Phillips v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (2024/004824) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1049 (20 October 2025)

82 Reportability
Municipal Law

Brief Summary

Municipal Law — Billing Dispute — Pensioner Rebate and Water Meter Charges — Applicant, an 81-year-old pensioner, disputed the City of Johannesburg's billing practices, claiming entitlement to a pensioner rebate and challenging charges for water from two meters, one of which was not on his property. The respondent acknowledged the rebate but failed to adequately address discrepancies in the credited amounts and continued to charge based on an incorrect property valuation. The court found that the respondent's explanations were insufficient and that the applicant was entitled to relief regarding both the pensioner rebate and the water meter charges, emphasizing the need for accurate billing practices by municipal authorities.

Comprehensive Summary

Case Note


Phillips v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (Case number 2024/004824) — High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg — 20 October 2025


Reportability


This judgment has been marked “Reportable” by the court. Its significance lies in three inter-related considerations. First, it adds to the growing body of jurisprudence in Gauteng concerning systemic failures in municipal billing and the constitutional duties owed by metropolitan municipalities to consumers. Secondly, it squarely addresses the recurring procedural problem of municipal legal advisers deposing to affidavits without personal knowledge, an issue previously condemned in Millu and Ordicode. Thirdly, the court’s order clarifies the nature and scope of relief that can competently be granted in billing disputes, distinguishing between impermissible “re-calculations” of accounts and permissible declaratory and mandatory relief. For these reasons the decision is of precedent value and is therefore of interest to other courts, practitioners, and litigants faced with comparable billing controversies.


Cases Cited


Plascon-Evans Paints Limited v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Limited 1984 (3) SA 623 (A)

Wightman t/a J W Construction v Headfour (Pty) Limited 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA)

Millu v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Another 2024 JDR 1329 (GJ)

Ordicode (Pty) Limited v City of Johannesburg (unreported, Gauteng Local Division, 9 September 2025, case number 2023/077080)


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (sections 152 and 195 implicit in the judgment’s reasoning on municipal obligations)


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, rule 6 (motion proceedings), referenced implicitly through the discussion on affidavits and the Plascon-Evans approach


HEADNOTE


Summary


The applicant, an 81-year-old pensioner, approached the High Court for declaratory and punitive relief after years of unsuccessful attempts to persuade the City of Johannesburg to correct multiple errors on his municipal account. His complaints centred on the municipality’s failure to apply a pensioner rates rebate, the wrongful imposition of charges in respect of a duplicate water meter, and delays in installing a prepaid electricity meter. The municipality conceded some issues belatedly but failed to provide documentary or evidential support sufficient to defeat the application. The court, applying the Plascon-Evans rule, found the municipality’s version untenable, granted substantive relief setting aside several categories of charges, and ordered attorney-and-client costs against the respondent.


Key Issues


Whether the municipality had in fact rectified its prior failure to apply the pensioner rebate and reverse all attendant interest and inflated valuation charges.

Whether the applicant’s property was billed simultaneously on two water meters and, if so, whether the respondent provided a cogent explanation for that duplication.

Whether a legal adviser without personal knowledge can depose to affidavits on factual billing matters and whether the respondent’s overall conduct warranted punitive costs.


Held


The court held that the municipality had not demonstrated that it had properly credited the applicant’s account. Its bare assertions were contradicted by its own statements and unsupported by admissible evidence. The duplicate-meter explanation was speculative and advanced only from the Bar. Consequently, the court ordered the reversal of all impugned charges, the application of the pensioner rebate from January 2019 to December 2023, the setting aside of interest and water-meter charges from July 2021 onwards, and costs on the attorney-and-client scale against the respondent.


THE FACTS


The applicant is the registered owner of a residential property in Randburg and has, since reaching pensionable age, been entitled to a municipal rebate in respect of property rates. Despite repeated written and in-person engagements, the municipality failed to apply this rebate, continued to bill him on an inflated property valuation, and levied interest on the unwanted arrears that consequently accrued.


In mid-2021 the municipality commenced charging the applicant for water consumption on two separate meters. The applicant produced invoices and photographs to show that the second meter was neither situated on nor serving his property. The municipality later averred—without evidential backing—that the original meter had been replaced and that only one meter was operative at any given time. Municipal statements, however, reflected concurrent billing periods for both meters, thereby contradicting the respondent’s version.


A third dispute concerned the applicant’s request to convert to prepaid electricity to avoid further “network charges”. Although the municipality finally installed a prepaid meter a week before the hearing, that belated step came only after litigation had been launched, leaving the other disputes unresolved. Faced with contradictory accounts and mounting financial prejudice, the applicant sought the court’s intervention.


THE ISSUES


The court was tasked with determining, first, whether the pensioner rebate, interest reversals and valuations corrections had in fact been implemented or whether declaratory and mandatory relief remained necessary. Secondly, it had to decide whether the dual-meter billing amounted to an unlawful charge and whether the municipality’s explanation, lacking affidavit support, could defeat the applicant’s claim. Finally, the court examined whether the municipality’s litigation conduct—especially the practice of legal advisers deposing to factual affidavits—was so egregious as to justify a punitive costs order.


ANALYSIS


Acting Judge Chohan meticulously applied the Plascon-Evans rule. Because final relief was sought on motion, the respondent’s version, if plausible, had to be accepted. Nonetheless, the court found that the respondent had provided no meaningful version at all. The answering affidavit, deposed to by a legal adviser with no personal knowledge, was replete with conclusory statements but bereft of supporting documentation or first-hand facts.


On the pensioner rebate, the respondent contended that it had credited the account, yet numerical discrepancies between the alleged credit entries and actual statements were left unexplained. The court emphasised that once the municipality conceded entitlement to the rebate, the evidentiary burden shifted to it to show full redress, a burden it failed to discharge.


Regarding the water-meter dispute, the municipality’s case collapsed under its own documents. Statements showed overlapping billing periods for the old and new meters, and the supposed “hyphen distinction” raised ex improviso during argument found no echo in the papers. Relying on Wightman, the court held that a litigant cannot make up its case orally during argument; facts must be set out under oath. Consequently, there was no bona fide dispute of fact capable of resisting the relief sought.


The court further bemoaned the respondent’s persistence in having legal advisers depose to affidavits despite previous judicial rebuke in Millu and Ordicode. Such conduct, it held, undermines the integrity of motion proceedings and warrants the court’s censure through costs.


REMEDY


The court issued a detailed mandatory order. All property-rates charges for the period January 2019 to December 2023 were set aside and the correct pensioner rebate ordered to be applied retrospectively. Water-consumption charges levied against the second meter from November 2021 to December 2023 were struck down. All interest on the account from July 2021 to the date of judgment was reversed. Importantly, the court directed the municipality to give effect to these adjustments, thereby ensuring that the applicant’s account reflected a credit rather than a debit balance. Costs were awarded on the punitive attorney-and-client scale against the respondent to mark the court’s displeasure and to indemnify the applicant fully for the expense of litigation that should never have been necessary.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment re-affirms the Plascon-Evans principle that, in motion proceedings for final relief, only real and acceptable factual disputes can avert a grant of the order; speculative or undeposed explanations do not suffice. It underscores municipalities’ constitutional obligations to render accountable, responsive, and open administration of basic services, aligning with sections 152 and 195 of the Constitution.


A further principle concerns evidential responsibility: deponents must possess personal knowledge of the facts. Where a legal adviser lacks such knowledge, his affidavit is likely to attract judicial scepticism, if not outright rejection. This is not a mere procedural nicety; it is essential to the truth-finding function of affidavit-based litigation.


Finally, the judgment consolidates the discretionary basis for punitive costs where a public body’s conduct is vexatious, reckless, or in breach of constitutional obligations. Courts will not hesitate to impose attorney-and-client costs to discourage institutional stonewalling and to vindicate the rights of vulnerable litigants.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

CASE NO: 2024/004824
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED.
DATE 20 October 2025
SIGNATURE

In the matter between:

DAVID WALTER PHILLIPS

Applicant

and

THE CITY OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY

Respondent



JUDGMENT


INTRODUCTION
1. This is, as Wilson J expressed in Ordicode (Pty) Limited v The City of
Johannesburg,1 yet another billing dispute triggered by inaccurate
municipal billing. But this application is perhaps more disconcerting

1 Unreported judgment delivered on 9 September 2025 under case no: 2023/077080.

than the one dealt with by Wilson J in Ordicode. That is because in
this application, the applicant is an 81 year old pensioner who has
had no joy in attempting to resolve his billing disputes with the
respondent. That he has had to seek recourse from this court is most
unfortunate and an indictment on the respondent’s constitutional duty
and failure to timeously and properly address and resolve the dispute
raised by him.

BACKGROUND
2. The applicant is the owner of the remaining extent of Erf 1[...] B[...]
G[...], situate at [...] R[...] Street, B[...] G[...], Randburg.

3. He raises three disputes:
3.1. the first is in relation to a pensioner rebate which he says
he was entitled to but which the respondent had failed to
implement thus resulting in an incorrect charge being
levied by the respondent;
3.2. the second relates to a complaint that he has been
charged for water in terms of two water meters in
circumstances where the second meter is not on his
property or for his property;
3.3. the third is a complaint relating to his application to obtain
a prepaid meter so as to avoid the payment of network
charges to the respondent.

4. I was informed from the Bar that the respondent had approximately a
week ago, attended at the applicant’s property and had finally
installed a pre -paid meter. To that extent, the relief sought by the
applicant in this regard has become academic.

5. I deal with the remaining two disputes below.

PENSIONER REBATE
6. It is common cause that the applicant is a pensioner and that he was
entitled to a pensioner’s rebate. The respondent, after much toing
and froing recognised this and claims that it had subsequently
credited the applicant’s account with such rebate including interest
that had been levied by it with the result that this dispute has now
become moot.

7. But that does not appear to be the case. The amounts credited by
the respondent subsequent to its acceptance that the applicant was
entitled to a pensioner’s rebate are inconsistent with what the
applicant claims he was entitled to. Thus, for example:
7.1. the respondent credited the applicant with R2,386.85 in
respect of interest yet the total interest that the respondent
levied was an amount of R8,823.00. There is no
explanation by the respondent for this discrepancy;
7.2. the respondent claims to have credited the applicant’s
account resulting in the applicant’s account having a credit
balance of R6,264.81. Yet the respondent’s subsequent
account dated 5 August 2024 only reflects a credit balance
of R666.59;
7.3. the respondent had charged the applicant R2,895.90 for
four months from July to October 2023 based on an
admittedly incorrect property valuation of R4,253,000.00.
Despite the concession, the respondent has not reversed
these charges.

8. It was for the respondent to address these issues in its answering
affidavit. It failed to do so. It has not demonstrated that it properly and
accurately reversed all of the charges which it had levied and which it
subsequently admitted should not have been levied by it.

9. It follows that the applicant is entitled to the relief he seeks in respect
of the pensioner rebate dispute.

THE WATER METER DISPUTE
10. During the period 5 June 2021 to 4 October 2021, the respondent
charged the applicant for water from meter number: 3[...] as well as
meter number: C[...].

11. The respondent contended that it had not charged the applicant
under two meters but that what in fact occurred was that meter
number: 3[...] had been removed on the 16 th of July 2021 and
presumably replaced with a new meter C[...] on the 17th of July 2021.

12. The difficulty with that allegation is that the applicant’s account which
was attached to his founding affidavit dated October 2021 reflects a
reading period from 5 June 2021 to 4 October 2021 (being a period
of 122 days) in respect of meter number: 3[...] and an estimated
reading over that same period in respect of meter number C[...].

13. There is no explanation by the respondent in its answering affidavit
why a reading period up until 4 October 2021 was done in respect of
meter number: 3[...] in circumstances where that meter, on the
respondent’s own version, had been removed on the 16 th of
July 2021. One would have expected the reading period to have
ended on the 16 th of July 2021 even if the reading may have been
taken later. There was equally no explanation of why the respondent
would charge both for an actual reading and an estimated reading for
the same period.

14. Mr Sithole who appeared on behalf of the respondent sought to
furnish an explanation from the Bar as to what the statement meant
and how it should be read. But this explanation had not been

tendered in the respondent’s answering affidavit and was thus of little
if any probative value and weight.

15. To complicate matters, the applicant, in his replying affidavit,
reaffirmed that in the respondent’s October 2021 statement, the
respondent had reflected the number of two meters , namely meter
number: 3[...] and meter number: C[...] which the applicant said was
not on his property and never has been. He was told by the
respondent that meter number: C[...] had been “routed” to a different
account number in a letter dated 18 May 2024. That letter reads as
follows, in relevant part:
“Account number 5[...] routed to Johannesburg Water for
duplicated meter number C[...].”

16. In the course of argument, Mr Sithole sought to explain from the Bar
that there was in fact a confusion on the applicant’s part in that there
were two different meters distinguished only by a hyphen between
the letters C and V. The argument from the Bar, so it went, was that
the applicant’s meter is identified as C[...] whereas the applicant’s
neighbour’s meter is simply C[...]. There was of course no attempt by
the respondent to provide this explanation in an affidavit even in
rebuttal by way of a further supplementary affidavit of what was said
by the applicant in his replying affidavit so that the correct
understanding on its version may have been conveyed. It is an
explanation that does not even feature in Mr Sithole’s heads of
argument.

17. The applicant went one step further. He attached to his founding
papers, photographs of the relevant meter. Once again, there was no
attempt by the respondent to engage with the applicant on his
apparent misunderstanding. During the course of the argument,
Mr Sithole suggested that an inspection in loco be conducted

immediately so as to confirm which meter was on the applicant’s
property. The argument went further to suggest that the relief that the
applicant seeks would result in him having received water services
for free. But that would be the result only because of the
respondent’s failure to have properly addressed the dispute in its
answering affidavit.

18. Quite why the respondent did not take a photograph (as the applicant
had done) and to have explained its position in an answering
affidavit, was self-evidently not considered by the respondent.

19. In motion proceedings, the Plascon-Evans2 rule applies. This rule to
restate the trite principle is that a court should only grant relief in
motion proceedings where final relief is being claimed, if the facts
presented by a respondent, together with any facts admitted by an
applicant, justify the order being sought. If the respondent’s version is
not so farfetched that it can be rejected, then a court must accept
that version.

20. In this case however, the respondent has not provided any
explanation in its answering affidavit let alone a reasonable one. 3 Its
only version is that the meter had been replaced with one that
services the applicant’s property. But its own municipal statements
belie that version. It is thus not a version that this court can readily
accept. This is particularly so given that the respondent’s answering
affidavit was deposed to by its legal advisor who had a responsibility
to ascertain and engage with the facts which the applicant had raised
and to accurately and comprehensively deal with them in his
answering affidavit.

21. Having regard to what is said by the respondent in its answering

2 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A).
3 Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA).

affidavit, the order sought by the applicant in relation to the water
dispute is justified.

THE RESPONDENT’S OVERALL CONDUCT
22. The respondent’s answering affidavit was deposed to by
Mr Tuwani Ngwana. He is, as pointed out earlier, a legal advisor at
the respondent. It was quite apparent from the answering affidavit
that he had no personal knowledge of the engagements between the
applicant and various representatives of the respondent.

23. In Millu v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and
another,4 the same Mr Ngwana deposed to the respondent’s
answering affidavit. In that regard, Sutherland DJP said the following:
“The practice of requiring a legal advisor to depose to the
affidavits is both a clue to the cause of the debacle and a
manifestation of the City’s reckless attitude. It should be self -
evident that the City’s legal advisor has no personal knowledge
of the accounting. He cannot ever be more than a conduit. His
affidavit craftily states that he makes it based on the information
available to him, deafly evading the typical formula that the
deponent has access to and control over the documents qua
evidence … If Mr Ngwana is ever to be cross examined on his
affidavits it seems likely that embarrassment would soon follow.
It must be stated bluntly that the affidavits in litigation should be
from persons who administer the accounts. The practice of a
legal advisor being a deponent to facts of which he has no
personal knowledge must stop.”

24. The respondent would have been aware of this judgment which had
been delivered prior to the launching of this application by the
applicant. Despite that, it would appear that the respondent had

4 2024 JDR 1329 (GJ).

ignored Sutherland DJP’s remarks and Mr Ngwana continues to
depose to affidavits on the respondent’s behalf in circumstances
where he has no personal knowledge of the allegations contained in
his affidavit.

25. In Ordicode, Wilson J likewise rebuked the respondent for having
Mr Ngwana depose to its answering affidavit. The learned judge said
the following in this regard:
“12. For their part, the respondent’s raise no genuine dispute
that Ordicode has been incorrectly billed. In the first place,
I do not think that the deponent to the answering affidavit
could have the personal knowledge he claims of the facts
necessary to meet Ordicode’s case. Ordicode’s case
concerns meter malfunctions and accounting errors dating
back 3 years from the date on which the application was
launched. The deponent to the answering affidavit is a
Mr Tuwani Ngwana, a legal advisor to the City of
Johannesburg who says nothing to ground the inference
that he has personal knowledge of the state of the meters
at the property or of the way that Ordicode’s accounts
have been calculated. There are no affidavits from any of
City Power’s functionaries and certainly nothing from
anyone who has dealt directly with Ordicode’s account.
This court has in the past strongly disapproved of City
legal advisors attesting to facts of which they can have no
personal knowledge, or purporting to answer a case based
on facts clearly beyond their ken (see Millu v City of
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and another
[2024] ZAGPJHC 419 (18 March 2024)(paragraph 45). It
appears that this disapproval has yet to filter through to
those responsible for drawing papers on the City’s behalf.”

26. A further worrying aspect was the uploading of various documents
and attachments onto caselines without any affidavit to explain the
documents being uploaded. The respondent saw fit to upload a
number of its tax invoices onto caselines but without any
supplementary affidavit seeking leave to introduce these invoices into
the record or to explain their significance. They were consequently
not considered and carried no admissible or probative value.

27. If this is the practice being adopted by practitioners, then it should not
be countenanced.

CONCLUSION
28. Mr Sithole sought to impress upon me that the relief sought by the
applicant was inappropriate and should not and cannot be granted.
He relied on the judgment by Wilson J in Ordicode. But that judgment
is distinguishable. In that matter, Wilson J concluded that the relief
that was being sought was one in respect of which he had no power
to grant. That is because what was being sought by Ordicode was a
recalculation of Ordicode’s account in a particular way outlined in
Ordicode’s notice of motion. That is not what is being sought by the
applicant in this application. Here, the applicant merely seeks that his
account reflect his pensioner’s status and rebate and that all charges
including interest, that were erroneously levied by the respondent, be
set aside. Similarly, insofar as the charges in respect of water is
concerned, the applicant merely seeks that he is not charged for
water in terms of a meter which he has illustrated is not on his
property and not for his property.

29. The applicant sought that the respondent pay the costs on an
attorney and own client scale. He does so because he says he
should not have had to launch this application in the first place had
the respondent acted diligently and responsibly. There is

considerable merit in this submission. The respondent, instead of
dealing with the applicant’s complaints and addressing them
foursquarely, resorted to technical defences such as that the
applicant should have sought to review the respondent’s decisions or
failure to make decisions rather than seek the setting aside of its
erroneous billing. Coincidentally, it too sought that the application be
dismissed with attorney and client costs. It would therefore seem that
both parties were of the view that the appl ication warranted an
attorney client costs scale.

ORDER
30. In the result, I make the following order:
30.1. the property rates charges levied on the municipal account
number: 5[...] (“the Municipal account”) in respect of the
applicant’s property, being the remaining extent of Erf 1[...]
B[...] G[...] , [...] R[...] Street, B[...] G[...] , Randburg (“the
property”), for the period January 2019 to December 2023
be set aside;
30.2. the respondent is directed to apply the applicable
pensioner’s rebate to the Municipal account for the period
January 2019 to December 2023 and to credit the
Municipal account accordingly;
30.3. the water consumption charges levied by the respondent
in respect of the Municipal account on the property for the
period November 2021 to December 2023 , based on a
meter number: C[...] be set aside;

30.4. all interest debited by the respondent in the Municipal
account in respect of the property from July 2021 to date
of this order be reversed and set aside;
30.5. the respondent is to pay the costs of this application on
the scale as between attorney and client.

M A CHOHAN

ACTING JUDGE OF THE GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION

20 October 2025


DATE OF HEARING: 8 October 2025




DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20 October 2025



APPEARANCES:


FOR THE APPLICANT: Adv. Q. du Plessis
Instructed by: Nochumsohn Pretorius
Inc. Attorneys






FOR THE RESPONDENT: Adv. E. Sithole

Instructed by: Ncube Incorporated
Attorneys