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DELIVERED: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e -mail and publication on CaseLines. The date
and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10h00 on 24 October 2025.
F. BEZUIDENHOUT AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against a judgment and order I
granted on the 18th of July 2024 where I dismissed the application brought
by the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. For the sake of
convenience, the parties will be referred to as in the main application.
[2] The grounds upon which the applicants rely, have been set out in detail in
the notice of application for leave to appeal and I do not intend to repeat
them here.
APPLICATIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL -THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[3] The applicants contend that leave should be granted as there is reasonable
prospects of success on appeal, there are compelling reasons why an appeal
should be heard and it is in the interests of justice to grant leave.
[4] The application for leave to appeal must be considered against the backdrop
of the prevailing statutory requirements.
[5] The applicants seek leave to appeal in terms of the provisions of
section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act.1
1 Act 10 of 2013.
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[6] The test for granting leave to appeal has become more stringent and a
threshold for granting leave more onerous.2
[7] In Mont Chevaux Trust v Goosen and Others,3 Bertelsman J interpreted the
test for granting leave to appeal as follows: -
“It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against the
judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former
test whether leave to appeal should be granted was that a reasonable
prospect that another court might come to a dif ferent conclusion…
The use of the word ‘would’ in the new statute indicates a measure
of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose
judgment is sought to be appealed against.”
[8] In Mothuloe Inc Attorneys v The Law Society of the Northern Provinces and
Another4 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated as follows regarding a court
a quo’s liberal approach on granting leave to appeal: -
“It is important to mention my dissatisfaction with the court a quo's
granting of leave to appeal to this court. The test is simply whether there
are any reasonable prospects of success in an appeal. It is not whether a
litigant has an arguable case or a mere possibility of success...
This court has in the past bemoaned the regularity with which leave is
granted to this court in respect of matters not deserving its attention.
2 Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Democratic Alliance In
Re: Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others
(19577/09) [2016] ZAGPPHC 489 (24 June 2016)
3 [2014] 2325 (LCC).
4 2017 JDR 0533 (SCA); para [18].
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(See Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Bumpers Schwarmas CC & others 2003
(5) SA 354 (SCA) para 23.)
[9] A court in considering an application for leave to appeal must be persuaded
with a measure of certainty that another court will differ.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
[10] The applicants argued that the court’s interpretation of the obligation
imposed on the applicants by section 77 of the Local Government: Municipal
Property Rates Act5 (“the Rates Act”) to “regularly, but at least once a
year, update its valuation roll” is patently wrong. The delay in reflecting the
property on the supplementary roll is according to the applicant not a basis
to interpret section 78 of the Rates Act. It was contended on behalf of the
applicants that the court erred when it attributed to t he applicants a
statutory function of the municipal valuer. Thus, the applicants concluded
that the court misidentified the functionary in whom the public power vests.
[11] In addition, the applicants argued that the case before the first respondent
and the review application before the court was not premised on a failure
on the part of the applicant or of any functionary to perform in terms of
section 79 of the Rates Act. Accordingly, so the applicants argued, the court
erred when it stated that the applicants failed in their statutory duties.
[12] The applicants also argued that the court erred in finding that the applicants
5 6 of 2004.
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did not exhaust internal remedies before approaching the court on a review.
DELIBERATION
[13] The Supreme Court of Appeal held in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality v Zibi and Others 6 that section 77 obliges the municipality to
update the valuation roll annually, either through a supplementary
valuation roll under section 78, or an amendment of the valuation roll under
section 79.7
[14] In my view, my finding as stated in paragraph [48] of my judgment that
the applicants did not adhere to their statutory duty by not regularly causing
the valuation roll to be amended, is supported by the aforesaid judgment
and is therefore correct.
[15] Further, in my view, it remains wrong, unfair and against the spirit of the
Constitution and the fairness principle enshrined in the Rates Act that the
applicants can merely prepare a supplementary valuation roll for three
consecutive years and thereafter apply section 78(1)(d) of the Rates Act so
that new rates become payable from the date of the event that caused the
increase
CONCLUSION
[16] In determining whether there is a reasonable prospect of success and
whether it is in the interest of justice to grant leave, I re-considered my
6 2021 (6) SA 100 (SCA).
7 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Zibi (supra) paragraph [31].
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judgment, the grounds set out in the application for leave to appeal and the
heads of argument filed by the parties in both the main application and the
application for leave to appeal.
[17] The applicants in my view reargued their case as it was presented at the
hearing of the main application. The reasons for dismissing the main
application were articulated in detail in my judgment and nothing raised in
the application for leave to appeal detracts from my findings and the
ultimate conclusion that I arrived at and that is that the main application
must be dismissed with costs.
[18] Accordingly, I am not persuaded that another court will come to a different
conclusion, that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or
that it is in the interest of justice to grant leave to appeal.
ORDER
In the result, the following order is made: -
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicants, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be
absolved, shall pay the costs of the first and second respondents.
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On behalf of second respondent: Adv A Berkowitz
berkowitz@counsel.co.za
Instructed by:
Hutcheon Attorneys
(011) 454-3221
kevin@hutcheon.co.za.