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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: A174/2025
Court a quo case number 318/2024
In the matter between:
SEA PRIDE PROCESSORS (PTY) LTD First Appellant
PIONEER FISHING (PTY) LTD Second Appellant
and
LAUREN EBONY MASIMLA First Respondent
SALDANHA BAY MUNICIPALITY Second Respondent
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND INFRASTRUCTURE
(CAPE TOWN REGIONAL OFFICE) Third
Respondent
Coram: SALDANHA J and BARENDSE AJ
Heard: 10 October 2025
Delivered: 21 October 2025
ORDER
1 Condonation for the late filing of the Notice of Appeal is granted, the
appeal is dismissed, no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
Barendse AJ (Saldanha J concurring):
[1] This is an appeal against a decision by the Magistrates Court for the
District of Vredenburg to stay eviction proceedings pending the outcome of
proceedings pending in the Labour Court . The Appellants also applied for
condonation for the late filing of the Notice of Appeal.
[2] The Second and Third Respondents were not parties to the appeal and
were cited in these proceedings because they were so cited in the eviction
proceedings.
[3] The First Respondent is the party whom the Appellants are seeking to
evict and in whose favour the stay of the eviction proceedings was granted.
The First Respondent did not oppose the appeal and formally filed a Notice
to Abide this court`s judgment.
[4] It is common cause that the First Respondent was employed by the
Second Appellant and its erstwhile joint venture partner on 16 May 2015
and thereafter remained in the employment of the Second Appellant as a
Human Resources Manager. In the Founding Affidavit ("FA") in the
eviction proceedings , the COO of the Sec ond Appellant, Mr Pieter Greeff
stated that the First Respondent was provided with staff accommodation as a
benefit by virtue of her employment with Second Appellant.1 A written lease
agreement was concluded between Second Appellant and First Respondent
and it was a term thereof that the lease would terminate when the First
Respondent's employment terminated.2
[5] The First Appellant erected the dwellings in which staff is being
accommodated on Erf 1 […], St Helena Bay. Erf 1 […] is being let to First
Appellant by the Third Respondent. The First Respondent initially occupied
premises at 1[…] B[…] Street, St Helena Bay and since May 2022 , she has
been in occupation of no. […] B[…] Street.
1 Record p12 para 22.
2 Record p44.
[6] On 14 June 2023, the First Respondent was dismissed from employ ment
by the Second Appellant. During October 2023 , notice was given to her to
vacate the dwelling occupied by her and motion proceedings were
eventually commenced in the Vredenburg Magistrates Court on 1 March
2024 in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act, 19 of 1998 ("PIE Act"). The First Respondent is
opposing these proceedings and filed an Answering Affidavit ("AA").
[7] It is apposite to mention that in her AA , the First Respondent declared
that her dismissal was unfair and that she was challenging this in
proceedings pending in the Labour Court. It also appears from her AA that
she was previously in a romantic relationship with Mr Greeff who deposed
to the Appella nts' affidavits in the eviction proceedings, that since
termination of this relationship , the relations between her and Mr Greeff
soured which ultimately culminated into her dismissal. This court makes no
presumptions around the reasons, lawfulness and fai rness of First
Respondent's dismissal; the Labour Court being seized with those issues.
[8] On 25 October 2024 , the First Respondent launched an interlocutory
application in the eviction proceedings.3 The application was headed "Notice
of Motion: First Respondent's Special Plea" and it introduced a special
defence of Lis Alibi Pendens. This opened a proverbial rabbit's hole in which
the parties and more so , the Appellants evidently lost direction. This was
what ultimately brought the parties before this court.
3 Record p157-168.
[9] On 6 February 2025 , the Magistrate gave judgment on the
abovementioned application the effect of which was to stay the eviction
proceedings pending the outcome of the Labour Court proceedings. The
Appellants appealed against this ruling by the Magistrate.
[10] In his reason s in terms of Rule 51(8) , the Magistrate indicated that
when arriving at the decision to stay, he considered and relied upon the
judgment of the Labour Court in R Naicker and Another v Dr MM Muswaba
and three Others, case no. C194/2024. 4 The Magistrate quoted from the
above judgment as follows: '… the Respondents are prejudiced by having to delay
any eviction process till later, if they should ultimately be successful. On the other hand,
if the applicants are compelled to vacate the premise s before the outcome of the pending
council proceedings , if they are ultimately successful, they will have suffered the cost
and considerable inconvenience of having to move and find alternative temporary
accommodation for them an d their families, and wil l have to extricate themselves from
those accommodation arrangements before they would be able to re -occupy their present
accommodation. In the light hereof, the balance of convenience favours the applicant.'
[11] The grounds of appeal listed in the Appel lants' Notice of Appeal were
as follows:
(a) The Court erred in finding that the requirements of lis alibi pendens had
been met;
(b) The Court erred in finding that the Labour Court proceedings instituted
by First Respondent related to the same cause of action;
(c) The Court erred in applying the Labour Court judgment of R Naicker and
one other v DR MM Muswaba and three others in coming to its decision;
4 Record p 194.
(d) The Court erred in not finding that the aforementioned case is
distinguishable on the facts;
(e) The Court erred in staying the eviction application pending the outcome
of the appeal to the Labour Court.
[12] In Naicker, an interim interdict was granted, preventing the employer
from taking steps to evict employees from free accommodation linked to
their employment in circumstances where a dispute over their terms of
employment was pending in bargaining council proceedings. Notably,
formal eviction proceedings had not commenced by the time that the interim
interdict was granted.
[13] It is necessary to have regard to the following which appears at
paragraph [28] of Naicker. 'The applicants have already invoked a suitable remedy
to determine their contractual rights, which in turn will determine if they have a current
contractual right to continue to occupy the premises rent -free. If they are proven correct
in those proceedings, that will negate the basis for pursuing any eviction proceedings by
the college, which are based on them not having contractual rights to such
accommodation. An order of interim relief will preserve their right to obtain finality on
their current rights. In essence the applicants wish to halt a further legal process
initiated by the college , which presumes to pre -empt the outcome of the council
proceedings. Undoub tedly, in any proceeding under the PIE Act, the applicants could
raise a defence of lis penden s and argue that the PIE Act proceedings be stayed pending
the outcome of their disputes at the bargaining council.'
[14] Given that the First Respondent did not oppose the appeal, the court
requested her attorney to attend the proceedings, the purpose of which was
to gain better insight into the status of the Labour Court proceedings. First
Respondent's attorney established that those proceedings were argued during
April 2025 and that judgment is being awaited.
[15] The First Respondent's lease can only be terminated on the account of
termination of her employment if her dismissal was lawful. This should be
obvious. When considering a PIE application, the first determination that the
court must make is whether the occupier is an unlawful occupier. The
Labour Court will make a declaration as to whether the Second Appellant
acted lawfully when dismissing the First Respondent. The Appellants' stance
that because of her mere dismissal, the First Respondent became an unlawful
occupier is opportunistic and without merit.
[16] Mr Greeff of the Appellants himself stated that the First Respondent's
entitlement to the accommodation was entirely dependent on her contract of
employment. Whether her employment was lawfully terminated will be
determined by the Labour Court. The court h earing the PIE application will
necessarily be better placed to determine the lawfulness of First
Respondent's occupation of the premises once the Labour Court judgment
becomes available.
[17] Further, when exercising its discretion on just and equitable relief in the
PIE proceedings , the court should have as much information as possible
around the occupier's circumstances. In the FA of the PIE application the
Appellants provid ed little around this. It was not disclosed that the First
Respondent has minor children and that the househol d which they intended
to evict was a household headed by a woman. Counsel for the appellant
accepted that if the respondent is found by the Labour Court to have been
the subject of an unlawful dismissal by the appellant , such unlawful conduct
on the part o f the appellant may well constitute a relevant circumstance
when the magistrates court exercises its just and equitable jurisdiction. That
notwithstanding, the respondent does not seek reinstatement as a remedy in
the Labour Court but a declaration of unfa ir dismissal and harassment and
an award of compensation.
[18] Much of the Appellants' focus in this appeal was on the lis pendens
issue. Nowhere in his written reasons did the Magistrate expressly refer to lis
pendens but even if this underpinned his reasoning, a court on appeal is not
seized with the reasoning but rather with the relief granted by a court a quo.
There is no suggestion that Naicker was wrongly decided and although that
case concerned an interim interdict and the present case concerns s tay of
proceedings, it is startling that the Appellants did not realise or were not
advised that what was quoted from Naicker in paragraph 13 of this judgment
was directly relevant to this matter. Moreover, the authorities are clear that
where an order is correct, it will not be set aside because the reasons
advanced by the court a quo were unsound 5. There is in my view, simply no
basis on which it can be found that the Magistrate wrongly exercised his
discretion when granting an order for the stay of the eviction proceedings.
[19] The Magistrat e's order was in any event not appe alable. It was not
final in effect, was n ot defini tive of the rights of the parties and di d not
dispose of any portion of the relief claimed in the main proceedings.6
5 see, for example Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Theletsane and Others 1991 (2) SA 192 (A) I
197B.
6 See Zweni v Minister of Law and Order of the Republic of South Africa 1993 (1) SA 523 (A).
[20] In the result, this appeal must fail and is hereby dismissed. No order
as to costs is made as the appeal was not opposed.
_____________________________
RD BARENDSE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Saldanha J (concurring)
_____________________________
V SALDANHA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For applicant: Adv C Francis
Instructed by: Kaplan Blumberg Attorneys
For respondent: None