THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case No: JR849/21
In the matter between:
PUBLIC SERVANTS’ ASSOCIATION Applicant
OBO LEBOMBO & OTHERS
and
GOVERNMENT PRINTING WORKS First Respondent
ISAAC KEKANA NO Second Respondent
GENERAL PUBLIC SERVICE SECTOR Third Respondent
BARGAINING COUNCIL
Decided: In chambers
Date: 3 October 2025
JUDGMENT: LEAVE TO APPEAL
2
DANIELS J
Introduction
[1] The applicant seeks leave to appeal against my judgment handed down
on 25 March 2025. For ease of reference, the applicant’s members are
referred to as the “individual applicants”.
Condonation
[2] The first respondent filed its submissions opposing the application for
leave to appeal some three days late. The reason for the delay was the
first respondent’s difficulties in briefing the same counsel it had used in
the review application. The submissions were finalised and served as
soon as possible after counsel was briefed. The first respondent also
experienced logical difficulties filing the submissions. Most importantly,
the period of the delay is short, and there is a reasonable explanation for
the delay. On a conspectus of all the relevant factors, it is in the interests
of justice to grant condonation. The late filing of the first respondent’s
submissions is condoned.
Legal principles
[3] Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act No. 10 of 2013 provides that
leave to appeal may only be given where the judge is of the opinion that
the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there is some
other compelling reason the appeal should be heard. Leave to appeal
should not be granted unless there is a sound and rational basis to
conclude that there is a reasonable prospect of success.
1 In Martin & East
1 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha and Another [2016] JOL 36940 (SCA) at paras 16 –
17
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(Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers & others 2 the court, per Davis
JA stated:
“This was a case which should have ended in the Labour Court. This
matter should not have come to this court. It stood to be resolved on its
own facts. There is no novel point of law to be determined nor did the
court a quo misinterpret existing law. There was no incorrect application
of the facts; in particular the assessment of the factual justification for
the dismissals/alternative sanctions. I would urge labour courts in future
to take great care in ensuring a balance between expeditious resolution
of a dispute and the rights of the party which has lost. If there is a
reasonable prospect that the factual matrix could receive a different
treatment or there is a legitimate dispute on the law, that is different. But
this kind of case should not reappear continuously in courts on appeal
after appeal, subverting a key purpose of the Act, namely the
expeditious resolution of labour disputes
.”
(Own emphasis)
Grounds for leave to appeal
[4] The applicant contends that there is a reasonable prospect that another
court would come to a different decision. It contends that this court erred in
the following respects:
4.1 The court erred by finding that section 198B was not applicable
because the Public Service Regulation 57(4) permits the employment
of individuals on fixed term contracts for periods exceeding twelve
consecutive months,
2 (2014) 35 ILJ 2399 (LAC) at 2406
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4.2 The court erred by finding that the employment of the individual
applicants did not exceed twelve consecutive months,
4.3 The court erred by finding that Regulation 57 was applicable to the
dispute because the evidence at arbitration did not canvass this
issue,
4.4 The court erred by finding that the individual applicants were
‘additional to establishment’,
4.5 The court erred in finding that the individual applicants had no
reasonable expectation of continued employment.
[5] I have considered the grounds upon which the application is based,
together with the submissions filed by the first respondent. I align myself
with the submissions of the first respondent, which I find compelling. The
applicant fails to meet the high threshold for leave to appeal. In my view,
there are no prospects that another court would come to a different
decision. Accordingly, I must refuse leave to appeal.
Conclusion
[6] For the reasons set out above, I make the following order:
6.1 The late filing of the first respondent’s submissions is condoned,
6.2 The application for leave to appeal is dismissed,
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6.3 There is no order as to costs.
RN Daniels
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa