SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case number: 2025-150363
In the matter between:
PETER FLENTOV First
applicant
MARINA NESTEL Second applicant
and
GODELIEVE ADELHEID LUTGARDE KOELMA First respondent
XNEELO (PTY) LTD Second
respondent
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON 27 OCTOBER 2025
VAN ZYL AJ:
Introduction
1. These proceedings arise from an ongoing public and very acrimonious
mud-slinging between the applicants and the first respondent. The main
application, which is an application for interdictory relief against the
respondents, has spawned a series of further applications, namely:
1.1 an application by the applicants to hold the first respondent in
contempt of court for failing to adhere to the terms of the rule nisi
granted in the main application;
1.2 an application by the first respondent to stay the rule nisi granted
in the main application “pending the final determination of the Rule
Nisi and/or any appeal proceedings instituted by the F irst
Respondent”; and
1.3 an application by the first respondent se eking the joinder of five
additional parties to the main application, coupled with a
“counterclaim” for the reinstatement of a n interim protection order
that had been granted and set aside in the magistrates’ court, and
the “granting of a Final Protection Order” against the first applicant
in favour of the first respondent “ in regard to the First Applicant’s
ongoing conduct” as set out in the application.
2. The papers fill several lever -arch files . This is in itself not an issue,
because the Court reads what needs to be read. The problem is that,
apart from the expected founding, answering, and replying affidavits in
each application, the parties delivered several supplementary affidavits
without seeking the Cout’s leave to do so. The applicants did so mainly
in response to a series of additional affidavits delivered by the first
respondent, each filled with new allegations and evidence.
3. This is not a situation that should be countenanced. It invites chaos,
and wastes time and money , whether a party is represented or not .
The Court admittedly has a wide discretion under Rule 6(5)(e):1
“It is in the interests of the administration of justice that the well known and well
established general rules regarding the number of sets and the proper
sequence of affidavits in motion proceedings should ordinarily be observed.
That is not to say that t hose general rules must always be rigidly applied: some
flexibility, controlled by the presiding Judge exercising his discretion in relation
to the facts of the case before him, must necessarily also be permitted. Where,
as in the present case, an affidavit is tendered in motion proceedings both late
and out of its ordinary sequence, the party tendering it is seeking not a right, but
an indulgence from the Court: he must both advance his explanation of why the
affidavit is out of time and satisfy the Court that, although the affidavit is late, it
should, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, nevertheless be
received.”2
4. There was, in the present matter, no application under Rule 6(5)(e)
before me, whe ther in writing or orally from the bar during argument ,
even after I had voiced the Court’s concerns in this regard . I
nevertheless had regard to the additional affidavits. 3 They do not take
the core issues further other than pouring more oil on the fir e. In the
circumstances, I am not inclined to allow them into the record.4
5. I turn to consider each of the applications.
1 Rule 6(5)(e): “ Within 10 days of the service upon the respondent of the affidavit and
documents referred to in sub -paragraph (ii) of paragraph (d) of subrule (5) the applicant
may deliver a replying affidavit. The court may in its discretion permit the filing of further
affidavits.” (My emphasis.)
2 James Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd (Previously named Gilbert Hamer & Co Ltd) v
Simmons NO 1963 (4) SA 656 (A) at 660D–H. My emphasis.
3 I do not include in this category those supplementary affidavits that had been duly
3 I do not include in this category those supplementary affidavits that had been duly
delivered with the leave of the Court in the course of the interlocutory skirmishes that
followed the grant of the rule nisi.
4 These affidavits are , in the contempt appli cation the first respondent’s first
supplementary affidavit dated 3 September 2025 and the applicants’ replying affidavit
thereto dated 8 September 2025; and the first respondent’s second supplementary
affidavit dated 4 September 2025 and the first applicant’s replying affidavit thereto dated
8 September 2025. In the main application, these affidavits are the first respondent’s
supplementary affidavit dated 8 September 2025 and the first respondent’s replying
affidavit thereto dated 26 September 2025.
The main application for interdictory relief
Relevant principles
6. Defamation is regarded as the " intentional infringement of another's
right to his good name, or, more comprehensively, the wrongful,
intentional publication of words or behaviour concerning another which
has the tendency to undermine his status, good name or reputation".5
7. At common la w, for a claim in defamation to succeed, the applicants
bear the onus of establishing the wrongful , intentional publication of a
defamatory statement concerning themselves, on a balance of
probabilities.6
8. The requirement of wrongfulness is met where the applicants’
reputations have been unlawfully harmed, assessed by means of an
objective standard, that is, whether a reasonable member of the
community would regard the ir good name as having been diminished .
Once the publication of defamato ry material has been proven, the
courts generally infer the requisite intention (animus iniuriandi) to injure
the applicants’ reputation.7
9. Publication, in turn, is established where the defamatory statement has
been communicated to at least one person ot her than the applicants.
Such publication may occur through various mediums, including oral
communication, printed material, or electronic dissemination via online
5 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Deliktereg (5ed, 2006) at p325. The Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996, entrenches rights such as freedom of expression in
section 16 thereof which appears to clash with the laws of defamation, and a balanci ng
exercise is thus required. The law of defamation safeguards the legitimate and legally
recognised interests of individuals in the preservation of their reputation and good
name. This protection is further entrenched by the Constitution which recognises and
guarantees the inherent right to dignity in section 10 as a fundamental human right.
6 Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa (1985) at p35.
6 Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa (1985) at p35.
7 See the discussion in National Media Ltd and others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196
(SCA).
platforms, social media, and similar forums. 8 In circumstances where it
is reasonably fores eeable that the statement would come to the
attention of others, publication will be presumed unless the contrary is
demonstrated.9
10. To determine whether the impugned statements are defamatory, the
Court examines the ordinary or primary meaning of the wor ds used.
Where the words bear a secondary or latent meaning, such innuendo
must be established to demonstrate that the words convey a
defamatory imputation.10
11. There are three primary defences to a claim in respect of defamation.11
First, a defendant may justify the statement by proving that it was both
true and in the public interest. Second, the defence of fair comment or
the exercise of freedom of expression may be invoked, provided the
statement constitutes an opinion rather than a factual assertion. Third,
privilege may serve as a defence where the statement was made on an
occasion recognised by law as privileged, whether absolutely or
qualifiedly. In addition to these traditional defences, a further ground of
justification was recognised in National Media Ltd and others v
Bogoshi,12 namely the reasonableness of the publication. Under this
defence, the Court considers factors such as the nature, extent, and
tone of the allegations, as well as the steps taken to verify the
information, to determine whether the publication was reasonable in the
circumstances.
12. I turn to the facts against this brief background.
8 See Nel “Online defamation: the problem of unmasking anonymous online critics” 2007
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa (CILSA) 193.
9 National Media v Bogoshi supra ; International Tobacco Co (SA) Ltd v United Tobacco
Co (South) Ltd (4) 1955 (2) SA 40 (W).
10 HT Group (Pty) Ltd v Hazelhurst [2003] 2 All SA 262 (C).
11 Borgin v De Villiers 1980 (3) SA 556 (A).
12 Supra at 1212-1213.
The respondents’ conduct
13. The advent of the internet has established a pervasive and influential
medium for the exercise of the constitutional right to freedom of
expression. Such expression, whether manifested in written, oral,
audio-visual, or other communicative forms, enjoys constitutional
protection, provided that it is exercised within the bounds of law and
without unlawfully infringing upon the rights and reputational interests of
others.13
14. In the present case, these parameters have been wholly disregarded.
14. The first applicant and the first respondent became known to each
other around June 2020, when the first applicant joined a Facebook
group called the “Atlantic Seaboard Community Forum ”, which was run
and administered by the first respondent.
15. A few months thereafter, the first applicant warned the first respondent
about a post she had made on that Facebook page about a certain Ms
Finch. The first applicant was of the view that the post could be
considered as harassment. In response, the first respondent blocked
the first applicant from the group.
16. In February 2022, glaringly defamatory statements were posted on
Facebook about the first applicant's mother. The first respondent also
sent the first applicant WhatsApp messages in which allegations were
made about, amongst others, his mother’s activities in the Second
World War. The first respondent proceeded to post similar statements
on Facebook. She went quiet about the first applicant for about two
years until January 2024.
13 See Botha v Smuts and another 2025 (1) SA 581 (CC).
14. In January 2024, the f irst applicant posted an article on t he Atlantic
Seaboard Community Forum Facebook page entitled “A Cautionary
Tale” about the danger of not opposing an application for the grant of
an i nterim protection order. The article had its origins in events
concerning the second applicant (also a member of the community) and
the first respondent.
15. The second applicant and the first respondent were friends for some
time prior to 2023. When the relationship turned sour, it became messy
and litigious. The first respondent made degrading posts about the
second applicant on the Forum’s Facebook page in January 2023 , to
which second applicant responded on her own Facebook page,
rebuffing the statements. In the comments to the post the first
respondent called the second applicant a drug addict, labelled her as
dangerous, and culminated in attacking the second applicant’s mental
health status: " I will ensure that I am properly protected against this
lunatic, she belongs in a rehab psychiatric centre for life!"
16. During January 2024 the second applicant was arrested at the ins tance
of the first respondent under the provisions of the Protection from
Harassment Act 17 of 2011, for violating an interim protection order
obtained against her by the first respondent . This is what the first
applicant reported on, in particular how th e failure to oppose a
protection order application could lead to an order being granted in a
respondent's absence.
17. The interim protection order was set aside on 6 February 2024, and the
criminal case against the second applicant was removed from the court
roll in September 2024. The first respondent, who had filmed the
second applicant’s arrest, proceeded to post it to her YouTube page in
September 2024, entitled " Marina Nestles Arrest", where it was viewed
almost 300 times.
18. Towards the end of June 2025, and throughout July and August 2025,
the first respondent continued to publish blatantly scandalous posts on
her various social media pages , including Facebook, X, Instagram, and
YouTube, relating to both applicants . The content of the first
respondent’s posts accuses the applicants of unethical business
practices, dishonesty, bullying, and other misconduct. These posts
morphed into book format , in which the statements are repeated and
elaborated upon. It appears from the book that the first respondent feels
she has been “wronged” by various persons, all of whom she names
and shames in her book. The book was released on 28 July 2025. It is
entitled “Bullied in South Africa” (the Court received a copy).
19. The content of the first respondent’s social media posts, and the
allegations contained in her book, are clearly defamatory and damaging
to the applicants' reputation. The applicants are the direct and
expressly named targets of a sustained and escalating campaign of
online vitriol by the first respondent. She has created and disseminated
frankly astounding content across multiple social media platforms,
including Facebook, lnstagram, YouTube , and a website titled w[…],
which she operates or controls , hosted by the second respondent .
Picking examples from the papers of the impugned statements and
repeating them in this judgment will serve no purpose.
14. The first respondent’s affidavits, like her book, are filled with allegations
against the applicants and others in a stream of conscio usness
unchecked by what is reasonable and acceptable in the public realm.
No justification for this conduct is apparent therefrom, except that the
first respondent feels that she is entitled to tell her “ lived experience”. I
agree with counsel for the a pplicants that there must be a clear
balancing of the respective rights of the first respondent’s freedom of
expression on the one hand, whether truthful or not, and the applicants’
rights to dignity and privacy on the other. A consideration of the
affidavits filed of record, and the first respondent’s book, reveals that
the first respondent is simply vindictive in her persistent postings, which
serve no other purpose than to defame and insult the applicants.
15. In oral argument before this Court , too, it be came clear that the first
respondent was out to hurt the applicants because she felt that they
had hurt her. Upon questioning by the Court, the first respondent was
unable to refrain from repeating her views as to the applicants’
character, mental health, and activities. Warnings from the Court about
her statements went unheeded.
15. The applicants, unsurprisingly, instituted urgent proceedings against the
first respondent's defamatory publications in respect of them, and the
second respondent's hosting of s uch material. The relief included the
deletion of existing defamatory content, the removal of a defamatory
website, and an interdict against the further distribution of the first
respondent book. The founding affidavit details the nature and extent
of the ongoing smears, attaching screenshots, URLs, and references to
online material. It demonstrates that the content is widely accessible,
shared, and hosted by the second respondent. The material is of such
nature as to cause substantial harm to the applicants’ dignity,
reputations, and business relationships. They are subjected to public
ridicule and reputational damage that continues to compound daily.
16. The main application was launched ex parte, and on 29 August 2025 a
rule nisi was issued, calling upon the respondents to show cause why a
final interdict should not be granted prohibiting the first respondent from
publishing defamatory posts and comments on her social media
platforms, Facebook, lnstagram, and YouTube, and prohibit ing the
second r espondent from publishing further defamatory content. The
interim order further directed that all defamatory content be removed
from the social media platforms. It prohibit ed the selling and distribution
of the first respondent’s book, and directed that the website selling the
book be removed.
17. The first respondent was ordered to pay the cost of the urgent
application on a punitive scale.
18. The first respondent was undaunted. After service of the rule nisi on her
on 30 August 2025, for example, the first respondent posted the order
on her Facebook page which is, like her book, titled “ Bullied in South
Africa”. She added photographs of the second applicant. On 31
August 2025 she published the same post, with the court order, on her
X page. On 1 September 2025 the first respondent posted a video on
her YouTube channel containing voice notes from the second
respondent. On 2 September 2025 the first responde nt shared a post
to the “ Bullied in South Africa ” Facebook page which clearly refers to
the matter before Court, although the applicants are not mentioned by
name. On 3 September 2025 the f irst respondent made her post of 30
August 2025 a featured post on her Facebook page.
19. The second respondent has complied with the provisions of the rule nisi.
20. There have been various interlocutory squabbles since the grant of the
rule nisi but the question at this stage is whether it should be made
final. It is trite that the requirements for the grant of a final interdict are
a clear right; an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended;
and the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy.14
16. I am of the view that the applicants have met these r equirements.15 The
applicants have a clear right to their dignity, reputation and good name.
14 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 at 227.
15 See, for example, Heroldt v Wills 2013 (2) SA 530 (GSJ); Isparta v Richter 2013 (6) SA
529 (GNP).
This right is worthy of protection especially in the light of the first
respondent's continued defamatory statements even in the face of the
interim order. No ju stification for the first respondent’s conduct is
apparent from the papers, which are so replete with vexatious content
that even Plascon Evans 16 cannot assist her. In these circumstances,
the applicants’ right to dignity prevails over the first defendant’s right to
freedom of expression.
17. The injury is undeniable and ongoing. Both applicants depend on their
reputation and good name to earn an income, and this has been
tarnished. Even after the grant of the rule nisi the first respondent
continued to post on social media, advertising her book which contains
the very defamatory statements this application concerns.
18. The applicants do not have another remedy other tha n the interdict.
Attempts at settlement were futile. The first applicant, for example,
attempted to accommodate the first respondent in 2024 at her behest for
them mutually to withdraw certain social media posts about each other.
Whilst he honoured this agreement to end the feud, she reneged.
Conclusion on the main application
19. In all of these circumstances, the rule nisi granted on 29 August 2025
must be made final.
20. In Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 17 the Constitutional
Court stated as follows in relation to punitive costs orders:
“[223] More than 100 years ago, Innes CJ stated the principle that costs on an
attorney and client scale are awarded when a court wishes to mark its
16 The applicants seek final relief on motion. Where factual disputes might arise on the
papers, I approach the matter in accordance with the principles set out in Plascon-
Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E-I.
17 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) para 223.
disapproval of the condu ct of a litigant. Since then this principle has been
endorsed and applied in a long line of cases and remains applicable. Over the
years, courts have awarded costs on an attorney and client scale to mark their
disapproval of fraudulent, dishonest or mala fides (bad faith) conduct; vexatious
conduct; and conduct that amounts to an abuse of the process of court.”
21. An extended meaning was given to the concept of “vexatious” in
Johannesburg City Council v Television and Electrical Distributors (Pty)
Ltd and another:18
“ … in appropriate circumstances the conduct of a litigant may be adjudged
‘vexatious’ within the extended meaning that has been placed upon this term in
a number of decisions, that is, when such conduct has resulted in ‘unnecessary
trouble and expense which the other side ought not to bear (In re Alluvial Creek
1929 CPD 532 at 535).”
22. The first respondent has been deliberate, persistent, and vexatious in her
conduct, even after the grant of the interim order. She should bear the
costs of the main application on the scale as between attorney and client.
Contempt of court
The relevant principles
23. Contempt of court, in the present context, has been defined as “ the
deliberate, intentional (i e wilful), disobedience of an order granted by a
court of competent jurisdiction”.19
24. Wilfulness is an essential element of the act or omission alleged to
constitute contempt.20 In addition to the element of wilfulness, there must
18 1997 (1) SA 157 (A) at 177D.
19 Consolidated Fish Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Zive 1968 (2) SA 517 (C) at 522B–D.
20 Culverwell v Beira 1992 (4) SA 490 (W) at 493D–E.
be an element of mala fides.21 Once it is shown that the order was
granted (and served on or otherwise came to the notice of the
respondent) and that the respondent had disobeyed or neglected to
comply with it, both wilfulness and mala fides will be inferred. 22 Thus,
once the applicant has proved the order, service or notice, and non -
compliance, an evidentiary burden rests upon the respondent in relation
to wilfulness and male fides, that is, to advance evidence that establishes
a reasonable doubt as to whether non -compliance w ith the order was
wilful and male fide.23
25. Even though the defaulting party may be wilful, such party may still
escape liability if they can show that they were bona fide in their
disobedience. Where the defaulting party has genuinely tried to carry out
the order and has failed through no fault of his or her own, or has been
unable but not unwilling (for example, by reason of poverty), to carry out
the order, proceedings for committal will fail.24
26. As far as penalty is concerned, the law postulates that where a
respondent displayed an unacceptable degree of arrogance and
perceived inviolability and disregard for the rule of law, the penalty has to
be commensurate with the degree of contempt, the intention with which it
was committed, and the interests aff ected. It has to act as a deterrent,
and be punitive.25
The first respondent’s conduct
27. I have already touched upon the first respondent’s conduct following
service of the rule nisi on her. Upon receipt of the interim order, the
21 Jayiya v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 (2) SA 611
(SCA) at 621E.
22 Townsend-Turner v Morrow 2004 (2) SA 32 (C) at 49C–D.
23 Fakie N.O. v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd and another 2006 (SCA) at paras [42]-[43].
24 Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd and others; Mkhonto and others v
Compensation Solutions (Pty) Ltd 2018 (1) SA 1 (CC) at paras [85]-[88].
Compensation Solutions (Pty) Ltd 2018 (1) SA 1 (CC) at paras [85]-[88].
25 HL and another v Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd and another [2016] 1 All SA 543 (GJ).
first respondent sent threatening WhatsApp messages to the
applicants' attorney about lodging a complaint against her with the
Legal Practice Coun cil. She also sent insulting messages to the first
applicant.
28. Whilst those actions were not in defiance of the interim order, the first
respondent then turn ed to social media . On her “ Bullied in South
Africa” page, she posted the interim order together with a summary of
what it entail ed, as well as photographs of the second applicant. She
added a screenshot of a previous post entitled “The Chapter on Marina
Nestel in the Book, Bullied in South Africa”
29. Read in isolation, these particular posts might be regarded as not in
defiance of the interim order. Having been posted on social media,
however, they easily lead a reader who scrolls down on those social
media pages to see the previous posts relating to the applicants. The
first respondent also attached screenshots of previous posts which can
easily be searched by anyone who visits the page.
30. The interim order directs the first respondent to remove all defamatory
posts relating to applicants. At the time of the hearing of this
application, she had not done so. Moreover, after her website had
been taken down by the s econd respondent in compliance with the
interim order, the first respondent simply advertised her book for sale
on a different site, namely Amazon.
31. The first respondent has not offered any acceptable justification for her
conduct. She is of the view that the interim order should not have been
granted, as she had been wronged by the applicants. She wilfully
chose (and continues to choose) to disregard the terms of the interim
order.
Conclusion on the contempt application
32. In these circumstances, the first respondent is declared to be in
contempt of court for her failure to comply with the provisions of the
interim order granted on 29 August 2025 , and she is ordered to pay a
fine of R5 000,00.
33. The failure to comply with the terms of a court order constitutes
blameworthy conduct that justifies a punitive costs orde r, especially in
the particular circumstances of this case. That is in any event the usual
order granted in matters concerning the blatant and wilful non -
compliance with orders of court.
The application to stay the execution of the interim order
34. The application to stay the execution of the rule nisi was brought on the
basis that the interim order should not be in operation pending the
determination of whether it should be made final, or pending the
determination of any appeal brought by the first respondent against the
interim order.
35. In terms of Rule 45A a court may, upon application, suspend the
execution of any court order for such period and on such terms as it
deems fit. In Gois t/a Shakespeare’s Pub v Van Zyl 26 the principles for
the grant of a stay in execution were set out as follows:
“(a) A court will grant a stay of execution where real and substantial justice
requires it or where injustice would otherwise result.
(b) The court will be guided by considering the factors usually applicable to
interim interdicts, except where the applicant is not asserting a right, but
attempting to avert injustice.
(c) The court must be satisfied that:
26 2011 (1) SA 148 (LC) para 37.
(i) the applicant has a well -grounded apprehension that the
execution is taking place at the instance of the respondent(s);
and
(ii) irreparable harm will result if execution is not stayed and the
applicant ultimately succeeds in establishing a clear right.
(d) Irreparable harm will invariably result if there is a possibility that the
underlying causa may ultimately be removed, ie where the
underlying causa is the subject -matter of an ongoing dispute between
the parties.
(e) The court is not concerned with the merits of the underlying dispute - the
sole enquiry is simply whether the causa is in dispute.”
36. The first respondent’s founding affidavit, which consists of a series of
conclusions rather than factual allegations, does not establish any case
for the stay of the execution of the interim order, even had there been
room in our law for the staying of a r ule nisi pending the determination
of the matter. The application has in any event now been overtaken by
the fact that the rule nisi has been made final.
37. The application was patently without merit, and was brought in
circumstances where the first respondent continued to act in contempt
of the interim order. It accordingly falls to be dismissed, with costs on
the scale as between attorney and client.
The application for joinder
38. The first respondent’s application for joinder is also still-born.
39. The first respondent seeks the joinder of additional parties to the main
application, on the following bases:
39.1. Werner Eichler and Jill Eichler (the second applicant’s parents),
because they have “materially funded, supported, and enabled the
conduct of the Second Applicant”.
39.2. Rolf Behr, a long-time childhood friend of the second applicant’s,
trained in the field of psychology, on the basis that he has
“prepared strategy documents .. and actively assisted the litigation
campaigns and defamatory online publications against the First
Respondent”.
40. The legal principles underlying the law on joinder are well-known:
"The issue in our matter, as it is in any non -joinder dispute, is whether the party
sought to be joined has a direct and substantial in terest in the matter. The test
is whether a party that is alleged to be a necessary party has a legal interest in
the subject matter, which may be affected prejudicially by the judgment of the
court in the proceedings concerned."27
41. No court can make findi ngs adverse to any person's interests, without
that person first being a party to the proceedings before it.28
42. Joinder is thus necessary when a party has a direct and substantial
interest that could be prejudiced by the Court's judgment. I t is clear
from the papers in the main application that none of the persons sought
to be joined fall in the category of persons who would be prejudiced by
this Court’s orders in the present matter.
43. The first respondent’s aim in effecting the joinder is, however, mainly to
hold the se persons liable as being having been complicit in what she
regards as the applicants’ wrongful conduct against her. She seeks
“disclosure” f rom them in relation to a myriad of issues personal and
confidential as to the applicants, so as to support her “counterclaim”,
27 Gordon v Department of Health: Kwazulu-Natal 2008 (6) SA 522 (SCA) para 9.
28 Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Limited and others; Mkhonto and
others v Compensation Solutions (Pty) Limited 2018 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 92.
namely the reinstatement of the interim protection order that had been
set aside in the magistrates’ court in February 2025.
44. The first respondent submits that these parties’ “ roles demonstrate that
they are not neutral third parties but are part of the same network of
actors who have contributed to the abuse of process and to the
perpetuation of defamator y publications against me … Their joinder is
necessary to ens ure that any interdict or cost orders granted … are
effective, biding, and comprehensive”.
45. The first respondent was not willing to accept, when the matter was
heard, the Court’s explanation that it was not the appropriate forum for
the re-litigation of the defunct protection order. Counsel for the parties
sought to be joined (they had not been properly cited – they had merely
received service of the application) deli vered detailed argument on the
deficiencies of the joinder application, with reference to issues of
compellability, relevance, privilege , and confidentiality, but it is not
necessary to say anything more about it.
46. The application is plainly an abuse, and falls to be dismissed, with costs
on a punitive scale.
Order
47. In all of these circumstances, the following orders are made:
47.1. The rule nisi granted on 29 August 2025 in the applicants’
application for interdictory relief is made final.
47.2. The first respondent shall pay the costs of the main application, on
the scale as between attorney and client.
47.3. The first respondent is declared to be in contempt of court for her
failure to comply with the provisions of the interim order granted on
29 August 2025, and she is ordered to pay a fine of R5 000,00.
47.4. The first respondent shall pay the costs of the contempt application
on the scale as between attorney and client.
47.5. The first respondent’s application for the stay of execution of the
interim order dated 29 August 2025 is dismissed, with costs on the
scale as between attorney and client.
47.6. The first respondent’s application for joinder is dismissed, with
costs on the scale as between attorney and client.
P. S. VAN ZYL
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Appearances:
For the applications: Ms F. Jakoet
Instructed by: Kellerman Hendrikse Attorneys
For the parties sought to be joined: Mr A. Kassen
Instructed by: Hanekom Attorneys
The first respondent in person
No appearance for the second respondent