IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case number: 2025-150096
Date of hearing: 16 September 2025
Date delivered: 23 September 2025
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED
DATE
SIGNATURE
In the application between:
WILLIAM DANIEL HALL Applicant
and
WD HALL TRANSPORT (PTY) LTD First Respondent
WILLIAM DANIEL HALL Second Respondent
VODACOM GROUP LTD Third Respondent
__________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
SWANEPOEL J:
[1] The applicant and the second respondent are directors of the first
respondent, together with Ms. Sunette van Tonder. The second
respondent and the applicant are father and son. Ms. Van Tonder is the
applicant’s sister.
[2] The first respondent operates a dairy , farming and compost
business on the family farm. During or about 2005 the applicant joined
the family business , later becoming the operations manager. It is
uncontested that the applicant worked hard, for many years, to build up
the business for the benefit of the family. On 23 May 2019 the applicant
and his sister were appointed as directors of the first respondent.
[3] During June 2025 conflict arose between the applicant and his
father. The applicant says in the founding affidavit that his employment
benefits were unilaterally change d, without his consent. It emerged
though that the dispute related to the applicant’s demand that his salary
be increased. The second respondent was not prepared to adjust the
applicant’s salary, which resulted in the applicant’s employment
becoming terminated. The question of whether the applicant was
unlawfully dismissed, or whether he resigned is a matter for the labour
courts. It is, however, undisputed that the applicant is no longer
employed by the first respondent.
[4] As a result of the termination of his employment, the applicant
vacated his office. The applicant has demanded the return of a company
vehicle, the applicant’s cellular telephone, and that he should vacate the
home that he occupies on the farm.
[4] On 4 August 2025 the applicant became aware of the fact that his
cellular telephone was not operative. Upon enquiry he was told that the
first respondent had done a sim -card swop, resulting in the applicant no
longer being able to use the sim-card. The applicant’s access to
customers was terminated, he could not access electronic banking, nor
did he have access to his contact lists.
[5] The applicant says that he has been spoliated in two respects:
Firstly, he says that his access to his personal sim -card has been
terminated. Secondly, he says that his access to the business of what
he terms “Billy’s Compost” has been terminated. The applicant seeks
the restoration of his sim -card, access to the electronic information of
Billy’s Compost, and physical access to the premises from which, he
says, Billy’s Compost is operated.
[6] The crux of the case is the applicant’s allegation that during or
about 2006 he entered into a joint venture with the first respondent and
his late mother in a business named “Billy’s Compost” (both the
applicant and his father are named ‘Billy’). Each of the parties to the
alleged joint venture held a one -third share therein. The applicant says
that he was entitled to receive one-third of the profits of the joint venture,
although he variously describes this entitlement as either commission
on sales or a share in the profit. It is not entirely clear what the
applicant’s case is on this aspect.
[7] The applicant says that when he became employed by the first
respondent he already had use of the sim -card, use of the cellular
telephone number associated therewith, and access to the information
contained on the card. In argument, counsel for the applicant contended
that the applicant had already had use of the sim -card during his
university days, although that contention is not supported by the papers.
The applicant contends that his rights to the use of the sim -card predate
his employment, and that he has now been spoliated from his right to
access his own cellular information and his own cellular telephone
number.
[8] It is not in dispute that the cellular telephone itself is that of the
first respondent, who has contracted with the third respondent for
cellular services. The cellular telephone has been made available to the
applicant as part of his renumeration package, and the first respondent
has paid for the cellular services. The applicant was entitled to the use
of the cellular telephone not only for business purposes, but also for his
private affairs. The question to be determined is whether the applicant
has established at least a prima facie right to the use of the cellular
has established at least a prima facie right to the use of the cellular
number and the information on the sim-card.
[9] The applicant’s version of events is that when he joined the first
respondent, one of the perquisites of his employment was that the first
respondent would pay his cellular phone expenses. He utilized the
cellular telephone in his dealings on behalf of the first respondent and of
Billy’s Compost. The applicant says that he is the public face of the joint
venture, and that he utilizes his cellular telephone to communicate with
customers. He says that the first respondent produces compost for its
own acco unt, and that he then markets and sells the compost to
individuals for the account of Billy’s Compost.
[10] The first and second respondents’ version is starkly different.
They agree that when the applicant was employed at first, he was given
the cellular telephone as a perquisite . The contract with the third
respondent is , they say, in the name of the first respondent, the first
respondent pays for the cellular services, and they deny that the
applicant had use of th is particular cellular number before he became
employed by the first respondent.
[11] Furthermore, the first and second respondents deny that there is
a separate joint venture as described by the applicant. The second
respondent says that Billy’s Compost ed Manure is the product that the
first respondent sells under a certificate issued by the Department of
Agriculture. The first respondent is also a registered producer of
fertilizers under the trade name Billy’s Composted Manure. The first and
second respondents say that there has never been a separate joint
venture as the applicant alleges, and that Billy’s Composted Manure is a
division of the first respondent.
[12] There are thus two distinct disputes of fact on the papers: Firstly,
whether the applicant has ever held personal rights to the use of the
cellular telephone number, and secondly, whether a separate entity
such as Billy’s Compost, ever existed. The applicant has attempted to
such as Billy’s Compost, ever existed. The applicant has attempted to
make the case that the first and second respondents have admitted that
the applicant has had personal use of the cellular telephone and that he
has thus been spoliated. The applicant has ignored the fact that the first
and second respondents have contended throughout that the cellular
telephone, and its associated number were provided by the first
respondent and that the applicant’s personal use thereof was simply a
perquisite of his employment.
[13] The applicant also contends that the first and second
respondents have admitted that Billy’s Compost is a separate entity
from the first respondent, and was started by the applicant and his
mother. That is not so. The first and second respondent’s case has
been, throughout, that there is no separate entity, and that Billy’s
Composted Manure is simply a division of the first respondent.
[14] Where there is a dispute of fact on the papers, I must accept the
version of the respondent, unless it is so clearly untenable that it can be
rejected out of hand. 1 In this matter I cannot reject the first and second
respondent’s version on the papers. On the contrary, their version is, on
the face of it, confirmed by the various registration certificates that
evidence that it is the first respondent that conducts the composting
business. There is no evidence to support the applicant’s version that
Billy’s Compost is a separate entity independent of the first respondent.
[15] Furthermore, there is no evidence that the applicant ever had use
of the sim-card before he became employed by the first respondent. The
evidence is that in fact the cellular service has been provided in terms of
a contract between the first and third respondents. Had the applicant
had any entitlement to the sim -card, one would have expected him to
say when he obtained the number for the first time, and how it came to
be transferred to the first respondent. The papers are silent on this
issue.
[16] In Ferreira v Levin NO: Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and
Others2 the Court explained the approach to interlocutory interdicts as
follows:
“It has, up to now, been accepted that in order to establish a prima
facie right entitling an applicant to an interim interdict, an applicant has
to make out a case that he is entitled to final relief. If on the facts
alleged by the applicant and the undisputed facts alleged by the
respondent a court would not be able to grant final relief, the applicant
has not established a prima facie right and is not entitled to interim
protection.”
[17] Ultimately, I do not have to decide which version is more likely. If
I cannot reject the first respondent’s version, I must accept it and decide
the matter on that version.
[18] If the first respondent’s version is accepted, then the applicant’s
entitlement to the use of the sim -card is an instance of his employment
with the first respondent. The facts in this matter are similar to the facts
in Telkom Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd 3. In Telkom the respondent had sought
a spoliation order to restore its internet services. The court held that the
respondent’s entitlement arose from its contract with the appellant4:
“In the alternative counsel argued that the quasi -possession of the right
to receive Telkom’s telecommunication services consisting of the actual
use (‘daadwerklike gebruik’) of those services must be restored by the
possessory remedy. This is, however, a mere personal right and the
order sought is essentially to compel specific performance of a
contractual right in order to resolve a contractual dispute. This has
never been allowed under the mandament van spolie and there is no
authority for such an extension of the remedy.”
[19] On the first respondent’s version the applicant has no rights to
the sim-card. When his employment ended, his entitlement to use the
sim-card similarly ended. The fact that all of his personal information is
sim-card similarly ended. The fact that all of his personal information is
on the card is unfortunate, but it does not entitle him to the continued
use of the card.
[20] As far as the rest of the relief sought is concerned, that the
applicant be given access to the business premises and electronic
records of the first respondent, I sought clarity from applicant’s counsel
on the basis for such relief, but I am yet to receive an answer. If the
applicant’s employment contract has terminated, as is common cause,
then the applicant has no right to access the premises nor to have
access to the business records.
[21] Consequently, the application must fail, and I make the
following order:
The application is dismissed with costs on Scale C.
SWANEPOEL J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION PRETORIA
Counsel for the applicant: Adv. G Jacobs
Instructed by: B Verster Attorneys
Inc
Counsel for the respondents: Adv. P Bruwer
Instructed by: Enslin Inc
Hearing on: 16 September 2025
Judgment on: 23 September 2025
1 Plascon Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A)
2 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others: Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others
1995 (2) SA 813 (W) at 817F
3 Telkom SA Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd 2003 (5) SA 309 (SCA)
4 At para [14]