2

Noko J.

Introduction
1. The applicant launched an urgent application for the following orders: first, an order
declaring that statements (“ impugned statements ”) published by the respondent on his
Facebook account are defamatory, alternatively that they were made with the intention to
injure the applicant, and further alternatively that they violated the applicant’s rights to
dignity. Second, an order compelling the respondent to permanently retract and / or remove
and/ or delete the statements published. Third, an order directing the respondent not to
publish or cause to be published any further defamatory statements concerning the applicant,
similar to the impugned statements. Fourth, an order directing the respondent to unreservedly
publish an apology to the applicant for the impugned statements within 24 hours of the order,
alternatively referring the issue of apology to action proceedings, to be instituted by the
applicant.

Background
2. The respondent’s mother , who was married to the applicant’s brother ,1 passed on
21 August 2025. The applicant’s brother and his family appointed the applicant to coordinate
and supervise the arrangements for the funeral, which was scheduled to take place on
27 August 2025. Due to the strained relationship between the respondent on the one hand
and the applicant’s brother (who is the respondent’s stepfather) and his family on the other
hand, the re was initially reluctance to allow the respondent to participate in the funeral
arrangements. They later relented, and the respondent was permitted to attend and speak at
the funeral. However, due to some misunderstandings during preparations, including alleged
accusations and threats inter se, the permission to speak at the funeral was retracted.

3. The respondent published three posts on his Facebook account: first, a post on
27 August 2025 stating that the applicant is protecting a family of abusers and rapists.

27 August 2025 stating that the applicant is protecting a family of abusers and rapists.
Second, a post on 29 August 2025 stating that the applicant, as the chairperson of IEC, should
tell his wife why he had condoms hidden in the boot of his Mercedes-Benz. Third, a post on

1 The names of the applicant’s brother and other parties are not set out in this judgment as they were not joined
to the lis and have not been afforded the right of reply to the allegations which implicate them.

3

30 August 2025 stating that the applicant hired bouncers to prevent him from attending the
funeral and secured government funds for members of the Tshwane Metropolitan Police
Department (“TMPD”) to attend the funeral.

4. The applicant construed the said posts as defamatory and caused a letter of demand
to be sent to the respondent on 31 August 2025 , demanding the retraction of the said posts
and an apology . The respondent failed to heed the demand, and the applicant dispatched
another letter of demand on 11 September 2025, which was followed by the launching of
these court proceedings on 12 September 2025.

5. The applicant has filed a supplementary founding affidavit after the respondent has
published further defamatory statements after the launching of the application. This
supplementary founding affidavit is preceded by an application in terms of Rule 6(5)(e) of
the Uniform Rules of Court, in terms of which the applicant seeks leave of the court to allow
further affidavits.

6. The respondent is opposing these proceedings and has filed his answering affidavit
out of time and has applied for condonation for the late filing of the said affidavit. The
respondent has, in addition, filed two further affidavits. First, a supplementary answering
affidavit which expands or supplements his answers set out in the answering affidavit.
Second, a ‘Further Final Supplementary answering affidavit’ which deals with the averments
set out in the applicant’s supplementary founding affidavit.

Urgency
7. The applicant submits that the application is urgent because the impugned statements
would have a negative impact on his application to apply for employment . His contract is
coming to an end, and there will be a shortlisting for the said post shortly. Further, he would
not be able to a ttain a substantial relief in the ordinary course. In this regard, he continued,
damages associated with infringement of the dignity may not be readily qua ntifiable. He

damages associated with infringement of the dignity may not be readily qua ntifiable. He
contends further that he attempt ed to avoid rushing to court by communicating with the
respondent through letters from his attorneys, both on 1 September and 12 September 2025,
which was an endeavour to exploit other means without rushing to court. Further , he was

4

advised on 2 September 2025 to consider legal action and had to raise funds to pay for the
legal services. To this end, the applicant contends that the applicant pursued this process
without unnecessary delay. In the alternative, the fact that the posts are still on his Facebook
account and are defamatory, they remain continuing wrongful acts and remain as such daily,
more particularly as the respondent had instead continued to make further defamatory
statements against the applicant, which were posted on 12 September 2025.

8. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the applicant did not act with the
necessary haste and has therefore compromised the urgency by launching the proceedings
after a period of nine days. The applicant can obtain a substantial relief in due course and can
sue for damages or request Facebook to delete the posts.

9. The test for urgent applications has become settled in our law. Rule 6(12)(b) of the
Uniform rules stipulates: “In every affidavit or petition filed in support of any application
under paragraph (a) of this subrule, the applicant shall set forth explicitly the circumstances
which he avers render the matter urgent and the reasons why he claims that he co uld not be
afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.”

10. In addition, the Constitutional Court in the New Nation Movement NPC 2 affirmed
that: ‘In assessing whether an application is urgent, this Court has in the past considered
various factors, including, among others: (a) the consequence of the relief not being granted;
(b) whether the relief would become irrelevant if it is not immediately granted;
(c) whether the urgency was self-created.’ (Footnotes omitted).

11. Where there is a delay, the locus classicus in urgent matters is East Rock Trading,3
where:
“… the court held that w here there has been a delay in launching an urgent
application, it is for the applicant to “explain the reasons for the delay and why ,

application, it is for the applicant to “explain the reasons for the delay and why ,
despite the delay, he claims that he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing

2 New Nation Movement NPC & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others (CCT110/19)
[2020] ZACC 11;2020 (8) BCLR 950 (CC); 2020 (6) SA 257 (CC) (11 June 2020).
3 East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Limited and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Limited and Others (11/33767)
[2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) paras 5 to 9.

5

in due course. I must also mention that the fact that the Applicant wants to have the
matter resolved urgently does not render the matter urgent. The correct and crucial
test is whether, if the matter were to follow its normal course as laid down by the
rules, an Applicant will be afforded substantial redress . If he cannot be afforded
substantial redress at a hearing in due course, then the matter qualifies to be enrolled
and heard as an urgent application. If, however, despite the anxiety of an Applicant,
he can be afforded a substantial redress in an application in due course , the
application does not qualify to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application.”

12. Having regard to the circums tances of the case, the applicant cannot be faulted for
first attempting to demand retraction and apology from the respondent, who failed to heed
the same. In addition, it is correct , as argued by the applicant, that for as long as the posts
were on the respondent’s Facebook, each day may be construed as a wrongful act warranting
the court’s urgent attention. If the applicant proceeds on a normal basis, the tenor of the relief
sought and ultimately granted would pale into insignificance. I am therefore persuaded that
a proper case has been mounted for urgency, and the relief sought in this regard is sustained.

Respondent’s application for Condonation.
13. The respondent applied for the condonation for the late filing of the answering
affidavit. The respondent avers that the application came to his attention o n
16 September 2025 in the eveni ng. He was required , in terms of the notice of motion, to
serve notice to oppose on 15 September 2025 and to serve an answering affidavit on
17 September 2025. The dies to file notice to oppose had already passed, and the dies for
the filing of the answering affidavit was too short. He contended that the applicant would
suffer no prejudice if condonation is granted, whereas if it is not granted, he would be denied

the right to answer the case against him.

14. The applicant’s counsel, on the other hand , contended that it is not correct that the
respondent only received the court processes on 16 September 202 5, as it was personally
served on him on 12 September 2025. He elected to ignore the same since, he argued, it was
ineffectual as it was not served by a sheriff . That notwithstanding, the applicant’s counsel
submitted that the said application for condonation is not opposed.

6

15. I had regard to the stance of the applicant who mounted no opposition to the
application for condonation. Furthermore, in urgent applications, strict compliance with rules
(and prescribed timelines) is where warranted relaxed, and importantly, the applicant was
able to consider the answering affidavit and repl ied thereto. I therefore find that there is no
prejudice to visit the applicant and, in the premises, I exercise my discretion in terms of the
rules of court 4 and grants the condonation for the late filing of the respondent ’s notice to
oppose and the respondent’s answering affidavit.

Applications in terms of Rule 6(5)(e)
16. The applica nt brought an application , which was uploaded on CaseLines on
19 September 2025, seeking leave for the court to admit a supplementary founding affidavit.
The applicant contended that the affidavit relates to further defamatory statements that were
published by the respondent after the launch and service of this application. The applicant
contends that the respondent would not be prejudiced if the affidavit is admitted , since it
relates to the respondent’s own statement, which demonstrates the total disregard of the law
by the respondent, and, if anything, it enhances the basis of the urgency of the application.

17. The respondent , on the other hand , argued that the application to admit a further
affidavit should not be granted as it is trite that a party has to make their case on the founding
affidavit and should not be allowed to have a second bite of the cherry.

18. At the same time, the respondent has filed supplementary answering affidavits and
requested admission in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6(5)(e) of the uniform rules
of court.

19. Rule 6(5)(e) endows the court with a discretion to permit the filing of further
affidavits. In this regard , the authors of Erasmus: Superior Court Practice stated that “ The
court will exercise this discretion against the backdrop of the fundamental consideration that

court will exercise this discretion against the backdrop of the fundamental consideration that
a matter should be adjudicated upon all the facts relevant to the issue in dispute.” 5 In view
of the fact that the said further affidavits raise pertinent issues and both parties have engaged

4 In terms of Rule 27 of the Uniform Rules of Court.
5 See Erasmus – “Superior Court Practice” at B1-46.

7

with their contents, I find that there is no prejudice to either of the parties , and as such, the
respective applications are granted.

The parties' contentions and submissions.
20. The applicant contended that the first post stating that the applicant is protecting the
rapists and abusers is unfounded and defamatory. The said post presented itself as a statement
of fact without any basis o r cogent evidence. To a reasonable reader, the applicant argued,
the said post implies that he is a man with little regard for the law.

21. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the applicant was aware of the abuse
he and his mother suffered at the hands of the applicant’s siblings during 1992 – 1995, and
he has failed to do anything about it. The abuse included the rape of his mother and himself.
In addition, he attempted to lay criminal charges against the applicant and believes that his
efforts were thwarted by the applicant, who has his own contacts and has therefore influenced
SAPS to refuse to allow him to lay a criminal complaint against the applicant. This , the
respondent argues, amounted to a corrupt pr opensity on his part which impacts on his
integrity as an officer occupying a senior position in government.

22. Regarding the refusal of the SAPS to open the case against the applicant and the
allegations that he pulled strings, led the respondent to state that “… it is precisely this
history of suppression and lack of institutional response that compelled me to raise these
issues in the public domain. My statements were aimed at ensuring public accountability and
transparency for a person who holds one of the highest constitutional offices in the country.
They were made in the public interest and did not exceed the lawful bounds of my rights to
freedom of expression.”6.

23. The respondent had also sent an email to the applicant's employer on 18 September
2025, relaying the same allegations of protecting abusers in his family and accusing him of

2025, relaying the same allegations of protecting abusers in his family and accusing him of
frustrating the prosecutions of his criminal charges because he is a high-ranking official. He
is flabbergasted at the hesitance of the applicant’s employers for not contacting him so that
he can substantiate the allegations of the applicant abusing his position and state resources.

6 Second para at CL 011-23

8

The applicant contends that the respondent has no evidence to back up such allegations, as
he could have made them in the email without hoping for a special invitation from the
employer, and this demonstrates malice.

24. In his defence , the respondent further stated that the statements he made are in the
public interest. There is, however, no evidence tendered as at publication as to what benefit
the public would accrue from the publication. The allegations of abuse are old and were
allegedly stated in his book, which was written in 2020. The attempt to justify the statement
after the fact is far-fetched, implausible, and was mentioned to be dismissed.

25. The applicant contends that the second post regarding the condom , which was
allegedly hidden in the boot of his car, would appear to a reasonable reader that the applicant
is dishonest to his wife, a cheat, and an adulterer. He disputes the correctness of the statement
and has asserted that the statement is posited by the respondent as a fact but not supported by
any evidence. The law requires that the post should have been backed up with evidence,
without which it remains defamatory. His attempt to secure a witness, Mr Samuel Manamela
(“Mr Manamela”), failed as the said witness appeared not to be keen to present evidence to
support his assertions. The said witness stated in an email that the allegations were started 14
years ago, and the respondent should let go, in any event, as they seem not to advance his
real case regarding the sexual abuse.

26. The inference to be drawn from such a statement , the applicant argues, is that the
applicant is not trustworthy as a leader at his work and at church. In any event, the applicant
disputes the said story as it has never taken place. The post cannot be justified on the basis
that it was in the interest of the public.

27. The respondent stated that he saw the applicant on 16 December 2011 attempting to

27. The respondent stated that he saw the applicant on 16 December 2011 attempting to
hide the condoms that fell out of the spare wheel , further that he was not alone, and his
firstborn son can attest “… to what pathetic father he was.” In contrast, his son denied the
truthfulness of the statement and further stated that the car belonged to his wife and was not
his. The applicant stated that the statement has the effect of describing him as a man of
questionable morals.

9


28. In his defence, the respondent continued, he argued that the statement regarding the
condom “… constituted a fair comment on the integrity of a public figure who occupies a
constitutional position and presents himself as a moral and spiritual leader.” In any event, the
allegations contained may be of public interest, bearing in mind that the applicant is a leader
at the church and employed in a senior position at a public institution.

29. Concerning the post of abuse of power and state’s resources, t he respondent stated
that the backing of the accusation that the applicant is corrupt is that he secured the attendance
of the bodyguards, intended to prevent him from attending the funeral, and the presence of
the six motorbikes of TMPD7.

30. The applicant correctly submitted that the publication should have been supported by
cogent evidence, and the attempt to suggest that evidence would be provided later is not a
justification. The allegations are more than 14 years old and cannot be fair comment now or
be considered fair comments . They are not even of public interest . In the premises, t he
defence is therefore unsustainable.

31. The respondent referred to two bases upon which he believed that the applicant
abuses state resources and employs his powers to attain his personal or private gain . He
further stated that the applicant is corrupt, as he managed to get him enrolled in a school by
following some irregular means. This is disputed by the applicant, who stated that the
admission at the said school was above board.

32. Further that he used the state resources to obtain his home address, which was never
given to him by the respondent. The applicant stated that this was untrue, and the address
was provided to him by the respondent’s mother when she was still alive. Second, and
without providing any supporting evidence, the respondent posted a statement and insinuated
that I pulled strings in getting six members of the TMPD to attend the funeral , who were

that I pulled strings in getting six members of the TMPD to attend the funeral , who were
bouncers hired by him. All these imply that he abused the state resources. This was denied

7 The respondent had initially stated that they were JMPD, and the same was rectified to TMPD.

10

as the applicant was on leave and could not have put the resources into action to advance the
course associated with the funeral.

33. The respondent’s statements were also tagged to the Electoral Commission of South
Africa, the Presidency of South Africa, the African Transformation Movement, and the
African Democratic Movement. The respondent averred that “[T]he fact that I tagged
institutions such as the Electoral Commission, the Presidency, and political organisations
was consistent with my right to seek transparency and oversight when a public office-bearer
institutes litigation against me that implicates issues of abuse, corruption, and misuse of state
resources. This was not mala fide, but rather an appeal to oversight bodies and stakeholders
who have a legitimate interest in whether the IEC Chairperson is acting with integrity.”8

34. These assertions were meant to elicit the reasons from the applicant to provide a
proper answer on state resources abuse, as there were bouncers and members of the TMPD,
and the applicant having failed to provide the respondent with a persuasive answer meant
that there was an abuse.

35. In his defence, the respondent further contended that the allegations also impact the
applicant’s integrity and accountability as a chairperson of the IEC and are of public concern
relative to the role he plays. Further, the allegations made have been disclosed in his book
and through interviews in 2019 and were never challenged.

Legal principles
36. It is trite that to establish defamation, a party should show that a false statement was
published negligently or with malicious intent to a third party, which causes harm to the
reputation of a person. Once a plaintiff establishes that a defendant has pub lished a
defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, it is presumed that the publication was both
unlawful and intentional. The defendant who wishes to avoid the consequences must then
raise a defence which rebuts unlawfulness or intention.9

raise a defence which rebuts unlawfulness or intention.9


8 CL 011-46
9 See Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at para 18. See also Manuel at para 36.

11

37. The SCA held in Manuel10 that the exercise to determine whether a statement is
defamatory involves a twofold inquiry. “First, one establishes the meaning of the words used.
Second, one asks whether that meaning was defamatory in that it was likely to injure the
good esteem in which the plaintiff was held by the reasonable or average person to whom
the statement was publish ed. Where the injured party selects certain meanings to point the
sting of the statement, they are bound by the selected meanings. The meaning of the statement
is determined objectively by the legal construct of the reasonable reader and is not a matter
on which evidence may be led.”. At para 30 (footnotes not added).

38. Concerning the relief of apology, the court stated in Manuel, wherein reference was
made of McBride,11 where it was indicated that ordering an apology would not be warranted
in certain circumstances . It also held, at para 130, that when coupled with a relief for the
award of damages, it would not be awarded separately, as it may weigh heavily in
determining the quantum of damages in defamation cases. it was stated in Du Toit12 that “

“I do not believe that it would be reasonable for the applicant, who has explicitly stated that he
does not wish to pursue a claim for damages and seeks only the interdicting of future
defamatory conduct, together with a retraction and apology, to pursue such a costly and time-
consuming remedy”.13

39. For the assessment on the question of intention to injure, it was stated in Manuel,14
that 'Evidence that a defendant honestly thought that his defamatory words were published
with a lawful purpose, although in accordance with an objective standard the purpose was
not lawful, would justify an inference that he did not have the intention to injure.'

40. Concerning the requirements for an interdict , the applicant has contended that his
right to a good name, reputation, and dignity is being infringed or harmed by the publication.

right to a good name, reputation, and dignity is being infringed or harmed by the publication.
The defences open to the respondents include fair comment, truth, and reasonable

10 Economic Freedom Fighters v Manuel (711/2029) [2020] ZASCA 172; [2021] 1 All SA 623 (SCA); 2021
(3) SA 425 (SCA) (17 December 2020).
11 The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd and Others v McBride 2011 (4) SA 191 (CC).
12 Du Toit v Becket and Another (8687/2023) [2024] ZAWCHC 56 (21 February 56).
13 Id at at para 109.
14 Id note 10.

12

publication. On the question of alternative remedies, it was stated in Du Toit 15 that
“Recognising that an action for damages is likely to be protracted and costly, an interdict in
appropriate cases may be justified.” Also, at para 117 , where it was stated that “Regarding
the availability of an alternative remedy, I believe that in that case a claim for damages is not
a satisfactory alternative remedy.

41. The court16 stated at para 25 that, “It is partly for these reasons that our courts have
long held that whether the publication of a defamatory statement is for the public benefit
depends critically on the content of the statement and the time, manner and occasion of its
publication. T he question is whether there was overall public benefit to the statement’s
publication in how it was published and when it was published.”

42. Concerning the defence of reasonable publication, the SCA in Manuel17 stated that
“…whether publication was reasonable would involve an assessment of several factors,
including the reliability of the source and the steps taken to verify the information. It goes
without saying that it would have to be shown that they were satisfied that the information
was true...”

43. Regarding the dispute of facts, it is trite that where there are disputes of fact in motion
proceedings, the court would ordinarily decide in favour of the respondent unless it can be
demonstrated that such disputes are palpably implausible and untenable.18
Analysis

15 Id note 12.
16 Id.
17 At para [65].
18 See Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at pp 634 and 635 held
as follows: -
‘It is correct that, where in proceedings on notice of motion disputes of fact have arisen on the
affidavits, a final order, whether it be an interdict or some other form of relief, may be granted if those
facts averred in the applicant's affidavits which have been admitted by the respondent, together with

the facts alleged by the respondent, justify such an order. The power of the Court to give such final
relief on the papers before it is, however, not confined to such a situation. In certain instances , the
denial by respondent of a fact alleged by the applicant may not be such as to raise a real, genuine or
bona fide dispute of fact … … Moreover, there may be exceptions to this general rule, as, for example,
where the allegations or denials of the respondent are so far-fetched or clearly untenable that the Court
is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers ...’.

13

44. It is noted that several arguments were advanced by the respondent in his defence.
First, contending that the requirements for a defamatory claim were not satisfied alternatively
that he satisfied applicable common law defences . Second, that the requirements for an
interdict were not met, and finally, there is a dispute of facts.

45. The respondent contends that the statements were true and / or substantially true,
alternatively constituted fair comments made in good faith and in the public interest.
Furthermore, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the unlawfulness or animus
iniuriandi exists. It is stated by the authors in LAWSA that “Publication of a defamatory
statement raises two rebuttable presumptions of fact, namely a presumption of intent as well
as a presumption of unlawfulness. Once these presumptions arise , the onus rests on the
defendant to rebut them.”19 The respondent has failed to discharge this onus.

46. For a defence of reasonable publication to succe ed, the applicant has correctly
submitted that such a defence enjoins the respondent to first accept the statement as false.
Further that the SCA in Bogoshi20 stated that the publication has to demonstrate that attempts
were made to verify the information, and the applicant has been allowed to reply before the
publication. Only then would the respondent be considered to have conducted himself
reasonably. No evidence has been marshalled by the respondent to verify the information in
his posts.

47. About the defence that the statement is true , it was stated in Manuel21 that the
respondent is required to prove that such a statement was a true public interest defence. The
post was not supported by any evidence to justify the respondent invoking this defence.
Notwithstanding the applicant disputing the truthfulness of the allegations in the post , the
respondent failed to advance a persuasive argument to demonstrate that the allegations were
true.

true.


19 Joubert WA “The Law of South Africa”, Vol 7, 2nd Ed., LexisNexis, at 235.
20 National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi (579/96) [1998] ZASCA 94; 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA); [1998] 4
All SA 347 (A) (29 September 1998).
21 Id note 10 (para 37)

14

48. The defence contended that the allegation made in the post that he was abused has
not been challenged, and mentioning the same is set to be the truth , as he was relating his
personal experience. It is noted that abuse (in general) and the crime of rape are ravaging the
soul of society with devastating consequences and permanent scars to the victim. They should
be frowned upon whence they lurk. Though traumatic and not easy, the facts and evidence
underpinning such allegations need to be proved with evidence in court. If they are not
proved, it would not be proper for a party to be publicly accused thereof or accused of not
having acted thereupon. It is noted that the respondent has acknowledged that the alleged
offences did not lapse and can still be proceeded with now . It follows that the respondent
may still pursue criminal proceedings against the perpetrators. The decision of the members
of SAPS in refusing to open a case can be challenged in court ; alternatively, private
prosecution, if appropriate, can also be launched. Until then, cadit questio.

49. Concerning the defence of fair comment, the counsel for the applicant contended that
the respondent needs to demonstrate that he made a comment and not make a statement of
fact. It is trite that a party would succeed with this defence provided that such a comment is
not made maliciously and is based on facts that were fairly stated and substantially true.22 On
a proper reading of the statements, the post was not an opinion but a factual indication by the
respondent. For a fair comment, the publication should be a matter of public interest , as
contrasted with a matter of interest to the public.

50. When asked by the court why it was necessary to raise the issues now , which have
been published in his book, he retorted that he was angry and distraught at how the applicant
treated him at the funeral , where he was stopped from practising his cultural rituals when

treated him at the funeral , where he was stopped from practising his cultural rituals when
someone is burying his or her parents. He was entitled to be upset at the moment. This
response is not accommodated in any of the defences set out in our jurisprudence.

51. About the requirements of a final interdict , the respondent contended that the
applicant has failed to show that he has a clear right. He failed to exploit alternative remedies,
including approaching Facebook and requesting that the post s be deleted. In addition, the

22 The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd and Others v McBride 2011 (4) SA 191 (CC) para 83, where the court stated that
the statement is not unlawful if it was reasonable to publish even if it was false. The respondent bears the onus
of proving reasonableness.

15

alleged defamatory statements have been mentioned in his book he wrote and published in
2020. The applicant had never come to challenge the said publication.

52. In addition, he argues, the applicant failed to prove that there was an intention on his
part to defame him, and without establishing the same, the application is unsustainable.

53. The respondent further disputes that there would not be irreparable harm, as there are
very few people visited and viewed his post. This contention has no legal basis since the
publication need not be any wider to qualify for defamation and warrant an interdict. It would
be sufficient if the statements were made to one person. In this case, besides his friends on
Facebook, he sent the messages to IEC , t he Presidency, the African Transformation
Movement, and the African Democratic Movement.

54. The question of interdict has been satisfactorily dealt with. The constitutional court
stated in OUTA23 that where a right claimed is sourced from the constitution , a party need
not embellish its facts to any extent. With regard to irreparable damages , it should be noted
that if the applicant loses the opportunity to be appointed at the upcoming interview , the
damages would not be quantifiable. Further aggravating the situation is that the respondent
continued and posted further defamatory statements, hence the filing of a supplementary
affidavit.

55. The respondent contended further that there are disputes of fact, the matter must be
referred for trial, and in the meantime, he is amenable to deactivate his Facebook account.
He will then be able to present evidence from witnesses, voice recordings, and media
interviews that have never been contradicted before.24 To the extent that the respondent is
unable to provide evidence in an acceptable form, then the alleged contention of the presence
of a dispute of facts is untenable and bound to be dismissed.

of a dispute of facts is untenable and bound to be dismissed.

56. In reply, the counsel for the applicant stated that the respondent has failed to highlight
which facts are in dispute . That notwithstanding , the test should also be whether the said

23 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliances and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC).

16

disputes are materially related to the issues to be determined. His argument about the history
of his abuse and the meetings that were held does not relate to the issues that are up for
determination. Also, the issue about the relationship between her mother and the stepfather
is immaterial to the defamation of the applicant. The respondent has failed to discharge the
onus upon him to rebut that the allegations do not amount to defamation, having clearly stated
that the stin g attached thereto is that the applicant was dishonest , a cheater, and with
questionable moral character.

Conclusion
57. The applicant has successfully demonstrated that the impugned statements regarding
misusing state resources implied that he is corrupt , abuses his powers, a man with no
integrity, honesty, and that state resources are sustainable, since no evidence was proffered
to prove the existence of such facts. The respondent cannot argue that such statements were
in the public interest if he cannot prove that they are true or that he was making fair
comments. Such statements were presented as if they were correct facts, and the respondent
failed to demonstrate that he made efforts to determine their correctness.25 Instead, he argues
that he was hoping that the applicant would prove him wrong. He failed to provide any
supporting evidence regarding the condom statement.

58. An attempt to invoke the provisions of section 16 of the Constitution cannot avail the
respondent, more particularly, since the said provision does not provide for a licence to
defame other parties. Such a right must co-exist with other rights, including dignity26 and a
good name. DCJ Moseneke stated in Dikoko27 that “[I]t seems to me that the dialect of
defamation implicates human dignity, which includes the reputation on the one hand and
freedom of expression on the other. Both are protected in our Bill of Rights.”

59. The respondent failed to survive the challenge mounted by the applicant that the

59. The respondent failed to survive the challenge mounted by the applicant that the
statements published were not supported by any evidence whatsoever, and in retort, the

25 See para 37 in Manuel where the court stated that “[T]ruth and public interest and fair comment are two
defences that have long been recognised as rebutting the presumption of wrongfulness. A defendant relying on
truth and public interest must plead and prove that the statement is substantially true and was p ublished in the
public interest.”
26 Section 10 of the Constitution.
27 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) at para [90].

17

respondent contended that he is prepared to deactivate his account and then later prove his
statements in a trial court. If he is unable to prove the same now, they must be removed. Once
there are no facts or evidence for the statements, they are obviously false (and not true) and
cannot be considered to be a fair comment ; neither would the defence of reasonable
publication be sustained as the respondent does not accept that the statement is false.

60. His statements appear to have been actuated by malice , as he was angry at how he
was treated at the funeral of his mother. It is understood that anyone who feels unfairly dealt
with by being forbidden to participate in one parent’s funeral has a valid complaint, but this
cannot justify having to publicly annihilate another person's reputation and dignity without a
prior proper reflection.

61. In the premises, I find the application to be sustainable.

Costs
62. The general principle that the costs should follow the result shall apply.

Order
63. In the premises, I make the following orders.

1. The rules relating to forms and time lines prescribed in terms of the rules and
practice directives are dispensed with, and this matter is treated as urgent in terms
of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
2. Applicant’s application to permit the supplementary founding affidavit is
granted.
3. Respondent’s application to permit the supplementary answering affidavit is
granted.
4. A declarator is issued that statements published by the respondent on his
Facebook account on 27, 29 , and 30 August 2025 and 12 September 2025 are
defamatory.
5. The respondent is ordered to permanently delete the said statements from his
Facebook account.