THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
Case No: JR2444/21
In the matter between:
LEPADIMA PHUTHI CASBETH & 13 OTHERS Applicant
And
SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
BARGAINING COUNCIL First Respondent
RONALD MUDAU N.O. Second Respondent
CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY Third Respondent
Heard: 14 August 2025
Delivered: 17 October 2025
JUDGMENT
RAMJI, AJ
Introduction
[1] The 14 applicants (the employees) referred a dispute to the first respondent
(the Council). The dispute was referred as one concerning the interpretation
and application of a collective agreement , and the certificate of non- resolution
also recorded this.
[2] After the City raised a point in limine at the arbitration, the second respondent
(the Commissioner) ruled that the Council does not have the jurisdiction to
hear the dispute because ‘the [employees] do not request an interpretation or
application of a collective agreement, but rather that the outcome of the step 3
grievance by implemented which the Council does not have the jurisdiction to
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enforce… under the interpretation and application, section 24 of the LRA ’
(sic).
[3] The question in this Court is whether the Commissioner was correct, i.e
whether the Council has jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute. The outcome of
the grievance procedure (in favour of the employees) must be accepted as
correct, and its substance is not part of this review.
[4] This judgment sets out: (a) a brief factual background; (b) the submissions in
this Court; and (c) the City’s reliance on section 33A.
The grievance process and outcome
[5] The employees are permanently employed by the City as emergency medical
care and ambulance service employees. They were appointed to permanent
positions between 2012 and 2013.
[6] Prior to their appointments, the Collective Agreement on Conditions of Service
and the Collective Agreement on the Implementation of a U niform Salary
Grading Scheme for Emergency Medical Care and Ambulance Service
Employees were concluded.
[7] The employees were aggrieved by a decision taken by the City in 2013, which
disqualified them from certain employment terms contained in the collective
agreements (specifically, extra notches added to their salaries annually).
[8] On 30 April 2020, the employees lodged a collective grievance on the
prescribed form and in accordance with the City’s Grievance Procedure.
[9] On 25 November 2020, the employees were given notice of a ‘ Step 3
Meeting’ to investigate their grievance.
[10] On 7 December 2020, the City issued a letter (Outcome Letter). Among other
things, the letter recorded the following:
10.1. The Grading Scheme for Emergency Medical Care and Ambulance
Services Employees was applicable to the employees.
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10.2. An employee will qualify for a notch increment if he or she attains a
50% +1 performance rating.
10.3. An employee without the relevant driver’s permit is not disqualified from
the above notch increment.
10.4. An employee not having the relevant driver’s permit or Health
Professions Council registration is a disciplinary issue and not a
performance issue.
[11] The Outcome Letter is essentially an interpretation of t wo collective
agreements.
[12] The employees’ dispute then escalated to a complaint that, even after the
Outcome Letter, the City did not adjust their salary scales as required. They
set out the years in which the City withheld their salary notch increments . For
some, it was one year for which an increment was withheld, for others , over
five years. This means that the City has allegedly not complied with its
obligations under the collective agreement s, as interpreted in the Outcome
Letter. This is therefore a dispute about the collective agreements.
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[13] The employees referred their case to the Council. They complained that the
outcome of their grievance, which they referred to as a settlement agreement,
had not been enforced. They sought an award directing the Council to
‘enforce settlement agreement…’ There is no settlement agreement , strictly
speaking. Instead, the applicants refer to and rely on the outcome of the
grievance procedure, which was in their favour. The outcome of the grievance
is recorded in a letter from the City dated 7 December 2020 and received by a
shop steward, who recorded on the letter, ‘Agreed’.
[14] Following the City’s failure to comply with the terms of the Outcome Letter, the
employees referred a dispute to the Council seeking the enforcement of the
findings detailed in the Outcome Letter.
1 See: Rukwaya & Others v Kitchen Bar Restaurant (2018) 39 ILJ 180 (LAC) at paras 17 – 18, which
ruled that claims for payment of outstanding salaries that are based on alleged contraventions of a
collective agreement are to be dealt with by the provisions of the L abour Relations Act 66 of 1995, as
amended (LRA) relating to collective agreements.
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[15] The City has remained silent on whether it is not complying with the Outcome
Letter and, by extension, the collective agreements. Instead, it has limited
itself to advancing only a technical argument on whether a section 24 referral
was correct.
Section 24 or section 33A of the LRA
[16] The employees argue that the Council has jurisdiction to arbitrate their referral
in terms of section 24 of the Labour Relations Act 2 (LRA) because a ‘dispute
about enforcement of the collective agreement is tantamount to a dispute
about the application of such agreement ’. In support of this argument, the
employees’ written submissions referred to the well -known decision of
Revelas J from 2000 in which she held that –
‘.. “a dispute about a collective agreement” … applies to the situation where
there is non -compliance with a collective agreement and one of the parties
wishes to enforce its terms.’3
[17] There were other decisions to this effect during that period. In 2002, however,
the LRA was amended to cater for the enforcement of collective agreements.
Enforcement provisions are now separately contained in section 33A of the
LRA.
[18] The employees’ submissions , unfortunately, did not address the debates on
whether the decision of Revelas J remains applicable with the introduction of
section 33A.
[19] The City argued:
‘The enforcement of a collective agreement is not provided for in terms of
section 24 of the LRA. Rather the enforcement of the collective agreement is
provided for under section 33A of the LRA.’
[20] The City was careful not to expressly state that the employees should have
referred a dispute in terms of section 33A.
2 Act 66 of 1995, as amended.
3 NUCW v Oranje Mynbou en Vervoer Maatskappy Bpk [2000] 2 BLLR 196 (LC) at para 9.
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The scope of section 33A
[21] At the hearing, I asked the parties whether the Council had jurisdiction, in any
event, to arbitrate this dispute in terms of section 33A of the LRA , given the
failure by the employees to comply with its prescribed procedures.
[22] This was primarily a question for the City, which had relied on the existence of
section 33A to persuade the Commissioner that he did not have jurisdiction
under section 24 of the LRA. The City’s argument might have implied that the
employees’ problems would be solved if they referred a dispute in terms of
section 33A.
[23] Both parties were given the opportunity to make further submissions by
29 August 2025. On 26 September 2025, I received further submissions from
the City. I have not received submissions from the employees.
Finding on section 33A
[24] Although the dispute was conciliated, I find that section 33A would still not
give the Commissioner jurisdiction to arbitrate this dispute for the following
reasons:
24.1. Section 33A is intended to give bargaining councils the primary
responsibility to oversee compliance with collective agreements.
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24.2. The procedure envisioned does not entail arbitration following referral
to conciliation by aggrieved employees, and a certificate of non-
resolution.
24.3. Instead, section 33A(3) first envisions an aggrieved person
approaching a ‘ designated agent’ for a ‘ compliance order ’. There
appears to be no restriction on who may seek a compliance order and I
therefore agree with the City’s further submissions when they write that
seeking a compliance order ‘could have resolved the matter…’ and that
a ‘mechanism existed within the enforcement framework which ought
to have been utilised before the matter was escalated’ (that is, referred
4 Section 33A(1) of the LRA.
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to the Council). The Council’s Main Agreement sets out the designated
agent and the compliance order process.
24.4. It is only if there is ‘ an unresolved dispute concerning compliance with
any collective agreement ’ that the dispute may be referred to
arbitration.5 I agree with the City that the subsection only permits the
Council, as the guardian of its agreements , and not the individuals
subject to the agreements, to refer a dispute to arbitration.6
24.5. An individual who is a party to the arbitration may object to the
appointment of an arbitrator, but there is no provision for an individual
or a party to the dispute to make the referral to arbitration in the text of
section 33A(4) or in the context of section 33A as a whole.
[25] The section 33A explanatory memorandum explains that after the LRA
decriminalised non- compliance with collective agreements , compliance
disputes were being referred to conciliation and, where necessary, arbitration.
It noted a gap in that the LRA did not ‘deal expressly with those disputes in
which a bargaining council is a party ( whether to claim payments on behalf of
an employee or payments such as levies that are due to the council or
contributions to funds established by councils) ’7 (own emphasis). It explained
that section 33A was being introduced ‘ to provide an explicit statutory basis
for arbitrations dealing with the enforcement of bargaining council collective
agreements.’8
[26] It is therefore for the employees to place the City’s alleged non- compliance
with the collective agreement, as interpreted according to the Outcome Letter,
at the Council’s door by seeking a compliance order in terms of section
33A(3) of the LRA . If the City still fails to comply, it will be for the Council to
preserve the integrity of its agreements by referring the dispute for arbitration
in terms of section 33A(4) of the LRA. The Commissioner will not only have
5 Section 33A(4) of the LRA.
5 Section 33A(4) of the LRA.
6 See for example: National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry v J 'n B
Sportswear CC & Another (2011) 32 ILJ 1950 (LC) at para 1; Skulpad and Another v Department of
Health, Eastern Cape and Others (2025) 46 ILJ 193 (LC) at para 65.
7 Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2000 Explanatory Memorandum 2000 ILJ 2195 at p 2212.
8 Cited in Innovative Staffing Solutions (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Bargaining Council for the
Road Freight and Logistics Industry and Others (2025) 46 ILJ 336 (LAC) at para 12.
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the jurisdiction under section 33A(4) to arbitrate the issue of compliance, and
should the employees succeed in showing non- compliance, the
Commissioner will further have the power to make an award ‘ that gives effect
to [the] collective agreement[s]’.9
Conclusion
[27] For this reason, the review application must fail . The employees have relief
under section 33A(3) of the LRA.
Costs
20. There is an ongoing relationship between the parties , and the applicants have
already incurred expenses of legal representatives and relied on their advice
in trying to protect their interests . Should they continue to pursue their case,
they also have a long road ahead of them. Therefore, although this review
application had no merit from the outset, a costs order in favour of the
successful party is not warranted.
Order
1. The review application is dismissed.
2. There is no order as to costs.
_______________________
B. Ramji
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
9 Section 138(9)(a) of the LRA.
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Appearances:
For the Applicant: Adv B Lukhele
Instructed by: Mketsu & Associates
For the Third Respondent: Ms Patience Ndlovu, Leepile Attorneys