IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CIRCUIT LOCAL DIVISION,THEMBALETHU)
Case No: 267/25
In the matter between
GEORGE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY APPLICANT
AND
THABANG MOTJAMELA RESPONDENT
Date of Hearing : 28 August 2025
Date of Delivering : 20 October 2025
__________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
__________________________________________________________________
THULARE J
ORDER
(a) No legal proceedings shall be instituted by the respondent against any person
in any court or any inferior court without the leave of that court, or any
judge thereof, or that inferior court, as the case may be.
(b) The Registrar is directed at transmitting a copy of this order to the Registrar
of the Labour Court and also to cause it to be published in the Government
Gazette. The applicant is to cover the costs of such publication, which costs
the applicant is to recover from the respondent if the applicant so elects.
(c) Should the respondent continue to make, utter, publish and distribute
disparaging defamatory statements related to alleged violations of his basic
human an d fundamental rights, fraud, exploitation, racism and
discrimination against the applicant and/or its employees , court
administrative support staff at any court or any of the judges of any court or
presiding officers in any inferior court , the applicant is granted leave to
approach this court, on the same papers duly supplemented, in order to seek
appropriate relief, which may include that the court inquire into the mental
wellbeing of the respondent.
(d) The respondent i s to pay the costs of this application on a scale as between
attorney and client and costs of counsel on scale B.
[1] This is an opp osed application that the respondent be declared a vexatious
litigant in terms of section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, 1956 (Act No.
3 of 1956) (the VPA); that the responden t be interdicted and restr ained from
instituting any legal proceedings against the applicant premised on the Expanded
Public Works Programme and or section 198B of the Labour Relations Act, 1995
(Act No. 66 of 1995) (the LRA) relationship between the parties in any División of
the High Court of South Africa, any Division o f the Labour Court or any other
lower court without leave of that court or Judge of that court as the case may be, as
contemplated in section 2(1)(b) of the VPA; that a copy of such order be
transmitted to the Registrar of the Labour Court, Cape Town and also be published
in a Government Gazette, as contemplated in section 2(3) of the VPA ; that the
respondent further be interdicted and restrained from making, uttering, publishing
and distributing any disparaging, defamatory and untrue remarks relating to alleged
violations of his basic human and fundamental rights, fraud, exploitation, rac ism
and discrimination against the applicant and/or its employees and that the applicant
be granted leave to approach the court on the same papers, duly supplemented, in
the event that the respondent is in contempt of any order or judgment handed down
in these proceedings plus costs.
[2] On 5 October 2018 , 27 people referred a dispute against the applicant (the
Municipality) praying for a declaratory order that the Municipality appoint them on
an indefinite basis. The referral was in terms of section 198B of the LRA and was
considered by the Western Cape Division of the South African Local Government
Bargaining Council (SALGBC). It was allocated case number WCP101805. The
26 others abandoned the referral and only the respondent pursued it. On 18
November 2019 the arbitrator found that the respondent had been employed in
terms of two fixed term contracts in an Expanded Public Works Programme
(EPWP). It was found that the conclusion of the two contracts wer e justified in
terms of section 19 8B(4)(g) of the LRA; that the EPWP contract could not be the
basis for the Municipality to be ordered to appoint the respondent on a contract of
indefinite duration or to order the Municipality to reinstate the respondent after
expiry of the fixed term contract period. The dispute was dismissed, and no cost
order was made.
[3] The respondent sought a review and setting aside of the SALGBC decision ,
which was dismiss ed on 13 December 2023 under case number C824/19 of the
Labour Court of South Africa, Cape Town (the LCSA). His application for leave to
appeal the decision was dismissed on 12 February 2024. The respondent petitioned
the Labour Appeal Court of South Africa, Johannesburg (the LAC) under case
number CA2/24. The petition for leave to appeal was refused on 27 Marc h 2024.
The respondent approached the Constitutional Court of South Africa (the CC)
under case number CCT 99/24 for leave to appeal . The application was dismissed
for no prospects of success on 16 July 2024. On 19 August 2024 the respondent
lodged a rescission application with the CC. As at the date of the hearing of this
application the outcome of the rescission application was not known to the
Municipality.
[4] In 2020 the respondent referred an unfair discrimination dispute to the
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). It was allocated
case number WEGE2404-20. The applicant advertised 8 posts i n 2018 for Water
Distribution Assistants. At the time , the respondent worked on the EPW P fixed
contracts. The respondent applied and was shortlisted for practical assessments.
Due to financial challenges the applicant froze the 8 posts, and the recruitment
process was put on hold. In 2020 the applicant could only proceed with 5 of the 8
posts. The posts were re -advertised. At that time, the EPWP contract in which the
respondent worked had ended. The respondent applied and was not shortlisted for
practical assessments and was not employed in any of those posts. The basis for the
referral was that the respondent believed that as he was shortlisted in 2018, he
should have been shortlisted in 2020, and that he was discriminated against as he
had previously referred a dispute against the Municipality to the SALGBC. The
respondent’s case was found to be without merit, and his matter was dismissed.
The Commissioners view, Anele Mgubasi, was that the respondent’s referral was
vexatious.
[5] The respondent sought to review and set aside the award in the LCSA under
case number C73/2021. The Judge President of the LCSA found that the
application had lapsed and it was archived in terms of the LCSA Practice Manual
at the time. The respondent instituted an application to reinstate the review
application. Legal Aid and SALAW had declined the respondents request for
assistance due to poor prospects of success. The reinstatement application was
dismissed. A day after the dismissal, the respondent filed an urgent application for
a request for the suspension of the rule requiring the filing of transcripts. The
respondent’s failure to provide transcripts from 2021 to 2024, that is for three
years, was amongst others the reason that the respondents review application was
found to have lapsed and was also one of the reasons advanced for the opposition
and order not to reinstate the application . On that same day, 29 November 2024,
the respondent filed an application for the review of the reinstatement application.
On 3 December 2024 the respondent addressed correspondence wherein he asked
that the application for suspension of the provision of the transcript be referred to
the then Acting Judge President . He therein recorded his displeasure at what he
termed the poor service at the LCSA, Cape Town . He expressed the view that the
Labour Court actions were clear that they were working with the Municipality to
criticize his application as he was a young black applicant and it showed racism.
The applicant’s attorneys, who were ccd in his correspondence, in reply indicated
to him that the correct procedure was for him to first seek leave and then appeal
and cautioned him not to make unfounded allegations. The respondent later that
day wrote an objection to the then ADJ P Savage dealing with his application,
accusing her of bias, incompetence and racism. The JP did not accede to this
request.
[6] On 10 September 2024 the respondent filed an application for fraud in the High
Court of South Africa, Cape Town. In the notice of motion the Municipality was
the respondent. The first part of the prayers was for an order allocating a case
number to the matter, granting permission for electronic service and submission of
all documents in the case and directing that the matter be heard virtually. The body
of the notice also had a second set of prayers which wer e for permission for
electronic service and submission, urgency, permission for a virtual hearing and
that the court set appropriate period within which the respondent may file an
opposing affidavit. The third set of prayers in the body of the notice was requesting
the court’s assistance in ensuring a fair and accessible process, allowing for
efficient handling of the matter as he was a layperson, and that the matter pertained
to fraudulent actions committed deliberately which have adversely affected his
interests and rights. In the closing paragrap h of the founding affidavit there were
further prayers that it be declared that the Municip ality engaged in fraudulent
misrepresentation of the contract, that the Municipality provide all necessary
documentation and records relating to his employment, that the Municipality be
ordered to compensate him in the amount of R20 000 000-00, the costs o f the
application and reimbursements for legal fees and expenses. The facts set out in the
founding affidavit related to the EPWP contract earlier discussed in this judgment.
The Registrar of the high Court advised the respondent that matters pertaining to
fraud were criminal and civil in nature, and the process was not issued.
[7] On 25 March 2025 the respondent caused the issue of an urgent application
under case number 125/25 in the High Court of South Africa, Eastern Circuit Local
Division, Thembalethu. The notice indicated that he brought a civil matter against
the applicant which constituted fraud as false document claim was contract of
employment, fabricated information and exploitation of cheap labour and
requested to serve via email. The facts set out in the founding affidavit related to
the EPWP earlier discussed . In the founding affidavit, the relief sought were that
the applicant be ordered to reinstate him as a permanent employee, compensation
for damages in the amount of R65 000 000-00, rectification of the fraudulent
documents, an order that the applicant cease the exploitation of temporary workers
under EPWP scheme and to enforce compliance with labour laws and an
investigation into the fraudulent practices within the Municipality with the
potential for disciplinary action against those responsible. On 2 May 2025 Dolamo
J dismissed the application with co sts. The respondent filed an application for
leave to appeal the decision of Dolamo J , which at the ti me of the filing of the
papers in this application, had not yet been heard. On 13 May the respondent filed
an application for objection, objecting against Dolamo J hearing his matters on the
grounds that Dolamo J failed to uphold the standards of impartiality, fairness and
protection of constitutional rights and what was required by an oath of office.
Dolamo J had at the time dealt with and dismissed three of the respondent’s urgent
applications. The first was in case 118/25 which related to a different set of facts,
the other two were cases wherein both the respondent was the applicant, and the
Municipality was the respondent, case numbers 122 /25 and 125/25 heard on 02
May 2025.
[8] In September 2024 the respondent opened two criminal cases, one against the
Municipality and another against the District Municipality related to the facts of
the EPWP contract. In both the Senior Public Prosecutor of George (the SPP)
declined to prosecute for lack of sufficient evidence. It is not clear how the matters
were elevated to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape, (the DPP). The
DPP agreed with the decision of the SPP to decline to institute a prosecution in
both as there was insufficient evidence to sustain a successful prosecution. It will
not be a quantum leap to conclude that the respondent, who was the party
interested in pursuin g both the Municipality and the District Municipality, would
be the person who was unhappy about the decision of the SPP and sought the
intervention of the DPP.
[9] Throughout his pursuit of the EPWP issue against the Municipality, the
respondent appeared in person . He was aware and had been advised at least on
three occasions in writing by Legal Aid South Africa (LASA), that his case had no
prospect of success. On 25 November 2020, on appeal to the Provincial Executive
of the Northern and Western Cape precincts of LASA (PE of LASA) said to the
respondent:
Having considered the above documents, factors as well as the grounds of appeal, I have no
compelling reasons to uphold your appeal for the reason that there are no prospects of success.
You were contracted by the Municipality of George as a non -permanent employee based on
funding the Municipality received from the Department of Public Works. The documents relied
upon does not assist in taking the ma tter any further. Accordingly your appeal against the refusal
of legal aid is hereby unsuccessful.
On 7 January 2021, on appeal to the Acting Chief Executive of LASA (the CLE) at
its National Office, the CLE said to the respondent:
We have reviewed your application and we are not satisfied that there are good prospects of
success in the review application. We hold the view that the Commissioner considered the
relevant evidence, especially the fact that you signed a contract that clea rly indicated that the
employment is part of the Extended Public Works Programme, and reached a decision that falls
within the ambit of reasonableness.
Considering the above your appeal against refusal of legal aid is therefore unsuccessful.
On 20 July 2021 the PE of LASA said to the respondent:
Kindly be advised that in terms of the Legal Aid Manual your appeal was unsuccessful and legal
aid is refused due to lack of prospects of success.
[10] The respondent characterized the application as that of the apartheid system of
segregation of 1948 to 1994 where Black people did not have constitutional rights.
He approached it from the lenses of exploitation of cheap labour and
discrimination and alleged fraud in misinterpreting the employment contract. In his
answering affidavit he also referred to the theme throughout his court processes in
that he was a layperson to whom courts should consider his procedural errors with
fairness and compassion as an unrepresented person who acted in good faith to
expose injustice, unfair labour practices and discrimination. In the background
facts, the respondent relied on his case and arguments in the EPWP matter
throughout the institutions and courts. In essence he argued his EPWP case again.
Furthermore, a ccording to him granting the order sought by the Municipality
would amongst others prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
access to justice which was protected under section 34 of the Constitution. It would
silence him from raising valid labour -related grievances, which was a violation of
section 23 which he set out as his right to fair labour practices. It would protect the
unlawful conduct of a government entity at the expense of a v ulnerable,
unemployed and unrepresented individual . It would set a dangerous precedent
where poor people were denied justice simply because they could not afford legal
representation.
[11] According to him the relief would essential ly criminalise poverty and silence
dissent and this would cause irreparable prejudice not only legally but also
emotionally and economically. His case was also that the application constituted an
unjust and unconstitutional attempt to silence a citizen raising concerns of unfair
labour practices, fraud and discrimination . He implored the court to prevent the
Municipality from denying him his right to speak publicly a bout the exploitation
he experienced and to affirm his right to bring future legitimate actions in terms of
section 34 of the Constitution. He drew the court’s attention to the importance of
protecting the rights of poor and unrepresented people in the fac e of institutional
power and complexity. He denied that he was a vexatious litigant , and was a poor,
unemployed and unrepresented citizen who turned to the legal system in search of
justice for the wrongs he believed were committed against him . In conclusion, his
case was that justice should be accessible to all and not only to those with legal
knowledge or financial means. He prayed for an order that would ensure that no
one misused legal proceedings to d eny others their constitutional rights to ac cess
justice.
[12] Section 2(1)(b) of the VPA reads as follows:
2 Powers of court to impose restrictions on the institution of vexatious legal
proceedings
(1) (b) If, on an application made by any person against whom legal proceedings have been
instituted by any other person or who has reason to believe that the institution of legal
proceedings against him is contemplated by any other person, the court is satisfied that
the said person has persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted legal
proceedings in any court or in any inferior court, whether against the same person or
against different persons, the court may, after hearing that person or giving him an
opportunity of being heard, order that no legal proceedings shall be instituted by him
against any person in any court or any inferior court without the leave of the court, o r any
judge thereof, or that inferior court, as the case may be, and such leave shall not be
granted unless the court or judge or the inferior court, as the case may be, is satisfied that
the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court and tha t there is prima
facie ground for the proceedings.
The purpose of these provisions is to put a stop to persistent and ungrounded
institution of legal proceedings [Beinash and Another v Ernst & Young and Others
1999 (2) SA 116 (CC) at para 15; S v Sitebe 1965 (2) SA 908 (N) at 911B-C]. The
Act does so by allowing a court to screen as opposed to bar a person. The
screening was necessary to protect the interest of the victims of the vexatious
litigant and the public interest that the functioning of th e courts and the
administration of justice proceed unimpeded by the clog of groundless proceedings
[Beinash in th at same para 15]. There was an escape from the restriction on the
right of access to courts as soon as a prima facie case was made in circumstances
where the presiding officer was satisfied that the proceedings so instituted will not
constitute an abuse of the process of the court . The litigants right of access to
courts was regulated and not prohibited. The regulatory procedure allowed for a
courts was regulated and not prohibited. The regulatory procedure allowed for a
flexible proportionality to protect the interests of both the litigant and the public
[Beinash para 19]. The restriction was justifiable when confronted by a person who
demonstrated a propensity to abuse the process of courts [Beinash para 20]
--
[13] The respondent refused to accept did not understand that his multiple matters
and legal disputes do not have merit. He ignored legal advise that his matters did
not have merit. He continued to blame and make serious allegations against Judges
whenever decision s are made against him . He exhibits a general disregard for
established procedure and practice. He hid behind his being poor, African a nd not
trained in law as a default excuse in his intimidation of opponents and Judges into
submission to his his unmeritorious disputes. The Municipality used the limited
public resources, attorneys needed to be briefed and Judicial resources had to be
spent on reviews, applications and appeals which were known, even by the
respondent who instituted them, that they lacked merit. The respondent also simply
changed fora when he failed in one . Out of the same facts he appr oached the
Labour Court under case C824/2019 . When he failed, he instituted proceedings in
the High Court in case number 125/25 , and when he failed, he went to report a
fraud criminal case in Ge orge CAS 569/9/2024. The Labour Court, the Labour
Appeal Court, the Constitutional Court and the High Court, all on more than one
occasion, had to deal with proceedings which should in any event not have been
brought. The conduct of the respondent in instituting those proceedings fortfies the
legitimate and worthy objective of section 2(1)(b) of the VPA [Ernst & Young and
Others v Beinash and Others 1999 (1) SA 114 at 1138H-J].
[14] There is no indication that the respondent will cease litigation with the
Municipality on the same facts which have been pronounced upon by competent
courts, unless there was some intervention . The movement out of the Labour Law
realm to the Civil Courts and to the Criminal Courts have all been attempts to
reopen the same matter , in circumstances where it was known that the complaint
had no prospects of success. The proceedings were instituted without any
reasonable ground under the circumstances. The respondent engaged in recurring
or constantly repeated or continuous institution of legal proceedings in a court
within the meaning of section 2(1)(b) of the VPA [MEC, Department of Co -
operative Governance and Traditional Affairs v Maphanga 2021 (4) SA 131 (SCA)
at para 20]. The persistent or repetitive institution of legal proceedings by the
respondent related to the same matter, to wit, his EPWP contract . Later, and the
shortlisting case. At all times when the respondent approached the Labour Court
and the High Court of South Africa, he did so without any reasonable grounds.
This was because at times when he did so, he had the advice of LASA that his
cases had no p rospects of success. In the EPWP matter, the respondent went up to
the Constitutional Court and also sought its reconsideration whilst aware that his
matter had no prospects of success.
[15] In practice, the decision to decline assistance is first made by the legal
representative to whom the matter is allocated once processed administratively at
LASA. By the time the Local Executive in George decides, the legal representative
of first instance has already made a decision, and the matter is elevated for
consideration and communication with the client. In other words, it ordinarily takes
at least two legal brains to decide that there are no merits at local level. By the time
the Provincial Executive decides, at least two others have already considered the
matter and found it without merit , and often another lawyer at the province would
also have considered the appeal to advise the Provincial Executive . It therefore
generally takes four legal minds to express the position of the province. The
respondent ignored the advice and on his own approached the courts without any
reasonable grounds. An unequivocal finding is made that the claims had no
reasonable basis, on both the EPWP and the shortlisting cases.
[16] I would be failing in my duty not only towards the functioning of the courts
but also applicant and its employees, to court support services, including registrars
and secretaries of the courts, as well as almost all judges except for a few, who had
occasion to deal with th e respondents matters, if I do not give due attention to the
tendency of the respondent to send emails to a multitude of recipients, almost
anyone who had occasion to deal with his matter s, including to Judicial Managers
in the courts where his matters were heard. It is one thing to send correspondence
as follow-up or to address a particular pressing issue by email with the other side
and/or court support services. But this is one matter where I am convinced that if
the respondent’s parents were to know what he was up to, the Basotho elders’
immediate reaction would be that a laptop be removed from him or that he be
denied access to the internet altogether until a family meeting is called . One
necessary observation is that the respondent carries the surname of a very
respected and respectable Basotho clan, and that the surname in fact means one
who ensures or defends justice. In various emails sent to the applicant’s employees
including its attorneys, advocates, court managers , registrars and judges
secretaries, the respondent has made various allegations against most of them
including exploitation, incompetence, corruption, bias, sabotage, racism, collusion,
discrimination, fraud, human rights violations and abuse of power. These adverse
comments were also made against judges. There should be a boundary, including
when expressing displeasure. The default position in our law, which is a rebuttable
presumption, is that every litigant is sane. This presumption of sanity is a legal
principle that ssumes that an individual who initiates or is involved in legal
proceedings is sane until proven otherwise. I am duty bound to move fr om the
premise that considered the respondent mentally competent . I move d from the
assumption that the respondent has the mental capacity to understand his actions
and their consequences. The failure of the respondent to appreciate and objectively
understand the boundaries is worrying to me. However, in my view the interest of
justice demands that I throw the ball back into the respondent’s court and not make
the order sought by the applicant as regards the interdict and restraint in relation to
the remarks made against those who made decisions that the respondent did not
like. It is up to the respondent to move the applicant to require closer examination
and further research of his intellect and the capacity of self -restraint as regard s
rational thought , the foundations of which have been shaken, for the court to
consider the interdict sought. For these reasons the order is made.
______________________________
DM THULARE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
Counsel for Applicant : Adv. A Erasmus
Instructing Attorney: Mr M van der Walt
Counsel for the Respondent: In person ( Mr T Motjamela)