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[2025] ZAKZPHC 107
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Reece v Haripersad and Others (AR313/24) [2025] ZAKZPHC 107 (24 October 2025)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
CASE NO: AR313/24
In
the matter between:
YVONNE
REECE
APPLICANT
and
MS
A HARIPERSAD
FIRST RESPONDENT
THE
REGIONAL MAGISTRATE, MR CANNON
SECOND RESPONDENT
THE
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, KZN
THIRD RESPONDENT
ORDER
I
make the following orders:
The
application to review and set aside the ruling made by the second
respondent in the Regional Court, Pietermaritzburg on 19
June 24
under case number RCC 1/2023 is dismissed.
The
application for a permanent stay of the criminal proceedings in the
Regional Court, Pietermaritzburg under case number RCC
1/2023,
alternatively, that the charges in respect of those proceedings be
quashed, is dismissed.
The
applicant is directed to pay the costs of the application, on Scale
C.
JUDGMENT
Delivered
on:
SHAPIRO
AJ
(MIZRACHI AJ concurring)
Introduction
[1]
The applicant is the accused in a matter
pending before the Regional Court,
Pietermaritzburg
in which she faces charges of fraud,
theft and money laundering that originally were preferred against her
in 2018.
[2]
The applicant has launched what she
describes as an “omnibus application” for orders
reviewing and setting aside the
decision of the second respondent
(“the Learned Magistrate”) in which he dismissed her
objection to the charges contained
in a seventh version of the charge
sheet prepared by the State and which was provided to her and her
legal representatives during
May 2023. In addition to the review
sought by the applicant, she also seeks orders directing a permanent
stay of the prosecution
alternatively quashing the charges against
her.
[3]
The application and the Record exceed
3000 pages and include almost all the iterations of the
charge
sheets, objections to those charges,
related application papers and the transcript of the proceedings that
served before the Learned
Magistrate.
[4]
Adding to the complexity of the
application, the applicant also launched an application in this
Court
in 2019 seeking a permanent stay of the criminal proceedings against
her. That application remains pending – a situation
and a
consequence to which I will revert below.
The
2019 Stay application
[5]
In
the 2019 Stay application, the applicant sought an order that “the
criminal proceedings under
Case
No 41/136/2018 in the Specialised Commercial Crimes Court, Durban
[1]
be permanently stayed” and attached the then-current and second
version of the charge sheet against her.
[6]
The State alleged that the accused was
the employee of Graemor (Pty) Ltd, which rendered accounting services
to the complainant
company, Bellwood Civils (Pty) Ltd. Alfred
Joseph
messenger was described as the sole
shareholder of Bellwood and a director of the company.
[7]
It was alleged that
the
complainant company mandated the accused
to deal with tax submissions and payments to SARS in respect of the
complainant itself,
Mr Messenger two other individuals (Mr William
Ernest Messenger trading as Bellwood Stud/Cottages and Mrs JBA
Messenger) and a
Trust (the Pinewood Family Trust).
[8]
It was alleged that the complainant
would transfer funds into Graemor’s bank account but that the
accused used such monies
for own personal benefit, and was guilty of
fraud in that she unlawfully and intentionally misrepresented to the
complainant
company
and
Mr Messenger (described as “Bellwood Civils Alfred Joseph
messenger”) that the monies deposited by complainant as
per
Column 5 of the schedule annexed to the charge sheet were for actual
payments to SARS and therefore induced Bellwood and/or
Mr Messenger
to accept that the payments by the complainant and all persons
mentioned in Column 6 were valid transactions for SARS
when in truth,
the monies deposited by the complainant where illegitimate
transactions designed to defraud the complainant company
and/or Mr
Messenger as a lesser amount (set out in Column 7 of the schedule)
was actually paid to SARS.
[9]
The accused
was
charged alternatively with theft on the
same factual basis.
[10]
In the 2019 Stay application, the
applicant put up the first formal charge sheet that had been replaced
by the charge sheet referred
to above.
[11]
Although the allegations are marginally
more terse, it was alleged that the complainant company was Bellwood,
Mr Messenger was its
director and the accused unlawfully and
intentionally misrepresented the true state of affairs to the
complainant and to Mr Messenger
that the amounts deposited were for
the payments to SARS when in truth lesser amounts were actually paid
and the complainant company
was therefore defrauded.
[12]
The difference between the first and
second versions of the charge sheet were that the
second
version included further complainants,
and not just Bellwood.
[13]
However, the grounds of the charges
remained the same and, according to the State, sufficiently disclosed
the charges faced by the
applicant and the factual basis upon which
those charges rested.
[14]
The applicant and her legal team felt
differently and delivered a lengthy request for further particulars
to the charges.
[15]
Being
unsatisfied
with the state of proceedings, the
applicant then launched the 2019 Stay application on 5 June 2019
under case number 3881/19P.
[16]
The first respondent, being the
appointed prosecutor dealing with the prosecution against the
applicant, deposed to the answering
affidavit on behalf of the State
-to which objection was raised by the applicant.
[17]
The
applicant
not only delivered a replying affidavit
but signalled her intention to apply for leave to cross-examine the
first respondent.
[18]
After various
supplementary
affidavits were delivered, the papers in
the 2019 Stay application were complete by 8 October 2020.
[19]
The
applicant
took no steps to set the application
down, and it remains pending.
[20]
It is unclear why the applicant sought
leave to cross-examine the first respondent in circumstances where an
application had been
launched that the State was entitled
to
oppose. If there were disputes of fact,
the applicant had the normal options available to an applicant in any
application which
included applying for the matter to be referred for
the hearing of evidence on identified issues or to be referred for
trial.
[21]
The applicant did not follow any of
these routes and instead allowed the application to
lie
fallow.
[22]
For its
part
,
the State also failed to take any steps to set the application down
and to finalise those proceedings.
[23]
This
Court is therefore confronted with a pending application for a
permanent stay of the prosecution in respect of the same charges,
the
same issue and between the same parties.
[2]
[24]
The
applicant's
complaints up to October 2020 form part
of the 2019 Stay application.
[25]
The question of whether the prosecution
should be stayed based on those complaints is not before this Court
and this Court cannot
determine those complaints. It is for either
the applicant or the State to set the 2019 Stay application down for
hearing if they
wish it to be determined, and if, even at this remove
of time, it is some sort of bar to the prosecution of the applicant
proceeding.
The
questions that this Court must answer
[26]
There are therefore two fundamental
questions that are before this court only:
(a)
whether the Learned Magistrate's decision to dismiss the applicant's
objection to the charges
should be reviewed and set aside; and
(b)
whether a case has been made out that the criminal proceedings
against her be stayed alternatively
that the charges be quashed based
on grounds that postdate October 2020.
The
review application
[27]
Between 2018 and 2023, the State
delivered a further five versions of the charge sheet
against
the applicant.
[28]
Each
version
was met with lengthy request for further
particulars by the applicant and related interlocutory applications.
[29]
Before the objections to several of the
versions of the charge sheets could be determined, the state
delivered further versions
of the charge sheet.
[30]
The applicant argued, both in the courts
below and in this court, that the later iterations of
the
charge sheet somehow supplemented the
earlier ones and that the State could not serve further versions of
the charge sheet until
the objections to the previous versions had
been determined.
[31]
Whilst
I accept that the responses to requests for further particulars to
the charge sheet
amend
the charges,
[3]
I have
difficulty with the notion that the State is not permitted to issue
and serve further versions of the charge sheet if it
requires to do
so.
[32]
It seems practical and pragmatic for the
State to seek to remove any causes of complaint (whether they agree
with them or not) in
further versions of the charge sheet so that the
prosecution can proceed towards either a conviction or an acquittal.
[33]
In my view, a new charge sheet served by
the State has the effect of replacing the
previous
charge sheet (even if the earlier
version was amended by replies to requests for particulars).
[34]
Firstly, and in their express terms, the
later versions of the charge sheet commenced
with
a Preamble and then progress to the
charges themselves. It seems clear that the intention of the State
was for the later document
to replace the earlier one.
[35]
This makes sense. Sections 85(2)(a) and
86(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act allow for charges to be amended.
Whilst that power to
direct such amendments resides with the court,
what is contemplated is the curing of a defective charge sheet by an
amendment –
either pursuant to an objection by the accused
under section 85(1) or during the trial under section 86(1).
[36]
Section
85(2)(a) permits a court to grant an amendment to the charge. In
terms of section 86, and if the court determines that the
charge be
amended, the matter proceeds “
at
the appointed time upon the amended charge in the same manner and
with the same consequences
as
if it had been originally in its amended form
”.
[4]
[37]
The
amended
charge is then what remains, not the
previous, defective version.
[38]
I cannot
discern
any logical basis for concluding that if
a “defective” charge sheet is amended completely, by
substituting a later version
for an earlier one, that all versions of
the document remain extant and must be considered collectively. This
flies in the face
of the effect contemplated in sections 85(2)(a) and
86(3).
[39]
There is
also
no logical or policy basis that I can
identify that requires the State to wait for a court to hear an
objection under section 85(1)
or for a trial to commence before the
charge sheet can be amended – such that the State cannot
pre-empt such an order by
amending the charge sheet itself. This not
only avoids delay and the clogging of already clogged court rolls,
but it seems to be
salutary in obtaining a speedy trial for any
accused person.
[40]
The goal remains the same – a
charge sheet sufficiently clear and compliant that
permits
an accused to know what the charges
against him or her are, and why, and to be able to plead to them.
[41]
Although the Learned Magistrate was
called upon to determine whether objections to the seventh version of
the charge sheet should
be upheld, this Court was also provided with
versions 4, 5 and 6 (which was issued in approximately September
2022).
[42]
All the versions of the charge sheets
commence with a “Preamble” along the lines
quoted
above in respect of the second version
of the charge sheet.
[43]
They all allege that the accused was
mandated to deal with tax submissions and payments to SARS by the
complainant company, and
that the complainant mandated the accused to
deal with the tax submissions and payments in respect of not only the
company and
Mr Messenger but also William Ernest Messenger trading as
Bellwood Stud/Cottages, Mrs JBA Messenger and the Pinewood Family
Trust.
[44]
In all versions, it was alleged that the
accused used the monies deposited into the account of Graemor
Accounting Services for her
own personal benefit, and was therefore
guilty of fraud, alternatively theft in that she unlawfully and
intentionally misrepresented
to Bellwood Civils and Alfred Joseph
Messenger that the monies deposited by the complainant were for
actual payments to SARS, whereas
in truth, the payments were not and
a lesser amount was actually paid.
[45]
Versions 5 and 6 tightened up some of
the wording in both the Preamble and explanation
of
the charge, but the gravamen of the
charges did not change.
[46]
From
version
5 onwards, an additional charge of money
laundering was preferred against the accused on the same factual
basis as the fraud and
theft charges.
[47]
Version 7 was served in May 2023 and is
virtually identical to version 6 of the charge sheet.
[48]
It commences with a Preamble that sets
out the background facts and what allegedly occurred and then
proceeds to charge the accused
with fraud, alternatively
theft
and money-laundering on the same factual
basis as the State had relied upon from 2018.
[49]
The application to quash the charges
contemplated in version 7 of the charge sheet was argued before the
Learned Magistrate, at
length and in detail by the applicant's senior
counsel, Mr Scheltema SC and by the first respondent on behalf of the
State.
[50]
The
Learned
Magistrate delivered his ruling on 19
June 2024.
[51]
The Learned Magistrate commenced his
ruling by quoting
section 85
of the
Criminal
Procedure
Act 51 of 1977
, which permits an accused
to object to the charge on the ground that the charge does not comply
with the provisions of the Act
relating to the essentials of the
charge, that the charge does not set out an essential element of the
relevant offence, that the
charge does not disclose an offence and
that the charge does not contain sufficient particulars of any matter
alleged in the charge.
[52]
The Learned Magistrate correctly
referred to the court’s powers under
section 85(2)
if it
decided that an objection under
section 85(1)
was well-founded.
[53]
The Learned Magistrate understood the
complaint by the applicant, being that the charges were framed poorly
in law and that she
would be unable to formulate a defence to them
since the further particulars are provided by the state were
inadequate
, and the applicant therefore
could not know precisely what the allegations were she had to plead
to those charges.
[54]
The
Learned
Magistrate then held that:
‘
the
enquiry at this stage is whether the charge sheet, including the
preamble along with the particulars provided enable the accused
to
know with certainty the case against her. This is not the time to
interrogate the veracity of the averments of all the litigants
or to
overly test the probabilities. The State is not required to supply
particulars that are not within their purview. Whether
or not the
State can prove the allegations in the charges beyond reasonable
doubt is only to be decided at trial stage. At this
time the decision
remains within the purview of the prosecution. Obviously the
prosecutor in this case must believe that there
are reasonable
prospects of success should the matter proceed to trial.
In
respect of counts 1 to 39 the accused is charged with the common law
offence of fraud, alternatively theft. In my view, all the
elements
of fraud have been averred in the preamble, as well as in the
chargesheet. If read together, it clearly provides sufficient
detail
and particularity for the accused to plead. In respect of account 40
the State sets out how the accused committed the statutory
offence of
money laundering.
When
one reads the charge as drafted together with the preamble to the
charge sheet and bearing in mind counts 1 to 39 there are
sufficient
details present to allow the accused to plead to the charge.’
[55]
The
Learned
Magistrate therefore refused the
applicant's application.
[56]
The
grounds
upon which the proceedings of a
Magistrates’ Court may be reviewed by this court are set out in
section 22
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
.
[57]
The
applicant
has not alleged an absence of
jurisdiction on the part of the court or an interest in the cause,
bias, malice or corruption on the
part of the Learned Magistrate.
[58]
The applicant has not complained of the
admission of inadmissible incompetent evidence or the rejection of
admissible competent
evidence and could not
legitimately
have done so as the argument proceeded
on a point of law and the applicant’s counsel did not seek a
ruling from the Learned
Magistrate in respect of documents that he
wished to hand up and to which an objection was made. Counsel’s
attempt to hand
up the documents was abandoned and the matter
proceeded by way of argument.
[59]
It is therefore
necessary
for the applicant to demonstrate a gross
irregularity in the proceedings before the Learned Magistrate.
[60]
The
law in this regard is settled. A gross irregularity encompasses both
procedural
irregularities
(overt conduct of violating fair trial principles) and more latent
irregularities (errors in the application of the mind of the
presiding officer, such as misconceiving the nature of the enquiry).
A gross irregularity can occur even if the decision-maker
makes a
bona fide mistake if the mistake affects the fairness of the
proceedings or prevents a party from having their case fully
and
properly heard. In
Herholdt
,
[5]
the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a gross irregularity can also
occur if the decision-maker arrives an outcome so unreasonable
that
no reasonable decision-maker could reach it.
[61]
Whilst the
applicant
has complained that the Learned
Magistrate's ruling did not address her grounds of complaint and
misconstrued the enquiry before
him, none of these complaints have
merit.
[62]
There can be no suggestion that the
Learned Magistrate misconceived the nature of the enquiry before him.
He was aware that he was
dealing with an objection to the
charges
and whether they complied with the
provisions of
section 85
of the
Criminal Procedure Act.
[63
]
The
applicant
was given ample opportunity to make
submissions through her senior counsel, as the record of proceedings
demonstrates.
[64]
I cannot fault the Learned Magistrate's
reasoning, and I do not consider that the decision
that
he reached was unreasonable or so
unreasonable that no other reasonable presiding magistrate would have
reached it.
[65]
It is clear to the objective reader that
the applicant is being accused of misrepresenting the true facts to
the complainant and
to its director and sole shareholder which then
induced them on their own behalves and on behalf of the other named
parties to
pay approximately R8.5 million to the applicant on the
basis that these were for tax payments due to SARS when they were
not, and
that approximately R8 million was misappropriated by the
applicant for her personal benefit.
[66]
The
schedule
to the charge sheet sets out the dates
of each of the counts, identifies the parties involved and the
amounts at issue.
[67]
Without
considering
whether the allegations are true, or
whether the State will be able to prove them beyond reasonable doubt,
I can see no area where
the Learned Magistrate misdirected himself so
materially or committed a reviewable irregularity in dismissing the
applicant's application
or in finding that the charge sheet that
served before him contained sufficient particulars and was
sufficiently clear to enable
the accused to plead to the charges.
[68]
Not only can I find no grounds of
review, but I conclude that the Learned Magistrate was
correct
in his determination.
[69]
For the
avoidance
of doubt, and in my view, the charge
sheet that is currently extant (being version 7 of May 2023) does not
offend against the provisions
of
section 85
of the
Criminal Procedure
Act and
does contain sufficient particularity to enable the accused
to plead to all the charges contained in it.
[70]
It follows that the Learned Magistrate's
decision is not reviewable and the application in this
regard
must fail.
The
permanent stay/quashing of charges
[71]
A
permanent
stay of prosecution is an exceptional remedy and may only be granted
where the delay in the prosecution is egregious and has resulted
in
irreparable trial prejudice. The trial prejudice must be
“demonstrably clear (definite not speculative)”.
[6]
[72]
The applicant levels a series of
complaints against the first respondent in her founding
affidavit
.
[73]
The applicant alleges that she has been
“merrily strung along by the first respondent” since June
2018 and that the
only inference to be drawn from the “inability
of the first respondent to have constructed a final charge sheet when
I was
first arraigned on 7 June 2018” is that the first
respondent “was, at all relevant times, uncertain of the case
against
me, despite her repeated assurances to the Second Respondent…
that the charges are straightforward and that the factual matrix
upon
which the charges are based has been known to her for years”.
[74]
I do not
agree
that the applicant has been “merrily
strung along”. If blame is to be cast, the applicant must look
closer to home.
[75]
Where the First Respondent can be
faulted is in indulging the applicant's ongoing objections
instead
of seeking that they be finally
determined. Instead, and in an attempt to expedite matters, the first
respondent effected a number
of amendments by delivering six further
versions of the charge sheet.
[76]
In my view, the first respondent was
correct in stating that the charges were straightforward
and
that the factual matrix upon which they
were based had been known to her for some time. The various versions
of the charge sheets
bear this out.
[77]
It
is not the first respondent that caused the delays in this regard. It
is the applicant who did this
[7]
by insisting on seeking further particulars to charges that were not
objectionable and then objecting to them, repeatedly.
[78]
The charges are not “unduly
complicated”. They are simple and based on a defined set of
facts. Either the State will
discharge the onus of proof resting upon
it, or it will not - that is a question of evidence, not of
allegation.
[79]
I do not agree that the first respondent
is “seriously conflicted” or that this somehow gives rise
to grounds upon which
the prosecution can be stayed permanently or
that the charges can be quashed.
[80]
The first respondent, as the delegated
and authorised representative of the State in the prosecution, was
entitled to depose to
affidavits in opposition to the 2019 Stay
application
or
any further applications. Whether she did so on the merits, or by way
of confirmatory affidavits, would have made no difference.
The first
respondent had the knowledge of the facts and was required to confirm
them.
[81]
Similarly, it was not the first
respondent who opposed the relief sought by the applicant – it
was
the
State that did so, even if represented by the first respondent. It
was for a court to determine the propriety of that opposition.
[82]
The applicant appears to have adopted
the somewhat curious approach that the State was
not
permitted to oppose her applications and
should be criticised for doing so. I can see no grounds for this
argument and was not provided
with any authority that would support
it.
[83]
Regarding the
applicant’s
complaints that the first respondent
prevented her from fully and adequately addressing the Learned
Magistrate or placing evidence
before him, this rather misses the
point: the first respondent was representing a litigating party
before the Learned Magistrate
and was entitled to make submissions
and objections. The applicant was represented by senior counsel. It
was for the Learned Magistrate
to determine what to do and what
orders to grant.
[84]
If the applicant
did
not persist with various submissions
before the Learned Magistrate arising out of the first respondent's
objections, that was her
election. If the complaint is that the
Learned Magistrate made rulings adverse to the applicant, that is a
separate issue and would
go to whether the Learned Magistrate
committed a reviewable irregularity in the proceedings.
[85]
However, it cannot be that an objection
by the first respondent that was upheld by the Learned Magistrate
founds a reason to criticise
the first respondent or to conclude that
she is biased or conflicted. That the applicant’s counsel did
not persist in the
face of those objections (insofar as they related
to the attempt to place factual information before the Learned
Magistrate) seems
to confirm that the objection by the first
respondent was well made.
[86]
Not content with the complaints referred
to above, the applicant also complains that the first respondent
“opposed my request
to be afforded a reasonable
opportunity
to file my founding affidavit in this
application” and therefore concludes that the first respondent
“clearly wanted
to deny me my rights to bring this application
because she remained conflicted”.
[87]
I do not understand this submission.
There is nothing irregular or unfair in a litigating party
insisting
that applications are brought within the
required time periods.
[88]
If a litigating
party
cannot comply with those time periods,
it is for that party to seek condonation from the court and not from
their opponent.
[89]
There is no
application
for the removal or recusal of the first
respondent. The Learned Magistrate made the same point in the
proceedings that were before
him and the applicant’s counsel
accepted that the Learned Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to
make such an order.
[90]
Ultimately then, the applicant’s
complaints about the first respondent are only relevant if they
prejudice the ability of
the applicant to receive a fair trial.
[91]
Certainly, the first respondent has not
conducted the prosecution in the way that the applicant wishes, and
the applicant has formed
the somewhat unfortunate view that the first
respondent is “conflicted” in the proceedings, alleging
that this has
been pointed out to the first respondent repeatedly.
[92]
This does not make the applicant’s
complaints valid - and I conclude that they are not valid.
The
first respondent has represented the
interests of the State as zealously as the applicant’s legal
representatives have represented
her interests.
[93]
When
all the atmosphere is stripped away,
[8]
the applicant's core complaint justifying a permanent stay of the
prosecution or the quashing of the charges is the delay that
has
been
caused in bringing the matter to trial.
[94]
In this regard, and since October 2020,
it is the applicant that has objected to the various versions of the
charge sheet and who
has caused the concomitant delay.
[95]
Whilst
objections
to charge sheets are legitimate and an
accused is entitled to vindicate the rights afforded to them under
the Constitution and the
Criminal Procedure Act, if
an accused does
so and delay is caused, this cannot in and of itself justify a
prosecution being stayed permanently or charges
being quashed.
[96]
In this particular case, the applicant
could and should have pleaded to the charges years ago. Her election
not to do so was hers
to make, but she cannot visit the
consequences
of her choice on the State, which was
entitled to oppose her various applications.
[97]
The State argued that the applicant had
adopted this approach to avoid answering the
charges
,
and in the hope that the prosecution would collapse. This argument
has some force, but I do not make any findings in that regard
for the
reasons set out above.
[98]
The applicant also argues that a key
witness for the prosecution, Sarah Martens, emigrated to Australia
some years ago and that
her evidence is likely to cover material
issues. According to the applicant, there is “no certainty at
this stage as to whether
she is still available to testify in South
Africa” and that it “will not be in the interests of
justice to allow this
witness to testify in a virtual hearing”.
[99]
This argument is speculative. The
applicant does not know whether the witness will be
available
to testify or not travel to the Republic
to testify and no application for evidence to be led by way of a
virtual hearing has even
been mooted.
[100]
This
prejudice
manifestly is not the demonstrable and
clear prejudice that must be established in an application to stay
the prosecution.
[101]
The
applicant
has not made out a case justifying the
permanent staying of the prosecution or the quashing of charges, and
this application must
likewise fail.
Costs
[102]
The
applicant
argued the application herself, as her
erstwhile legal representatives withdrew.
[103]
However, she was represented by both an
experienced attorney and senior counsel up until the hearing.
[104]
Being a civil review and application in
this court, the state was entitled to brief counsel to represent it.
[105]
In doing
so
,
the state incurred legal costs.
[106]
The applicant sought costs against the
State on the scale as between attorney and
client
,
alternatively on Scale C and including the costs of the proceedings
in the courts below, and the costs consequent upon the employment
of
Senior Counsel.
[107]
The general
rule
in litigation is that costs follow the
result, and I can see no reason why that rule should not be followed
in this application.
[108]
Given the
findings
made in this judgement, there is no
reason why the applicant should not be directed to pay the costs of
this application.
Conclusion
[109]
I make the following orders:
1.
The application to review and set aside the ruling made by the second
respondent in the Regional
Court, Pietermaritzburg on 19 June 24
under case number RCC 1/2023 is dismissed.
2.
The application for a permanent stay of the criminal proceedings in
the Regional Court, Pietermaritzburg
under case number RCC 1/2023,
alternatively, that the charges in respect of those proceedings be
quashed, is dismissed.
3.
The applicant is directed to pay the costs of the application, on
Scale C.
Shapiro
AJ
I
agree.
Mizrachi
AJ
Appearances
For the
applicant:
In person
For the
respondents
Ms P S Cele, instructed by the State Attorney
Date of
hearing:
4 July 2025
Date of
judgment:
[?]
October 2025
[1]
These
proceedings are the same proceedings now pending before the Regional
Court, Pietermaritzburg under case number RCC1/2023.
[2]
Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd
v World of Marble and Granite 2000 CC and Others
2013 (6) SA 499
(SCA) paras 3 and 12.
[3]
Section
87(2)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
makes this clear.
[4]
See
section 86(3)
– emphasis added.
[5]
Herholdt
v Nedbank Ltd
2013
(6) SA 224 (SCA).
[6]
Van
Veen v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others
2025
(2) SACR 115
(SCA)
para
32. In
Van
Veen
,
a delay of 11 years was not found to constitute irreparable
trial-related prejudice.
[7]
See
Wild
and Another v Hoffert NO and Others
[1998] ZACC 5
;
1998 (3) SA 695
(CC) para 8.
[8]
It seems to me that an unnecessarily lengthy Record was placed
before the Court that had the effect of obscuring rather than
elucidating the core issues. It is difficult to escape the sense
that the applicant wished to buttress her arguments by sheer
volume.
This was an unnecessary burden for the Court and was unhelpful.