THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case no: 121/2024

In the matter between:
THE CITY OF JOHANNESBURG FIRST APPLICANT
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
MMC FOR HOUSING SECOND APPLICANT
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG
and
NAKAMPE RECTOR SEALE FIRST RESPONDENT
THE RABIE RIDGE COMMUNITY SECOND RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and
Another v Seale and Another (121/2024) [2025] ZASCA
156 (20 October 2025)
Coram: MBATHA ADP and MOKGOHLOA, MATOJANE, GOOSEN
and KGOELE JJA
Heard: 29 August 2025

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Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of
Appeal website and released to SAFLII. The date and time for the handing
down of the judgment are deemed to be 11:00 on 20 October 2025.
Summary: Application of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 –
– existence of two orders issued by this Court on application for leave to
appeal sufficient to establish jurisdiction to reconsider – no reasonable
prospects of success on appeal and no compelling reasons to grant leave to
appeal – prior orders of this Court set aside – application for leave to appeal
dismissed with costs.

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ORDER


On application for reconsideration : referred by Molemela P in terms of
s 17(2)(f) of Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013:
1 The orders of this Court, dated 29 November 2023, issued pursuant to
the applicants’ application for leave to appeal against the order of the Gauteng
Division of the High Court, Pretoria, dated 25 August 2023, are set aside.
2 The applicants’ application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
3 The applicants are to pay the costs of the application for reconsideration
and the costs of the application for leave to appeal.


JUDGMENT

Goosen JA (Mbatha ADP and Mokgohloa, Matojane and Kgoele JJA
concurring)
[1] On 14 July 202 3 and again on 21 July 202 3, officials of the first
applicant, the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (the City)
together with contracted security personnel, demolished informal shacks and
shelters that had been erected on a portion of the Allandale Farm
(the property), adjacent to the Modde rfontein Road in Johannesburg. The
property, owned by the City, has been earmarked for the development of low-
cost housing. The property has been the scene of numerous and oft-repeated

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land invasions and occupation by persons seeking housing or shelter. The City
has, in response to this state of affairs , conducted numerous preventative
actions involving the demolition of structures ; the removal of building
materials and belongings of occupiers; and, in some instances, the destruction
of shelters or materials used to erect shelters.

[2] The events of 14 and 21 July 2023 were, at the time, the latest of such
actions by the City. The conduct of the City prompted the affected persons ,
some 292 individuals who now constitute the respondents, to seek legal
assistance. As a result, the respondents launched an urgent application before
the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (the high court) in which
they claimed immediate relief (Part A) and further final relief (Part B) . The
immediate relief included an order declaring that the evictions were unlawful
and unconstitutional. In addition, they sought an order restoring the ir
possession of the demolished structures; payment of constitutional damages;
prohibiting their eviction without an eviction order; prohibiting damage to
their property; and that the City be restrained from intimidating, threatening
or harassing the respondents.

[3] The City opposed the application. Its defence was premised upon the
enforcement, or implementation, of a court order which it had obtained in
March 2017 (the Sutherland J order).1 The City contended that its conduct was
authorised by the Sutherland J order; that it had not evicted any persons from
the property; and that the demolition and removal of structures or destruction
of building materials was directed at preventing the unlawful invasion and

1 The order was issued by Sutherland J on 22 March 2017 under case number 2017/05167.

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occupation of the property. It contended that it had only acted against persons
who were in the process of invading the property and that such persons were
not, in fact, in occupation of the structures or property when the City acted.

[4] In this regard, the City explained that since before 2017, when the land
was earmarked for low-cost housing development , land invasions had
occurred regularly. Individuals who apparently anticipated securing a
preference in low-cost housing development would erect minimal structures
on the property to establish a semblance of permanent occupation. This
prompted the City to bring an application in the high court to interdict persons
who intended to invade the land from doing so and to authorise the prevention
of such invasion. That application culminated in the Sutherland J order. After
that order was issued , the City established security patrols to discourage
invasions, regularly monitored the area , and embarked on numerous raids ,
similar to those that occurred in July 2023.

[5] On 23 August 2023, after hearing the application brought by the
respondents, the high court granted the following order against the City, with
costs on the scale between attorney and client:
‘. . . .
2. The evictions effected by the [City] at Farm Allandale are unlawful and unconstitutional.
3. The [City is] to restore the status quo ante [the position as it was before ] of the
[respondents], which includes constructing emergency temporary accommodation for the
[respondents] whose shelters have been demolished at the time of the hearing of this matter
and who still require them, within 72 hours of granting this order.
4. Should the [City] not be able to restore possession as per (3) , then the [City] must pay
R1500 per shack to the [respondents] within 72 hours of granting this order to enable them
to do so themselves. The attorneys of the [respondents] are to facilitate such a process.

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5. The [City] and or any of the [City’s] representatives are barred from evicting or seeking
to evict the [respondents] without an eviction order.
6. The [City is] to refrain from intimidating, threatening, har assing and / assaulting the
[respondents].
7. The [City is] to refrain from causing any damage to the [respondent’s] property,
including but not limited to their personal belongings and building materials.
. . . .’

[6] The City applied for leave to appeal against the order. The application
was refused on 25 August 2023. An application for leave to appeal was filed
with this Court . O n 29 November 2023, the application (per Petse JA and
Chetty AJA) was dismissed. An application for reconsideration in terms of
s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (the Act) was lodged on
20 February 2024 (the reconsideration application). On 9 May 2024 , the
President of this Court, Mol emela P, referred the decision dismissing the
application for l eave to appeal to the Court for reconsideration and, if
necessary, variation. The referral also contained the usual order that the parties
should be prepared to address the merits of the appeal, if required.

The case for reconsideration
[7] The main thrust of the City’s application for reconsideration is the
existence of two orders issued by this Court in dismissing its application for
leave to appeal. The orders were both issued on 29 November 2023. They are
in standard form for orders issued in applications for leave to appeal. The first
order stated that the application was dismissed with costs on the grounds that
the requirements for special leave to appeal had not been met. The second
order, apparently issued by the Registrar later that day , provide d that the

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application for leave to appeal was dismissed on the grounds that there were
no reasonable prospects of success and no compelling reason s why leave
should be granted. In response to an enquiry made by the legal representatives
of the City, the Registrar stated that the s econd order corrected a ‘typo’ .
Nothing else appears in the record to explain the issuing of the two orders.

[8] The City contended that the existence of the first order gives rise to a
concern that a higher threshold test might have been applied in consideration
of its application for leave to appeal. It pointed out that upon granting an order,
a court is functus officio. It may only recall , alter or vary its order in certain
limited, but well-established, circumstances. In the absence of an explanation
from the Court itself, the issue of the second order cannot cure the apparent
misdirection in the adjudication of its application for leave to appeal.

[9] The general rule that applies to the pronouncement of court orders is
that a court itself has no authority to correct, alter or supplement the order. It
is functus officio.2 The time of issuing the order by the Registrar plays no part
in determining the status of the order.3 There are exceptions to this general
rule. In Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Gentiruco AG ,4 this Court set out
four instances in which a court might alter, vary or supplement its order. They
are that:
(a) The court may supplement its order in respect of an accessory or
consequential matter (such as costs or interes t) which the court had
overlooked or inadvertently omitted to grant.

2 West Rand Estates, Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd 1926 AD 173 at 178. See also De Villiers and
Another NNO v BOE Bank Ltd [2004] 1 All SA 481 (SCA); 2004 (3) SA 459 (SCA) para 7.
3 Naidoo v Naidoo 1948 (3) SA 1178 (W) at 1180. See also Ex Parte Nel 1957 (1) SA 216 (N) at 218E-F.
4 Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A) at 306F-307H.

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(b) The court may clarify its judgment or order if , on a proper
interpretation, the meaning remains obscure or ambiguous or otherwise
uncertain, so as to give effect to its true intention; provided that it does not
alter the sense and substance of the judgment or order.
(c) The court may correct clerical, arithmetic or other errors in its judgment
or order so as to give effect to its true intention. This exception is confined to
the mere correction of an error in expressing the judgment or order and does
not extend to altering its intended sense or substance.
(d) Where counsel has argued the merits and not the costs, but the court, in
granting judgment, also makes a costs order, the court may thereafter correct,
alter or supplement that order.

[10] Whether the exception in (c) might apply if the Court inadvertently
issues a substantive order which does not accurately reflect its true intention,
so that it might issue the correct substantive order, need not be decided. In the
present matter we do not know the circumstances in which the second
‘corrected’ order was issued. More , in my view, would be required tha n the
explanation proffered by the Registrar in this case.

[11] It must therefore be accepted that an order was issued which suggests
that a higher than required threshold test might, in the perception of the City,
have been applied to adjudicate its application for leave to appeal. The
language of s 17(2)(f) requires that the President may exercise her discretion
to refer the matter if ‘a grave failure of justice would otherwise result or the
administration of justice may be brought into disrepute’. The application of a
more stringent test than required meets this requirement. It follows, therefore,
that the jurisdictional requirement for reconsideration is met.

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Reconsideration of the decision to refuse leave to appeal
[12] Upon reconsideration of the application for leave to appeal, this Court
steps into the shoes of the two judges who dealt with the application and may
grant or refuse the application. If it grants leave , it will vary the order
‘dismissing the application to one granting leave either to th is Court or the
relevant high court’.5 The test to be applied is that which ordinarily applies to
the application that served before the two judges who considered the
application. Thus, if the application is one for special leave, the requirements
for such leave must be established. If it is one for leave to appeal brought in
terms of s 17(2)(b), as is the case in the present matter, leave to appeal will
only be granted if it is found that there is a reasonable prospect of success on
appeal, or there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be
heard.

[13] As indicated in the summary of facts above, there is no dispute that the
City demolished structures which had been erected on the property , that it
removed building materials and certain belongings of the affected persons
and, in some instances, destroyed certain materials. The City contended that
it had not thereby ‘evicted’ any persons from the property on the basis that the
affected persons were not in fact ‘occupiers’. They were, according to the
City, persons who intended to invade and occupy the property , who were
prevented from doing so by the actions of the City. The Sutherland J order, so
it was suggested, authorised this preventative conduct.


5 Motsoeneng v South African Broadcasting Corporation Soc Ltd and Others [2024] ZASCA 80; [2024] JOL
64831 (SCA); 2025 (4) SA 122 para 14.

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[14] The final order, which was granted by Sutherland J on 22 March 2017,
was granted in default of any opposition. The parties cited in that application
as the first respondents to whom the order would apply are described as
unknown individuals who intend to invade the property. The second
respondents are described as the unknown people who invaded the property.

[15] It is only necessary to quote paragraphs 2 and 3 to appreciate its import
and effect.6
‘2. The Respondents be interdicted from invading and taking possession of the property
known as the Remaining Extent of farm Allandale 10 Registration Division IR, Province
of Gauteng measuring 127,0696 hectares (“the property”) and more specifically the
following:
2.1 from invading and erecting houses/structures on the said property;
2.2 from erecting houses/structures on the property;
2.3 from attempting to prevent the Sheriff of the above Honourable Court and/or the
Johannesburg Metro Police and/or the South African Police and/or any other person
appointed by the Applicant to give effect to this court [order] from carrying out the
duties in preventing illegal invasion of the said property;
2.4 carrying out their duties in preventing the unlawful invasion and/or occupation of
the said property;
2.5 taking any steps to prevent the construction of any structures on the properties.
3. That the Sheriff of the above Honourable Court and/or the Johannesburg Metro
Police and/or the South African Police Services or any other person appointed by the
Applicant be mandated and requested to assist the Applicant in its activities and endeavours
to prevent the unlawful invasion and/or occupation of the property and take the necessary
steps preventing same.’


6 Paragraph 4 deals with service of the order and is irrelevant for present purposes.

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[16] The order is remarkable in several respects, not least that it was granted
against two sets of unidentified persons. To the extent that there existed, back
in March 2017, a group of unidentified persons who had already invaded the
property (the so-called second respondent), none of orders which intended to
prohibit them from invading could have had any application. Furthermore,
paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 are nonsensical as prohibitions intended to apply to the
unidentified respondents.

[17] Counsel for the City conceded, correctly, that the only source of
authorisation for the City’s conduct must be found in paragraph 3 of the order.
The plain language of paragraph 3 authorises the named persons and entities
‘to assist the [City] in its endeavours to prevent the unlawful invasion and/or
occupation of the property’. What those ‘endeavours’ are or might involve is
not specified. Counsel further conceded that the order, in its terms, could only
authorise lawful endeavours or the taking of lawful steps to prevent invasions
or unlawful occupation. However, it was submitted that paragraph 3 must be
read as authorising the City to enforce the prohibitions set out in paragraph 2.
On this basis, it was suggested that the authorised prevention of invasion and
occupation extended to the destruction or removal of structures built in
contravention of the prohibitions.

[18] In my view, that would be an extraordinary construction of the ambit
of the order. It would place the City in the position of the party responsible
for preventing a breach of the prohibitory orders, thereby enforcing the terms
of the prohibitory interdict. The terms of paragraph 3 do not provide for this.
In any event, the order does not, upon any construction, authorise the taking
of any steps against persons who had already invaded or occupied the property

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or had already erected structures or shelters, even if contrary to the
prohibitions contained in paragraph 2. The order does not serve to negate or
override statutory and constitutional protections afforded to persons in the
position of the respondents. Upon this basis, it could not serve as authorisation
for the actions taken by the City on 14 and 21 July 2023.

[19] The contention that the actions of the City did not constitute an eviction
of the persons concerned is without merit. The respondents annexed a series
of photographs taken of the scene of the City’s actions to remove them from
the property. They were not seriously challenged. In any event, the high court
conducted an inspection in loco in order to apprise itself of the circumstances.
The photographs depict piles of building materials from demolished
structures. They also show persons with personal belongings and household
goods. These images are difficult to reconcile with the claim, made by the
City, that no action was taken to demolish established shelters and structures.
The high court accordingly cannot be faulted in its conclusion that the City’s
actions constituted an unlawful eviction of the respondents who were
occupying the property at the time.

[20] It is necessary to say a final word about the Sutherland J order. It was
suggested that the order is valid and enforceable until it is set aside . That is
certainly correct as a general proposition of law . Whether the order, in its
form, was one which could competently be made in the case that was then
before the high court , is not a matter that arises in this case. The order was
granted in the context and circumstances of the particular case. The fact that
it prohibited actions by a group of persons, then unidentified, does not mean

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that the order now stands as a form of edict applicable to a class of persons
who were not at the time parties to the litigation.

[21] In Kayamandi Town Committee v Mkhwaso and Others,7 the attributes
of a court order were explained as follows:
‘One of the tests, of which there are several, for determining whether a particular act is to
be classed as a judicial act is whether there a lis inter partes (Wiechers Administrative Law
at 96).
In De Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action 4th ed at 83, the author calls this
‘‘perhaps the most obvious characteristic of ordinary Courts’ ’. It is, as remarked in
Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board v John East Iron Works Ltd [1949] AC 134 at 149:
‘‘…a truism that the conception of the judicial function is inseparably bound up with the idea of a
suit between parties, whether between the Crown and subject or between subject and subject , and
that it is the duty of the Court to decide the issue between those parties.’’
These dicta proclaim that there must be parties to a lawsuit…’8

[22] The court went on to state that:
‘A failure to identify defendants or respondents would seem to be destructive of the notion
that a Court’s order operates only inter partes, not to mention questions of locus standi in
iudico. An order against respondents not identified by name (or perhaps by individualised
description) in the process commencing action or (perhaps in very urgent cases, brought
orally) on the record would have the generalised effect typical of legislation. It would be a
decree and not a Court order at all.’9

7 Kayamandi Town Committee v Mkhwaso and Others 1991 (2) SA 630 (C).
8 Ibid at 634B-D.
9 Ibid at 634H-I. See also Illegal Occupiers of various erven, Philippi v Monwood Investment Trust Company
(Pty) Ltd and Others [2002] 1 All SA 115 (C) at 122; City of Cape Town v Yawa [2004] JOL 12519 (C) at 5,
[2004] 2 All SA 281 (C) at 283-284 where the court held:

[2004] 2 All SA 281 (C) at 283-284 where the court held:
‘However, it seems to me that there is a much more fundamental problem with this aspect of the application.
The persons who comprise or might comprise the twentieth respondent, namely persons intending to
unlawfully to occupy the erf, are not in any real sense an ascertainable group. In this instance there is not an
"identified or identifiable group of persons who are properly before the court and against whom an effective
order can be made" (Monwood at paragraph 15). There is no prospect that they will be identified during the
course of the proceedings, as happened in the Communicare case ... The identity of the members of the

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[23] In Zulu and Others v eThekwini Municipality and Others ,10 the
Constitutional Court considered an order framed in terms similar to the
Sutherland J order. The central question before the Constitutional Court
concerned the standing of persons, not identified as parties in the proceedings
in the high court, to intervene and thereby challenge an interim order that had
been granted by the high court. The interim order authorised the eThekwini
Municipality to take all reasonable and necessary steps to prevent persons
from invading the property concerned, from constructing any structures , or
from placing materials upon the property. It authorised the removal ,
dismantling or demolition of structures built after the date of the order.11 The
order also interdicted and restrained any persons from invading or occupying
or undertaking any construction on the property. Zondo J , writing for the
majority, found that the order, in its effect, amounted to an eviction order . It
was open to be interpreted as authorising the municipality to prevent ‘ongoing
invasion’ affecting persons who had already occupied the land . Upon that
basis, the Constitutional Court concluded that the applicants enjoyed standing
and were entitled to intervene in the proceedings.12

[24] In a minority judgment , Van der Westhuizen J (with Froneman J
concurring) addressed the constitutionality of the interim order . Van der
Westhuizen J reasoned that since the order constituted an eviction order and

twentieth respondent will change from day to day. Some of those currently intending to occupy the land may
decide not to do so. Some people, who today have no intention to occupy the land, may subsequently decide
to do so.’ (Citations omitted.)
10 Zulu and Others v eThekwini Municipality and Others [2014] ZACC 17; 2014 (4) SA 590 (CC); 2014 (8)
BCLR 971 (CC) (Zulu).
11 It is noteworthy, however, that this order specified preventative measures that might be taken , unlike the
order at issue here.

order at issue here.
12 Ibid paras 24-29.

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it was common cause that the mandatory requirement s of the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE)
had not been met prior to it being issued, the order was unlawful and
unconstitutional. It was necessary to reach that issue since there was
continuing conduct on the part of the e Thekwini Municipality, which relied
upon the lawfulness of the interim order.13 The majority did not agree that the
issue had been reached. They found that it could be addressed in the high court
proceedings in which the applicants had been granted leave to intervene.14

[25] For present purposes , the following passages from the judgment of
Van der Westhuizen J are apposite because they resonate with the facts of this
case and they speak to the admitted conduct of the City and its continuing
reliance upon the Sutherland J order:
‘…The interim order authorises evictions – and has been used as authority for at least three
evictions – without providing the unlawful occupiers a hearing and ensuring that they were
protected to the extent required by law. An order of this nature deprives unlawful occupiers
of rights enshrined in the Constitution and recalls a time when the destitute and the landless
were considered unworthy of a hearing before they were unceremoniously removed from
the land where they had tried to make their homes.
At the very least, an eviction order could not lawfully have been issued without judicial
determination that it was just and equitable to do so, considering all relevant circumstances
and having allowed affected persons, especially the most vulnerable, to present evidence
of their circumstances in a hearing. The order was issued without consideration of those
persons whom it would impact, in apparent contravention of PIE and in direct violation of
underlying constitutional rights . I would find that the interim order is unlawful and
therefore unconstitutional on the basis that it negates the Madlala Village residents’ rights

13 Zulu paras 44 and 45, 47 and 48.
14 Ibid per Moseneke ACJ (with whom a majority concurred), paras 73-75.

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(as well as those of un named others ) under PIE and s 26(3) of the Constitution.’ 15
(Emphasis added.)

[26] We are not required to determine that the Sutherland J order is
unconstitutional. We are required only to determine whether, given its
provenance, its ambit and its effect, it might justify the conduct of the City on
14 and 21 July 2023. In my view, it plainly cannot. Since the City premised
its defence of the application upon the Sutherland J order , it follows that the
City enjoys no reasonable prospects of overturning the order of the high court
on appeal.

[27] That would ordinarily be dispositive of the application for leave to
appeal, which now serves before this Court. There is, however, one further
aspect to consider . Counsel for the City pressed the fact that the high court
had granted an order directing payment of an amount of R1500 to each of the
respondents by way of compensation. It was submitted that the high court had
made an order for constitutional damages which was not sought at the stage
of adjudication of part A of the application. Based upon this, counsel
submitted that there are compelling reasons why leave to appeal ought to be
granted.

[28] I am unable to agree with the manner in which counsel characterised
the order granted by the high court. In paragraph 52 of the high court
judgment, the learned Judge records the following:
‘I, therefore, grant the order for restoration as set out. Should the Respondents, for whatever
operational reasons, not be able to do the reconstructions themselves, they should pay the

15 Ibid per Van der Westhuizen J, paras 44 and 45. (Citations Omitted.)

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Applicants R1500 per shelter to enable them to restore the property themselves. The order
for the payment of this money is part of the order of restoration and should not be viewed
as damages – it is part of the duty of restoration.’

[29] This passage explains that the high court was not addressing the issue
of constitutional damages. It was alert to the fact that the issue had been
deferred for subsequent consideration. There can be no doubt that the issue of
restoration, namely placing the City under compulsion to restore the
applicants in possession of their shelters, was central to the cause of action the
respondents had made out in part A of the application . The high court
explained its approach to an order of restoration with reference to this Court’s
judgment in Tswelopele Non -Profit Organisation and Others v City of
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality .16 As far as the amount of R1500 is
concerned, the evidence before the court indicated that basic building
materials for the type of structures which had been destroyed would cost that
amount.

[30] There is an important qualification in the order of the high court which
was overlooked in argument. Paragraph 4 of the order opens with the phrase:
‘[s]hould the respondents not be able to restore possession’. (Emphasis
added.) The payment is therefore made contingent upon the inability of the
City to provide restoration itself. It does not envisage payment outside of this
contingency. Furthermore, paragraph 3 of the order , requires only that
‘emergency temporary accommodation ’ must be provided for those ‘whose
shelters have been demolished … and who still require them ’. (Emphasis

16 Tswelopele Non -Profit Organisation and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality [2007]
ZASCA 70, [2007] SCA 70 (RSA); 2007 (6) SA 511 (SCA). See paragraph 49 and fn 32 of the judgment of
the high court.

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added.) This latter qualification also arises from the facts, which indicate that
many of the respondents had immediately commenced rebuilding their
demolished shelters in the wake of the actions of 14 and 21 July 2023.

[31] Finally, there was some suggestion that the high court order was open
to misinterpretation in the sense that it referred to payment of the amount
‘per shack’. Reference was made to a schedule of the members of the Rabie
Ridge Community, which was attached to the founding papers before the high
court. The schedule contains the names of the Rabie Ridge Community. It
provides information about the period of occupation, the number of persons
in each household and their status. Under a column with the heading ‘[w]hat
did you lose during the eviction/demolition? ’, lists of items are recorded
opposite each person’s name. (Emphasis added.) The lists refer to personal
belongings, shacks (in some instances multiple shacks), building materials
and the like. This list is relevant to the question of constitutional damages to
be considered in due course.

[32] Counsel for the City contended that the reference to multiple shacks
alongside the names of members, might be construed as entitling persons who
owned multiple shacks to being paid multiples of the R1500 provided by the
order. In my view, that is not what the order envisages. It envisages the
restoration of a shelter or shack for each of the households which was
destroyed or demolished. As already indicated, the order is not for
constitutional damages. It is an order for the provision of emergency
temporary accommodation, if still required , and the payment of an amount
arises in the context of the provision of such emergency temporary shelter.

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[33] In light of this, the contentions raised in relation to the order of the high
court do not establish compelling reasons why the City ought to be granted
leave to appeal. No other such compelling circumstances were advanced. It
follows, therefore, that the application for leave to appeal against the high
court order must be dismissed.

The orders
[34] When an application for leave to appeal is reconsidered pu rsuant to
s 17(2)(f) of the Act, the Court may either confirm or va ry the order under
reconsideration. In this case, however, there are two orders issued in relation
to the application now before us. Neither can stand, for the reasons advanced
above. They must be set aside and replaced with one that dismisses the
application for leave to appeal.

[35] Insofar as costs are concerned, there can be no doubt that the costs must
follow the result in the application for leave to appeal. Although the City was
successful in its bid to have the decision on petition reconsidered, its success
was confined to circumstances which arose in the formulation of the order of
the Court. It did not achieve substantive success. To award costs of the
reconsideration application to the City would be grossly prejudicial to the
respondents. For this reason, and considering the underlying issues in this
matter and the City’s conduct, it will be fair and reasonable to order the City
to also pay the costs of the reconsideration application.

[36] In the result, I make the following order:

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1 The orders of this Court dated 29 November 2023 issued pursuant to
the applicants’ application for leave to appeal against the order of the High
Court dated 25 August 2023, are set aside.
2 The applicants’ application for leave to appeal against the order of the
High Court dated 25 August 2023 is dismissed.
3 The applicants are to pay the costs of the application for reconsideration
and the costs of the application for leave to appeal.



________________________
G GOOSEN
JUDGE OF APPEAL

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Appearances

For the applicants: W R Mokhare SC (with T Mosikili and V Qithi)
Instructed by: Popela Maake Attorneys, Johannesburg
Symington De Kok Incorporated, Bloemfontein

For the respondents: M Coetzee (with N Sibeko)
Instructed by: Lawyers for Human Rights, Pretoria
Webbers Attorneys Incorporated, Bloemfontein.