
agreements prohibit 4 Bees Investments from relying upon the cession,
purely on an interpretation of the wording thereof, 4 Bees Investments
seeks to evade the consequences thereof by replicating that as a result of
Firstrand Bank’s alleged unlawful termination of SALT’s credit facilities,
SALT became financially distressed, entered into business rescue , was
placed in final winding -up and that the clauses therefore fall to be struck
down by the court because they were exploitative of the weaker
bargaining position that SALT was placed in at the outset of the facilities .
Furthermore, that the clauses are so unreasonable on their face that they
are contrary to public policy, alternatively and in the event that they are
found to be reasonable, that they ought not to be enforced as it would be
unconscionable, that they are contrary to the spirit of Ubuntu and to
enforce the clauses would be contrary to public policy .
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49. Over and above for what is pleaded in 4 Bees Investments’ replication, 4
Bees Investments seeks to introduce the 3 additional issues to be
separated, namely whether SALT breached the facility agreement(s)
which existed between it and Firstrand Bank, whether Firstrand Bank was
consequently entitled to terminate the credit facility agreement(s) due to a
breach of the agreement and whether Firstrand Bank was entitled to
unilaterally terminate a facility agreement which existed between it and
SALT absent any breach.
50. It is clear from 4 Bees Investments’ replying affidavit in support of the
counter-application that it is of the view that unless Firstrand Bank admits
all the allegations in 4 Bees Investments’ replication, substantial oral
evidence will be required to prove same as well as possible rebuttal
witnesses. If the counter -application is granted, the separated issues will
result in a full-blown trial where the separated issues would be
inextricably linked with the remaining issues between the parties and
possibly also the quantum of the alleged damages.
51. In the event that I limit the separation of issues in respect of the special
plea of locus standi to paragrap h 3.1 of 4 Bees Investments amended
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replication only, as asked for by Adv Bham SC during argument, the
effect thereof might be to prevent 4 Bees Investments from ventilating all
the issues pleaded in its replication as well as the additional issues it
deems relevant, which might be unfair to 4 Bees Investments.
52. I cannot see any advantages flowing from a separation of the lack of
locus standi special plea as it is not a distinct separate issue on the
pleadings as it currently stands and will probably lead to a duplication of
evidence when the remaining issues are adjudicated thereafter.
53. Wherefore I find that it would not be convenient to separate the special
plea of lack of locus standi from the remaining issues in terms of Rule
33(4).
COSTS
54. Firstrand Bank was substantially successful in bringing the application for
separation in terms of Rule 33(4) . I n as far as it was unsuccessful in
respect of its special plea of lack of locus standi to be separated , at the
time of the launch of the application, it seemed like a discreet limited
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issue which required little evidence before the replication was formally
amended.
55. The situation changed as set out above when 4 Bees Investments
amended its replication, which caused the question of lack of locus standi
to be inextricably linked with the merits of the case. Furthermore, in the
counter-application 4 Bees Investments seeks to include the additional
issues in the separation, which forms part of the merits at the heart of its
claim.
56. In as far as 4 Bees Investments seeks the separation of the prescription
issue, same is substantially the same relief claimed by Firstrand Bank in
1.1 and 1.3 of its notice of motion.
WHEREFORE I make the following order:
1. The following issues are to be decided separately in terms of Rule 33(4)
of the Uniform Rules of Court , prior to the remaining pleaded issues in the
pleadings:
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DATE OF HEARING: 29 JULY 2025
JUDGMENT DELIVERED : 28 OCTOBER 2025
APPEARANCE FOR THE APPLICANT : ADV A E BHAM SC with
ADV L V SWANDLE
ATTORNEYS FOR THE APPLICANT : WERKSMANS ATTORNEYS
APPEARANCE FOR THE RESPONDENT : ADV R BOSMAN
ATTORNEYS FOR THE RESPONDENT : LESLIE COHEN & ASSOCIATES