IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: 25696/2024
In the matter between:
NEW LIFE HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD APPLICANT
And
STEFANUS VAN WYK VAN DER HOVEN
JACOBUS REYNEKE VAN DER HOVEN
NEIL FRANS ROETS
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
THIRD RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: New Life Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Van Der Hoven and Others
(Case no 25696/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC … (23 October 2025)
Coram: NUKU J
Heard: 28 August 2025
Delivered: 23 October 2025
Summary: Procedure- application to strike out new matter in reply – alternatively
to deliver a further affidavit – no matter introduced in reply more than the
clarification of the pleaded case – both applications refused with costs.
Contract- interpretation of the terms of a guarantee providing for payment on
demand – liability arising on receipt of a written demand stating that any amount is
owed independently of the prior agreement that gave rise to the guarantee.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
1. The respondents are ordered to make the following payment to the applicant,
jointly and severally, with the one paying the others to be absolved:
(a) The sum of R8 376 045 (Eight Million Three Hundred and Seventy -Six
Thousand and Forty-Five Rand);
(b) Interest on the amount referred to in (a) above calculated at the rate of
11.75% per annum , from 5 August 2024, until the final date of payment,
both days inclusive; and
(c) Costs of the application on an attorney-and-client scale.
_____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________________
Nuku J
Introduction and factual background
[1] The applicant seeks payment of R8 376 045, along with interest and costs
from the respondents arising from a guarantee agreement concluded between the
parties (“guarantee”).
[2] The parties concluded the guarantee to secure the performance of the
obligations by Cl imealine (Pty) Ltd ( “Climealine”), arising from a sale of shares
and loan account agreement ( “SPA”) that Climealine had e ntered into with the
applicant for the sale of the applicant’s shares and loan account in Imalisoft (Pty)
Ltd (“Imalisoft”).
[3] The applicant pleaded the following terms of the guarantee , which the
respondents did not dispute, namely that:
(a) The phrase ‘guaranteed obligations ’ was defined as each and every of
Climealine’s payment obligations, liabilities and duties towards and/or in
respect of the applicant under and in terms of the sale of shares and loan
account agreement, including the obligations to timeously settle/pay the entire
purchase price, and each part thereof, and any accrued interest owing by
Climealine to the applicant under and in terms of the sale of shares and loan
account agreement.
(b) The word ‘guarantors’ was defined to refer to the resp ondents collectively, or
any of them, as context requires.
(c) The rights and obligations of the parties under the guarantee were subject to and
conditional upon the fulfilment of the condition precedent that the share sale
agreement be entered into and signe d by and between the relevant parties
thereto, and the same having become unconditional on or before 31 March
2023.
(d) The respondents, jointly and severally, irrevocably and unconditionally:
i. Guaranteed and undertook as a principal and independent obligatio n in
favour of the applicant, its successors -in-title and assigns, the due and
timeous performance by Climealine of all of the guaranteed obligations;
ii. Bound themselves as co-principal debtors in solidum with Climealine for the
due and timeous payment by Climealine of each and every amount owing by
Climealine to the applicant under and in terms of the SPA from time to time;
and
iii. Indemnified and undertook to hold harmless the applicant and its successors -
in-title against any and all loss, liability, damage, cost (including, without
limitation, legal costs on a scale as between attorney and own client) and
expense which the applicant and/or its successor -in-title and assignee may
suffer or incur in connection with a breach of the Guaranteed Obligations; on
the terms set out in the guarantee.
(e) The obligations of the respondents, jointly and severally , under the guarantee
are principal and independent obligations and remain enforceable
notwithstanding the invalidity or unenforceability, for a ny reason whatsoever,
of the guaranteed obligations.
(f) The security constituted by the guarantee constitutes a continuing covering
security for the guaranteed obligations and remains in force and effect until the
whole of the guaranteed obligations have been fully and unconditionally
discharged.
(g) No alteration or variation of the share sale agreement or any other present or
future agreement (or any alteration or variation thereof) between the parties
thereto shall in any way release the respondents from their liability.
(h) Upon receipt by the respondents, or any of them, of any written notice from the
applicant stating that any amount is payable by the respondents, or any of them,
or that the respondents, or any of them, are obliged to perform any obligation to
the applicant, in terms of the guarantee , the respondents, jointly and severally ,
will, notwithstanding that the respondents, or any of them, may dispute their
liability to make such payment, immediately:
i. Perform such obligation; or
ii. Pay the amount stipulated in the notice, in cash, without set off, withholding
or deduction of any nature whatsoever, into the bank accounts stipulated by
the applicant in writing for this purpose; or
iii. If requested by the applicant, provide security to the satisfaction of the
applicant in its sole and absolute disc retion for the performance of such
obligation or payment of such amount.
(i) A certificate under the hand of a manager and/or director of the applicant as to
the existence or amount of indebtedness of Cl imealine and/or the respondents,
or any of the ir, indebtedness to the applicant at any time, or as to the fact that
such amount is due and payable, the amount of interest accrued thereon, the rate
of interest applicable thereto or as to any other fact , matter or thing relating to
the indebtedness of C limealine and/or the respondents , or any of them, to the
applicant, shall be prima facie proof of the contents and correctness thereof. It
shall not be necessary to prove the appointment of the person signing such a
certificate.
(j) As part of the respondent s’ liability in terms of the guarantee, the respondents,
jointly and severally, shall pay the amount of costs, charges and expenses of
whatever nature incurred by the applicant in securing or endeavouring to secure
fulfilment of the guaranteed obligations as well as the respondents , or any of
their, obligations under the guarantee, including, without limitation, collection
commission and legal costs on the scale as between an attorney and client,
insurance premiums, broking costs, storage charges, costs and expenses of
valuation, maintenance , advertising, realisation (including agent’s and
auctioneer’s commissions and other charges and disbursements), taxes and
other fiscal charges.
(k) The respondents each renounced the benefits of the following legal exceptions:
i. No cause of debt and no value received;
ii. Revision of accounts and errors of calculations; and
iii. Non numeratae pecuniae.
(l) The respondents waived any right they have of first requiring the applicant (or
any director, shareholder or agent on its behalf) to proceed against or enforce
any other rights or security, or to claim payment from any person or Climealine
before claiming from the respondents under the guarantee. This waiver applies
irrespective of any law or provision of any agreement, docum ent or Guaranteed
Obligation to the contrary.
[4] The applicant’s case is that the condition s precedent contained in the
guarantee were fulfilled on or before 31 March 2023, as evidenced by a document
signed on behalf of the applicant, Climealine, and Imalisoft titled ‘Fulfilment of
conditions precedent pertaining to the sale of shares and loan account agreement’.
[5] Acting in accordance with clause 5.10 of the guarantee, the applicant issued
a demand to the respondents on 5 August 2024, requesting payment wit hin seven
days of R8 376 045, plus interest at a rate of 15,75% per annum from 1 July 2024,
until the date of payment. The respondents failed to pay the amount demanded.
Additional demands dated 26 September 2024, and 28 October 2024, also
addressed to the respondents, did not result in payment.
[6] On 22 August 2024 and 11 November 2024, the applicant issued breach
notices to the respondents, which elicited no positive response from them. That
resulted in the applicant instituting the present application seeking the enforcement
of the obligations arising from the guarantee.
[7] The respondents oppose the application on various grounds. In their
answering affidavit, the respondents raised two lis pendens alibi points in limine.
These points in limine relate to proceedings that are currently pending in the
Limpopo Division of the High Court.
[8] The first of these proceedings is an action by Climealine seeking payment of
R1 500 000 (One Million Five Hundred Thousand Rand) from the applicant
because the SPA has been cancelled due to the applicant’s repudiation, which
Climealine has accepted (“cancellation action”).
[9] The second is an action i nstituted by Climealine, Intuitive PDA (Pty) Ltd
(“Intuitive”), and Imalisoft, as plaintiffs, against the applicant, DebtSafe (Pty) Ltd
(“DebtSafe”), ADCAP (Pty) Ltd ( “ADCAP”), and Mr. Hendrik Christoffel Du
Plessis ( “Mr. Du Plessis ”), as defendants. In this action, Climealine seeks, as
against the applicant, a declaratory order to the effect that it is excused from
making payments under th e SPA to the applicant as long as the applicant remains
in breach of the agreement documenting the fulfilment of the conditions precedent.
For convenience, I refer to this action as the declaratory action.
[10] On the merits, the respondents’ case is that they are not liable for the same
reasons that Climealine is not liable to the applicant. This is based on their stated
purpose of the guarantee , which they say was to provide for the respondents to be
liable for Climealine’s debts in terms of the SPA, only if Climealine is liable to the
applicant in the first place.
[11] The applicant filed a replying affidavit stating that the outcome of the
application depends on whether the guarantee creates independent obligations or if
the guaranteed obligations only arise from the SPA. The replying affidavit also
described the difference between the parties’ approaches, with the deponent
suggesting that the respondents seem to treat the guarantee as a suretyship.
[12] The deponent to the replying affidavit went further to clarify the applicant’s
stance, stating that the guarantee creates principal obligations, and that the
guarantors’ liability is independent of the principal debtor (Climealine in this case)
and entirely separate from the SPA. The deponent went further to point out the
incorrectness of a statement made in the answering affidavit that , ‘the liability of
the respondents in terms of the guarantee depends on the anterior question as to
whether Climealine is liable to the applicants in terms of the sale agreemen t’. It
was also pointed out that the respondents overlook ed the provisions of clause 5.2
of the guarantee which provide that: ‘ For avoidance of any doubt, the obligations
of the Guarantors, jointly and severally, under this Agreement are principal and
independent obligations and are not and will remain enforceable notwithstanding
the invalidity or unenforceability, for any reason whatsoever, of the Guaranteed
Obligations.’
[13] The respondents applied to strike out the matter referenced a bove from the
applicant’s replying affidavit, arguing that the applicant is now attempting to
present an entirely different case from the one outlined in the founding affidavit.
[14] It was suggested that the case made out in the applicant’s founding affidavi t
is that the respondents are liable for the same amount that is due to the applicant by
Climealine under the SPA. It was further suggested that the applicant’s case in the
founding affidavit was never based on the respondents’ liability being ‘wholly
independent’ from the SPA and from Climealine’s liability to the applicant. Based
on these two averments, it was contended that paragraphs 3 to 11 of the applicant’s
replying affidavit should be struck out.
[15] Alternatively, if the strikeout application is refused, the respondents sought
the leave of the Court to file a further affidavit to address what they argued was a
new matter introduced in the reply.
[16] In the further affidavit sought to be filed by the res pondents, they, however,
repeated their position as stated in their answering affidavit, namely that their
liability under the guarantee is and can only be for the same amount that may be
due to the applicant by Climealine in terms of the SPA, and that the y are not liable
for the same reasons that Climealine is not liable.
[17] The only difference this time was that they cited some of the clauses of the
guarantee to support their position. In particular, they referenced clauses 2.2,
3.1.1.6, 4.2, 5.1.1 -3, 6-8, 12.2, which are not necessary to list since most of them
had been explicitly pleaded by the applicant as outlined in paragraph 3 above. The
affidavit concluded by stating that it will be argued at the hearing that, when
properly interpreted, the respondent s’ liability to the applicant can only be for
Climealine’s liability to the applicant under the SPA, and if that is not the correct
interpretation of the guarantee, then, at best for the applicant, the guarantee
contains such fundamentally contradictory and mutually destructive provisions that
it must be void for vagueness.
[18] The applicant opposed the application to strike out because the replying
affidavit did not present any new evidence. It also opposed the application to file a
fourth affidavit because the respondents , (a) have not shown exceptional
circumstances, (b) have not demonstrated any prejudice, and (c) intend to cure
avoidable defects in their answering affidavit.
Issues for determination
[19] The issues for determination in this application, in light of the above factual
background, are the following:
(a) The merits of the respondents’ strike-out application and application for
leave to file the fourth affidavit; and
(b) The interpretation of the terms of the guarantee and the availability of the lis
pendens alibi defences to the respondents.
The respondent s’ strike -out application and application for leave to file the
fourth affidavit
[20] The respondents argue that the case the applicant sought to make out in the
founding affidavit is that their liability under the guarantee relates to the same debt
owed by Climealine under the SPA. This is because the applicant, in the founding
affidavit, not only referenced the conclusion of the SPA and the alleged breach by
Climealine but also included demand letters sent to Climealine for the same
amount the applicant is seeking from the respondents in this application.
[21] In the replying affidavit, as the argument goes, the applicant now attempts to
make a different case, claiming that the respondents’ liability is not related to
Climealine or the SPA but is entirely independent of both.
[22] The applicant argued that a careful reading of the founding affidavit clearly
shows that, from the beginning, the applicant has always a imed to enforce the
guarantee without referencing the SPA, as paragraph 9 of the affidavit states: '[t]he
applicant seeks to enforce a guarantee agreement concluded between it and the
respondents. By seeking payment from the respondents, the applicant is e ffectively
seeking specific performance of the guarantee.’
[23] The argument further suggests that since the outcome of the application
depends on the interpretation of the guarantee, as the respondents must accept, no
new evidence has been introduced in the r eplying affidavit . Additionally , the
respondents complain of any prejudice because the interpretation of the guarantee
is based on legal argument, which the respondents remain entitled to present.
[24] Finally, it was argued that what the replying affidavit did was simply clarify
what was already pleaded, namely that the application concerns the enforcement of
a guarantee made between the applicant and the respondents.
[25] The arguments presented by the applicant have merit, and paragraph 9 of the
founding affidavit mentioned above clearly indicates the applicant’s cause of
action. The fact that the applicant chose to detail how the guarantee originated does
not change the f act that the applicant’s cause of action has always been based on
enforcing the guarantee. This also applies to the reference made to the demands
made to Climealine because the respondents' liability is a matter that must be
determined by interpreting the guarantee, and the evidence relating to the demands
made to Climealine has no role to play in that interpretative process.
[26] The respondents' misinterpretation of the reference to the origins of the
guarantee, along with the alleged breaches by Climealine a nd the subsequent
demands, cannot change the fact that the applicant’s claim is solely based on
enforcing the guarantee. In other words, the respondents cannot use their own
misreading of the pleadings to suggest that the applicant has either altered its cause
of action or introduced new evidence in reply.
[27] The affidavit supporting the strike -out application does not mention any
prejudice that the respondents would suffer if the application is refused. This is not
surprising because, as the respondents stat e in the same affidavit, their liability
depends on the interpretation of the guarantee. Given that, as the applicant argued,
the respondents are entitled to present legal arguments on that matter, the issue of
prejudice to the respondents does not arise. In fact, the affidavit that the
respondents seek to have admitted merely introduces legal arguments which they
are, in any case, entitled to present during oral argument.
[28] The respondents have not established a case for striking out the new matter,
which t hey claimed was introduced in the replying affidavit. This is because no
new matter was introduced in the replying affidavit. Since no new matter was
introduced in reply, there is no basis for granting the respondents leave to file a
fourth set of papers, which simply raises a legal argument that the respondents are,
in any event, entitled to present. Both the application for striking out and the
application for leave to file a fourth set of papers are refused with costs.
The interpretation of the terms of the guarantee and the availability of the lis
pendens alibi defences to the respondents.
[29] The applicant argued that the terms of the guarantee clearly show that the
respondents' liability under the guarantee is separate f rom Climealine's liability
under the SPA. Specific reference was made to clause 5.1.1, which states that the
respondents undertook ‘as a principal and independent obligation in favour of the
applicant, … the due and timeous performance by Climealine of all the Guaranteed
Obligations.’ Further reference was made to clause 5.2 , which reinforced the
independent nature of the respondents’ obligations under the guarantee , and it was
submitted that textually, there is only one plausible interpretation, namely tha t the
respondents’ liability under the guarantee is separate from that of Climealine.
[30] Turning to purpose, reference was made to clause 2.2 which recorded that
the applicant requires a guarantee and se curity for the due and punctual
performance and discharge by Climealine of all the Guaranteed obligations, and it
was submitted that the applicant could have required a suretyship but deliberately
chose to require a guarantee.
[31] As to what triggers the res pondents’ liability under the guarantee, reference
was made to clause 5.10 which states that:
‘Upon receipt by the Guarantors[respondents], or any of them, of any written notice from
the Seller [applicant] stating that any amount is payable by the Guarantors[respondents],
or any of them, or that the Guarantors, or any of them, are obligated to perform any
obligation to the Seller, in terms of this Guarantee, the Guarantors, jointly and severally,
shall, notwithstanding that the Guarantors, or any of them , may dispute that liability to
make such payment immediately perform such obligation or pay the amount stipulated in
the notice…’
[32] Clause 5.10, it was argued, clearly shows that the respondents’ obligation to
pay comes from the written notice by the applicant demanding payment, and that
the respondents cannot withhold payment due to their dispute over liability. Once
they receive a wr itten notice from the applicant demanding payment, all the
respondents can do is pay.
[33] Based on the argument that the guarantee creates independent obligations, it
was argued that the lis pendens alibi defences relied upon by the respondents are
not available to them. It was further asserted that the cause of action in the
cancellation and declaratory actions is different because they are based on the SPA,
whereas the cause of action in the current application is solely based on the
guarantee. It was also argued that there is no commonality of parties involved
between this application and the cancellation and declaratory actions, as the
respondents are not parties to the latter proceedings.
[34] Finally, based on all the above, it was argued that the respondents’ liability
has been established based on their failure to pay despite receipt of a no tice
contemplated in clause 5.10 of the guarantee.
[35] The respondents started their argument by referencing the disputes between
Climealine and the applicant concerning the SPA and the fact that Cl imealine has
cancelled the SPA. The argument then continued t hat the cancellation of the SPA
by Cl imealine has extinguished the Guaranteed Obligations as defined in the
guarantee, which means the respondents' liability does not arise.
[36] The follow-up argument was that it would be plainly absurd for the applicant
to be entitled to recover the amount claimed in this application on one side, while
simultaneously possessing the shares and the loan account on the other. If this were
the case, the respondents argued that such an interpretation would imply that the
applicant has the right to demand the fulfilment of guaranteed obligations that no
longer exist.
[37] The respondents critici sed the interpretation advanced by the applicant as
one that is limited to the text of selected passages without considering the purpose
of the guarantee as stated in the answering affidavit, which is that, ‘The purpose of
the guarantee is obviously to provide for the respondents to be liable for
Climealine’s debts in terms of the share sale agreement, only if, of course,
Climealine is liable in the first place.’
[38] It was further argued that the interpretation advanced by the applicant fails
to take into account the interconnected nature of the SPA and the guarantee , which
is so fundamental that the conclusion of the one is a condition precedent to the
enforceability of the other , and the fact that Climealine is also a party to the
guarantee.
[39] Reference was also made to the recital in clause 2 of the guarantee
(particularly subclauses 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3), as well as clauses 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, to
support the argument that ; (a) the purpose and reason for the existence of the
guarantee are outlined in clause 2, (b) the respondents committed themselves as co-
principal debtors in solidum with Climealine for the timely and full payment of any
amount Climealine owes to the applicant under the SPA (5.1.2), and (c) the fact
that the respondents are liable for any loss or expense that the applicant ‘may
suffer or incur with a breach of the Guaranteed Obligations (5.1.2).’
[40] The respondents’ response to the applicant’s interpretation of clause 5.2 was
that there is a difference between the invalidity or unenforceability of the
Guaranteed Obligations and the fact that the guaranteed obligations have ceased to
exist. In this case, it was contended that the guaranteed obligations have ceased to
exist, and therefore, the respondents’ liability cannot arise.
[41] Regarding the applicant’s interpretation of clauses 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 that these
clauses create independent obligations, it was submitted that these clauses are not
reconcilable with instances where the respondents’ obligation in the guarantee is
described as that of co-principal debtors.
[42] Reliance was also placed in clause 5.4 of the guarantee in support of the
argument that the guarantee has become unenforceable upon the unconditional
discharge of the guaranteed obligations.
[43] As an alternative argument, it was claimed that the guarantee is invalid for
being vague because co-principal debtors are responsible for the same debt. In this
case, this means the respondents would be responsible for Climealine’s debts. The
argument is that the guarantee, on one hand, refers to independent obligations, and
on the other hand, mentions co -principal debtors, an d that these two are
incompatible.
[44] The principles for interpreting documents are well -known and need not be
restated. ‘It is the process of attributing meaning to words used in a … contract ,
having regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or
provisions in the light of the document as a whole … giving consideration to the
language used … the context in which the provision appears and the apparent
purpose to which it is directed.’1
1 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at para 18.
[45] Since this application concerns the respondents' liability under the guarantee,
I find it useful to start with the analysis of clause 5.10, which was identified as the
trigger for the respondents’ liability. This clause requires the respondents to pay
‘upon receipt of any writte n notice from the applicant stating that any amount is
payable.’ It also states that the respondents’ liability to pay shall be joint and
several, and that the obligation to pay shall be ‘notwithstanding that the
respondents … may dispute their liability to make such payment immediately.’
[46] The text clearly indicates that the respondents’ obligation to pay is triggered
when the applicant provides written notice demanding payment of any amount the
applicant claims is owed. The fact that the respondents are no w disputing their
liability is also addressed by clause 5.10, which states that the respondents’
obligation to pay remains despite any dispute over their liability to do so.
[47] The respondents, however, have avoided addressing this provision, which is
crucial to resolving this matter. What is more , clause 5.10 aligns with clause 5.2
which makes it clear that the respondents’ obligations under the guarantee are
principal and independent obligations. The process of interpretation requires
meaning to be given to all the words used in a document and to interpret the
guarantee a s not imposing independent obligations would offend against that
principle.
[48] The purpose of the guarantee, as stated by the respondents, is not supported
by the text and, if anything, it contradicts the plain meaning of the words used in
the guarantee. The guarantee nowhere makes the respondents’ obligation
conditional on Climealine’s obligations, except for one instance —fulfilment of
conditions precedent. Once the conditions precedent are fulfilled, and it is
undisputed between the parties that they were f ulfilled, all that is needed to
establish the respondents’ liability is a written notice stating that any amount is
owed.
[49] To the extent that the respondents argued that their obligations have been
unconditionally discharged as contemplated in 5.4 of the g uarantee, that is merely
disputing their liability, which they cannot use to avoid liability under clause 5.10.
[50] To the extent that the respondents argued that the use of the term co -
principal debtor in one or some of the clauses indicates an intention to make the
respondents’ liability s ubject to Climealine’s liability, it was submitted on behalf
of the applicant that the use of the phrase co-principal debtors and liability in
solidum adds nothing and does not in itself , in the context of suretyships, make
them co-principal debtors.
[51] Reference was made to an extract from Caney’s The Law of Surety2, where
the author states that ‘the undertaking of the obligation expressly in those terms
adds nothing and does not in itself make the sureties co-principal debtors; if this is
intended, appropriate additional wording must be used. The argument then was
that, given the absence of the additional words used, it does not follow that the
intention was to make the respondents liable for the same obliga tions as
Climealine.
2 Forsyth CF and Pretorius JT Caney’s The Law of Surety 6 ed (2010) at 57.
[52] There is merit in this argument. The reference to the respondents as paras
5.1.2 a s binding themselves as co -principal debtors in solidum with Cl imealine,
cannot without more, result in the respondents’ obligations being the same as those
of Climealine.
[53] The respondent's defences regarding the dispute over Climealine’s liability
are unhelpful. This also includes the lis pendens alibi defences. In the absence of
fraud, the respondents cannot avoid payment once the applicant serves them with a
written demand stating that any amount is owed. This, the applicant has done, and
it follows that the applicant is entitled to judgment.
[54] The ap plicant has been successful and is entitled to costs. The guarantee
provides for costs to be payable on the scale between attorney and client, and that
scale shall be applied accordingly.
Conclusion
[55] The application to strike out is baseless because no ne w matter was
introduced in reply. The same applies to the request for an additional set of papers.
Both are accordingly refused.
[56] The guarantee creates independent obligations based on the respondents’
liability, which arises from a written demand by the applicant stating that the
respondents owe an amount. The dispute related to the SPA cannot serve as a
defence to the applicant’s c laim based on the written demand. This includes the
pending cancellation and declaratory actions. The application therefore succeeds
with costs.
Order
[57] As a result, the following order shall issue:
(a) The respondents are ordered to make the following payment to the applicant,
jointly and severally, with the one paying the others to be absolved:
i. The sum of R8 376 045 ( Eight Million Three Hundred and Seventy -Six
Thousand and Forty-Five Rand);
ii. Interest on the amount referred to in 1 above calculated at the rate of 11.75%
per annum, from 5 August 2024, until the final date of payment, both days
inclusive; and
iii. Costs of the application on an attorney -and-client scale, including costs of
two counsel where so employed.
_____________________________
LG NUKU
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For applicant: J Vorster SC with WJ Botha
Instructed by: Herman Vermaak Attorneys, Pretoria
C/O: Hayes Inc, Cape Town
For respondents: HA Van Der Merwe
Instructed by: Senekal, Simmonds Inc, Bedfordview
C/O: State Attorney, Cape Town.