THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case No: JR715/23
In the matter between:
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND
ADMINISTRATION Applicant
and
NEHAWU obo M G LETSWALO
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION First Respondent
KATLHOLO WABILE N.O Second Respondent
GENERAL PUBLIC SERVICE SECTOR
BARGAINING COUNCIL Third Respondent
Heard: 12 June 2025
Delivered: 20 October 2025
(This judgment was handed down electronically by emailing a copy to the
parties. The 20
th of October 2025 is deemed to be the date of delivery of this
judgment).
JUDGMENT
PHAKEDI, AJ
2
Introduction
[1] The Applicant approached the Court seeking an order to review and set aside
the arbitration award issued by the second respondent dated 24 November
2022. The review application was filed on 15 May 2022 outside the prescribed
period of six (6) weeks. The review application was filed together with a
condonation application, which is opposed by the first respondent.
[2] The applicant filed its notice in terms of Rule 7A(8)(b)
1 on 18 October 2023.
The Registrar issued a notice in terms of Rule 7 A(5) to the applicant on 21
July 2023, and the record was filed on 18 September 2023. However, the
notice in terms of Rule 7A( 6) was not filed. The f irst respondent submitted in
its heads of argument that the late filing of the record invoked the provisions
of the Practice Manual 2, as such, the review application is deemed to be
withdrawn.
[3] The Court has noted that these issues were not raised in the answering
affidavit to enable the applicant to cure the defect by applying for the
reinstatement of the review application. The heads of argument of the first
respondent are not stamped, and the Court is not in a position to determine
whether they were filed in Court or not. As such, the Court has taken a
decision to deal with the condonation application for the late filing of the
review application for the reasons set out below.
[4] Clause 1.2 of the Practice Manual provides that by their nature, the provisions
of the manual call for flexibility in their application where this is required to
promote their purpose.
[5] Clause 2.1 provides that the P ractice Manual is not intended to limit judicial
discretion.
1 GN 1665 of 1996: Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Labour Court, repealed with effect
from July 2024.
2 Practice Manual of the Labour Court of South Africa, effective 2 April 2013, repealed with effect from
July 2024.
3
[6] Rule 11(4) provides that “in the exercise of its powers and in the performance
of its functions, or in any incidental matter, the court may act in a manner that
it considers expedient in the circumstances to achieve the objects of the Act”.
[7] The Labour Appeal Court in Macsteel Trading Wadeville v Van der Merwe NO
& others
3 dealt with the provisions of Rule 11(4) and held that a primary object
of the Labour Relations Act 4 (LRA) is to promote the effective resolution of
labour disputes, integral to which is the speedy resolution of disputes as
stated in Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration and Others
5.
Condonation application
[8] The applicant stated that it received the arbitration award on 29 November
2022 and the six weeks period within which the review application ought to
have been filed on or about 10 January 2023. The review application was filed
on 15 May 2023, which is approximately 17 weeks outside the prescribed
period.
[9] The matter was referred to the office of the State Attorney for a legal opinion
on 14 December 2022. The State Attorneys could not proceed with the
procurement process as prescribed by the National Treasury Regulations due
to the festive season. Counsel was appointed and briefed on 26 January 2023
to determine the prospects of successfully reviewing and setting aside the
arbitration award.
[10] The said counsel requested a consultation on 3 February 2023, but the
officials were only able to consult on 9 February 2023. The applicant received
a legal opinion from Counsel on 23 February 2023.
[11] On 3 March 2023, the applicant received a supplementary legal opinion and
opted to engage in settle ment discussions with the first respondent. The
3 (2019) 40 ILJ 798 (LAC); [2018] ZALAC 50 at para 20.
4 Act 66 of 1995, as amended.
5 Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others
[2016] 3 BLLR 217 (CC).
4
settlement proposal was sent to the first respondent on 22 March 2023 with a
request for feedback on 30 March 2023, but there was no response.
[12] In respect of prospects of success, the applicant submitted that the
commissioner failed to apply his mind to the facts of the matter. He
misdirected himself and ultimately made a decision which a reasonable
arbitrator could not have reached based on the same facts.
[13] In respect of prejudice, the applicant submitted that the first respondent will
not be prejudiced and the matter is of public interest as it involves taxpayers’
money and may have serious repercussions for the public service
administration.
[14] The first respondent is opposing the condonation application on the basis that
the delay is excessive, as the review application was only instituted in May ,
which is four months outside the period within which the application ought to
have been filed. The first respondent also took issue with the fact that the
applicant had failed to provide evidence in support of all the events which led
to the review being filed late. Furthermore, the applicant failed to provide an
explanation and account for the period between 30 March 2023, when they
were expecting a response to the settlement proposal and the date when the
review application was eventually filed.
[15] On prospects of success, the first respondent submitted that the applicant had
no prospects of success in the review application. In respect of prejudice, the
first respondent submitted that the delay is excessive and this is prejudicial to
the employees who must wait for years for the matter to be finalised.
[16] The applicant, in his replying affidavit , chose not to deal with the issues
raised, and as such ,
the averments and allegations made by the first
respondent in its answering affidavit remain unchallenged.
[17] The Labour Court is a creature of statutes and derives its powers and
jurisdiction from the LRA. In order to exercise its review powers, it must have
jurisdiction from the LRA. In order to exercise its review powers, it must have
jurisdiction to entertain the application. Furthermore, an a pplicant in a
5
condonation application has to show good cause that it is deserving of the
Court’s indulgence for its non-compliance with its rules and the law.
Applicable legal principles
[18] Section 145(1A) of the LRA provides that “the Labour Court may on good
cause shown condone the late filing of an application in terms of subsection
(1)”.
[19] It is trite that in considering an application for condonation, the Labour Court
exercises a discretion which must be exercised judicially , premised on all the
relevant factors such as good cause, length of delay, explanation for delay,
prospects of success, interests of justice and prejudice.
Submissions by both parties in respect of condonation
[20] The applicant submitted that the delay of four months is not excessive based
on the circumstances of this matter. As stated above, the first respondent
submitted that the a pplicant failed to provide a reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the period of delay between 30 May 2023 and 12 May 2024
when the review application was eventually served on the respondents.
[21] The first respondent also rejects the applicant’s submissions that it has strong
prospects of success in the review application. Although the delay is not fully
explained and it is not insignificant, the Court is further required to consider
the prospects of success and related factors in order to properly deal with an
application for condonation.
[22] The basic principle in our jurisprudence is that in order to properly deal with
condonation applications, the Court must consider all the factors, including the
degree of lateness and explanation thereof, prejudice, the interests of justice,
prospects of success, as well as the importance of the case to both parties.
[23] The onus of showing the existence of good cause in a condonation
application rests with the applicant, and this essentially entails satisfying the
two well- established requirements, namely: (a) providing a satisfactory
two well- established requirements, namely: (a) providing a satisfactory
explanation for the delay; and (b) showing the prospect of success in the main
6
case. The applicant bears the burden of showing good cause. A mere
allegation of good cause will not be sufficient to assist the Court in exercising
its discretion whether to grant condonation or not. In other words, as stated in
Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v Eversafe (Pty) Ltd and Others
6, the
applicant must “at least, furnish an explanation of his default sufficiently full to
enable the court to understand how it really came about and to assess his
conduct and motives… Where there has been a long delay, the court should
require the party in default to satisfy the court that the relief sought should be
granted”.
7
[24] In its application for condonation, the a pplicant submitted that it has strong
prospects of success in the review application. It did not, however, specifically
outline those prospects, and the Court has to consider the review application
in order to determine on what basis he is alleging that the arbitration award is
reviewable on any of the grounds advanced.
Arbitration award and grounds for review
[25] The dispute of unfair labour practice was launched by the first respondent on
behalf of Ms Letswalo and Ms Letsoalo. At the arbitration, only Ms Letswalo
testified on behalf of the two employees.
[26] The arbitrator recorded that the issue to be decided was “ whether or not the
Employer committed an unfair labour practice against Ms Letswalo and Ms
Letsoalo in that it did not award them performa nce bonuses that were
allegedly due to them”. The performance bonuses were due to be paid during
the performance cycle 2018/2019 financial year.
[27] At the conclusion of proceedings and having heard the evidence of all parties ,
the arbitrator found that the e mployer committed an unfair labour practice
against the employees and ordered the e mployer to pay compensation to Ms
M Letswalo in the amount of R94 533.75 and Ms Letsoalo an amount of R43
398.75 by no later than 15 December 2022.
6 2000 (3) SA 87 (W) at para 12.
398.75 by no later than 15 December 2022.
6 2000 (3) SA 87 (W) at para 12.
7 Aspen Holdings (Pty) Ltd and another v Phelane and another (Aspen Holdings) [2025] 4 BLLR 409
(LAC); [2025] ZALAC 4 at para 14.
7
[28] The applicant has raised a number of grounds and stated that the a rbitrator
traversed the definition of unfair labour practice by relying on the decision of
the Constitutional Court decision in NEHAWU v University of Cape Town and
Others8. The second ground for review is that the documentary evidence
submitted on behalf of Ms Letswalo was not sufficient to support the rating
score of 4, and this was also the conclusion of the arbitrator. The third ground
is that the arbitrator erred in accepting the second performance assessment
submitted by Ms Letsoalo, and this was grossly irregular. The fourth ground
was that he failed to confine himself to what the parties had agreed to in the
signed pre -arbitration minutes. Finally, the applicant is aggrieved that no
evidence was submitted to the arbitrator for the determination of the amount
awarded as compensation, and the decision to award compensation was
made capriciously in that he did not follow the PMDS policy , which clearly
states that the performance bonus is equal to 2.5 of the salary notch of the
employee.
[29] The first respondent submitted that the review application must be dismissed
based on the fact that the applicant failed to prove that its decision to deny Ms
Letsoalo and Ms Letswalo their performance bonuses was exercised fairly.
The first respondent also submitted that the second and fourth grounds for
review must be dismissed on the basis that the applicant, in its papers,
acknowledged that the employees had referred a dispute of unfair labour
practice to the Bargaining Council on or during January 2020, arising from the
employer’s failure to pay performance bonuses.
[30] It is further submitted that the applicant failed to adduce evidence it relied on
to score the e mployees in the manner it did, and the demand for the
employees to resubmit their performance agreements was a transgression of
the policy. Finally, the first respondent denies that there was an agreement
the policy. Finally, the first respondent denies that there was an agreement
between the parties on the amount of performance bonus in the event that the
employees were successful, and the signed minutes did not record this.
Findings and conclusions of the arbitrator
8 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC); (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC).
8
[31] The arbitrator relied on the decision of the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) in
Apollo Tyres SA (Pty) Ltd v C ommission for C onciliation, Mediation &
Arbitration & others9 (Apollo Tyres) where it was held that “ the rights
contested in such cases must be interpreted to include advantages or
privileges employees have been offered or granted in terms of a policy or
practice subject to the employer’s discretion” .
10 The arbitrator stated further
that the exercise of discretion may be challenged on the basis of unfairness
and relied on Apollo Tyres, where the LAC held that:
‘Unfairness implies a failure to meet an objective standard and may be taken
to include arbitrary, capricious or inconsistent conduct, whether negligent or
intended.’
11
[32] The arbitrator assessed the conduct of the employer as a whole in
considering whether the employees were subjected to unfair labour practices.
He then concluded that the conduct of the employer was unfair in that, despite
having resubmitted the assessments, the calculator indicated that Ms
Letswalo was a highly effective performer. He then concluded that the
decision to deprive employees of the benefit was made in terms of a policy
(PMDS), which is subject to the employer’s discretion as contemplated in
Apollo Tyres12.
[33] In respect of Ms Letsoalo, he also accepted that the e mployer acted
capriciously by concluding that Ms Letsoalo was not entitled to a performance
bonus despite having achieved a rating score of 128% which is indicative of
highly effective performance. He then found that the two employees were
entitled to solatium, and the just and equitable amount, according to him, were
an amount equal to 3 months of the employees’ salary.
Evaluation
9 (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC); [2013] 5 BLLR 434 (LAC).
10 Arbitration award at para 5.9.
11 Apollo Tyres at para 53.
12 Ibid.
9
[34] The current application is premised on the provisions of section 145 of the
LRA, the usual question is whether the decision reached by the arbitrator is
one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.13
[35] The Supreme Court of Appeal in Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of SA
Trade Unions as Amicus Curiae)
14 held as follows:
‘A result will only be unreasonable if it is one that a reasonable arbitrator
could not reach on all the material that was before the arbitrator. Material
errors of fact, as well as the weight and relevance to be attached to particular
facts, are not in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside, but
are only of any consequence if their effect is to render the outcome
unreasonable.’
[36] In explaining the review test outlined in the Sidumo case, the Labour Appeal
Court in Gold Fields Mining SA (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others15 had, inter alia, the following, of
relevance here, to say:
‘[18] In a review conducted under s 145 (2)(a)(ii) of the LRA, the review ing
court is not required to take into account every factor individually,
consider how the arbitrator treated and dealt with each of those
factors and then determine whether a failure by the arbitrator to deal
with one or some of the factors amounts to process related irregularity
sufficient to set aside the award. This piecemeal approach of dealing
with the arbitrator’s award is improper as the review ing court must
necessarily consider the totality of the evidence and then decide
whether the decision made by the arbitrator is one that a reasonable
decision maker could make.
[19] To do it differently or to evaluate every factor individually and
independently is to defeat the very requirement set out in s 138 of the
LRA which requires the arbitrator to deal with the substantial merits of
the dispute between the parties with the minimum of legal formalities
the dispute between the parties with the minimum of legal formalities
13 See: Sidumo & a nother v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & o thers [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC);
(2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) at para 110 (Sidumo).
14 (2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA); 2013 (6) SA 224 (SCA) at para 25.
15 (2014) 35 ILJ 943 (LAC); [2014] 1 BLLR 20 (LAC).
10
and do so expeditiously and fairly. This is also confirmed in the
decision of CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries.’
[37] In terms of section 185(b) of the LRA, every employee has the right not to be
subjected to unfair labour practices.
[38] Section 186(2)(a) of the LRA defined unfair labour practice as “any unfair act
or omission that arises between an employer and an employee involving (a)
unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation
(excluding disputes about dismissals for a reason relating to probation) or
training of an employee or relating to the provision of benefits to an
employee”. The arbitrator in his award, found that the conduct of the applicant
was unfair towards the employees in that the decision not to award them
bonuses was made capriciously and not in line with the PMDS policy.
[39] The Labour Court in Aucamp v SA Revenue Service 16, eloquently
summarised the issue of whether a discretionary salary and/or bonus would
fall within the ambit of a benefit as provided for in section 186(2)(a) of the
LRA. The Court stated:
‘Even if a benefit is subject to conditions and the exercise of a discretion, an
employee could still, as part of the unfair labour practice proceedings, seek to
have instances where the employee then did not receive such benefit
adjudicated. So therefore, even if the benefit is not a guaranteed contractual
right per se, the employee could still claim the same on the basis of an unfair
labour practice if the employee c ould show that the employee was unfairly
deprived of the same. An example would be where an employer must
exercise a discretion to decide if such benefit accrues to an employee, and
exercises such discretion unfairly.’
[40] The LAC judgment of Apollo Tyres 17 held that a benefit, for the purposes of
section 186(2)(a), is not limited to an entitlement that arises ex contractu or ex
lege and included an advantage or privilege which is offered or granted in
lege and included an advantage or privilege which is offered or granted in
terms of policy or practice subject to the employer’s discretion.
16 (2014) 35 ILJ 1217 (LC); [2014] 2 BLLR 152 (LC) at para 29.
17 (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 (LAC); [2013] 5 BLLR 434 (LAC).
11
[41] The Labour Appeal Court LAC in H ealth & Other Services P ersonnel Trade
Union o n behalf of Tshambi v Department of Health, KwaZulu- Natal18 held
that:
‘An arbitrator is required to determine the true dispute between the parties. To
that end, it is necessary to establish the relevant facts and construe the
category of dispute correctly. An arbitrator must make an objective finding
about what is the dispute to be determined. This c ourt in Wardlaw v Supreme
Mouldings (Pty) Ltd (Wardlaw) (2007) 28 ILJ 1042 (LAC) , addressed directly
the question of whether the employee’s characterisation of a dispute should
enjoy deference and rejected that approach. Distinguishing the formalistic
school of thought from that of the substantive school of thought, this court
held that the latter should prevail. As a result, in Wardlaw, an arbitrator was
held to have incorrectly assumed jurisdiction over a dispute that was about an
automatically unfair dismissal, a category of dispute reserved for adjudication
by the Labour Court.’
[42] The Constitutional Court disposed of the above-mentioned issue in CUSA v
Tao Ying Metal Industries and Others19 and held that:
‘…commissioners are required to “deal with the substantial merits of the
dispute with the minimum of legal formalities ”.
This requires commissioners to
deal with the substance of a dispute between the parties. They must cut
through all the claims and counter -claims and reach for the real dispute
between the parties. In order to perform this task effectively, arbitrators must
be allowed a significant measure of latitude in the performance of their
functions. Thus, the LRA permits commissioners to “conduct the arbitration in
a manner that the commissioner considers appropriate”. But, in doing so,
commissioners must be guided by at least three considerations. The first is
that they must resolve the real dispute between the parties. Second, they
must do so expeditiously. And, in resolving the labour dispute, they must act
must do so expeditiously. And, in resolving the labour dispute, they must act
fairly to all the parties as the LRA enjoins them to do.
18 (2016) 37 (ILJ) 1839 (LAC); [2016] 7 BLLR 649 (LAC) at para 16.
19 2009 (2) SA 204 (CC); [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC) at paras 65 and 66.
12
A commissioner [ arbitrator] must, as the LRA requires, “deal with the
substantial merits of the dispute”. This can only be done by ascertaining the
real dispute between the parties.’
[43] I have considered the prospects of success advanced by the a pplicant in this
matter, and I do not believe that there is a need to interfere with the arbitration
award on any of the grounds listed by the applicant.
Principles applicable in condonation applications
[44] The LAC in Govender and o thers v Commission for Conciliation , Mediation
and Arbitration and o thers20 expanded the above- mentioned principles and
held that:
‘[57] … The factors relevant in the consideration of the grant or refusal of
condonation include the degree of lateness, the explanation therefor,
the prospects of success and the importance of the case. And in
certain cases, the interest of justice may play a role.
[58] Added to the factors applicable to condonation applications is the
consideration that employment disputes should be dealt with
expeditiously as a delay in the resolution of labour disputes
undermines the object of the LRA and “ any determination of the issue
of good cause must always be considered against the backdrop of this
fundamental principle” and further that review applications are by their
nature, urgent and must be treated with a degree of diligence and
promptness.’
[45] The LAC in Lekhesa: In re Ngwenya v Trustees for the Time being of Sishen
Iron Ore Co Community Development Trust & another21 stated:
‘The grant of condonation involves the exercise of a discretion, with a
decision to condone a party's non- compliance with the rules of the court or
directions constituting an indulgence granted by the court. Such an
application should be granted if, having regard to the particular circumstances
of the matter, it is in the interests of justice to do so, and refused if it is not. To
20 [2024] 5 BLLR 453 (LAC); [2024] ZALAC 6.
21 (2024) 45 ILJ 1220 (LAC); [2024] 6 BLLR 585 (LAC) at para 14.
13
reach a decision, regard is to be had to factors including the nature of the
relief sought, the extent and cause of the delay, the reasonableness of the
explanation for the delay, the importance of the issue to be raised, issues of
prejudice and the prospects of success. As a general proposition, the factors
to be considered are not individually decisive of an application for
condonation but are all considered to determine what is in the interests of
justice.’
[46] In Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority & another22, the Constitutional
Court stated as follows:
‘The interests of justice must be determined with reference to all relevant
factors. However, some of the factors may justifiably be left out of
consideration in certain circumstances. For example, where the delay is
unacceptably excessive and there is no explanation for the delay, there may
be no need to consider the prospects of success. If the period of delay is
short and there is an unsatisfactory explanation but there are reasonable
prospects of success, condonation should be granted. However, despite the
presence of reasonable prospects of success, condonation may be refused
where the delay is excessive, the explanation is non-existent and granting
condonation would prejudice the other party . As a general proposition the
various factors are not individually decisive but should all be taken into
account to arrive at a conclusion as to what is in the interests of justice.’
Conclusion
[47] Based on the authorities applicable in this court and on the principle of stare
decisis, this court comes to a conclusion that the award falls within the band
of reasonableness and warrants no interference.
[48] The applicant has not succeeded in showing good cause entitling it to be
pardoned for i ts failure to comply with the period prescribed for the filing of
review applications.
Costs
22 (2014) 35 ILJ 121 (CC); [2014] 1 BLLR 1 (CC) at para 51.
14
[49] The first respondent sought costs in the event that the application is
dismissed. It is trite that the awarding of costs in the Labour Court is
discretionary as envisaged in section 162 of the LRA. The Constitutional
Court in Long v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd and others and a related
matter
23 held as follows:
‘[27] It is well accepted that in labour matters, the general principle that
costs follow the result does not apply. This principle is based on
section 162 of the LRA, which reads:
“(1) The Labour Court may make an order for the payment of
costs, according to the requirements of the law and fairness.
(2) When deciding whether or not to order the payment of costs,
the Labour Court may take into account —
(a) whether the matter referred to the Court ought to have
been referred to arbitration in terms of this Act and, if
so, the extra costs incurred in referring the matter to the
Court; and
(b) the conduct of the parties —
(i) in proceeding with or defending the matter
before the Court; and
(ii) during the proceedings before the Court.”
[28] The relationship between the general principle of costs and section
162 was considered and settled by this Court in Zungu:
“In this matter, there is nothing on the record indicating why the
Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court awarded costs against
the applicant. Neither court gave reasons for doing so. It
seems that both courts simply followed the rule that costs
follow the result. This is not correct.”’
23 2019 (5) BCLR 609 (CC); (2019) 40 ILJ 965 (CC).
15
[50] The Constitutional Court in Booi v Amathole District Municipality & others24,
dealt with the issue of costs in the Labour Court and held as follows:
‘However, this is a labour matter and this c ourt’s jurisprudence is settled: the
ordinary rule that costs follow the result does not apply in labour matters.
Rather, what emerges from the provisions of the LRA and the jurisprudence is
that courts, when awarding costs in labour disputes, must consider what
fairness demands and err on the side of not discouraging parties from
approaching the courts for the peaceful resolution of labour disputes. Further,
if costs are to be awarded in labour matters, there must be reasons that justify
a court’s decision to depart from the position that a losing party should not be
mulcted in costs in labour disputes.’
[51] The above-mentioned principle was clearly espoused in Member of the
Executive Council for Finance, KwaZulu- Natal & another v Dorkin NO &
another25 where the Court held:
‘In making decisions on cost orders this c ourt should seek to strike a fair
balance between, on the one hand, not unduly discouraging workers,
employers, unions and employers’ organi zations from approaching the
Labour Court and this court to have their disputes dealt with, and, on the
other, allowing those parties to bring to the Labour Court and this c ourt
frivolous cases that should not be brought to court. That is a balance that is
not always easy to strike but, if the court is to err, it should err on the side of
not discouraging parties to approach these courts with their disputes. In that
way these courts will contribute to those parties not resorting to industrial
action on disputes that should properly be referred to either arbitral bodies for
arbitration or to the courts for adjudication.’
[52] Based on the above authorities, this Court comes to the conclusion that it is in
the interests of the law and fairness that each party be burdened with its own
costs.
the interests of the law and fairness that each party be burdened with its own
costs.
[53] In the result, the following order is made:
24 (2022) 43 ILJ 91 (CC); [2022] 1 BLLR 1 (CC) at para 60.
25 (2008) 29 ILJ 1707 (LAC); [2008] 6 BLLR 540 (LAC) at para 19.
16
Order
1. The application for condonation of the late filing of the review
application is dismissed.
2. The review application is dismissed.
3. There is no order as to costs.
_______________________
GC Phakedi
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Adv BK Hlangwane
Instructed by: State Attorneys Pretoria
For the Respondent: Adv L Quilliam
Instructed by: Ncube Inc Attorneys