IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NO T APP LICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE : NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: N
(3) REVISED
14 October 2025
DATE
In the ex parte application of:
LUKAS JURIE NIEMAND
JN WATERWORKS (PTY) LTD
In re:
LUKAS JURIE NIEMAND
JN WATERWORKS (PTY) LTD
and
ARESTECH(PTY)LTD
JUDGMENT
Case number: 172544-2025
Date: 14 October 2025
First Applicant
Second Applicant
First Applicant
Second Applicant
Respondent
MINNAARAJ
Introduction:
2
[1] On 30 September 2025, the applicants, in camera, obtained an urgent
ex parte Anton Piller order ('the order'). In terms of the order, the
respondent and/or any person in charge of the respondent's premises in
Benoni was to grant the Sheriff access to the premises to conduct a
search and to secure specified documents. The order clearly stated that
the following persons may accompany the Sheriff and that they would
be entitled to conduct the search and to secure the documents:
a. Mr E Beyers, the applicants' supervising attorney.
b. Mr E.J. Burger and/or Me M Kok from the firm known as ED Ras,
Burger and Partners.
c. Mr G L Strydom, a computer operator nominated by the
applicants and described as being an independent third party.
[2] In terms of the order, the documents are specified to be:
a. Technical engineering drawings and/or designs and technical
product information and/or specifications in relation to the
following products: sluice gates, mechanical front rake screens,
hydro and screw conveyors, compactors and washer compactors,
classifiers and sludge thickeners, de-gritting systems, biofilters,
wash water systems, Archimedes screw pumps, axial flow
pumps, clarifiers, trickling filters, aeration systems, weir plates
and fumes, pumping stations and dewatering equipment;
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b. Tender documents submitted by the respondent to any
municipalities in respect of the aforesaid water and/or sewerage
treatment products and/or equipment and contracts concluded
with municipalities pursuant to such tenders, including any e-mail
correspondence exchanged between the respondent and the
aforesaid municipalities, purchase orders received from, and
invoices issued to the aforesaid municipalities;
c. Contracts concluded between the respondent and any of the
following customers: Tecroveer, Waterskills (Pty) Ltd and
Dawson & Dobson (Pty) Ltd, and/or any other customer in respect
of the aforesaid water and/or sewerage treatment products and/or
equipment, including any e-mail correspondence exchanged
between the respondent and the aforesaid customers, purchase
orders received from, and invoices issued to the aforesaid
customers;
d. Searching the premises for the purposes of finding any computer
disc, hard drive and/or digital storage device containing any of the
items referred to above.
[3] The order further dictated that the respondent must forthwith disclose
passwords and procedures required for effective access to the
respondent's computers and/or other electronic devices and/or software
programs, for the purpose of searching on the computers and/or
electronic devices and/or software programs for the items and making a
disc copy, or if that is not possible, to print out documents containing
4
information of the nature which would be expected in a document
mentioned in paragraph 2 above.
[4] In terms of the order, the respondent permits the Sheriff to attach
and to remove any document and/or item pointed out by a person
mentioned in paragraph 1 above as being an item covered by paragraph
2 above.
[5] The respondent or the person found in charge of the respondent's
premises was further ordered to permit the persons mentioned in
paragraph 1 above to remain on the premises until the search and
seizure has been completed and, if necessary, to re-enter the premises
on the same or following day to complete the search and seizure.
[6] The order further authorised the Sheriff to attach any document
and/or item which is pointed out by any of the persons mentioned in
paragraph 2 above, and is directed to remove any attached document
and/or item in respect of which the applicants' attorney does not give a
different instruction. The Sheriff is directed to keep each removed
document and/or item in his/her custody until the applicants authorise its
release to the respondent or this Court directs otherwise.
[7] The order further directed that, until completion of the search
authorised in the preceding paragraphs the respondent may not access
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any computer and/or electronic device and/or software program or any
area where items of the nature mentioned in paragraph 2 above may be
present except with the leave of the applicants' attorney or to make
telephone calls or send an electronic message to obtain the attendance
and advice mentioned in the notice which is handed over immediately
before execution of this order.
[8] The order further provided that, before the order and the application are
served or executed, the respondent's rights be explained to the
respondent.
[9] The order was issued as an interim order with a return date of 21
November 2025, on which date the respondent is called to show cause
why the order should not be made final and why the documents and/or
items in the possession of the Sheriff pursuant to the execution of the
order should not be handed over to the applicant.
Rule 6(12)(c) reconsideration:
[10] Rule 6(12)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that a person
against whom an order was granted in such person's absence in an
urgent application may, by notice, set down the matter for
reconsideration of the order.
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[11] "The Rule has been widely formulated. It permits an aggrieved person
against whom an order was granted in an urgent application to have that
order reconsidered, provided only that it was granted in his absence. The
underlying pivot to which the exercise of the power is coupled is the
absence of the aggrieved party at the time of the grant of the order.
Given this, the dominant purpose of the Rule seems relatively plain. It
affords to an aggrieved party a mechanism designed to redress
imbalances in, and injustices and oppression flowing from, an order
granted as a matter of urgency in his absence. In circumstances of
urgency where an affected party is not present, factors which might
conceivably impact on the content and form of an order may not be
known to either the applicant for urgent relief or the Judge required to
determine it. The order in question may be either interim or final in its
operation. Reconsideration may involve a deletion of the order, either in
whole or in part, or the engraftment of additions thereto.
The framers of the Rule have not sought to delineate the factors which
might legitimately be taken into reckoning in determining whether any
particular order falls to be reconsidered. What is plain is that a wide
discretion is intended. Factors relating to the reasons for the absence,
the nature of the order granted and the period during which it has
remained operative will invariably fall to be considered in determining
whether a discretion should be exercised in favour of the aggrieved
party. So, too, will questions relating to whether an imbalance,
oppression or injustice has resulted and, if so, the nature and extent
thereof, and whether redress is open to attainment by virtue of the
7
existence of other or alternative remedies. The convenience of the
protagonists must inevitably enter the equation. These factors are by no
means exhaustive. Each case will tum on its facts and the peculiarities
inherent therein. "1
[12) In terms of the Rule 6(12)(c) procedure, no affidavit is required as the
notice suffices. If, however, the aggrieved party does file an affidavit,
then the other party has an opportunity to file a replying affidavit, which
is subject to the general rules and practice about not introducing new
matter illegitimately.2
[13] The respondent exercised its Rule 6(12)(c) rights and lodged an
urgent reconsideration of the order. In amplification of the notice for
reconsideration, the respondent delivered an affidavit in support. The
applicants, as they are entitled to, delivered an affidavit in response. This
affidavit must be regarded as a replying affidavit and may not contain
new evidence to justify the granting of the order.
[14) In essence, it is the respondent's case that the order should be
reconsidered and set aside, on the following grounds:
a. The applicants failed to comply with the safeguards expressly
contained in the order. The order had authorised only certain
1 ISDN Solutions (PTY} LTD v CSDN Solutions CC and Others 1996 (4) SA 484 (W) at 486 and 487
2 Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa v Sooliman and Others 2013 (5) SA 603 (GSJ) at
par 9 and 12; Farmers Trust v Competition Commission 2020 (4) SA 541 (GP) at par 15 to 20; The
Fonarun Naree: Afgri Grain Marketing (PTY) LTD v Trustees, Copenship Bulkers A/S (in liquidation)
and Others 2024 (I) SA 373 (SCA) at par 12 to 14
8
identified persons (as set out in paragraph 1 above) to enter the
respondent's premises. Despite this, the first applicant, along with
Patrick, who was believed to be an employee of the second
applicant, also accessed the respondent's premises when the
order was executed and accessed the respondent's computer
systems. From the replying affidavit, it became evident that this
person was, in fact, Mr Patrick Gerber. This conduct violated the
clear terms of the order, exposed the respondent's confidential
and proprietary information, and demonstrated flagrant disregard
for the order and the rule of law, a breach which, on its own,
justifies setting the order aside.
b. The applicants failed to disclose all material facts and misled the
court in the ex parte application. The first applicant falsely claimed
to be the sole director and shareholder of the second applicant,
even though company records show he had resigned as a director
and that another individual was the only registered director.
Moreover, the first applicant claimed that his former entities,
Shosalowe Investments (Pty) Ltd ('Shosalowe') and Wamechsi
CC ('Wamechsi'), were dormant when, in fact, both remained
active businesses.
c. The application lacked genuine urgency. The applicants knew
about the alleged 'published works' (i.e. the drawings in question)
as early as 3 September 2025, but only launched the application
on 22 September 2025 and then delayed execution until 8
October 2025. These delays contradicted the claim of urgency
9
and showed that the applicants did not treat the matter as
genuinely urgent.
d. The applicants lacked locus standi and failed to join necessary
parties. The alleged drawings relied upon by the applicants were
not their property but rather belonged to Wamechsi and
Shosalowe. These entities are indicated as being the owners of
the drawings. Despite this, and their substantial and direct interest
in the outcome, they were not joined to the proceedings. This
failure renders the application fatally defective.
e. The application amounted to a "fishing expedition". The
applicants sought the Anton Piller order not to preserve specific,
identifiable evidence, but to search broadly for unspecified
documents and information. The respondent contends that there
was no evidence or reasonable belief that any material would be
hidden, destroyed, or removed. In fact, the relevant drawings
were already publicly available online and even attached to the
applicants' own papers.
f. The respondent asserts that the drawings were not proprietary or
confidential, but were freely available in the public domain and
widely used within the industry. Similar or identical drawings
appeared on the websites of other companies. Even if copyrights
did subsist, the respondent maintains that it was unaware of such
rights and therefore cannot be held liable under section 24(2) of
the Copyright Act, 98 of 1978.
10
[15] In the replying affidavit, the applicants raised a point in limine stating
that the relief sought in the reconsideration application has become
moot. In this regard, the applicants contend that the order was already
executed, and the respondent, according to the applicants, provided full
cooperation during the execution. To now set aside the order would be
futile as the proverbial horse has bolted, and it is too late for the
respondent, at this late stage, to attempt to shut the stable door.
[16] The procedure of a rule nisi is usually resorted to in matters of urgency
and where the applicant seeks interim relief to protect an immediate
interest adequately.3 It follows that once a party has such an order, it will
be executed as a matter of urgency; otherwise, it might defeat the
purpose for which the order was obtained.
[17] For the applicants to now contend that the order was already executed
and therefore the manner in which the order was obtained and executed
has become irrelevant is misplaced. It is thus irrelevant whether the
horse has bolted. The applicants' approach to mootness flies in the face
of the provision of Rule 6(12)(c). If their approach is indeed correct, it
would result in an ex parte application being considered, with an order
granted and executed without any possibility to approach the court for
reconsideration. This would create an untenable situation.
[18] In light of the above, the applicants' point in limine is dismissed.
3 ISDN Solutions (PTY) LTD v CSDN Solutions CC and Others 1996 ( 4) SA 484 (W) at 486H
11
Safeguards in the order:
[19] Anton Piller relief is of a Draconian nature, which relief should only be
granted under exceptional circumstances.4 The application of Anton
Piller relief has been described as an example of the outer extreme of
judicial power. 5 The execution of the order must be meticulous and
adhere to its letter.
[20] The respondent complains about the presence of the first applicant
and Mr Gerber when the order was executed, as they were not included
in the list of persons allowed to be present.
[21] According to the applicants, when the order was executed on 8
October 2025, both directors of the respondent (Mr Pretorius and Mr De
Swardt) invited the Sheriff and the persons ordered into the boardroom.
The respondent's directors were advised of the respondent's rights and
informed that the respondent's attorney may be contacted. The
respective attorneys had a discussion at around 11 h00 on the day of
execution, and the respondent's attorney did not raise any objection to
the execution of the order. According to the applicants, the respondent
gave full cooperation and at no stage objected to their presence, nor did
they object to the presence of the first applicant and Mr Gerber. The
execution of the order proceeded on the next day, 9 October 2025, with
4 Rath v Rees 2007 (1) SA 99 (C) at 107H; Mathias International Ltd and Another v Bail/ache and Others
2015 (2) SA 357 (WCC) at 362E to 363D
5 Mathias International Ltd and Another v Bail/ache and Others 2015 (2) SA 357 (WCC) at 363D and
363H to I
12
the respondent's directors providing their unequivocal support
throughout. The respondent even took down its website, which is still in
maintenance mode.
[22] The respondent's version is in complete contradiction of the
applicant's version. In the respondent's affidavit, details are provided as
to the expedited manner in which they approached their attorneys to
lodge the urgent reconsideration after they've been 'released' at around
17h30 on 8 October 2025. These actions clearly do not indicate that the
respondent acquiesced to the validity of the order. The contrary is true.
[23] The fact of the matter is that neither the first applicant nor Mr Gerber
was authorised to attend the execution of the order. Their presence was
in direct contradiction of the terms of the order.
[24] It is settled law that serious irregularities in the execution of an Anton
Piller order can render it susceptible to being discharged on a
reconsideration thereof. 6
[25] Although I am not encouraging non-compliance with the terms of an
Anton Piller order, I do not, for this application, regard the presence of
the first applicant and Mr Gerber as a serious irregularity that would
justify the discharge of the order. It will, however, have an impact on the
scale of costs I intend to grant.
6 Audio Vehicle Systems v Whitfield 2007 (1) SA 434 (C) at 4440 - 4458 and 453F - G; Friedshelf I 509
(Pty) Ltd tla RTT Group v Kalianji 2015 (4) SA 163 (G) at 167H - I
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[26] On the attachment, removal, and safeguarding of the documents, the
order is clear: all of this will vest with the Sheriff. In this regard, the order
explicitly provides:
a. The Sheriff is permitted to attach and to remove any document
and/or item mentioned in paragraph 3 of the order.
b. The Sheriff is directed to keep each removed document and/or
item in his/her custody until the applicants authorise its release to
the respondent or this court directs otherwise.
c. It is only on the return date that the interim order will be made
final. If so, it is only then that the documents and/or items in the
possession of the Sheriff pursuant to the execution of the order
may be handed to the applicants.
[27] On a reading of the replying affidavit, the second applicant makes the
following startling remarks:
a. Paragraph 3.14: "In the premises the order has already been
executed and the items I required access to have already been
retrieved."
b. Paragraph 3.15: "If the order is set aside, the Respondent could
claim that I now have unlawfull access to their confidential
information which whould then make me potentially liable to pay
damages to the Respondent."
c. Paragraph 3.17: " ... This reconsideration, which is brought after
the fact, is nothing but a ma/a tide attempt at impeding upon my
14
right to use the information that I now have as I see fit." (my
emphasis)
[28] From the replying affidavit, it is clear that the first applicant has access
to all the documents, which are now in his possession. He asserts that it
is his right to use the information as he sees fit. This is in total disregard
of the safeguards as provided for in the order. This approach also
negates the whole purpose of Anton Piller proceedings: to preserve
evidence pending proceedings.
[291 It is clear, on the first applicant's version, that there is a clear deviation
from the provision that it is the Sheriff who has to preserve the
documents.
[30] The manner in which the applicants now have access to the
documents and information is in complete disregard of the order and the
purpose of the Anton Piller process. This constitutes a grave irregularity.
[31} On this point alone, the application for reconsideration must succeed,
and the order granted must be set aside.
Failure to disclose all material facts:
[32] An ex parte application by its nature requires the utmost good faith on
the part of the applicant. The court has a discretion to set the order aside
15
with costs on the ground of non-disclosure. It should, however, be noted
that the court has a discretion and is not compelled, even if the non
disclosure was material, to dismiss the application or to set aside the
proceedings.7
[33] In the founding affidavit, the first applicant pertinently stated that he is
the sole director and shareholder of the second applicant. If regard is
had to Annexure "JN1" to the founding affidavit, dated 3 September
2025, Mr Gerber and the first applicant are both active directors of the
second applicant.
[34] Mr Gerber's involvement in the second applicant is a bit of a mystery.
In terms of the certificate issued by the CIPC, dated 3 September 2025
and annexed to the founding affidavit, Mr Gerber and the first applicant
are both active directors of the second applicant. Attached to the
respondent's affidavit is a Lexis WinDeed search, dated 8 October 2025,
indicating that Mr Gerber is the active director of the second applicant.
He was appointed as such on 12 August 2025. According to this
document, the second applicant's status indicates that he had resigned.
This same document then states that the first applicant resigned on 30
August 2025, but was then appointed on 19 September 2025. The
applicants, in their replying affidavit, attached an updated CIPC
certificate, dated 9 October 2025. In terms thereof, the first applicant is
the sole director of the second applicant, and he was appointed as such
7 Schlesinger v Schlesinger 1979 (4) SA 342 (W) at 348E to 350B; National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Basson 2002 (1) SA 419 (SCA) at par 21
16
on 19 September 2025. This document indicates that Mr Gerber
resigned as a director on this date.
[35] On the papers presented to the Court when the order was granted, it
is evident that the first application made a misstatement in his founding
affidavit in declaring that he was the sole director and shareholder of the
second applicant. No resolution was presented to confirm the first
applicant's authority to have instituted the proceedings on behalf of the
second applicant. As such, I am not satisfied that the second applicant
had the requisite locus standi to have obtained the Anton Piller relief.
[36] The following aspect is the status of Shosalowe and Wameschi.
According to the first applicant, these entities were dormant. The
evidence, however, indicates that both of them remained in active
business. It would, however, appear that neither of these entities was
trading at the time of the alleged infringement and when the Anton Piller
was obtained.
[37] On the failure to adequately disclose all material facts, it follows that
the order must be set aside.
Lack of urgency:
[38] According to the first applicant, he became aware of the alleged
infringement on 3 September 2025. It is baffling that the applicants then
waited until 30 September 2025 to protect their rights.
17
[39] Urgency is, however, an aspect that is highly dependent on judicial
discretion and, as such, I do not deem it appropriate to involve myself in
the finding by the previous Court to have treated the application
sufficiently urgent to warrant the order being granted.
[40] Of concern is the execution of the order, which execution only took
place on 8 October 2025.
[41] The purpose of the Anton Piller procedure is to secure the
preservation of evidence in proceedings already instituted or to be
instituted by the applicant. In Shoba v Officer Commanding, Temporary
Police Camp, Wagendrift Dam, and Another; Maphanga v Officer
Commanding, South African Police Murder and Robbery Unit,
Pietermaritzburg, and Others 1995 (4) SA 1 (A) ([1995] 2 All SA 300;
[1995] ZASCA 49) at 15H - I the Appellate Division set out the essential
requirements for the establishment of Anton Piller relief. These
requirements were stated by Corbett CJ as follows:
'(W)hat an applicant for such an order, obtained in camera and without
notice to the respondent, must prima facie establish, is the following:
(1) That he, the applicant, has a cause of action against the
respondent, which he intends to pursue;
(2) that the respondent has in his possession specific (and specified)
documents or things which constitute vital evidence in
substantiation of the applicant's cause of action (but in respect of
18
which the applicant cannot claim a real or personal right); and
(3) that there is a real and well-founded apprehension that this
evidence may be hidden or destroyed or in some manner be
spirited away by the time the case comes to trial or to the stage
of discovery.'
[42] It is generally accepted that Anton Piller proceedings are of an
inherently urgent nature. One of the cornerstones of Anton Piller is a 'real
and well-founded apprehension that evidence may be hidden or
destroyed or in some manner be spirited away by the time the case
comes to trial or to the stage of discovery.' This, in my view, speaks
unequivocally that the relief claimed and the execution of such an order
were intended to provide for urgent intervention.
[43] The applicants' explanation that, from 1 October 2025 (when they
were placed in possession of the endorsed order) until 8 October 2025,
they were bound by the Sheriffs availability to execute the order does
not pass muster.
[44] This court has a serious concern about accepting the applicants'
assertion that there was a real and well-founded apprehension that the
evidence might be hidden or destroyed. Yet, they failed to enforce their
'urgent order' and waited some time. The applicants' failure to ensure
that the purported evidence is protected as a matter of extreme urgency
19
also touches on the nerve as to why the applicants waited from 5
September 2025 until 30 September 2025 to obtain the urgent relief.
[45] The applicants' failure to act promptly to preserve the documents and
protect their perceived rights is another reason to set aside the order.
The applicants' locus standi.·
[46] The respondent's attack on locus standi centres on the applicants'
failure to join Wameschi and Shosalowe to these proceedings, despite
them having a substantial and direct interest in the outcome hereof.
[47] As pointed out by the respondent, some of the drawings clearly
indicate that they are the sole property of Shosalowe or Wameschi. This
aspect was not appropriately addressed in the founding affidavit.
[48] Shosalowe and Wameschi are both independent legal entities, with a
direct and substantial interest herein. Yet, they were not joined to these
proceedings to protect their interest against any alleged infringement by
the respondent.
[49] Without Shosalowe and Wameschi being joined, their rights could not
have been implicated or protected. The first applicant's assertion that the
drawings belong to him and/or the second applicant and/or Shosalowe
and/or Wameschi (as the case may be) does not assist in this regard.
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[50] This is a further ground on which the order must be set aside.
"Fishing expedition":
[51] The essential purpose of an Anton Piller order is to preserve evidence
in proceedings already instituted or about to be instituted, and it is not to
enable a prospective litigant to 'see' his adversary's documents. 8
[52] An Anton Piller order is not to be used as a fishing expedition to obtain
evidence that may found a cause of action or as a blanket search for
unspecified documents or evidence that may or may not exist.9
[53] According to the respondent, the documents the applicants intended
to preserve were already publicly available online and even attached to
their own papers.
[54] The first applicant's flippant remark in paragraph 3.17 of the replying
affidavit, that he may now use the information that he has as he sees fit,
is a summary of the motivation behind the application: fish for what you
can get to know whether you have a case against your adversary. This
approach is a flagrant abuse of the Anton Piller purpose and process.
8 Hall and Another v Heyns and Others 1991 (I) SA 381 (C) at C 389H-1; Shoba v Officer
Commanding, Temporary Police Camp, Wagendrift Dam, and Another; Maphanga v Officer
Commanding, South African Police Murder and Robbery F Unit, Pietermaritzburg, and Others 1995
(4)SA I (A)at 15G--171
9 Roamer Watch Co SA and Another c African Textile Distributors also t/a M K Patel Wholesale
Merchants and Direct Importers 1980 (2) SA 254 (W) at 272 to 273
21
[55] If regard is had to prayer 3 of the granted order, no specifics are
presented on exactly what time frames are applicable. The documents
sought to be preserved deal with this specific industry in which the
parties trade, yet the net cast by the applicants is extensive. The relief
obtained was apparently devised to identify the documents the
respondent possesses, enabling the applicants to tailor a claim against
the respondent.
[56] The applicant has failed to meet the requirement that the respondent
has in its possession specific (and specified) documents or things which
constitute vital evidence in substantiation of the applicant's cause of
action. On this point, the application for reconsideration must succeed,
and the order must be set aside.
Nature of the drawings:
[57] According to the respondent, the applicable drawings are either
identical or nearly identical to those used by other companies in the
industry, and they are all available online.
[58] This contention by the respondent raises the question whether there
was a real and well-founded apprehension that the evidence, allegedly
held by the respondent but which is also available in the public domain,
may be hidden or destroyed or, in some manner, be spirited away by the
time the case comes to trial or to the stage of discovery.
22
[59] In the premises, and on a reconsideration of all the evidence, it follows
that the application for reconsideration must succeed, and the Anton
Piller order must be set aside.
Costs:
[60] There is no basis to deviate from the normal approach that costs
should follow the outcome.
[61] The respondent is seeking costs on an attorney and client scale.
Order:
I consider that the following would justify punitive costs:
a. The presence of the first applicant and Mr Gerber on 8 October
2025, when they had no authority under the Anton Piller order to
be present during its execution.
b. The first applicant's approach, indicating that he has now found
what he needed and that the documents and information are in
his possession.
Consequently, I make the following order:
1. The Anton Piller order issued on 30 September 2025 is set aside.
2. Within 48 hours of the granting of this order, the Sheriff shall return to
the respondent all documents taken into its possession during the
execution of the order.
3. Within 24 hours of the granting of this order, the first-and/or second
applicant is to deliver to the respondent's attorney:
3.1 All documents relating to the respondent and which came into the
possession of the applicants during the execution of the order,
whether in hard copy or electronic format.
3.2 A sworn statement to confirm that all documents stored by the
applicants in an electronic format, relating to the respondent,
which came into the possession of the applicants during the
execution of the order, have been destroyed and that the
applicants do not have any electronic record of the respondent's
documents.
4. The applicants, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be
absolved, are ordered to pay the costs of the application on the scale as
between attorney and client.
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Heard on
For the Applicants
Instructed by
For the First Respondent
Instructed by
Date of Judgment
24
: 10 October 2025
: Adv N Breitenbach
: E Beyers Attorneys
: Adv B C Bester
: Warrener De Agrela and Associates Inc.
: 14 October 2025