IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

JUDGMENT

Reportable

Case No: 2025-135243


In the matter between:



PRECISION METERS (PTY) LTD

Applicant



and

SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL ACCREDITATION
SYSTEM

NATIONAL REGULATOR FOR COMPULSORY
SPECIFICATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA



First Respondent


Second Respondent

Heard: 11 September 2025
Delivered: 28 October 2025
Summary: interim interdict; OUTA clearest of cases test for interim relief; costs

_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
1. The matter is dealt with as one of urgency.
2. Pending the outcome of part B:
a. The first respondent is directed to remove the unsigned documen ts
concerning the applicant , which were uploaded in August 2025 , from
its website.
b. The second respondent is directed, within two days of this order, to
issue the applicant with a designation verification certificate stating that
the applicant is a verifica tion body under the Legal Metrology Act 9 of
2014 for water meters with a nominal bore of up to 100mm.
3. The first and second respondents are to pay the applicant ’s costs jointly and
severally, and the costs are to include the costs of two counsel on scale C.

_____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________
Judgment handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal representatives
on email and released on SAFLII
HOFMEYR AJ:

Introduction
1 The applicant, Precision Meters, sells, verifies and installs water meters. Since
2015, the first respondent, SANAS, has accredited Precision Meters to verify the
accuracy of water meters with a nominal bore of up to 100mm. And since 2015,
the second respondent, the Specifications Authority, has designated Precision
Meters as a “verification body” to verify the accuracy of water meters up to
100mm.
2 On 31 July 2025, the Specifications Authority issued a designatio n certificate to
Precision Meters limiting it to verifying meters only up to 25mm. It did so because
SANAS had told it that Precision Meters was only accredited to verify meters up
to 25mm.
3 But, as recently as two months earlier, in May 2025, SANAS had acc redited
Precision Peters to verify meters up to 100mm.

4 Precision Meters therefore approached the court for an interim interdict to permit
it to continue verifying water meters up to 100mm until the determination of its
application to review and set aside the impugned decision s of SANAS and the
Specifications Authority.
5 I conclude that Precision has met the requirements for the interim interdict and
that it satisfied the requirements of urgency for that relief.
6 I deal with each aspect in turn below but before doing so, it is necessary to sketch
the legal framework for the case and the pertinent facts in which they arise.
Legal Framework
7 Section 1 of the Legal Metrology Act 9 of 2015 (the Metrology Act) permits a body
that is accredited in terms of the Accred itation for Conformity Assessment,
Calibration and Good Laboratory Practice Act 19 of 2006 ( the Accreditation Act )
to verify measuring instruments.
8 Section 7 of the Metrology Act says that the Chief Executive Officer of the
Specifications Authority may des ignate a verification body , which meets certain
prescribed criteria, to verify measuring instruments.
9 Section 22 of the Accreditation Act requires anyone seeking accreditation to
apply to SANAS. Section 23 says that an accreditation certificate issued by

SANAS must be signed by the chief executive officer or a person designate d by
him.
10 This Court has previously held that such an accreditation certificate “affords
objective proof that a particular body has been found by SANAS to meet the
required criteria for accreditation”.1
11 So, a body, such as Precision Meters, that wishes to undertake the business of
verifying water meters , needs an accreditation from SANAS and a designation
from the Specifications Authority.
12 SANAS has also prescribed an internal policy de aling with the withdrawal,
suspension or reduction of scope of an accreditation. The internal policy requires
SANAS to follow as prescribed process before any of these actions are taken in
respect of an accreditation.
The pertinent facts
The last twelve years
13 In 2013, Precision Meters applied to SANAS for accreditation to verify water
meters with a nominal bore of between 15mm and 30mm.


1 ABET Inspection Engineering (Pty) Ltd v the Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa
and Another [2018] ZAWCHC 7 para 17

14 In response to this application, SANAS accredited Precision Meters for more than
it sought. It was accredited to verify m eters up to 100mm. The accreditation was
valid from 30 May 2013 to 29 May 2017. Precisely why a greater accreditation
was granted than the one applied for is not clear on the papers. SANAS did not,
for example, provide the court with any evidence from anyo ne involved at the
time that the 2013 accreditation decision was made to explain the basis on which
Precision Meters was given an accreditation up to 100mm when it only applied for
one up to 25mm.
15 In 2014, Precision Meters invested in bulk water meter benc hes, equipment and
personnel to operate the benches in order to verify meters up to 100mm.
16 In early 2015, SANAS assessed Precision Meters and conducted an inspection of
its operations. SANAS issued Precision with a new accreditation certificate after
that visit, on 30 January 2015, for up to 100mm.
17 Since then Precision Meters has, to the knowledge of SANAS, and the
Specifications Authority, been verifying water meters up to 100mm.
18 Over the following decade , SANAS conducted a number of inspections and
audits of the bulk water meter benches and their operation at Precision Meters’
premises. After those inspections, it issued Precision Meters with multiple
certificates accrediting it to verify water meters up to 100mm.

19 Throughout this period , Precision Meters also supplied reports to the
Specification Authority that included information about the number of water
meters up to 100mm that it had verified.
20 This case is about whether Precision Meters should be permitted, on an interim
basis, pending the review, to continue to verify water meters up to 100mm.
21 It has come to court to seek the interdict because of a strange turn of events that
unfolded over the last year.
The last year
22 In August 2024, the City of Cape Town alerted Precision Meters to the fact that it
has been told that there were no laboratories accredited to verify water meters
above 100mm. But Precision Meters knew that it had received the necessary
accreditation. So it raised the issue with the Specifications Authority.
23 The Specifications Authority then engaged with SANAS. SANAS responded in an
letter that can only be described as extraordinary. It said that “historically”, the
scope of accreditation that SANAS had used for water meter verification had
used a heading that read “ SANS 1529-1: Water M eters for cold and hot potable
water of nominal bore not exceeding 100mm”.

24 Despite having, itself, chosen to use this heading, SANAS then went on to say
that the appearance of this “heading ”, “does not imply that the laboratory is
capable and competent to verify any meter below or up to 100mm”. SANAS then
explained that there was no SANAS accredited body that had “demonstrated their
competence to verify meters above 30mm during the normal course of
assessment visits”.
25 How SANAS could have said this given th eir regular assessment of Precision
Meters over the last decade is unclear. As I set out above, the facts reveal that
Precision Meters was assessed over the decade from 2015 and routinely showed
SANAS inspectors that it was verifying meters of up to 100mm.
26 Despite this, however , SANAS took up a provocative stance in its letter . It
“challenged” Precision Meters to “produce evidence in which SANAS assessors
had evaluated and acknowledged their capacity and competence to verify meters
up to 100mm”.
27 Then came the clincher. SANAS ended the letter on the basis that it was going to
“immediately” rectify the scope of accreditation for Precision Meters to “correct”
the range of verification up to a limit of 25mm.
28 Of course, despite saying that it was going to do so i mmediately, SANAS must
have known that, in order to change Precision Meter’s certificate to reflect such a

reduced scope, it would have needed to follow the procedure set out in its own
internal policy for a reduction in scope of Precision Meter’s certificate.
29 But it did no such thing.
30 Instead, seven months later, in March 2025 , it did the opposite. It assessed
Precision Meters and, on 6 May 2025, it issued Precision Meters with yet another
accreditation certificate to verify water meters up to 100mm.
31 But then, two further months later, on 31 July 2025, the Specifications Authority
suddenly issued a new verification certificate to Precision Meters in which it
limited Precision Meter’s designation to verifying meters only up to 25mm. I t
explained that it di d so based on SANAS’s “information” that Precision Meters
was only accredited to verify water meters up to 25mm.
32 But that “information” was entirely at odds with then then only extant accreditation
certificate that had been issued to Precision Meters. SANAS issued that
certificate in May 2025. The certificate said, in no uncertain terms, that Precision
Meters had been accredited to verify water meters up to 100mm.
33 Thereafter, things became stranger still. Over three days in August 2025, SANAS
created three new documents dealing with the “scopes of accreditation” for
Precision Meters’ accreditation certificates.

34 To understand the relevance of these “scope s of accreditation”, it is important to
explain that the accreditation certificates issued to Precision M aters comprise two
pages. The first page has the SANAS logo on it and refer s to Precision Meters by
name. It says mid -way down the page that “this certificate is valid as per the
scope as stated in the accompanying scope of accreditation, Annexure A …”
35 Annexure A is headed: “scope of accreditation”. The annexure has a table and a
column within it headed “types of verification and range”. Under that heading, on
Precision Meters’ May 2025 annexure (and all preceding annexures over the last
decade) appears the following: “Range: not exceeding 100mm”.
36 So what SANAS purported to do on three days in early August 2025 was to
replace this annexure A to Precision Meters’ accreditation certificate with new
documents that referred to a reduced scope of up to 25mm. SANA S also
produced two new unsigned documents purportedly replacing the then operative
and duly signed May 2025 certificate.
37 Precision Meters was mystified. It had been receiving accreditations up to 100mm
for a decade . A ll of a sudden , SANAS was trying to c hange its certificates by
posting unsigned documents on its website and the Specifications Authority was
issuing it with a new verification certificate limiting it to verifying meters of only up
to 25mm based on what SANAS was telling it, rather than its most recent signed
accreditation certificate that confirmed it could verify meters of up to 100mm.

38 So Precision Meters turned to this court for an interim interdict to maintain the
status quo pending a review.
Interim Interdict
39 In this section of the judgment, I deal with the requirements for interim interdictory
relief. I do so, first, by considering whether this is a case involving the strict
“clearest of cases” test set in the Constitutional Court’s decision in OUTA.2 I
conclude that this is not an OUTA case. So I then proceed to apply the normal
requirements for an interim interdict to the facts.
The OUTA clearest of cases test
40 Since the Constitutional Court’s decision in OUTA, interim relief applications
against organs of state regularly involve debates about whether the interdict will
impact on the ability of the respondent to exercise its statutory powers. Organs of
state opposing interim interdict applications routinely take up the opportunity to
run an “ OUTA-line” against the grant of the interdict . Irrespective of whether the
case is actually one involving an interdict that will stop the organ of state in the
exercise of its statutory powers, this line of defence is trotted out like a mantra
under the rubric of “separation of powers harm” to cautio n courts against undue
interference with the exercise of statutory powers.


2 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA 223
(CC)

41 This case is a prime example. In the Specifications Authority’s heads of
argument, the following statement of the law appears:
“An interdict against the exercise of public power c an only be granted in
the clearest of cases and in exceptional circumstances as provided for by
the Constitutional Court in OUTA.”
42 But that is not what OUTA held. As I shall set out below, OUTA is not authority for
the proposition that interdicts against any exercise of public power must meet the
clearest of cases standard. On the contrary, more is required from the wielders of
public power if they wish to bring themselves within the ambit of OUTA.
43 OUTA arose in a very particular set of circumstances. It be gan with a cabinet
decision to approve an extensive upgrade of roads in the economic hub of
Gauteng. So it fell within the heartland of executive conduct. 3 It then dealt with
decisions taken by the South African National Roads Agency to implement that
government policy. 4 Those decisions became the focus of a review application
instituted by the Opposition to Urban Tolling Allowance, more commonly known
as “OUTA”. Pending that review, OUTA sought an urgent interim interdict from
the Pretoria High Court to pr ohibit SANRAL from levying and collecting tolls on
the upgraded road network.


3 OUTA para 1
4 OUTA para 2

44 The interdict was therefore sought in a situation where cabinet had decided that
the road network needed to be upgraded. SANRAL took decisions to implement
that policy decision, funds were then secured to pay for the upgrades on the
basis that they would be funded from tolling revenue. The upgrades were rolled
out, the roads’ infrastructure substantially improved and then, on the eve of the
day when motorists were going to have to begin paying for those upgrades,
OUTA sought an interdict to stop the collection of tolls.5
45 It was against that backdrop that the Constitutional Court held that temporary
interdicts against the exercise of statutory power will only be granted in
exceptional circumstances. 6 The Court was concerned with the separation of
powers harm that can arise when the courts step into the “exclusive terrain of the
executive and legislative branches of government” and halt, on a temporary
basis, organs of state from exe rcising their constitutional and statutory powers
and duties. The case was therefore concerned with specific statutory and
constitutional obligations which a temporary interdict would inhibit.
46 On the facts of OUTA, those powers and functions concerned the roll out of a
massive tolling project that had received cabinet approval years before, had been
fully implemented, and was awaiting the collection of tolling revenue.


5 OUTA paras 3 to 7
6 OUTA para 44

47 The specific powers impacted in OUTA therefore had their origins in government
policy, implemented through a statutorily created organ of state – in the form of
SANRAL – whose statutory powers included, expressly, the obligation to exercise
its powers “within the framework of government policy”.7
48 Those factual features of the case provide t he context in which the Constitutional
Court’s reasoning is to be properly understood. The Court did not hold that all
cases involving an interim interdict “against the state” 8 can only be granted in the
clearest of cases.
49 On the contrary, the Constitutio nal Court was not dealing with any old interim
interdict brought against the state. It was dealing with an interdict that would
“disrupt executive or legislative functions conferred by the law ”.9 In that context, it
held that courts must ask whether an int erdict “will implicate the tenet of division
of powers ”10 because it was a case dealing with national executive decision -
making about the ordering pf public resources. That type of issue “ lies in the
heartland of executive-government function and domain”11 and inevitably involves
“policy­laden and polycentric decision­making.”12


7 OUTA para 2
8 See, for example, the judgment in Observatory Civic Association and Another v Trustees, Liesbeek
Leisure Properties and Others 2023 (1) SA 583 (WCC) at para 116 where this is how the ratio of
OUTA was described.
9 OUTA para 65
10 OUTA para 65
11 OUTA para 67
12 OUTA para 68

50 Those are the correct facts against which to understand the findings in OUTA.
The case was not concerned with stock -standard daily administrative decision -
making by any old organ of s tate. It was dealing with decision -making at the core
of executive policy formulation and the polycentric nature of those types of
decisions.
51 In Eskom v Vaal River, the majority of the Constitutional Court emphasised these
features of the OUTA decision. 13 It went on to hold that the strictness of the
OUTA test for an applicant for interim relief needed to be balanced against the
impact of the conduct, which is sought to be interdicted, for constitutional rights.
In other words, the Court recognised that eve n in cases where there are heavily
policy-laden and polycentric decisions that are sought to be interdicted, an
applicant for interim relief may still succeed in obtaining an interdict if, in the
ultimate balance of competing considerations, the impact on rights is significant.
In Eskom, the Constitutional Court described the rights violation as “atrocious”
and nothing short of a “human catastrophe”.14
52 In other words, even when one is dealing with heavily policy -laden and
polycentric decision -making by an or gan of state, a material and substantial
impact on constitutional rights will meet the clearest of cases test.


13 Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd and Others 2023 (4) SA
325 (CC) para 301
14 Eskom para 305.

53 However, the emphasis that the Constitutional Court placed on the impact on
constitutional rights in Eskom in no way detracts from the point I h ave
emphasised above. For OUTA even to apply, the case still needs to be one
involving the exercise of particular public powers – powers that strike at the
heartland of executive functioning and policy-formulation. Those decisions are the
particular preserve of the executive and legislative branches of government and
those are areas into which courts should not lightly tread.
54 Thus, in order for an organ of state to resist an interim interdict on the basis of the
OUTA test, it must, at a minimum, show that its decisions are of this policy-laden,
polycentric type. If it cannot do so, then it cannot call in aid the stringent “clearest
of cases” test that makes it more difficult for an applicant to obtain interim relief
than is usually the case.
55 On a proper re ading of OUTA (as later interpreted by the Constitutional Court in
Eskom), the following principles emerge.
56 In order for an organ of state to bring itself within “clearest of cases” test in
OUTA, its opposing papers should, at a minimum, set out the following:
56.1 what aspect of executive or legislative power will be impacted by the interim
interdict sought;
56.2 how the exercise of that power involves policy-laden or polycentric
decision-making;

56.3 what specific constitutional or statutory obligations or powers of th e organ
of state will be compromised if the interdict is granted; and
56.4 how those obligations or powers will be impacted by the temporary relief
sought.
57 The respondents in this case did not bring themselves within OUTA because they
did not explain how any of these features of the OUTA test were met.
58 It is important to be clear about what it takes to meet the OUTA standard. For
example, it is not enough for the organ of state simply to state, as SANAS did
here, that if the interdict is granted, it and the Spe cifications Authority will be
“precluded from carrying out their statutorily imposed mandates ”. It is not enough
to state a conclusion to bring oneself within the ambit of OUTA. An organ of state
wishing to invoke the OUTA standard must explain what it is about its mandate
that would be impeded by the interdict. Considering the facts of OUTA makes it
clear what is required. There, SANRAL was able to show that it had a statutory
mandate to collect the tolling revenue that cabinet had decided would the fundin g
mechanism for the upgrade of the national road infrastructure. The interdict, if
granted, would preclude it from discharging that very mandate. Despite having
spent all the money on the roads, it would not be able to recover that money . So
the immediate and ongoing impact of the interdict was that the National Treasury,
the executive government and the National Legislature would have to allocate
R270 million per month to SANRAL in order to meet its ongoing capital and

interest repayments in respect of the road upgrades. Thus the interdict therefore
had wide-ranging consequences for the fiscus and the management of the
country's sovereign debt.15
59 That is how an interdict can impede an organ of state from exercising its statutory
powers.
60 In this case, the most that SANAS could say about the impact of the interdict was
that it would preclude it from “effective compliance monitoring”, from “considering
applications for extension of accreditation ”, and from “determining how
accreditation certificates should be wo rded”. But even these claims were
incorrect. None of those alleged consequences will follow from an interim interdict
in this case . This interim interdict will not stop the respondents from exercising
any of their statutory powers. It will merely keep the status quo in place that
existed before the respondents purported to exercise powers by uploading
documents onto a website and issuing new designations.
61 An interdict will not prevent SANAS, or the Specifications Authority , from
exercising any of their monitoring or accreditation powers. It will merely let a
single entity – Precision Meters – continue to do what it has done for a decade
and for which it received accreditation as recently as May this year, until the
reviewing court decides part B of this application.


15 OUTA para 27

62 This is therefore not a case in which OUTA can be invoked because the decision-
making at issue is neither polycentric nor policy-laden.
63 The standard requirements for interim interdictory relief therefore apply – not the
OUTA clearest of cases standard.
Standard interim interdicts
64 The requirements for interim interdictory relief are trite. The applicant must show
a prima facie right, irreparable harm, the absence of an alternative remedy and
that the balance of convenience favours it over the respondent.16
65 The interim relief that Precision Meters seeks in this case is designed to protect
the status quo. It is directed at allowing Precision Meters to continue, as it has
been doing for the last decade, to verify water meters with a nominal bore of up to
100mm until its review is determined.
66 The review is directed at the conduct of SANAS and the Specifications Authority
since July of this year. On 31 July 2025, the Specifications Authority issued
Precision Meters with a designation verification certi ficate limiting it to verifying
meters up to only 25mm. And in August 2025, SANAS uploaded various


16 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221, as developed in Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W)
three decades later.

documents to its website purporting to replace the accreditation certificate that it
has issued in May to Precision Meters.
67 Precision Meters’ part B review i s directed at declaring the documents uploaded
on the SANAS website in August 2025 to be a nullity and requiring SANAS to
issue it with an accreditation certificate for up to 100mm. It also seeks to set aside
the Specifications Authority’s decision to limit the scope of its verification to 25mm
and substituting that decision for one designating Precision Meters to verify up to
100mm.
68 Precision Meters framed its part A relief in the form of orders suspending the
operation of SANAS’s “decisions” taken in Augu st 2025 as well as the
Specifications’ Authority’s decision on 31 July 2025 to issue it with a reduced
verification certificate. It also sought an order directing SANAS to remove the
August 2025 “accreditation certificate” from its website and an order req uiring the
Specifications Authority to issue it with a verification certificate for water meters
with a nominal bore of up to 100mm. All of this relief was sought pending the
outcome of the part B review.
69 The first question is therefore whether Precision M eters has established a prima
facie right to this relief.
Prima facie right

70 The Accreditation Act says that an accreditation certificate “must be signed by the
chief executive officer” or his designee. This means that, in order for a document
to be an accreditation certificate, it must bear the signature of the chief executive
officer of SANAS or his delegate. It is common cause between the parties that the
documents that were generated in August 2025 and uploaded onto the SANAS
website were not signed by the chief executive officer of SANAS nor his
designee. Indeed, they bore no signature at all.
71 This means that they were not certificates under the Accreditation Act.
72 This finding is a pure question of law. It concerns the legal status of documents
that were uploaded onto the SANAS website. I find that those documents did not
meet the requirements of an accreditation certificate under the Accreditation Act
and therefore were no more than documents which some officials within SANAS
uploaded onto a website. They could not affect the legal rights that vested in
Precision Meters when it was issued with a duly signed accreditation certificate
on 30 May 2025. That certificate will expire on 29 May 2029, unless withdrawn by
SANAS before then.
73 Once the legal status of the uploaded documents is clarified, it is not, strictly
speaking, necessary for Precision Meters to secure any of the interim relief it
seeks that is directed at the “decisions” that were taken in August 2025 because
those purported “decisions” had no impact on the legal rights of Precision Meters.

Its rights accrued when it was issued with a duly signed certificate on 30 May
2025.
74 Nonetheless, provided Precision Meters meets the remaining requirements for an
interim interdict, it would be appropriate to direct SANAS to remove the
documents that it uploaded onto its website to avoid confusion as to the legal
status of Precision Meters’ accreditation pending the review in part B.
75 And in so far as the Specifications Authority’s decision to issue a new designation
verification certificate to Prevision Meters on 31 July 2025 is concerned, the
Specifications Authority made it clear in it answering affidavit that it relies on the
SANAS accreditation process before it issues a verification certificate. It sai d
expressly that it “cannot designate a verification body for a scope not assessed
and accredited by SANAS”. In this, it was correct. It was also correct when it said
that where SANAS “has issued an accreditation certificate for less th an 25mm,
the [Specifications Authority] cannot issue a designation certificate for higher”.
76 But the problem in this case is that, as at 31 July 2025, the only accreditation
certificate that had been issued to Precision Meters accredited it to verify meters
up to 100mm. It was not limited to 25mm.
77 On its own understanding of the law, therefore, the Specifications Authority was
bound to follow the accreditation actions of SANAS. It was not open to it to issue
a verification certificate on 31 July 2025 that was at odds with the then extan t

accreditation certificate that SANAS had issued to Precision Meters on 30 May
2025.
78 And the conduct of SANAS officials in early August 2025 of uploading documents
onto the SANAS website cannot regularise the Specifications Authority’s conduct
on 31 July 2025 for two reasons. The first is that it occurred after the verification
certificate was issued on 31 July . And the second is that, even if the uploading
had preceded the issue of the verification certificate at the end of July 2025, the
documents that were uploaded onto the SANAS website where not accreditation
certificates under the Act. So they could not form the basis for a designation
verification certificate from the Specifications Authority.
79 I therefore find that Precision Meters has al so established a right to have a
designation verification certificate issued to it that aligns with the accreditation
certificate from SANAS dated 30 May 2025 pending the part B review.
80 I deal with the remaining requirements for an interdict in the next section.
The remaining requirements

81 Our courts have previously held that the requirement of a prima facie right stands
in an asymmetric relationship with the balance of convenience; t he stronger the
one, the weaker the other is permitted to be.17
82 As Holmes J held in Olympic Passenger Service:
“It thus appears that where the applicant's right is clear, and the other
requisites are present, no difficulty presents itself about granting an
interdict. At the other end of the scale, where his prospects of ultimate
success are nil, obviously the Court will refuse an interdict. Between those
two extremes fall the intermediate cases in which, on the papers as a
whole, the applicants' prospects of ultimate success may range all the way
from strong to weak. The expressi on prima facie established though open
to some doubt seems to me a brilliantly apt classification of these cases.
In such cases, upon proof of a well -grounded apprehension of irreparable
harm, and there being no adequate ordinary remedy, the Court may gran t
an interdict — it has a discretion, to be exercised judicially upon a
consideration of all the facts. Usually this will resolve itself into a nice
consideration of the prospects of success and the balance of convenience
— the stronger the prospects of su ccess, the less need for such balance
to favour the applicant: the weaker the prospects of success, the greater
the need for the balance of convenience to favour him. I need hardly add


17 Picnoord Kitchen (Pty) Ltd and Another v Lynx Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 2024 (6) SA 599
(GJ) para 21

that by balance of convenience is meant the prejudice to the applicant if
the interdict be refused, weighed against the prejudice to the respondent if
it be granted.”18
83 I have found above that Precision Meters has established a strong right to have
SANAS remove the documents uploaded onto its website in August 2025 , as well
as to have the Specifications Authority issue it with a designation verification
certificate that aligns with the 30 May 2025 accreditation certificate that was
issued by SANAS.
84 In the light of this finding, less is required of Precision Meters on the balan ce of
convenience in order to be entitled to the interim interdicts it seeks.
85 In so far as the balance is concerned, Precision Meters estimates that if the
interdict is not granted, it will lose approximately 15% of its revenue going
forward. It also has c oncerns about the impact on its reputation of being
understood in the market no longer able to verify meters up to 100mm. It
estimates that it may have to lay off as many as four staff members as a result of
this impact on its business.
86 As against this harm, the respondents offer nothing meaningful.


18 Olympic Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd v Ramlagan 1957 (2) SA 382 (D) at 383D – G

86.1 The Specifications Authority invoked only an OUTA-line of defence,
reminding the court that interdicts against organs of state can only be
granted in the clearest of cases. I have, however, explained above why that
standard does not apply in this case.
86.2 SANAS merely aligned itself with the Specifications Authority’s point about
OUTA and then saw fit to criticise Precision Meters for “trying to obtain
through the back door, so to speak, a right and entitlement to which it is not
entitled, and in fact in law does not have”. It also accused Precision Meters
of trying illegitimately to obtain a “market advantage over its competitors” . It
said that Precision Maters was doing so intentionally and recklessly. This
criticism of Precisions Meters was made throughout SANAS’s answering
affidavit. It accused Precision Meters of advancing a “false narrative”, of
being “deliberately reckless” and “vexatious” , and of “knowingly” peddling
untruths.
86.3 This sort of accusation should never be lightly made against a party. In
Knoop NO, the Supreme Court of Appeal reminded legal practitioners about
the care that is required when affidavits are drafted. It cautioned against
allegations cast in emotive terms that are not borne out by any e vidence.
And it reminded legal practitioners that serious allegations of misconduct
against opponents should only be made “after due consideration of their
relevance and whether there is a tenable factual basis for them”.19


19 Knoop NO and Another v Gupta and Another 2021 (3) SA 88 (SCA) para 145

86.4 In this case, there was no basis for these accusations against Precision
Meters at all. The facts show clearly that it has consistently been accredited
to verify water meters up to 100mm. I t received that accreditation for a
decade, and most recently in May this year. At some point in thi s process,
however, SANAS seems to have come to the view that it ought not to have
issued such accreditation to Precision Meters. But instead of acting as a
responsible public body and following its own prescribed processes for
adjusting the scope of a cer tificate, it unilaterally started uploading
documents onto its website and telephonically informing the Specifications
Regulator that Precision Meters should not be issued with a verification
certificate for anything more than 25mm.
86.5 SANAS never frankly fes sed up to its own error in this case. Instead, it
maligned and criticised Precision Meters without justification.
87 Finally, on the issue of an alternative remedy, SANAS argued that Precision
Meters could have applied for an extension of scope to increase i ts accreditation
from 25mm to 100mm. But that misses the point that the only currently operative
accreditation certificate that SANAS has issued is one that authorises Precision
Meters to verify water meters up to 100mm. It is not clear how Precision Meter s,
in the face of this certificate that authorises it to verify meters up to 100mm, could
apply for an extension to verify meters up to 100mm. It cannot apply for an
extension to do what it is already authorised to do.

Conclusion
88 In the light of what is se t out above, I find that Precision Meters has establish a
strong right to the interdicts it seeks. It has shown that it will suffer serious harm if
it is not granted these interdicts and the balance of convenience overwhelmingly
favours it. There is also no alternative remedy available to it.
89 The last remaining question is whether Precision Meters did enough to justify
urgent relief in this case.
Urgency
90 The impugned decisions in this matter were taken on 31 July 2025, in so far as
the Specifications Author ity was concerned, and in early August, in so far as
SANAS is concerned.
91 Precision Motors moved with considerable speed to launch the application on 11
August 2025. It did not delay at all.
92 The respondents argued against the urgency of the application primarily on the
basis that Precision Meters unduly delayed bringing this application because it
did not come to court shortly after the SANAS letter in August 202 4 in which it
said that it was going to withdraw Precision Meters’ accreditation “immediately”.

93 But Precision Meters can hardly be criticised for not coming to court then. At that
stage, it was copied on a letter in which SANAS said that it thought it had made
an error and explained that it was going to take steps to correct its error. But then
SANAS did not take any such steps until August 2025. As I have already set out
above, after SANAS began uploading documents onto its website in August 2025
in a purported attempt to cure its error, Precision Meters moved with considerable
speed to launch the application. So there is no respect in which it can legitimately
be accused of delay.
94 The parties have also exchanged full sets of affidavits. Both respondents sought
leave to file further answering affidavits. In the scheme of an urgent application
such as this, I find that they ought to be granted such leave to ensure that their
position is properly before the court.
95 The final remaining question for urgency is whether Precision Meters has done
enough to show that it will not obtain substantial redress in the ordinary course.20
Precision Meters approached this court because it had been on the receiving end
of truly remarkable conduct from two public bodies. Because of the conduct of
SANAS and the Specifications Authority, the market has been led to understan d
that it cannot do the work it has been doing for ten years. It faces the prospect of
15% of its business being negatively impacted and having to lay off four staff
members. That can be avoided if the urgent relief is granted now. Given the


20 Luna Meubels Vervaardigers v Maikin and Another 1977 (4) SA 135 (T) 137F-G

strength of its right to the relief, I find that a sufficient case has been made out for
urgency.
Costs
96 It remains to say a last word about costs.
97 Although I have not granted Precision Meters all the relief it sought, it has still
been substantially successful. Its more limited relief is a product not of a lack of
success but rather the fact that its success lay in a part of the case on which it did
not focus. It related to the legal status of the documents that were uploaded onto
SANAS’s website in early August 2025. On ce those documents are understood
for what they are, and more importantly, what they are not, it is clear that they
were not accreditation certificates . So they could not, in law, replace the
certificate that was issued to Precision Meters on 30 May 2025.
98 Costs should therefore follow the result.
99 Precision Meters sought costs only on a party and party scale. Had it sought
punitive costs, I would have been inclined to grant them for the following reasons.
100 SANAS is a public body. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasised
that public bodies do not litigate as ordinary private litigants; they have

heightened obligations 21 to do right, and to do it properly .22 Scurrilous and
unjustified attacks on one’s adversary is never appropriate in litigation. But it is
even less so when it comes from an organ of state.
101 In this case, SANAS levelled unjustified attacks on Precision Meters’ bona fides
throughout its affidavits. It did so in circumstances where, objectively, SANAS
was the one who repeatedly erred in thi s case. It was SANAS who, on its own
version, issued an initial accreditation certificate to Precision Meters for a scope
broader than the one sought. When SANAS uncovered this “error”, it said that it
would immediately correct it. But it did not do so . In stead, it issued a new
certificate consistent with the ones it had been issuing for the previous decade
despite the fact that, according to it, the certificate contained an error. And then it
unilaterally tried to change that certificate , without following its own prescribed
processes for reducing the scope of an accreditation, by uploading unsigned
documents onto its website. And finally, when it was called to account for this
conduct in this litigation, it went on the offensive . Instead of plainly accepting that
it had erred, it attacked Precision Meters mercilessly and repeatedly in its papers.
102 Lawyers draft affidavits but witnesses confirm the correctness and truth of their
contents. Lawyers are wordsmiths; they are trained to use language to advance
their client’s case. But their clients are the ones who go under oath and present


21 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) para 237
22 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape and Another v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer
Institute 2014 (3) SA 481 (CC) para 82

their version to the court. As I highlighted above, the Supreme Court of Appeal
has already warned lawyers to be careful in their drafting of affidavits. 23 But the
caution extend s to witnesses too, especially when those witnesses are the
representatives of public bodies. No claim should be made in an affidavit unless
there is proper support for it in the facts. Here, the allegations of recklessness,
contrivance, and deliberate fal sehoods that SANAS levelled at Precision Meters
had no sound basis in the facts. They ought not to have been made.
103 Had there been a request for punitive costs, I would have granted them as a mark
of the court’s displeasure. 24 This type of unwarranted attac k on an adversary in
litigation is not appropriate from an organ of state that ought to know , and do ,
better.
Orders
104 I therefore make the following orders:
1. The matter is dealt with as one of urgency.
2. Pending the outcome of part B:


23 Knoop NO and Another v Gupta and Another 2021 (3) SA 88 (SCA) para 145
24 Ex Parte Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2024 (2) SA 58 (CC) para 92

a. The first respondent is directed to remove the unsigned documents
concerning the applicant , which were uploaded in August 2025 , from
its website.
b. The second respondent is directed, within two days of this order, to
issue the applicant with a designation verification certificate s tating that
it is a verification body under the Legal Metrology Act 9 of 2014 for
water meters with a nominal bore of up to 100mm.
3. The first and second respondents are to pay the applicant ’s costs jointly and
severally, and the costs are to include the costs of two counsel on scale C.


________
K HOFMEYR
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

APPEARANCES
Applicant’s counsel: A Kantor SC with M Bishop
Attorneys: Enderstein Malumbete Inc

First respondent’s counsel: G Walters SC with A Brouwer
Attorneys: Norton Rose Fulbright

Second respondent’s counsel: S Manganye
Attorneys: Mothle Jooma Sadiba