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JUDGMENT
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NOKO J.
Introduction
[1] The app licant instituted an application to stay the implementation of the appeal
board’s finding and sanction imposed by the Board of Enquiry and confirmed by the Board
of Appeal pending the review of the decision of the board. Second to fourth respondents are
not opposing the application, and reference to the respondent in this judgment would mean
the first respondent. The respondent is challenging the urgency, failure to satisfy the
requirements of an interim interdict, and disputing the prospects of success of the review
application.
Background
[2] The applicant is a professional jockey and a member of the respondent, National
Horseracing Authority of Southern Africa (“NHA”). NHA is an entity “… that promotes and
regulates the sport of thoroughbred horse racing in South Africa. Its duties include, inter alia,
the licensing of participants, including jockeys, horse trainers, racecourse operators,
racecourse owners, horse breeders, grooms, and farriers.
[3] NHA is regulated by the Constitution and Rules to which members are required and
have agreed to comply. In instances of failure to comply or breaches of the rules, NHA will
conduct an investigation, inquiries, and arraign such a member to a disciplinary inquiry.
Members are entitled to lodge an appeal in the event they are aggrieved by the finding s of
the inquiry.
[4] On 26 January 202 5 at Turffontein Racecourse, an incident occurred where the
applicant and Mr Jason Gates (“Mr Gates”) got involved in a confrontation during the racing.
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The applicant, who was riding Gimme A Storm, alleged that Mr Gates, who was riding
Blurred Vision, struck his horse across its chest with his riding crop and also struck the
applicant on his arm. The applicant, in return, struck Mr Gates twice on his body protector
with his crop and missed him on the third attempt. The applicant averred in his affidavit that
the two then continued to ride until the end of the race. The first respondent, on the other
hand, averred that the applicant stopped the riding and failed to finish the race.
[5] NHA arraigned both the applicant and Mr Gates before an inquiry for breaching the
rules. The Board of Enquiry returned a verdict of not guilty in respect of some breaches and
guilty in respect of the following rules 1: Rule 62.2.22 read with Rule 62.2.33; Rule 72.1.254
and Rule 72.1.26 5. The sanction imposed in respect of the applicant was a fine of R
200 000.00 of which R 100 000.00 was suspended for a period of two years provided he is
not found guilty of contravention of the above rules and suspension from riding in races for
a period of 90 days, of which 60 days were suspended on condition that the applicant is not
found guilty of contravening the above rule for a period of years.
[6] Mr Gates was found guilty of contravening Rule 62.2.4, and a sanction imposed was
for a fine of R 10,000.00, of which R 5000.00 was suspended for two years, provided that he
is not found guilty of contravening Rule 62.2.4.
[7] The applicant lodged an appeal, which confirmed the findings of the board of inquiry
and dismissed the appeal on 8 September 2025. In the premises, the applicant started serving
his 30-day suspension on 12 September 2025.
[8] The applicant was aggrieved by the outcome and launched an urgent application on
15 September 2025 with the relief set out in two parts. First, an order for an interim interdict
suspending the implementation of the order of the Appeal Board dated 8 September 2025
suspending the implementation of the order of the Appeal Board dated 8 September 2025
pending the adjudication of Part B, for the review and setting aside of the decision of the
1 In light of the outcome described below, detailed reference to the provisions of the rules is unnecessary, and
they are summarized in paragraph 76 and following of the respondent’s heads of argument at CL054 -56.
2 Relates to the overarching duty to ride in a competent and professional manner.
3 Targets the specific requirements of riding. That rider must ride his horse out to the end of the race.
4 Release to general conduct on the race course property.
5 Which concerns the safeguarding of horse racing as a whole.
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Appeal Board. The applicant reserved the right to supplement or amend once the record of
the proceedings is delivered to him.
Urgency
[9] The applicant avers that the suspension would gravely prejudice his ability to earn
income he would have generated if he were not on suspension. He will miss the opportunity
to participate in both local and lucrative/prestigious international horse racing. Additionally,
his family would suffer since riding is the only source of income.6
[10] The gripe that the claim is for a commercial purpose is unsustainable, as the court has
decided in Luna Meubel Vervaardigers EDMS Bpk v Makin and Another 1977 (4) SA 135
(w) that even a claim of a commercially oriented nature may warrant the intervention of the
urgent court. His livelihood, ability to conduct his trade, reputation, and financial harm are
on the horizon.
[11] The respondent’s gripe is the failure of the applicant to account for seven days during
which he could have la unched these proceedings. He failed to explain why he would not
obtain redress in due course. The contention that he could not consult with counsel as he was
out of the province cannot be a justification. He also claimed to have consulted with counsel
on 12 September 2025 , but issuing papers only on 15 September 2025 shows a lack of
urgency on his part. This is despite the applicant’s attorneys having notified the respondent
on 8 September 2025 that urgent proceedings would be launched. In premises, the applicant
created their own urgency as set out in Chung-Fung Pty Ltd and Another v Mayfair Residents
Association and Others,7 where the court emphasised that a litigant cannot take a supine
posture and wait for the last minute to approach the court.
[12] The dies afforded to the respondent was very short , being required to file an
answering affidavit within 24 hours . In any event, the horse has bolted as the applicant has
already served 19 days of the suspension, the respondent argued.
6 Para 73.5 at 001-36.
already served 19 days of the suspension, the respondent argued.
6 Para 73.5 at 001-36.
7 (2023/080436) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1162 (13 October 2023). See also East Roc k Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and
Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011).
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[13] The respondent further argued that the applicant contends that the basis for urgently
seeking the relief is that he would lose money. He has , however, failed to provide any
supporting documents to take the court into his confidence, including his failure to disclose
that he is receiving an additional sum of R 20,000.00 elsewhere. According to the
respondent, the records indicate an income of R 80 000.00 over a period of 7 months , and
the monthly liability to the tune of R 275 000.00 is therefore unsustainable.
[14] In addition, the respondents submit that the applicant fails to address the prejudice to
be suffered if the interim interdict is not granted, prejudice to the respondents if it is granted,
and the prejudice to other parties who had to queue for the normal roll. The requirements for
urgency were not dealt with by setting out clearly the circumstances why the application is
urgent, and also the basis why the applicant believes that he would not obtain substantial
redress in the long run. The attempt by the applicant to add further facts in the reply cannot
be sanctioned by the court, and the applicant is required to reply in his founding papers.
Legal principle and analysis
[15] The test for urgent applications is now trite in our law. Rule 6(12)(b) of the Uniform
rules stipulates: “In every affidavit filed in support of any application under paragraph (a) of
this subrule, the applicant shall set forth explicitly the circumstances which it is averred
render the matter urgent and the reasons why the applicant claims that applicant could not be
afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.”
[16] In addition, the Constitutional Court in the New Nation Movement NPC 8 affirmed
that: ‘In assessing whether an application is urgent, this Court has in the past considered
various factors, including, among others: (a) the consequence of the relief not being granted;
(b) whether the relief would become irrelevant if it is not immediately granted;
(b) whether the relief would become irrelevant if it is not immediately granted;
(c) whether the urgency was self-created.’ (Footnotes omitted).
[17] In respect of delays, the locus classicus in urgent matters is East Rock Trading ,9
where it was stated that if there was a delay, then the applicant must :
8 New Nation Movement NPC & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others (CCT110/19)
[2020] ZACC 11;2020 (8) BCLR 950 (CC); 2020 (6) SA 257 (CC) (11 June 2020).
9 Id, note 7 at para 9.
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“… explain the reasons for the delay and why, despite the delay, he claims that he
cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. I must also mention
that the fact that the Applicant wants to have the matter resolved urgently does not
render the matter urgent. The correct and crucial test is whether, if the matter were
to follow its normal course as laid down by the rules, an Applicant will be afforded
substantial redress. If he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due
course, then the matter qualifies to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application. If,
however, despite the anxiety of an Applicant, he can be afforded a substantial redress
in an application in due course, the application does not qualify to be enrolled an d
heard as an urgent application.”
Analysis
[18] The applicant attempts to account for the period between 8 and 15 September 2025
is very t hin and lends credence to what the respondent identifies as self-created urgency.
There is no indication as to why the applicant had to engage an advocate who was not
available to attend to his matter for the requisite haste. That notwithstanding, it does not
appear ex facie the papers as to why the applicant found it imperative to wait for the specific
advocate to attend to his matter; the application does not appear to require a legal practitioner
with any specialised expertise.
[19] It is noted that previously, attorneys were not able to pursue matters in the high court,
and this is no longer the position. The applicant’s attorney notified the respondent of his
instruction on 8 Se ptember 2025 to launch urgen t review proceedings . It would be safe to
assume that the attorney assessed the instruction and concluded that the applicant’s case has
merit. The applicant fails to advance reasons why the attorney was disabled from executing
the instruction. Noting that the applicant would have been able to supplement or amend his
the instruction. Noting that the applicant would have been able to supplement or amend his
founding papers after receiving the records , there would have been an opportunity for the
identified advocate to review and add to the papers, subject to proper motivation.
[20] On the basis of the foregoing, I am not persuaded that the delay is excusable.
[21] The second leg for urgency motivation is for the court to consider reasons advanced
to justify that the applicant would not be afforded a substantial redress at the hearing in due
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course. The reasons advanced are commercial in nature, and the applicant has correctly
argued that the respondent’s stance that it is archaic to argue that a claim which is commercial
in nature cannot be the basis to approach an urgent court. In this regard , the applicant
contended that his livelihood, his ability to participate in trade of his choice as envisaged in
section 22 of the Constitution, his reputation, and financial harm are on the horizon.
[22] Regrettably, his wherewithal to demonstrate the financial harm was thwarted by his
failure to take the court into his confidence or to provide a detailed and comprehensive
presentation of his finances and how they would be impacted. The applicant testified before
the inquiry that his monthly expenses were R 110 000.00, and before this court, he stated that
it is R 257 000.00. Both versions cannot be correct , and t he replying affidavit failed to
provide proper clarity in this regard.
[23] The respondent provided a record of the estimated earnings of the applicant, to be in
the region of R 80,000.00 over a period of 7 months. This works out to almost R 10 000.00
per month. If the applicant’s monthly expenses are R 110 000.00 or R 257 000.00 per month,
then it follows that with an estimate of R 10 000.00 per month, the applicant does not have
horse racing as his primary source of income. There is a hiatus in the replying affidavit to
properly dispel this inference . The motivation for any negative impact on his finances is
therefore found wanting. The intermittent participation in the racing also lends credence to
the contention that horse racing is not his primary source of income.
Conclusion
[24] The applicant has failed to marshal a persuasive case to warrant an order to condone
non-compliance with the rules and directives of the court, and his application is bound to fail.
Costs
[25] The general principle that the costs follow the result brooks no interrogation.
Order
[25] The general principle that the costs follow the result brooks no interrogation.
Order
[26] In the premises, I make the following order.