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[1994] ZASCA 67
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S v Mila and Others (568/92) [1994] ZASCA 67 (19 May 1994)
Case No 568/92
/mb
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between:
GLADYS MILA
FIRST APPELLANT
PRISCILLA NTOMBODIDI LUTHULI
.. SECOND APPELLANT
MIRIAM LINDELWA GROOTBOOM
.... THIRD APPELLANT
BENJAMIN KANAKA
FOURTH APPELLANT
and
THE STATE
RESPONDENT
CORAM
: HEFER, KUMLEBEN et VAN DEN HEEVER JJA
HEARD
: 19 MAY 1994
J U D G M E N T
KUMLEBEN, JA
/...
2
KUMLEBEN, JA
These are the reasons the court undertook
to furnish when allowing the appeal of each appellant.
On 14
December 1985 at Jansenville a woman, Gladys Febana, was forcibly taken from her
home and murdered. During the early evening
of that day she was at home with her
mother, the State witness Mrs Katy Yantolo, when a large and aggressive group of
young people
arrived. Both women fled to the house of a neighbour. The deceased
was caught by the mob and dragged off. The next morning her body
was found some
distance away. The cause of death was third degree burns: in fact her entire
body had been reduced to a charred mass.
This was achieved by placing her within
a tyre and igniting it with the aid of some inflammable substance. The motive
for the killing
3 was apparently that her assailants had decided
that she was a police informer.
In due course six accused, all teenagers, stood trial on a murder charge
in the Graaff-Reinet Circuit Local Division of the Supreme
Court before R Kruger
AJ and two assessors. Four of the accused, the present appellants, were found
guilty as charged and sentenced
to life imprisonment. The convictions were based
principally, indeed decisively, on the evidence of Yantolo. Her evidence
identifying
those convicted was found to be reliable and the alibis of those who
testified were rejected.
Leave to appeal was granted (per Cooper J) against the convictions and
sentences. The primary ground of appeal was that the trial
judge had conducted
himself in such a manner that the appellants were not accorded a fair trial.
In
4 addition, with reference to the merits, the acceptance of the
evidence of Yantolo and the rejection of the alibi defences were challenged;
and, as regards the fourth appellant, it was submitted that his failure to give
evidence was insignificant in deciding upon his conviction.
Finally, it was
submitted that in any event the sentences were unduly severe.
The circumstances in which untoward conduct, or worse, on the part of a
judicial officer may in itself vitiate a verdict have been
considered from time
to time by this court. S v
Rail
1982(1) SA 828(A) was concerned with
excessive cross-examination of an accused by the court and the manner of such
questioning, the
latter aspect conveying the presiding judge's disbelief or
scepticism of the accused's evidence. Certain general observations (per
Trollip
JA) are pertinent
5 to this case. It was said at 831H - 832B that a
trial judge
"must ensure that 'justice is done'. It is equally important, I think, that
he should also ensure that justice is seen to be done.
After all, that is a
fundamental principle of our law and public policy. He should therefore so
conduct the trial that his open-mindedness,
his impartiality and his fairness
are manifest to all those who are concerned in the trial and its outcome,
especially the accused
(see, for example,
S v Wood
1964 (3) SA 103
(0) at
105G;
Rondalia Versekerings-korporasie van SA Bpk v Lira
1971 (2) SA 586
(A) at 589G;
Solomon and Another NNO v De Waal
1972 (1) SA 575
(A) at
580H). The Judge should consequently refrain from questioning any witnesses or
the accused in a way that, because of its frequency,
length, timing, form, tone,
contents or otherwise, conveys or is likely to convey the opposite impression
(cf
Greenfield Manufacturers (Temba) (Pty) Ltd v Royton Electrical
Engineering (Pty) Ltd
1976 (2) SA 565
(A) at 570E-F;
Jones v National
Coal Board
[1957] EWCA Civ 3
;
(1957) 2 All ER 155
(CA) at
159F)."
Similar views are expressed in a more recent
judgment of this court, with citations from some of its earlier decisions. In
S v Tyebela
1989(2) SA
6 22(A) 29G - 30C Milne JA stated
that:
"It is a fundamental principle of our law and, indeed, of any civilised
society that an accused person is entitled to a fair trial.
S
v Alexander and
Others
(1)
1965 (2) SA 796
(A) at 809C-D;
S v Mushimba en Andere
1977
(2) SA 829
(A) at 842B and 844H. This necessarily presupposes that the judicial
officer who tries him is fair and unbiased and conducts the
trial in accordance
with those rules and principles or the procedure which the law requires.
S v
Meyer
1972 (3) SA 480
(A) at 481F and
S v Rail
1982 (1) SA 828
(A).
In the latter case Trollip AJA said at
833B:
'Of course, if the offending questioning of witnesses or the accused by the
Judge sustains the inference that in fact he was not open-minded,
impartial, or
fair during the trial, this Court
will
intervene and grant
appropriate relief
(cf for example
S v Meyer
1972 (3) SA
480
(A)).'
In
Meyer
's case Kotzé AJA said at 484D:
'Wanneer 'n regterlike beampte optree soos hierbo aangedui gaan hy, na my
mening, redelike perke te buite. Hy skep dan nie die indruk
dat die doel van sy
ondervraging is om duidelikheid te vind nie. Veel eerder word die indruk gewek
dat die geskil vooraf beoordeel
word en dat reg en geregtigheid nie geskied
nie
7
(
Solomon and Another NNO v De Waal
1972 (1) SA 575
(A) op 580). In
die
onderhawige geval net die optrede van die landdros, volgens my mening, in sy
geheel gesien, en veral sy gedrag teenoor die appellant
terwyl hy getuig net,
sulke afmetings aangeneem dat dit nie gesê kan word dat hy 'vleklose
onpartydigheid' gehandhaaf het nie
(
Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van SA
Bpk v Lira
1971 (2) SA 586
(A) op 589) . Bygevolg moet bevind word dat hy
nie sy funksie as regspreker na behore uitgeoefen het nie.
Afgesien van die meriete in hierdie saak is 'n bevinding onvermydelik dat
die landdros nie deurgaans 'n onbevange oordeel bewaar het
nie (
Lira
se
saak op 589) en dat sy optrede so ernstig afgewyk het van behoorlike en ordelike
regspraak dat die verhoor en uitspraak ongeldig
is.'
In such a case the Court will declare the proceedings invalid without
considering the merits."
In the present case the
unacceptable manner in which the judge conducted the trial was not restricted to
questions he asked and comments
made by him. In certain other respects
his
8 approach was not a judicial one. The more important of these
are the following.
During the course of the State case Mr Koetaan
was called as a witness. He was an accomplice and was given the customary
conditional
indemnity after being sworn. He, however, reneged on his written
statement by denying that he had made one, by saying that he knew
nothing about
the incident and by denying that he knew any of the appellants. The whole of his
statement was then put to him and
he continued to deny its contents. In it he
had said that he received 33 pellet wounds that night from the discharge of a
shotgun.
This gave rise to the following questioning:
"
HOF
: Wie het die 33 koeëls oor sy lyf gekry?
MNR MOORE
: U Edele, dit sal uit die verklaring verder blyk wanneer
hy - dit kom later ook uit die verklaring uit, U Edele.
9
HOF
: Wat hy gekry het?
MNR MOORE
: Hy het 33 haelkorrels in sy lyf gehad.
HOF
: Het jy ooit 33 haelkorrels in jou lyf gehad? Is jy raak geskiet
en jy het 33
haelkorrels op jou lyf gekry, of nie? --- Nee
meneer, ek het nooit so 'n ding gekry by my nie meneer.
Jy het nog nooit haelkorrels gehad nie? ---
Nee meneer.
As ek die dokter vra om jou te ondersoek sal
hy nie die plekke kry nie - merke kry nie? ---
Nee meneer."
The witness had not been declared
hostile. The proceedings following upon his denial of having made the statement
were, or ought to
have been, governed by the provisions of
s 190(2)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
. All that was necessary, in the light of his
denial, was to identify the statement and prove that it was in fact made (cf
S v Polo
1975(1) SA 641 (THC) 642).
10
However, the questions by the judge amounted to cross-examination and
were plainly intended to establish that the witness
was
involved in the
incident and that his denials were false. The impression was inevitably created
in the minds of the appellants, indeed
of any listener, that the judge regarded
the contents of the statement as true with every likelihood of his taking it
into account.
An extensive cross-examination along these lines ensued on the
part of State counsel and the judge which served to confirm this impression.
This irregularity needs to be mentioned but is largely by the way. The real
complaint related to what followed upon this cross-examination:
"
HOF
: Ja. Sal hy vandag arresteer word?
MNR MOORE
: Ja, U Edele die getuie is reeds in 'n Verbeteringskool
in die Kaap. Die Staat sal nog besluit of dit die moeite werd sal wees om
horn
werklik van meineed ook aan te kla, alhoewel ek dit sal aanbeveel. Hy is tans
in
11
(tussenkoms)
HOF
: Maar ek dink u moet 'n bietjie kyk na artikel 189
(onduidelik) geskied,
dat ons miskien hierdie hele verhoor kan uitstel vir 2
jaar - al ses van hulle in die gevangenis aanhou, vir horn aanhou vir 2 jaar
en
oor 2 jaar terug te roep en vra of hy nie wil getuienis gee nie
. Kyk 'n
bietjie na artikel 189.
MNR MOORE
: Soos dit u behaag U Edele. U Edele, ek is ietwat
onverwags gevang met die optrede vandag in die Bank, dis hoekom ek my
(tussenkoms)
HOF
: Ek dink ook vandag dis my funksie om horn te straf vandag as
hy 'n onwillige getuie is.
MNR MOORE
: Ja U Edele, soos ek sê ek is -miskien moet ek 'n
verdaging vra om my net 'n bietjie voor te berei op die punt. Ek is ' n bietjie
onverwags gevang, U Edele. Ek het dit nie verwag nie.
HOF
: Kyk 'n bietjie daarna, want hy sal vinnig genoeg uitvind dat
'n tronk 'n ander plek as 'n verbeteringsgestig is.
MNR MOORE
: Ja, dit is korrek, U Edele. Miskien op hierdie stadium
moet ek net vra vir 'n verdaging. Ek wil net volledig voorberei om u te kan
toespreek op hierdie punt.
HOF
: Ja,
ek dink Mnr Pienaar wat u betref moet u ook maar ' n
bietjie in ag neem die
12
effek wat dit op jou kliente qaan he.
MNR PIENAAR
: Ekskuus, U Edele?
HOF
:
Jy moet maar in ag neem wat die effek is op u
kliënte
.
MNR PIENAAR
: Soos dit die Hof behaag.
HOF
: Ek meen as ek nog 2 jaar leef, sal ek nie omgee om oor 2 jaar
terug te kom (onduidelik).
MNR PIENAAR
: Soos dit die Hof behaag."
The
inference to be drawn from the words I have italisized is that the judge
envisaged: sentencing the witness to the maximum period
of imprisonment stated
in that section (incidentally without first conducting the enquiry for which the
section provides) ; ensuring,
as far as he was able to do so, that the
appellants during such period would be immured; and adjourning the trial for two
years.
He was bent upon punishing the appellants for the recalcitrance of a
State witness. There was simply
13 no ground for involving the
appellants in this issue
except
on the unwarranted and prejudicial
assumption that they, one or more of them, were responsible for Koetaan not
giving evidence in
accordance with his statement.
At the close of the State case counsel applied for the discharge of two
of the accused. The application was unopposed and its grant
ought to have been a
formality. Instead the judge saw fit to remark:
"Daar is niks wat julle aan die misdaad verbind nie. Ons Reg het sekere
reels wat sê dat sekere getuienis nie toelaatbaar is
nie. Daar was 'n stuk
getuienis gewees wat ek glo, maar ek mag daar nie notisie van neem nie, naamlik
dat no. 5 die vuur aan die
brand gesteek het, maar ek mag nie daarvan notisie
neem nie en julle kan dus die res van julle vonnisse gaan uitdien, maar ek gaan
iets buitengewoons doen met julle twee. Ek gaan julle waarsku dat hierdie soort
van barbarisms - hulle sê die gereg het 'n
lang arm, maar as julle skuldig
was en hy dink julle was, maar ek het nie getuienis nie, dan sal julle hardloop
vir die res van julle
lewens.
Julle
14
sal soos 'n honger bok dors word en hyg, maar julle sal moet hardloop want
julle sal gejaag word vir die res van julle lewens. Het
julle
verstaan."
He in effect said that he believed the
inadmissible evidence, which ought to have been
genuinely
ignored, and by
referring to a rather obscure extra-curial punishment implied that he did not
doubt the guilt of these two accused.
If he could reach such a conclusion on
untried inadmissible evidence, the appellants, against whom there was some
evidence, would
have had every reason to suppose that their fate had likewise
'been sealed prematurely and before they had entered upon their
defence.
When it came to the defence case the questions put by the judge were
frequently sceptical or sarcastic and his attitude was often
one of impatience
or intolerance. His attitude
15
created the impression that he was biased against the appellants and had
prejudged their guilt. A few illustrations will suffice.
At the outset of the evidence of the third appellant, she was asked how
far she lived from Yantolo. This caused the following questions
to be put by the
judge:
"Hoe ver bly julle van mekaar af? --- Katy
Yantolo bly in Draai-lokasie en ek bly in Bricksfield-lokasie, U
Edele.
Hoeveel is dit? Hoe ver soos die kraai vlieg? --- Dis bale ver, U
Edele.
Ja, Londen is ook baie ver. Wat is baie ver, praat asseblief moenie vir
my die vrae so
(onvoltooid). --- U Edele, dit sal my 'n lang
tyd vat om soontoe te stap, want dis ver.
Dit sal my 14 maande vat om Sahara toe te
loop, vertel my nou hoe ver is dit. --- Dis
ver, U Edele.
Sal jy my vraag antwoord, of nie? Ek waarsku vir jou, as jy dit nie
antwoord nie gaan daar
probleme wees. --- Dit is mos ver, U Edele.
Katy Yantolo bly in 'n ander lokasie en ek bly in 'n ander
lokasie.
16
Soweto is ver van hier af, né? Dis ' n ander lokasie van 'n ander
lokasie af - nou praat.
Ek sal noteer, tensy Mnr Pienaar dit van haar gaan kry dat daar geen
antwoord, of die antwoord is geweier op die vraag.
MNR PIENAAR
: U Edele, kan ek net moontlik met haar opklaar een
aspek?
Hoe lank sal dit jou vat om van jou huis te
stap tot by Katy se huis? --- Ek kan nou nie
'n skatting maak van die tyd nie, U Edele.
HOP
: Is u tevrede?
MNR PIENAAR
: Soos dit die Hof behaag.
HOP
: Sy wou nie die vraag beantwoord nie."
At
another point in her evidence the third appellant explained her presence in the
vicinity of the killing by saying that she was
returning from a shop where she
had made a purchase. In this connection the question was put to her by the
prosecutor: "Nou het u
nooit teruggegaan na daardie winkel toe
die volqende
dag
17 om goed te gaan koop nie?" To which she replied: "Nee."
The judge erroneously noted her reply to read: "Ek is
nooit
terug na
daardie winkel, ek het niks nodig gehad nie." (I emphasise in each case.) The
following passage follows in this regard:
[
HOF
:] "Nou hoekom het jy gesê dat jy is
nooit terug nie? --- Ek kan nie onthou dat ek
nou so gesê het nie, U Edele.
Stry jy met my?
--- Ek weet nie.
Stry jy met my? - Is ek verkeerd as ek vir jou
so sê?--- Ek het gedink dat u bedoel - U
Edele bedoel dat ek nou weer daardie selfde Saterdag gaan koop
het."
The judge was in fact wrong in what he put to her and she was entitled to
say that she had no recollection of stating his version.
When the second appellant testified, she was asked by counsel:
"Hoe ver was u van die groep af gewees? ---
Ek sal sê miskien van waar ek staan in die
18
getuiebank tot nou by die punt van hierdie kas.
Ongeveer 2 meter, U Edele met verlof van die Hof. Ongeveer 2 meter? So u was
reg by die
groep gewees - is dit korrek? --- Nee, ek was
nie by die groep gewees nie, ek was 'n entjie ver van die groep af.
Ja, maar u was (tussenkoms)
HOF
: 'n Honderd mense staan hulle binne 2 meter van mekaar? --- Ek
weet nie.
HOF
: Natuurlik weet jy. Moenie my met 'ek weet nie' vir die gek hou
hier nie. Dit is wat u besig is om te doen. Sal jy 'n honderd mense
in 2 meter -
2 vierkante meter hier neersit? --- Nee U Edele."
Thus
it appears that the witness was unreasonably and intolerantly reprimanded for
not knowing the answer to a question which by any
standard is
inscrutable.
Finally, it has to be remarked that the judge disclosed an obsession with
the brutality of the crime at an early stage of the trial
so as
to
19 strongly suggest that at almost any price the conviction of
the appellants would follow to provide the necessary retribution. The
crime was
self-evidently a cruel and callous one. When the condition of the corpse was
described by the district surgeon, the judge
unnecessarily laboured this point
by saying
inter alia
:
"Kan jy jou 'n wreder dood indink? --- Ek het
ook 'n storie gehoor van iemand wat iemand stadig uitmekaar uit gesny het.
Nou dit is ook seker wreder.
Ja. Ek dink daar was 'n
Duitse vrou wat wors
gemaak het van (onduidelik) of so iets. ---
So, maar is wreed is wreed."
This attitude bent upon harsh punitive action, is at the end of the trial
reflected in the sentences imposed. A sentence of imprisonment
for life is,
broadly speaking, reserved for a hardened criminal who is likely to prove a
continuing threat to the
20 community. The appellants, though
deserving of severe punishment if correctly convicted, certainly do not fall
within such category.
Thus it was that the irregular conduct of the
trial was of so gross a nature as to
per se
vitiate the trial without
reference to the merits. (See
S v Naidoo
1962(4) SA 348(A) 354 D - F. )
During argument on appeal Mr Pretorius for the State rightly and responsibly
conceded this. For these
reasons the appeal was allowed.
M E KUMLEBEN
JUDGE OF
APPEAL
J J F HEFER JA
L VAN DEN HEEVER JA