IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
( I)
(2)
R EPO RT/\BI.I:: NO CASE NO: A301 /2023
O F rNTER FST Tl)OTllER .IIJDGES:
NO
(3) REVI ED: 0
07 October 2025
DATE SIGN /\rU R E
In the matter between:
PHILIP MATSUBANE PASHA Appellant
And
THE STATE Respondent
Delivered: By transm ission to the parties via email and uploading onto Case Lines the
Judgment is deemed to be delivered.
JUDGMENT
MBOWENI AJ (MOSOPA J concurring):
INTRODUCTION
[1] This matter come s before us as an appeal against both conviction and sentence
imposed upon the appellant, Mr Phillip Matsobane Pasha, by the Regional
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Court sitting in Pretoria. The appellant was convicted of the offence of murder
and sentenced to fifteen (15) years' direct imprisonment on 13 September
2019. The basis of the conviction was a dying declaration made by the
deceased, Ms Francinah Ramanyelo , identifying "Phillipus" as the person who
had stabbed her. The appellant challenges both the admissibility and weight of
that declaration and contends that the sentence imposed was unjust in light of
the totality of the circumstances.
[2] The appellant's grounds of appeal in respect of conviction may be summarised
as follows:
2.1 .That no eyewitness saw the appellant either at the scene of the crime or in the
company of the deceased on the relevant day;
2.2 .That the deceased did not state where she was when she was stabbed;
2.3 .That the dying declaration referred only to "Phillipus" without a surname, which,
the appellant argues, renders the identification vague and unreliable.
[3] In respect of sentence, the appellant contends that the Regional Mag istrate erred
in overemphasising the seriousness of the offence and failed to properly weigh the
appellant's personal circumstances, including his prior time spent in custody
awaiting trial. He submits that a sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment is
disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence and ought to be
reduced.
[4] The issues for determination in this appeal are thus twofold:
4.1. Firstly, whether the trial court erred in accepting the dying declaration of the
deceased as reliable and sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of
direct or corroborating eyewitness testimony; and
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4.2. Secondly, whether the imposition of the minimum sentence of fifteen years'
imprisonment under section 51 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997 was appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE :
[5] The State's case rested on the testimony of several witnesses, most notably
the deceased's mother, Ms Mogadi Ramanyelo. According to her account, the
deceased, Ms Francinah Ramanyelo , returned to her mother's home late at
night on 7 March 2010. She was bleeding from a wound to her upper chest.
Upon being asked what had happened, the deceased uttered the words:
"Phillipus stabbed me with a knife." She pointed to the wound, struggled to
breathe, and collapsed shortly thereafter. She was later pronounced dead.
[6] This statement that "Phillipus" had stabbed the deceased forms the cornerstone
of the State's case. The mother, who testified under oath, explained that she
knew the appellant personally and that he was commonly referred to by the
name "Phillipus" in the family and community. The appellant had previously
been in a romantic relationship with the deceased and was well known to both
her and her family.
[7] The State did not lead any eyewitness who observed the actual stabbing. Nor
did any witness testify to seeing the appellant and the deceased together
immediately before the incident. However, there was evidence that the
appellant and the deceased had previously spent time together, and that he
was known to frequent the yard of the deceased's mother, where she resided.
Notably, the appellant disappeared from the area shortly after the incident, and
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his belongings we re removed from the premises whe re he had previously
resided.
[8] The appellant's defence was a denial of the offence and an alibi. He claimed
that on the date in question, he was in Limpopo and not present in the vicinity
of the deceased. He further denied being involved in any altercation with the
deceased and insisted that he had been falsely implicated by the family out of
suspicion.
[9] D uring sentencing proceedings, it emerged that the appellant had a prior
conviction from 2016 for assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and
escaping from lawful custody. He was sentenced to thirty (30) months'
imprisonment and declared unfit to possess a firearm. These previous
convictions were admitted during the proceedings through the SAP69 record.
[1 0] The trial court found the evidence of the deceased's mother to be credible and
consistent. He r testimony was not contradicted in any material way under
cross-examination, and the court found her to be an honest witness with no
motive to falsely implicate the accused. The deceased's statement was
regarded as a spontaneous utterance made in extremis, and thus afforded
significant weight.
LEGAL FRAMEW OR K :
[11] The admissibility and weight of the deceased's statement "Phillipus stabbed
me with a knife" must be assessed in the context of the rules governing hearsay
and dying declarations in South African criminal law. It is common cause that
the deceased's statement was conveyed to the court through the oral testimony
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of her mother, and that it constitutes hearsay unless it qualifies under a statutory
or common-law exception.
[12] Section 3(1 )(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 provides
that hearsay evidence may be admitted where the person upon whose
credibility the probative value of such evidence depends is unavailable, and the
court is satisfied that the admission of such evidence is in the interests of
justice. In the present case, the declarant, the deceased was obviously
unavailable due to her death. The trial court was accordingly entitled to consider
whether her statement should be admitted under this statutory provision.
[13] The courts have long recognised that statements made by a deceased person
relating to the cause of death may be admissible as dying declarations,
provided the circumstances reflect spontaneity, proximity in time to the event,
and reliability. In S v Ndhlovu 2002 (2) SACR 325 (SCA), it was held that
hearsay evidence may be admitted even where it goes to the core of the
dispute, provided the safeguards of fairness and reliability are maintained.
[14] In S v Sigcawu (A47/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 137; 2022 (1) SACR 577 (WCC),
the court upheld a conviction based on a dying declaration in which the
deceased referred to the assailant by a familiar nickname - "Kaizer who works
at the municipality." The court held that where the context made clear who was
being referred to, and where the declarant was familiar with the person, the
absence of a surname did not render the identification insufficient.
[15] Similarly, in S v Cupido (1257/2022) (2024] ZASCA 4, the Supreme Court of
Appeal confirmed that hearsay may be admitted under section 3(1 )(c) where
the reliability, probative value, and interests of justice favour its inclusion. The
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court held that the context in which a statement is made , the relationship
between the parties, and the circumstances of the utterance are all critical in
assessing its admissibility and weight.
[16] Moreover, in S v Classen and Another (83/2021) [2022] ZASCA 130, the SCA
warned that hearsay should not be admitted where the identity of the
perpetrator is speculative or unclear. However, it confirmed that identification is
not necessarily defective simply because the declarant used a first name or
nickname, provided there is sufficient context and the identifying party is
familiar with the individual.
[17] These authorities confirm that a court is entitled to admit and rely upon a dying
declaration naming the assailant by a first name if the declarant had a personal
relationship with the accused, and if the circumstances surrounding the
statement indicate it was both spontaneous and reliable.
EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS:
[18] The crux of the appellant's argument is that the name "Phillipus" was insufficient
to link him conclusively to the offence. He contends that because no surname
was mentioned, the deceased may have been referring to another individual.
This argument, in our view, cannot succeed in light of the surrounding evidence
and applicable law.
[19] It is not uncommon in South African criminal cases for dying declarations or
witness identifications to rely on nicknames, first names, or other informal
designations. The key question is always whether the court, on the evidence
before it, can reasonably conclude that the person named is indeed the
accused. In this case, the deceased's mother, who knew both her daughter and
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the appellant intimately, immediately understood that the reference to
"Phillipus" was to the appellant, who was known by that name in the community.
[20] The deceased and the appellant were in a romantic relationship prior to the
incident. The appellant had been living in the yard where the deceased resided.
There was no suggestion that any other individual named Phillipus was
connected to the deceased in any way . More especially the appellant did not
deny that he is referred by the name of Phillipus. This background is essential
in placing the deceased's utterance in context.
[21] The deceased's declaration was spontaneous and unprompted. She was
bleeding and in distress, having suffered a fatal stab wound. Her utterance
identifying her assailant was made in circumstances of urgency, when death
was imminent. In such conditions, courts have consistently held that people
have no motive to fabricate or falsely implicate others.
[22] In S v Sauls 1981 (3) SA 172 (A), the Appellate Division confirmed that even
a single witness's testimony can be sufficient for a conviction if it is credible.
The same applies to hearsay or dying declarations they may stand alone if their
reliability is established.
[23] The trial court applied the correct legal principles. It acknowledged the hearsay
nature of the evidence, evaluated the credibility of the deceased's mother, and
gave sound reasons for admitting and relying on the dying declaration. It also
considered whether the circumstances supported the reliability of the utterance.
We find no fault in this approach. When the prosecutor informed court of his
intention to introduce hearsay evidence, the appellant who was legally
represented did not raise any objection.
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[24] The appellant's alibi that he was in Limpopo at the time of the offence was not
supported by any independent evidence. There is no onus on the appellant to
prove his alibi. However, it was raised late in the proceedings and was
contradicted by circumstantial evidence. The is evidence that he was in the
company of the deceased, sister of the deceased who unfortunately died before
her testimony was led and most importantly his friend who also places him
around the vicinity of the incident a day before the commission of the offence
and also on the day of the commission of the offence, when they were
consuming alcohol at the deceased's place of residence. He did not testify to
who he was with, or provide corroboration. The trial court found the alibi not
reasonably possibly true, and this conclusion was fully justified.
[25] The disappearance of the appellant from the area immediately after the offence,
and the removal of his belongings, strongly suggest consciousness of guilt. This
conduct, while not determinative on its own, reinforces the reliability of the
deceased's identification.
[26] In R v Blom 1939 AD 188, the court laid down the two cardinal rules of logic in
dealing with circumstantial evidence: (a) the inference sought to be drawn must
be consistent with all the proven facts, and (b) the facts must exclude every
other reasonable inference. Applying those rules here, the only inference that
can be drawn from the totality of evidence is that the appellant was the person
the deceased referred to as "Phillipus."
[27] Accordingly, we are satisfied that the trial court did not misdirect itself in
accepting the evidence of the dying declaration and convicting the appellant.
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The evidence was properly admitted, and the trial court's conclusion was
supported by the facts and applicable legal authority.
SENTENCING:
[28] The appellant was sentenced to fifteen (15) years' direct imprisonment
following his conviction for murder. The Regional Court imposed this sentence
in terms of section 51 (2)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997,
which prescribes minimum sentences for serious offences. The appellant now
appeals that sentence on the grounds that it is disproportionate, overly severe,
and that the sentencing court failed to give adequate consideration to mitigating
circumstances.
[29] In assessing this ground of appeal, it is necessary to reiterate the principle that
sentencing is pre-eminently a matter within the discretion of the trial court. An
appellate court will only interfere with a sentence if it is vitiated by a material
misdirection, or if it is so severe that it induces a sense of shock. This principle
was reaffirmed in S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 857D-F, where it was held
that punishment must fit the crime, the offender, and the interests of society,
and must be blended with a measure of mercy.
[30] The sentencing court considered both aggravating and mitigating factors. In
mitigation, the appellant's counsel argued that he had dependants, a limited
level of education, and had spent a substantial period in custody awa iting trial.
The appellant was 39 years old at the time and had been in pre-trial detention
for several years due to delays in the finalisation of the matter.
(31] However, the court found that the aggravating features significantly outweighed
these factors. Chief among them was the seriousness of the offence: the
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violent, intentional taking of a human life by stabbing a defenceless woman in
the chest. The attack occurred in the deceased's own yard, a place where she
ought to have felt safe. There was no evidence of provocation or justification.
[32) The court further took into account the appellant's prior convictions, particularly
one for assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and escaping from
custody. Although the prior offence occurred in 2016, it demonstrated a
propensity for violence and a disregard for the rule of law.
[33) The trial court was also entitled to consider the absence of remorse. Throughout
the trial, the appellant denied the offence and maintained a version that was
found to be false. In S v M atyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SC A ), the court
emphasised that genuine remorse is a key indicator of prospects for
rehabilitation. The appellant's lack of contrition and dishonest defence weighed
heavily against him.
[34) In terms of the legislative framework, the prescribed minimum sentence for
mu rder (where no substantial and compelling circumstances are found) is
fifteen years' imprisonment for a first offender. This was the starting point for
the sentencing court, which correctly directed itself to the test laid down in S v
Ma/gas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SC A ) and later confirmed by the Constitutional
Court in S v Dodo 2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC ).
[35) The appellant bore the onus to show that substantial and compelling
circumstances existed which would justify a departure from the minimum
sentence. The court was not satisfied that such circumstances were present.
The mitigating factors cited age, dependants, time spent in custody were
considered but found not to tip the scales.
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[36] In S v MM (SS 52/2022) [2024] ZAGPJHC 134, the court reiterated that where
the interests of society and the seriousness of the offence clearly outweigh the
personal circumstances of the offender, minimum sentences must be enforced
to reflect the need for deterrence and retribution.
[37] The sentencing court also applied the triad in S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A),
balancing the nature of the offence, the character of the offender, and the
interests of the community. In the face of growing femicide and violent crime in
South Africa, the court expressed that a clear message must be sent that
violence against women w ill not be tolerated.
[38] We find no misdirection in the reasoning of the trial court. The sentence
imposed, though severe, is not disproportionate to the gravity of the crime and
reflects both the letter and the spirit of the applicable legislation and case law.
CONCLUSION:
[39] Having considered the full record, the evidence adduced, the applicable legal
framework, and the arguments advanced on appeal, we are satisfied that the
trial court exercised its discretion judiciously. The conviction rests on a dying
declaration that was lawfully admitted, carefully evaluated, and supported by
the surrounding circumstances. The appellant's identity as the perpetrator was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
[40] As to sentence, we are similarly satisfied that the court a quo gave due
consideration to all relevant factors. It we ighed the appellant's personal
circumstances against the seriousness of the offence and the broader interests
of justice. The imposition of the minimum sentence was not only justified but
necessary in the context of the offence and its impact on society.
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[41] There is accordingly no basis for interference with either the conviction or the
sentence.
ORDER:
[42) In the result, the following order is made:
1. The appeal against conviction is dismissed.
2. The appeal against sentence is dismissed.
3. The conviction for murder and the sentence of 15 (fifteen) years' direct
imprisonment imposed by the Regional Court is confirmed.
I agree,
Date of Hearing
Date of Judgment
03 September 2025
07 October 2025
MBOWENI AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,PRETORIA
MOSOPAJ
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,PRETORIA
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Counsel for the Appellant
Instructed by
Counsel for the State
Instructed by
Adv van Wyk and Adv Augustyn
Legal aid, South Africa
Adv Pruis
Director of Public Prosecutions,
Pretoria
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