IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
D ELETE W HICHEVER IS NO T APP LICABL E
(1) REPORTABL E: ~ NO
Case number: 28302/2014
Date of hearing: 21 October 2025
Date delivered: 23 October 2025
(2) O F INTER EST TO OT H ERS JU DGE S: '(!!'5/NO
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DA TE
In the application between:
RIAAN COETZEE
RIAAN COETZEE N.O.
and
NEDBANK LTD
SWANEPOEL J:
JUDGMENT
First Excipient
Second Excipient
Responde nt
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[1] This is an exception against the respondent's amended declaration
dated 13 July 2022. The excipients, who are sued as sureties in respect
of an overdraft facility for a company that was finally wound up in August
2023, allege that the declaration is vague and embarrassing for the
following reasons (I distill the essence of the complaint):
[1.1] That the respondent claims that upon the principal debtor
being wound up the debt became immediately due, but it does not
plead what the debt was at that date, nor does it plead what the
default was, but that it simply relies upon certificates of balance
bolster its claim;
[1.2] That the certificate of balance refers to a date after the
principal debtor was wound up, and it does not reflect whether
there were further transactions on the account;
[1.3] That the certificate refers to an overdraft facility and not
to a current account, as is referred to in the agreement with the
principal debtor;
[1.4] That the various certificates of balance reflect different
amounts at different times;
[1.5] That the rate of interest reflected in the suretyship relating
to the first excipient is incorrect, and that the excipients cannot
determine from the declaration what the capital sum was , when
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interest commenced to run, and how the default interest rate was
calculated.
[1.6] That the respondent has pleaded two different
suretyships in respect of the first excipient. In the first the first
excipient's liability was limited to R 262 500, and in the second,
signed some months later, to R 525 000. The excipients say that it
is unclear upon which suretyship is relied.
[2] A certificate of balance is intended to convey the amount that the
plaintiff believes is owing. It is not intended to provide the defendant with
a full accounting of how that amount is arrived at. Once the defendant has
been told what the plaintiff alleges is owed , the defendant can then
interrogate the certificate, and if it is not in agreement, it can dispute the
correctness of the certificate.
[3] In this case there is nothing sinister about the fact that the first
certificate of balance was issued sometime after the principal debtor was
wound up. The account did not disappear at that date, but continued to
accrue interest. The balance on the account would, consequently, vary
from day to day. It is, therefore, not sinister that certificates issued at
different times would reflect different amounts to be due.
[4] There is nothing unusual about a bank requiring a suretyship with
a specific limit, and then, later on, requiring a suretyship with a higher
liability limit. The fact that the respondent has pleaded two different
suretyships, that were entered into by the first excipient months apart,
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does not render the particulars of claim vague and embarrassing. The
fact that one document refers to a current account agreement account,
and the other to an overdraft facility is unremarkable. A rose by a different
name is still a rose, and I fail to see how the excipient could possibly be
embarrassed by the different nomenclature.
[5] A further complaint is that whilst all the certificates reflect an
interest rate of 21 % , the latest, dated 20 May 2022 does not apply interest
at all. The excipients say that they cannot ascertain how the interest rate
was determined, nor which is the correct interest rate. In my view the
excipient simply has to look at the agreement between the respondent
and the principal debtor to determine whether the correct interest rate has
been applied. They can then plead and either admit or deny the
correctness of the certificate.
[6) Ultimately, the test is whether the alleged deficiencies prejudice
the excipients. The onus is on the excipient to demonstrate prejudice. A
useful exposition of the approach to be taken is to be found in Lovell v
Love//1:
"[15) It is trite that an exception is a procedure 'designed to dispose of
pleadings that are so vague and embarrassing that an intelligible cause of action
or defence cannot be ascertained.' The aim of the exception procedure is to
avoid the leading of unnecessary evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeal
recently summarised the approach to be adopted in regard to adjudicating
1
Case no. 24583/2009 [2022) ZAHCPHC 711 dated 22 September
2022
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exceptions in Luke M v Tembani and Others v President of the Republic of
South Africa and Another, the SCA stated2:
'Whilst exceptions provide a useful mechanism 'to weed out cases without
legal merit', it is nonetheless necessary that they be dealt with sensibly. It is
where pleadings are so vague that it is impossible to determine the nature of
the claim or where pleadings are bad in law in that their contents do not support
a discernible and legally recognised cause of action, that an exception is
competent. The burden rests on an excipient, who must establish that on every
interpretation that can reasonably be attached to it, the pleading is
excipiable. The test is whether on all possible readings of the facts no cause
of action may be made out; it being for the excipient to satisfy the court that
the conclusion of law for which the plaintiff contends cannot be supported on
every interpretation that can be put upon the facts.' (References omitted).
[16] The same court stated that:
'It is thus only if the court can conclude that it is impossible to
recognize the claim, irrespective of the facts as they might emerge at
the trial, that the exception can and should be upheld.' (My emphasis).''
[7] Applying these principles to this matter, it is my view that the
declaration is not vague and embarrassing. The excipient will still be
entitled to interrogate the correctness of the averments made by the
respondent at trial, and will be able to seek further particulars if
necessary. For that reason the exception must fail. The suretyships make
provision for attorney/client costs, and I shall so order.
(8] I make the following order:
2 [2022) ZASCA 70 (20 May 2022)
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The exception is dismissed with costs on the attorney/client
scale.
Counsel for the excipients:
Instructed by:
Counsel for the respondent:
Instructed by:
Hearing on:
Judgment on:
SWANEPOEL J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION PRETORIA
Adv. N Strydom
Wiese & Wiese Inc
Adv I Kruger
Stegmans Inc
21 October 2025
23 October 2023
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