IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA)
CASE NO.: CA&R 226/2025
In the matter between:
VILI KRASIMIROV GEORGIEV Appellant
and
THE STATE Respondent
JUDGMENT
GQAMANA J
Introduction
[1] The appellant, Mr Vili Krasimirov Georgiev is a Bulgarian citizen who came to
South Africa in December 2014 and has been here since. On 22 November 2024,
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the magistrate for the district of Gqeberha issued an order for the committal to
prison of the app ellant awaiting a decision by the Minister under the provisions of
section 10 of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962 (“the Extradition Act”). Aggrieved
with such order and judgment, the appellant lodged an appeal to this court.
[2] Two issues are raised in thi s appeal, namely, whether : (a) the provision of
section 9 (3) of the Extradition Act was complied with and (b) the interpreter’s
competency was properly established and recorded as required by section 6 (2) of
the Magistrate’s Courts Act.
[3] Before setting out the facts, I must outline the relevant legislation dealing with
extradition for a better understanding of this appeal.
Extradition scheme
[4] For purposes of the contested issue on extradition on this appeal, I intend to
limit my discussion of the extradition scheme to the judicial phase of the
extradition process because the administrative and executive phases are not an
issue herein. The Extradition Act determines the conditions that must be complied
with on the domestic plane before any person sought by a foreign State to undergo
trial or serve a sentence there can be surrendered to the requesting State for that
purpose1. The Act envisages an expeditious process which is geared towards the
apprehension and transfer of the individual sought to face criminal trial or serve his
or her sentence in the foreign State.
[5] The extradition process is succinctly summarised in Harksen v President of the
Republic of South Africa 2,as follows:
1 DPP, Cape of Good Hope v Robison [2004] ZACC 22 (CC) at para 2.
2 2000 (2) SA 825 (CC) para 14.
‘…before the person whose extradition is sou ght may be surrendered to the foreign State, the
procedures prescribed in the [Extradition] Act must be completed. This includes the arrest of the
person under section 5(1), the holding of an enquiry under section 9(1), and a finding by a
Magistrate under section 10 that the evidence is sufficient to make the person liable to surrender.
If the Magistrate makes that finding, the Minister of Justice is given a discretion under section 11
to order the surrender of the requested person to any person authorised by the foreign State to
receive him or her.’
[6] Once the person sought is detained under a warrant of arrest, s/he must be
brought before a magistrate as soon as possible. The magistrate must hold an
enquiry with a view to the surrender that person to th e foreign State concerned.
The extradition process as well as the nature of the extradition enquiry could differ
significantly depending on whether the Act alone is applicable or whether an
extradition agreement is in force 3. Where the extradition is requ ested by a foreign
State, as in this matter, extradition process begins in terms of a section 4(1)
request, and the extradition enquiry is governed by section 10 of the Act.
[7] The procedure and form of the extradition enquiry is set out in sub -sections
9(2) and (3). Section 9(2) requires such enquiry to be in the form of a preparatory
examination conducted in criminal proceedings. However, the committal enquiry is
not a criminal trial 4. The purpose of the enquiry is not to determine the guilt or
innocence for the alleged offence, but rather whether the person sought should be
sent to the foreign State to stand trial or serve his/her sentence.
[8] The manner in which such an enquiry is to be held was authoritatively
articulated by the Constitutional Court in Geuking5 and it was said:
3 Robison supra at para [3].
4 Geuking v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (3) SA 34 (CC).
5 Geuking supra.
‘[13] After the process of extradition has been initiated by the issue of a warrant of arrest by a
magistrate under section 5(1)(a), section 9(1) requires that the arrested person be brought before
him or her as soon as possible for the purpose of holding an enquiry with a view to the surrender
of such person to the foreign State concerned……Under section 9(2) the inquiry shall proceed in
the manner in which a preparatory examination is to be held …. This means that the enq uiry
must be held in open court, subject to the provisions of section 9(3) of the Act; the evidence must
be led to oath or affirmation; and oral evidence is subject to cross examination and re -
examination. The State first leads evidence and thereafter the person has the opportunity of
making a statement, testifying or calling witnesses.
[14] Under section 9 (3) of the Act, the magistrate may receive any deposition, statement on
oath or affirmation (irrespective of whether it was taken in the presence of the person whose
extradition is sought), any record of conviction, or any warrant issued by a foreign State, or any
copy or sworn translation thereof. Provision is made in section 9(3) of the Act for the
authentication of such documents.’
[9] At the conclusion of the enquiry and after hearing the evidence, the magistrate
must either grant a committal order or discharge the person. 6 There are two
requirements that have to be established before a committal order is made by the
magistrate. First, it is required that the magistrate must be satisfied that the person
who sought is liable for surrender to the requesting foreign State. The issue of
liability for extradition is determined by section 3 of the Extradition Act.
[10] The second req uirement is that there must be sufficient evidence to warrant
prosecution.7 If the magistrate is satisfied that these two requirements have been
established, s/he must issue an order committing the person sought to prison to
6 Section 10 of the Extradition Act.
6 Section 10 of the Extradition Act.
7 Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Tucker [2021] ZACC 25 (6 September 2021) at paras 11-14 and
68.
await the decision of the Minister with regard to surrender.8
[11] In Tucker,9 the Constitutional Court held that:
‘A section 10 enquiry is limited to establishing these two jurisdictional facts. If they are
established, the magistrate shall commit the sought person to prison, pend ing the Minister’s
decision to surrender the person. …… The enquiry before the magistrate involves establishing
the liability for extradition and sufficient evidence warranting prosecution in the foreign State
and the section 10 decision is solely whether to commit or discharge. The committal
determination is ‘a narrow and specific issue’ and that does not ‘ involve deliberation on human
rights issues’ or ‘whether it is unjust or unreasonable to surrender the applicant’. These are
questions that are relevant to the Minister’s decision to surrender the sought person, which is
made in terms of section 11 (the surrender decision).10’
[12] In Geuking,11 the Constitutional Court had the following to say:
‘An extradition enquiry is a balancing act between the requesting State. Their right to prosecute
alleged offenders and the individual’s rights include the right to a fair trial. The prima facie
standard ensures that the individual is not arbitrarily surrendered without some legitimate basis.’
[13] This appeal does not engage the executive phase of the extradition process,
and I will not deal with it. The contention by the appellant is that there was no
admissible evidence as envisaged in section 9(3) whi ch the magistrate could have
relied upon to issue the order committal order pending the Minister’s decision.
[14] The relevant part of section 9(3) reads as follows:
8 Section 10(1) of the Extradition Act.
9 At para 69.
10 footnotes omitted.
11 Supra.
‘(3) Any deposition, statement on oath or affirmation taken, whether or not taken in the presence
of the accused person, or any record of conviction or any warrant issued in a foreign State, or any
copy or sworn translation thereof, may be received in evidence at any such enquiry if such
document is -
(a)(i) accompanied by a certificate according to the example set out out in Schedule B;12
(ii) authenticated in the manner provided for in the extradition agreement concerned; or
(iii) authenticated by the signature and seal of office-
(aa) ………
(bb) of any government authority of such foreign State charged with the authentication of
documents in terms of the law of that foreign State;
(cc)……….; or
(dd). ………’
Facts
[15] It is now convenient to set out the facts. The appellant together with his two
co-accused13 were charged for murder of Stoyan Stoyanov Baltov (the deceased)
on 5 December 2008 in Sofia, Bulgaria. His co -accused were found guilty, but the
appellant was found not guilty and acquitted in the Sofia City Court on 19 July
2013.
[16] Following his acquittal the prosecution appealed successfully to the Sofia
Court of Appeal and his acquittal was overturned. Accordingly, the appellant was
convicted on the charge of murder and was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment.
12 Apostille.
13 Those two accused persons are not relevant to the issues in this appeal.
[17] The matter was then referred to the Sofia Appellate Court. On 17 April 2014,
the conviction and sentence were confirmed.
[18] Subsequent to that the appellant through his legal representative appealed the
conviction and the sentence. That appeal was heard on 10 November 2014, by the
Supreme Cassation Court. On 19 December 2014, the appeal was dismissed, and
the conviction and the sentence of 18 years imprisonment was again confirmed.
[19] While the appeal processes in Bulgaria were pending, the appellant was out on
warning. He knew that should his appeal fail, he would have to hand himself over
to serve his sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment.
[20] While the appeal was pending in Bulgaria, the appellant came to South Africa.
On 17 August 2018, the appellant was arrested in South Africa upon a warrant of
arrest and on request of the Bulgarian authorities to have him extradited, so that he
could serve his sentence there.
[21] On 13 September 2018, he was granted bail in the extradition hearing. There
were delays in finalising th e extradition enquiry, but on 22 November 2024, an
order was issued by the magistrate for his committal to prison to await the
Minister’s decision with regard to his surrender. Aggrieved with such order, the
appellant lodged an appeal to this court.
[22] The appellant is out on bail pending the outcome of this appeal. Every stage of
the process was intensely litigated.
[23] It is common cause that at the enquiry before the magistrate the State
presented the evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Swanepoel of the SAPS. He is the
police officer who executed the appellant’s warrant of arrest on 17 August 2018. In
addition, through his testimony the State also presented a bundle of documents
which were marked exhibit A to exhibit M. There are two exhibits which are
central to this appeal. First its exhibit B which is the formal extradition request of
the appellant from Bulgarian authority to South Africa. Each document therein
contains a translated version and an original Bulgarian version. The second
document is exhibit C (which was marked C1 to C5(A)) and it contains what I will
term “the record of the legal proceedings in the various courts in Bulgaria”.
Exhibit C contains inter alia, the judgment delivered by the Sofia City Court,
sentence by that court, argu ments in Sofia Court of Appeal, sentence proceedings
in Sofia City Appeal Court and decision of the Supreme Cassation Court. Each
document, that is, C1 to C5 (A) contains both a certified translation version and the
original Bulgarian version.
[24] In a nutshell the aforementioned documents in exhibit C shows that the
appellant was charged for murder and he was acquitted but his co -accused were
convicted. The appeal by the prosecution against his acquittal was successful and
he was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment. His further appeal processes in all the
Bulgarian courts were unsuccessful and consequently his conviction on murder and
sentence of 18 years imprisonment were confirmed. The Bulgarian authority had
made a request for his extradition so that he could serve his sentence in Bulgaria.
Interpretation of section 9(3) of the Extradition Act
[25] It was submitted on his behalf that the documents mentioned in paragraph 23
above were inadmissible evidence due to lack of compliance with section 9(3) and
consequently the magistrate should not have received them in evidence.
[26] In advancing his stance, it was argued that the aforementioned foreign
language documents which the State relied upon had to be accompanied by sworn
translations as required by section 9(3). Because properly construed, section 9(3)
requires that the translated documents must be sworn and to read the word ‘or’ as
dispensing with that additional requirement which requires sworn translation
would render the specific reference to sworn translation in that section meaningless
and would defeat the very purpose of the safeguard.
[27] Mr Daubermann argued that the requirement for the sworn translation is not a
mere technicality but an essential safeguard. Without a sworn translator attesting
under oath the accuracy and completeness of such a document in foreign language,
the magistrate could not have been sure that she was acting on a true and faithful
record. Therefore, to rely on unsworn translation, albeit a certified t ranslation falls
far short of the constitutional guarantees like an individual’s right to freedom and
security and the right not to be deprived of freedom without just cause.
[28] It was submitted that section 9(3) gives effect to these safeguards by ens uring
that a sworn translation is the only acceptable way for a court to rely on foreign
language material. A strict compliance with the statutory pre -conditions for
extradition is a jurisdictional requirement. And if the sworn translation requirement
is not met, the magistrate had no lawful basis to act.
[29] Because the magistrate received only an unsworn translation of Bulgarian
documents, it was submitted that she was never presented with competent evidence
and therefore without competent evidence, the magistrate lacked any jurisdictional
foundation to issue a committal order. The unsworn translation documents were
not admissible evidence and without admissible evidence the magistrate made the
order without jurisdiction.
[30] In addition, it was submi tted that authentication of foreign documents should
not be conflated with accuracy of the translated content. Because authentication
only assures the court that the document is genuine not that its meaning is correctly
conveyed. A sworn translator’s affid avit is such a separate safeguard designed to
ensure that the court does not act on mistranslated or incomplete material.
Therefore, the full processes are that the authentication and sworn translation are
distinct and accumulative.
[31] Mr Daubermann pla ced reliance in Mohamed v President of the Republic of
South Africa 14 for his submissions. He submitted that jurisdictional preconditions
in extradition matters are peremptory and cannot be cured by silence, or consent. In
advancing that argument it was s ubmitted that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction
because the Bulgarian documents were not accompanied by a sworn translation as
required by section 9(3) and jurisdictional precondition cannot be waived by
consent or silence. Taking the argument to its conc lusion, it was submitted that the
absence of sworn translation is a fatal defect that cannot be cured by silence.
[32] On the other hand, Mr Stander for the respondent argued that the issues raised
14 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC).
by the appellant are technical niceties. It was submitte d that the extradition inquiry
was in terms of the European Convention on Extradition and both South Africa and
Bulgaria are signatories to it. Article 12 of the aforementioned convention states
that the request for extradition must be in writing and be su pported by the original
or authenticated copy of the conviction and sentence or of the warrant of arrest or
other order having the same effect and issued in accordance with the procedure laid
down in the law of the requesting party, which is Bulgaria. It w as submitted that
the documents which were placed before the magistrate and in particular exhibit C
contained the translation and followed by an original version. So the argument was
that the original version was presented to the magistrate. And those docu ments
were issued in accordance with the laws of the requesting state, which is Bulgaria.
[33] Furthermore article 23 deals with the language to be used and it states that:
‘The documents to be produced shall be in the language of the requesting or requested Party. The
requested Party may require a translation into one of the official languages of the Council of
Europe to be chosen by it.’
[34] So the original documents were placed before the magistrate and that those
documents were all in Bulgarian language, the appellant’s first language and there
were also accompanied by a certified translation. It was evident from the appeal
record that the appellant is also fluent in English. The transcript of his bail
application bears testimony to this.
[35] The respondent to boost its case also made reference to the provisions of
sections 30 and 31 of the International Co - Operation in Criminal Matters Act 75
of 1996. I have no ambition to discuss the provisions of Act 75 of 1996 because I
hold the view that they are of no assistance to the real issues on this appeal.
[36] In relation to section 9 (3) of the Extradition Act, Mr Stander submitted that it
is not a requirement that the original document must be accompanied by the sworn
translation. The respondent could have either placed the original or copy or sworn
translation before the magistrate. And therefore, because the respondent had placed
the original, it was not necessary for same to be accompanied by the sworn
translation.
[37] The argument was further that section 9 (3) must be read in conjunction with
the European convention. With reliance in Tucker15judgment, it was argued that it
is not for the courts to attempt to impose our rules and standards on other foreign
legal system in dealing with extradition matters and therefore our legislation
should not put higher burden of proof on the requesting State as to what the
European Convention states. It was accordingly submitted that the documentation
placed before the magistrate complies with the provisions of section 9 (3).16
[38] When one deals with an interpretation of a statute or any legal document the
correct approach is that which was set out in Natal Joint Municipality Pension
Fund v Endumeni 17 that:
‘[18] …. Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be
it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided
by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document a s a whole and the
circumstances attendant upon coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the document,
consideration must be given to the language used in light of the ordinary rules of grammar and
syntax; the context in which the provision appears; th e apparent purpose to which it is directed
15 Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Tucker [2021] ZACC 25 (6 September 2021).
16 See Director of Public Prosecutions, Cape of Good Hope v Robinson 2005 (44) SACR 1 (CC) paras 61- 68.
17 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at para 18.
and material to those responsible to its production. Where more than one meaning is possible
each possibility must be weighed in light of all these factors. The process is objective and not
subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike
results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard
against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or busine sslike for
the words actually used. To do so in regard to the statute or statutory instrument is to cross the
divine between interpretation and legislation. In contractual context it is to make the contract for
the parties other than the one they in fact made. The inevitable point of departure is the language
of the provision itself, read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the
background to the preparation and production of the document.’
[39] In Cool Ideas 1186 v Hubbard and Another,18 it again said:
‘[28] A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that the words in a statute must be given
their ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do so would result in absurdity. There are three
important interrelated riders to this general principle, namely:
(a) that the statutory provisions should always be interpreted purposively;
(b) the relevant statutory provision must be properly contextualised; and
(c) all statutes must be construed consis tently with the Constitution, that is, where
reasonably possible, legislative provisions ought to be interpreted to preserve their
constitutional validity. This proviso to the general principle is closely related to the
purposive approach referred to in (a).’19
[40] Section 9(3) deals with the admissibility of evidence from foreign States
during an extradition enquiry. It allows for either the original, or copy, or sworn
translation of the document concerned, provided it is authenticated in the manner
translation of the document concerned, provided it is authenticated in the manner
set out in the Extradition Act or as stipulated in the extradition agreement.
[41] It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that section 9(3) of the Extradition
18 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC) para 28.
19 footnotes omitted.
Act expressly requires that any foreign document relied upon in an enquiry must be
accompanied by a sworn translation. Section 9 (3) does not expressly state that. In
any event, to construe section 9 (3) in the manner suggested by Mr Daubermann
would be inconsistent to the authorities referred to above in relation to the correct
approach on statutory inte rpretation. A provision in a statute must always be
interpreted purposively and read in context.20
[42] Nowhere in section 9 (3) is it required that the original document be
accompanied by the sworn translation. The documents that were placed before the
magistrate were original plus the translation version appropriately authenticated.
As indicated above, both South Africa and Bulgaria are signatories to the European
Convention on Extradition.
[43] In Robinson, 21 it was made clear by the Constitutional Court that: ‘the decision
as to whether a person is to be extradited including the question as to whether documents have
been authenticated appropriately must be made by reference to the agreement and the Act.’ So,
provisions of section 9 (3) must be read in conjunction with the European
Convention on Extradition. Article 12 of such Convention states that the request
must be supported by the original or an authenticated copy of the conviction and
sentence or of the warrant of arrest issued in accordance with the procedure laid
down in the law of the requesting party.
[44] The reliance in Mohamed22 by the appellant in his proposition in relation to
the jurisdictional requirements for a magistrate before a commi ttal order can be
issued is misplaced. Mohamed was not concerned with either the proper
20 Cool Ideas and Natal Joint Municipality Pension Fund (supra).
21 DPP, Cape of Good Hope v Robinson supra para 3.
22 Supra.
interpretation of section 9(3), or the liability to surrender in terms of section 10(1)
of the Extradition Act. An issue in that case was whether Mohamed was deported
or extradited.
[45] Therefore considered section 9(3) in conjunction with the extradition
agreement, I’m satisfied that the documents placed before the magistrate were
admissible evidence. The appellant presented no evidence in the enquiry. The
evidence by the State was accordingly unchallenged. That evidence shows that the
appellant was convicted of murder in Bulgaria and was sentenced to 18 years of
imprisonment. Murder is an extraditable offence as defined in section 1 of the
Extradition Act. Further there was sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution. In
fact, the appellant has already been convicted and sentenced for such an offence.
The request for the extradition is for him to serve his sentence in Bulgaria.
[46] Accordingly, both requirements set out in section 10(1) of the Extradition Act
were established and as such the magistrate was correct to issue the order
committing the appellant to prison to await the decision by the Minister with
regard to his surrender.
Was the interpreter’s competence properly established
[47] The second ground of appeal is that the magistrate failed to determine the
competence of the interpreter. It was argued that once the magistrate elected to
proceed with an interpreter, section 6(2) of the Magistrate’s Court A ct and rule 68
(2) imposed a mandatory duty to administer the prescribed oath or affirmation to
the interpreter and record a clear finding that the interpreter was competent to
interpret between Bulgarian and English. The fact the appellant is fluent in b oth
English and Bulgarian languages does not remove that duty by the magistrate.
[48] With reliance on Sayed v Levitt NO ,23 it was submitted that a magistrate must
actively satisfy himself that an interpreter is fit for purpose and that merely
swearing in an interpreter is insufficient. It was argued that failure to ensure
competence results in an inherently prejudicial irregularity, vitiating the
proceedings.
[49] Firstly, the magistrate in his reasons has stated the following:
“On 29 July 2024 the court enquired about her competency as an interpreter. She was a
Bulgarian citizen, with Bulgarian language as her first language and English as a second
language. She finished school in Bulgaria and is currently residing in South Africa. Upon
questioning her ability to translate, she handed documentation to the court confirming
this and stated that she is fluent in both languages. The documentation was handed back
to her upon request. The court made a ruling that she is a competent interpreter and swore
her in. There was no need to establish her competency again on 18 November 2024.”
[50] Secondly, the appellant’s home language is Bulgarian. However, it is evident
from the appeal record that the appellant is fluent in English. The record shows us
that in the bail application, he testified fluently in English. And nowhere during the
enquiry did the appellant raise issue on incorrect interpretation. Unlike in Sayed,
where the issue of incorrect interpretation was pertinent. There, the court even said
that the record reflects that the interpreter was not fluent in English, at times the
court could not understand what the interpreter was saying and even the appeal
records shows that it was difficult to follow and understand what the interpreter
said. This is not the case here. The appeal record is clear. It shows that the
interpreter was also fluent in English.
23 2012 (2) SACR 294 (KZP).
[51] Furthermore on both appearances at the extradition enquiry (i.e. on 29 July
2024 and 18 November 2024), no objection was raised about the incorre ct
interpretation.
[52] Neither the appellant nor his legal counsel raised an objection about the
competence of the interpreter during the enquiry. The enquiry was not merely a
game; there was an ethical duty on the appellant’s counsel to raise the issue of the
interpreter’s competence if he felt that the interpreter was not properly sworn in.
The issue with the interpretation suddenly surfaced for the first time in the notice
of appeal after the committal order had been issued.
[53] Accordingly the second ground of appeal has no merits, and it must also fail.
Order
[54] In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
N GQAMANA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree:
V NONCEMBU
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Appellant : Mr Daubermann
Instructed by : Griebenouw Attorneys
Gqeberha
Counsel for Respodent : Adv M Stander
Instructed by : Director of Public Prosecutions
Gqeberha
Heard on : 30 July 2025
Judgment delivered on : 07 October 2025