IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION PRETORIA
Case Number: 2024-008136
( l) REPORT ABLE : YES
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED
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DATE
In the matter between:
SIYANDA SABE LO TRADING (PTY) LTD
and
TWIN RIVERS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
NPC
JUDGMENT
VIVIAN AJ
Applicant
Respondent
2
Introduction
[1] On 28 August 2025, I handed down judgment in which I placed the present
applicant, Siyanda Sabelo Trading (Pty) Ltd, in provisional winding-up. The
applicant now applies for leave to appeal.
[2] Mr Davis, who appeared for the respondent, raised a point in limine that a
provisional winding-up order is not appealable. I agree. The application for leave
to appeal accordingly must be dismissed. My reasons for this conclusion are set
out below.
The test for appealability
[3] Traditionally, the question as to whether an order is appealable is considered
using the attributes referred to in Zweni. 1 The Zweni attributes are whether the
order is (1) final in effect and not susceptible to alteration by the court of first
instance; (2) definitive of the rights of the parties, that is, the order must grant
definitive and distinct relief; and (3) has the effect of disposing of at least a
substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main proceedings.2 This is not a
checklist. An order may be appealable even if it does not possess all three
attributes. 3
[4] Mr Moela, who appeared for the applicant, submitted that the test as to whether
to grant leave to appeal is whether it is in the interests of justice to do so. He
1 Zweni v M inister of Law and Order 1993 (1) SA 523 (A)
2 Paraphrasing TWK Agriculture Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Hoogveld Boerderybeleggings (Pty) Ltd and Others 2023 (S)
SA 163 (SCA) at para 12; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum and Another 2016 (6) SA 279
(CC), at para 41
3 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Von Abo 2011 (S) SA 262 (SCA) at para 17
3
referred me to the Constitutional Court ("ConCourt") decisions in City of
Tshwane v Afriforum4 and OUTA. 5 I referred Mr Moela to the Supreme Court
of Appeal ("SCA") decision in TWK Agriculture,6 in which Unterhalter JA
expressed reservations in respect of the applicability of the interests of justice
test.
[5] However, as Mr Moela correctly pointed out, TWK Agriculture overlooked the
ConCourt decision in Lebashe, in which Madondo AJ held: "Under the common
/aw principle as laid down in Zweni, if none of the requirements set out therein
were met, it was the end of the matter. But now the test of appealability is the
interests of justice, and no longer the common-law test as set out in Zweni."7
[6] Koen AJA (as he then was) explained the test for appealability as follows:
"The Zweni triad of attributes for an order to be an appeal able order, is therefore
no longer cast in stone, nor exhaustive. But those attributes have also not
become irrelevant or supplanted by the development in our jurisprudence. This
court has remarked that, 'the interests of justice should now be approached with
the gravitational pull of Zweni'. If one of the attributes in Zweni is lacking. an order
will probably not be appea/ab/e, unless there are circumstances which in the
interests of iustice. render it appealable. The emphasis has moved from an
enquiry focused on the nature of the order, to one more as to the nature and
effect of the order, having regard to what is in the interests of justice. What the
4 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum, supra at para 40
s National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at para
25
6 TWK Agriculture Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Hoogveld Boerderybeleggings (Pty) Ltd and Others 2023 (5) SA 163 (SCA)
7 United Democratic Movement and Another v Lebashe Investment Group (Pty) Ltd and Others 2023 (1) SA 353
(CC) at para 43
4
interests of justice require depends on the facts of a particular case. This
standard applies both to appealability and the grant of leave to appeal, no matter
what pre-Constitution common law impediments might exist."8 (my underlining)
The nature and effect of a provisional winding-up order
[7] Item 9 of schedule 5 to the Companies Act (Act 71 of 2008; "the 2008 Companies
Act") provides for the continued application of provisions of the Companies Act
(Act 61 of1973; "the 1973 Companies Act") in respect of the liquidation of
insolvent companies. The application for liquidation was brought under the 1973
Companies Act.
[8] The 1973 Companies Act does not expressly provide for provisional winding-up
orders. However, the procedure is well established,9 albeit that in this Division it
is the practice that a final order may be granted without first granting a provisional
liquidation order.
[9] The approach taken to the evidence contained in the affidavits is different at the
provisional and final stages. As Binns-Ward J put it:
"While the evidence might be the same as it was when the provisional order was
granted, the approach to be taken to it for the purposes of considering whether
a final order should be made is different. At the provisional stage the applicant
had to make out only a prima facie case - in the peculiar sense of that term
8 MV Smart: Minmetals Logistics Zhejiang Co Ltd v Owners and Underwriters of MV Smart and Another 2025 (1)
SA 392 (SCA) at para 32; see also Lebashe Investment Group (Pty) Ltd and Others v United Democratic Movement
and Another (1308/2023) [2025) ZASCA 29 (28 March 2025) at para 2
9 Wackrill v Sandton International Removals (Pty) Ltd and Others 1984 (1) SA 282 (W) (Wackrill) at 285B-D; Kalil
v Decotex (Pty) Ltd and Another 1988 (1) SA 943 (A) para 59
5
explained in Kalil v Oecotex (Ply) Ltd and another 1988 (1) SA 943 at 9760 -
978F. In order to succeed in obtaining a final order the applicant has to prove its
case on the evidence as it falls to be assessed in the usual manner in
proceedings on motion for final relief. The practical distinction between the two
requirements thus arises out of the application of the Plascon-Evans evidentiary
rule in opposed proceedings for a final order; cf. Export Harness Supplies (Pty)
Limited v Pasdec Automative Technologies (Pty) Limited 2005 JOR 0304 (SCA),
at para. 4.2. The effect has been described in terms which suggest that a higher
'degree of proof ... on a balance of probabilities' is required for a final order than
for a provisional order (Paarwater v South Sahara Investments (Pty) Ltd [2005]
4 All SA 185 (SCA), at para. 3). While the basis for that description is
understandable, I would suggest respectfully that the position might more
accurately be described as being that while the applicant must establish its case
on the probabilities to obtain either a provisional or a final order, in an opposed
application, a different, and more stringent approach to the evidence, consistent
with the Plascon-Evans rule, must be adopted by a court in deciding whether the
applicant has made a case for a final order. This is in contradistinction to the
approach to an opposed application for a provisional order, when the case is
decided on the probabilities as they appear from the papers."10
[1 O] Because the Court reassesses the matter on the return date and applies a
different approach, what is decided at the provisional stage is inherently
10 Absa Bank ltd v Erf 1252 Marine Drive (Pty) Ltd and Another (23255/2010) [2012] ZAWCHC 43 (15 May
2012) at para 4; applied in this Court in, inter alia, Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa v
Phosfert Trading (Pty) limited (2020/28966) [2023] ZAGPJHC 84 (3 February 2023) at para 6
6
susceptible to alteration on the return date. It is not finally definitive of the rights
of the parties and does not dispose of the relief sought (a final winding-up order).
[11] A provisional winding-up order accordingly does not have the Zweni attributes.
[12] Mr Moela drew my attention to the recent judgment in Singh. In that case, the
High Court granted a provisional sequestration order. On appeal, the SCA held
that the Judge was disqualified from hearing the matter because of a conflict of
interest. Relying inter alia on the earlier judgment in Moch, 11 Keightley AJA (as
she then was) held that the Judge ought not to have heard the case and that a
case for her recusal was properly established. She set aside the provisional
sequestration order.12
[13] Keightley AJA did not refer to appealability in Singh. Presumably, this is because
that issue was already decided in Moch. In Moch, the High Court Judge had
refused to recuse himself. He granted a provisional winding-up order. On appeal,
Heher JA dealt with appealability. He held that, although the dismissal of a
recusal application does not dispose of the relief sought by the parties, it is
appealable. He held that a decision dismissing a recusal application reflects on
the competence of the presiding Judge to define the parties' rights and to grant
or refuse the order sought.13 It was accordingly appealable. Heher JA then
considered the merits of the recusal application and held that the Judge ought to
have recused himself. As a result, not only was the decision to refuse recusal set
aside, but it followed that the provisional winding order was a nullity.14
11 Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American Express Travel Service 1996 (3) SA 1 (A)
12 Singh v Body Corporate of St Tropez (386/2023) (2024] ZASCA 142 (21 October 2024)
13 Moch, supra at 10 F to 11 B
14 Moch, supra at 9 G to 10 B
7
[14] Accordingly, neither Singh nor Moch is authority for the proposition that a
provisional sequestration or winding-up order is appealable.
The Tariomix judgment
[15] Mr Moela further relied on the judgment of Morgan AJ in Tariomix.15 Tariomix
was the return date of a provisional winding-up order. Morgan AJ commenced
his judgment as follows:
"The crystallised issue for me to determine is whether Tariomix and/or other
interested parties have made out a case militating against the provisional
liquidation order, granted by Djaje DJP on 23 February 2023 against Tariomix,
from being made final. In other words, this court is called to decide whether
Tariomix and/or other interested parties have made out a case in favour of the
discharge of the provisional liquidation order made against Tariomix."16
[16] Morgan AJ held that, once a Court makes a provisional order, it is for the Court
to set aside that order.17 Having quoted Section 35418 of the 1973 Companies
Act, Morgan AJ held that the Court must satisfy itself that the respondent
company or other interested parties have shown good cause why the company
should not be liquidated.19
[17] If Morgan AJ intended that there is an onus on the respondent or other interested
parties to make out a case for the discharge of the provisional order, this is
1' Bates and Others v Tariomix (Pty) Ltd and Others 2024 (6) SA 203 (NWM)
16 Bates v Tariomix, supra at para 2
17 Bates v Tariomix, supra at para 55
18 Erroneously referred to as Section 254 in the judgment
19 Bates v Tariomix, supra at para 58
8
contrary to decisions such as Absa v Erf 1252 and Paarwater.20 On the return
day, the onus rests on the applicant "in seeking a final order to satisfy the court,
on a balance of probabilities, that it was indeed 'Just and equitable" finally to
liquidate the respondent."21 The fact that the rule nisi invites interested parties to
"show cause why the order should not be made final" does not invert the onus
and does not change the way in which disputes of fact in the affidavits are
assessed.
[18] Section 354( 1) of the 1973 Companies Act concerns an application to stay or set
aside winding-up proceedings. It is not applicable to the return day of a
provisional winding-up order. The legislative history and purpose of this
subsection were discussed in Storti v Nugent.22 Gautschi AJ highlighted four
features of Section 354(1) in that judgment. Two show that Section 354(1) is not
applicable to the return day of a provisional winding-up order.
[19] "Firstly, it refers to the staying or setting aside of 'proceedings' and not 'order'."23
The grant of a winding-up order sets in motion a process whereby a company is
wound up. During the course of that process, events may occur which make it
necessary or desirable to stay or set aside the winding-up process. One example
given by Gautschi AJ is an offer of compromise.24
[20] Secondly, the company itself does not have standing to bring the application.25
20 Paarwater v South Sahara Investments (Pty) Ltd, (2005) 4 All SA 185 (SCA)
21 Paarwater, supra at para 3
22 Storti v Nugent and Others 2001 (3) SA 783 (W)
23 Storti v Nugent, supra at 794 A
24 Storti v Nugent, supra at 794 B
25 Storti v Nugent, supra at 794 D
9
[21] An application in terms of Section 354(1) is an application brought by a liquidator,
a creditor or member. It is not the mechanism used by the respondent company
or an interested party to show cause why a final winding-up order should not be
granted.
[22] With respect, Section 354 is not relevant to the approach to be taken by the Court
on the return day of a provisional winding-up order.
[23] There is an additional fact that weighs against Morgan AJ's conclusion that, on
the return date, the Court must satisfy itself that the respondent company or other
interested parties have shown good cause why the company should not be
liquidated. It is for the applicant to ensure that the matter is properly enrolled on
the return date. If it is not enrolled, the rule nisi lapses and the provisional
winding-up order is automatically discharged. If the matter is properly enrolled,
but there is no appearance for the applicant on the return date, the Court will
discharge the rule nisi and the operation of the provisional winding-up order
comes to an end.26 This would not be the case if the Court is required to satisfy
itself that the respondent company or other interested parties have shown good
cause why the company should not be liquidated.
[24] Accordingly, I respectfully differ from Morgan AJ. In opposed liquidation
proceedings the standards differ at the two stages: a prima facie showing may
justify a provisional order, but a final order may issue only where the applicant
proves its case on the affidavits as evaluated under Plascon-Evans.27 The "show
26 Ex parte S & U TV Services (Pty) Ltd: In re S & U TV Services (Pty) Ltd (In Provisional Liquidation) 1990 (4) SA
88 (W) at 89 J
27 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E-635C
10
cause" formulation in a rule nisi is procedural and does not shift the onus.
Accordingly, on the return day, the enquiry is whether the applicant has
established a case for final winding-up. It is not whether the respondent company
or other interested parties have shown good cause to stave off liquidation.
[25] This means that the Court is required to revisit the merits of the matter and that,
on the return date, the order may be altered in the sense that the provisional
order may be discharged. It is not correct, as was submitted in argument, that
the Court is bound by findings of fact at the provisional stage.
Interests of justice
[26] Is it, in any event, just and equitable that the provisional winding-up order should
be considered appealable based on the facts? In my view, it is not.
[27] The grounds of appeal are wide-ranging. They start with the proposition that the
respondent is not a creditor because the debt is not due and payable. That is not
correct.
[28] On the common cause facts, the respondent is the applicant's creditor. The
applicant signed an acknowledgement of debt. Section 346(1 )(b) provides that
an application may be brought by a creditor, including a contingent or prospective
creditor. It does not matter whether the debt is due and payable.28
[29] In submitting the contrary, Mr Moela referred me to the judgment of Crisp AJ in
Kowarski. The learned Judge held: "A debt which is not payable upon receipt of
a statutory notice by a Respondent but has to undergo further processes in order
28 Absa Bank Ltd v Hammerle Group 2015 (5) SA 215 (SCA) at para 9
11
to determine whether payment is possible cannot support a winding-up order, in
terms of my reading of s 345 (1) (a). Unless the debt is payable without further
ado, such debt is not one which may support an application for a winding-up of
a company."
[30] If Crisp AJ intended that a creditor whose debt is not due cannot apply for
winding-up, I respectfully disagree. The conclusion is contrary to the judgments
of the SCA in Absa Bank Ltd v Hammerle Group 29 and Express Model
Trading v Dolphin Ridge,30 which are binding on me.
[31] Crisp AJ relied on two judgments in support of the reasoning. In Barclays v
Riverside,31 Newton Thompson J held: " ... the main claim for the winding-up of
respondent based on secs. 111 (f) and 112 (a) must fail, as there is no money
'then due' ... as required by sec. 112 (a).32 The references are to the 1926
Companies Act.33 In that Act, Section 112(a) is the equivalent of Section
345(1 )(a) of the 1973 Act. All that the learned Judge was saying was that in order
to rely on the deeming provision in Section 112(a) (now Section 345(1 )(a)), the
applicant had to show a debt of no less than R100 then due. Newton-Thompson
J then proceeded to consider whether it had been proved to the satisfaction of
the Court that the respondent was unable to pay its debts under Section 112(c)
(now Section 345(1 )(c)).34 He concluded that a proper case had not been made
out.
29 Kowarski v Time Clothing (Pty) Ltd (413/2010) [2010) ZAECGHC 87 (16 September 2010) at para 31
30 Express Model Trading 289 CC v Dolphin Ridge Body Corporate 2015 (6) SA 224 (SCA) at para 14
31 Barclays Bank (D, C & 0) and Another v Riverside Dried Fruit Co (Pty), Ltd 1949 (1) SA 937 (C)
32 Barclays v Riverside, supra at 948
33 Act 46 of 1926
34 Barclays v Riverside at 949 to 950
12
[32] The second case referred to by Crisp AJ is Gatx-Fuller.35 Gatx-Fuller was an
application to interdict the respondent from instituting proceedings for the
winding-up of the applicant on the basis of a Section 345(1 )(a) notice. Kirk-Cohen
held: "It is trite that a contingent or prospective creditor has locus standi to apply
to Court for the winding-up of a debtor company but not on the grounds of non
compliance with a demand for payment made by such creditor in terms of the
provisions of s 345 (1) (a) (i) of the Act."36 He agreed with the respondent's
counsel that it had standing to seek a winding-up order under grounds other than
Section 345(1 )(a). But that was not what the applicant sought to interdict.37
[33) Neither Barclays v Riverside nor Gatx-Fuller is authority for the broad
proposition in Kowarski. The correct position is that an applicant in a liquidation
application cannot rely on Section 345(1 )(a) unless it holds a debt of not less
than R100 and that debt is due and payable. If the debt on which it relies is not
yet due and payable, it retains locus standi, but must rely on other grounds.
Insofar as it contends that the respondent should be wound up because it is
unable to pay its debts, it can rely on Section 345(1 )(b) or (c).
[34) In any event, the applicant itself admitted the debt and that it is due and payable.
In answer to the allegation in the founding affidavit that the total sum of
R685 738,60 was due, R621 840.39 for one property and R63 898,21 for the
other property, the applicant said in the answering affidavit: "Part of this
paragraph is admitted. The remainder is denied. In amplification of the denial,
35 Gatx-Fuller (Pty) Ltd v Shepherd and Shepherd Inc [1984] 4 All SA 75 (W) [also reported in 1984 (3) SA 48
(W)]
36 Gatx-Fuller, supra at 80
37 Gatx-Fuller, supra at 81
13
the respondent pleads that the second property has no building or occupancy
and to the extent it is billed for water, same is dispute."
[35) The applicant accordingly admitted that a significant portion of the debt was due.
[36) The next ground of appeal is that the finding of commercial insolvency (inability
to pay debts) is not supported by the facts. Focussing on paragraph 18 of my
judgment, the applicant contends that I found that the debt was not due and
payable and that this is a complete defence. That is not a correct interpretation
of paragraph 18 and is not correct in law.
[37) My finding that the applicant is unable to pay its debts is based in the first place
on the Section 345(1 )(a) notice. It is so that, in order for this notice to be valid,
the applicant for liquidation must show a debt of not less than R100 that is due.
As I showed above, this is admitted on the affidavits. Counsel's argument does
not detract from the admission.
[38] Second , the signing of an acknowledgement of debt is, in the circumstances,
strong evidence of commercial insolvency. The debt was for levies and other
charges due to a body corporate. The applicant's director signed the
acknowledgement of debt because the applicant had failed to pay levies and
other charges when they fell due. The most probable inference is that it was
unable to do so.
[39) Third, the applicant said in its answering affidavit: "Thus, it is evident that while
the indebtedness has not been extinguished, the [applicant], with all its bona
tides, paid approximately 40% of the debt and thus, is honouring the terms and
spirit of the AOD as when it is able to do so."
14
[40] In my view, on a conspectus of the facts, the respondent proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that the applicant is unable to pay its debts.
The discretion to grant a provisional winding-up order
[41] The respondent has not fully complied with Section 346(4A)(b). I referred in my
judgment to the recent case of Rent-a-Tank38 and concluded that this was a
case in which it was appropriate to grant a provisional winding-up order. The
reasons for this conclusion are set out in my judgment.
[42] Mr Moela referred me to another recent judgment in Investec v Culverwell.39
Although Rent-a-Tank was delivered two months after Investec v Culverwell, it
is not referred to by Gilbert AJ. In Investec v Culverwell, Mahalelo J referred to
the judgment of Moorcraft J in Cassim.4° Cassim was also not referred to in
Rent-a-Tank.
[43] In both Cassim and Investec v Culverwell, there had been non-compliance
with Section 346(4A). In Investec v Culverwell, Mahalelo J held that it was clear
that the application was not served on the employees or on any trade union.
Reliance was placed on a return of non-service.41
[44] In Cassim, the affidavit filed in terms of Section 346(4A)(b) was non-compliant
because the deponent was not the person who furnished the application to the
employees and to SARS. The sending of bulk sms's to employees and to SARS
38 Rent a Tank JHB (Pty) Limited v Fuelgiants (Pty) Limited (2025/012156) (2025] ZAGPJHC 517 (19 May 2025)
39 Investec Bank Limited v Culverwell Cattle Company (Pty) Ltd (048263/2022) [2025] ZAGPJHC 291 (17 March
2025)
4° Cassim NO v Ramagale Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others (2020/11605) [2020] ZAGPJHC 149 (12 June 2020)
4 1 Investec v Culverwell, supra at para's 12 and 13
15
did not cure that as the sms's did not include the application itself.42 Moorcraft
AJ held that the SCA in EB Steam 43 did not give its blessing for the grant of a
provisional order when the application was not "served" in terms of Section
346(4A). He held that the judgment is confined to urgent circumstances where it
is shown that the employees could not be served, such as where it was affixed
to the main gate but the employees had left the premises.44
[45] In both Cassim and Investec v Culverwell, the Court removed the matter from
the roll.
[46] In Stratford, the Constitutional Court interpreted the provisions of Section 9(4A)
of the Insolvency Act (Act 24 of 1936). These mirror Section 346(4A) of the 1973
Companies Act. Leeuw AJ held:
"Failure to furnish the employees with the petition may not be relied upon by the
debtor for opposing sequestration when the question to be decided is whether
sequestration is to the advantage of creditors. In EB Steam the Supreme Court
of Appeal stated that the purpose is not to provide a 'technical defence to the
employer, invoked to avoid or postpone the evil hour when a winding-up or
sequestration order is made'. I agree. There may be instances where a
provisional order should be granted to avoid the concealing of assets or for other
urgent reasons in circumstances where a delay would substantially prejudice the
creditors. Thus, non-compliance will not always render the granting of an order
fatal, but this should be only in exceptional circumstances. "45
42 Cassim, supra at para 18
43 EB Steam Co (Pty) Ltd v Eskom Holdings Society Ltd 2015 (2) SA 526 (SCA)
44 Cassim, supra at para 15
45 Stratford and Others v Investec Bank Ltd and Others 2015 (3) SA 1 (CC) at para 42
16
[47] It is plain that the Court has a discretion to grant a provisional winding-up order
in circumstances where there has not been proper compliance with Section
346(4A). This is consistent with the Court's power under Section 347(1) to make
any interim or other order that it deems just.
[48] In essence, the applicant contends that I exercised my discretion to grant a
provisional order incorrectly. However, this cannot be elevated to a fact that
makes the provisional winding-up order appealable. If it were, then it would have
precisely the effect that Leeuw AJ warned against in Stratford - it would give
the company a technical defence to a provisional winding-up order.
Order not sought
[49] A further ground of appeal was that the Court granted an order not sought by the
respondent. Mr Moela referred me to the very recent judgment of the SCA in
Selective Empowerment. 46 In that matter, the appellant had been placed in final
winding-up at the behest of the respondent. The majority upheld the appeal, set
aside the order and replaced it with an order dismissing the application.
[50] The grounds upon which Norman AJA , writing for the majority were: (1) the
applicant for the winding-up order did not have locus standi,47 (2) the applicant
had failed to satisfy the jurisdictional facts under Section 81 ( 1 )(f) of the 2008
Companies Act (Act 71 of 2008)48 and (3), having brought its application under
46 Selective Empowerment Investments 1 Ltd v Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (1325/2023)
(2025] ZASCA 71; (2025] 3 All SA 368 (SCA) (30 May 2025)
47 Selective Empowerment, supra at para 165
48 Selective Empowerment, supra at para 157
18
that the applicant should seek a final winding-up order in the notice of motion,
but the Court may still grant a provisional order. Paragraph 10.11 of the Practice
Manual of the Gauteng Division: Johannesburg is to the same effect. This has
long been the established practice in this Division.
(54) Norman AJA correctly pointed out that a provisional winding-up order has
adverse consequences for a company and for its employees. The Court must
always be alive to these consequences. That does not mean that a provisional
winding-up order is appealable.
(55) Accordingly, I conclude that the provisional winding-up order is not appealable.
[56] The respondent sought punitive costs against the applicant's attorneys. I do not
consider that to be justified in the circumstances. In respect of appealability, the
applicant relied on Tariomix. It is hardly unreasonable for an applicant to rely on
a reported case, even if the Court ultimately holds that the propositions that it
relies on are incorrect.
(57] I accordingly make the following order:
57 .1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
57.2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the application, including the costs of
counsel on Scale B.
Vivian, A
Acting Judge of the Gauteng Division
of the High Court of South Africa
Appearances
For the Applicant:
For the Respondent:
Date of hearing:
Date Delivered:
L Moela
Instructed by Matlhwana Attorneys Inc.
SN Davis
Instructed by JJR Inc.
10 September 2025
1 October 2025
19
MODE OF DELIVERY: This Judgment was handed down electronically by circulation
to the parties' and or parties' representatives by email and by being uploaded to
CaseLines. The date and time for the hearing are deemed to be 1 0h00 on 1 October
2025