THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Not Reportable
Case no: C469/2024
In the matter between:
UNIVERSITY AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION Applicant
and
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN First Respondent
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, Second Respondent
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
Heard: 14 August 2025
Delivered: 2 October 2025
JUDGMENT
MacKENZIE, AJ
Introduction
[1] On 14 August 2025, I dismissed this application with costs and indicated
that my reasons would follow. They are as follows.
2
[2] The applicant, the University and Allied Workers Union (UAWU) acting on
behalf of certain of its members, sought an order directing the f irst
respondent, the University of Cape Town, to consult with the applicant
regarding the relocation of its members forming part of the first
respondent’s Campus Protection Services. The affected members were to
be relocated from the first respondent’s Graduate School of Business
(GSB) campus to its Rondebosch campus.
[3] The first respondent opposes the application.
The facts
[4] The background facts are uncomplicated and almost entirely undisputed.
[5] On 27 April 2018, the a pplicant and f irst respondent concluded a
Recognition and Procedural Agreement (“ the Recognition Agreement ”)
which effectively regulated the applicant’s organisational rights. Clause 3.1
frames the qualifying criteria for the applicant’s enjoyment of
organisational rights with the f irst respondent. In particular, clause 3.1.1
requires the applicant to have a minimum of 300 members for it to remain
a recognised union by the first respondent.
[6] On 25 October 2022, the f irst respondent informed the applicant that,
according to the f irst respondent’s membership statistics for September
2022, the a pplicant no longer met the required representivity threshold
under the Recognition A greement. Accordingly, the f irst respondent
withdrew certain of the a pplicant’s organi sational rights. That was
confirmed by the f irst respondent in writing to the a pplicant on 25 January
2023.
[7] On 27 January 2023, the first respondent cancelled the Recognition
Agreement. It did so in the wake of embarking upon a process of creating
a single bargaining unit with a single bargaining forum for all professional,
administrative and support services (PASS) employees. The first
respondent likewise cancelled its recognition agreements with other trade
unions, namely the National Education, Health and Allied Workers ’ Union
3
(NEHAWU), the Democratised Transport Logistics and Allied Workers’
Union ( DETAWU) and the University of Cape Town Employees’ Union
(UCTEU). Pursuant thereto, the first respondent engaged with those
unions regarding its proposal of forming a single bargaining unit. Since it
no longer recognised the applicant, the first respondent did not invite the
applicant to participate in that process.
[8] Nevertheless – and significantly – pursuant to a written settlement
agreement concluded on 11 October 2023 in respect of an altogether
separate dispute, the first respondent nevertheless afforded the a pplicant
certain organisational rights.
[9] On 18 January 2024, the f irst respondent concluded a collective
bargaining agreement with NEHAWU, DETAWU and UCTEU, which
established the envisaged single bargaining unit forum. Since it was n o
longer recognised, the applicant was not a party to that agreement.
[10] Several months later, during May 2024, the f irst respondent resolved to
relocate the thirty -six members of its campus security staff from its GSB
campus to its Rondebosch campus. It did so to improve the visibility and
availability of security at the Rondebosch campus. The relocation was
intended to be effected on 1 January 2025.
[11] On 9 September 2024, the f irst respondent met with representatives of
NEHAWU, DETAWU and UCTEU to discuss the proposed relocation.
[12] On 16 September 2024, the applicant wrote to the f irst respondent,
seeking to participate in the consultation process regarding the proposed
relocation. Again, since it no longer recognised the applicant, the f irst
respondent unsurprisingly declined that request, in writing, on 18
September 2024.
[13] On 20 September 2024, the a pplicant referred a dispute to the second
respondent concerning the first respondent’s refusal to allow the a pplicant
to participate in the consultation process . On 18 October 2024, the f irst
respondent was given notice to attend a conciliation hearing.
4
[14] On 8 November 2024, the parties attempted conciliation. At that meeting,
the parties agreed for the conciliation process to be postponed for thirty
days. However, the purpose of that postponement is disputed.
14.1 The applicant alleges that the parties agreed to a postponement to
allow the a pplicant to take part in the consultation process. There
is nothing in the founding affidavit bearing out that assertion.
14.2 The first respondent alleges that the process was postponed for it
to obtain a mandate whether or not to allow the applicant to
participate in the consultation process. Importantly, the first
respondent’s version is borne out by a contemporaneous e- mail
dated 11 November 2024 by Mr Mpe Ngcosane, who is an
employment relations specialist employed by the f irst respondent.
It is evident from that e-mail that the first respondent elected not to
engage with consultations with the applicant as a non-recognised
union.
14.3 Given the lack of evidence by the Applicant , and since it is clearly
neither untenable nor far -fetched, I consider that the first
respondent’s version on this score must prevail.
1
[15] Aggrieved, the applicant launched this application on 20 November 2024.
Analysis and discussion
Preliminary objection: jurisdiction
[16] The first respondent raised two preliminary ( in limine ) objections:
jurisdiction and the absence of a certificate of outcome.
[17] The first respondent argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
matter for two reasons.
1 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E –
635C; Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others v Anglo Gold Ashanti
Limited t/a Anglo Gold Ashanti and Others (2022) 43 ILJ 291 (CC) at fn 103–104.
5
[18] Firstly, this dispute is not justiciable since it is an ‘interest’ dispute and not
a ‘ rights’ dispute. Indeed, the applicant, in its referral to the second
respondent, characterised the dispute as one of ‘ mutual interest’ and not
one concerning any cognisable or enforceable rights. I agree with the first
respondent. The facts bear out that the applicant had no right to
participate in the collective bargaining process with the other recognised
unions. At best, the applicant had only an interest in that process. In
HOSPERSA & another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration,
Mogoeng AJA (as he then was) held that a dispute of interest is not
arbitrable, but must be dealt with in terms of collective bargaining
structures. This is so, he held, since allowing an ‘interest dispute’ to be
adjudicated would subvert the collective bargaining process itself. 2 The
applicant’s response to this contention is that the Labour Relations Act,
1995 (LRA) does not speak of ‘rights disputes’ or ‘interest disputes’. While
that may be so, 3 the absence of such a distinction in the LRA is neither
here nor there. Nor does it derogate from the authority binding upon me in
HOSPERSA. Since it concerns a mere interest, it is not one that engages
this Court’s jurisdiction . Accordingly, the first respondent’s objection on
this score is well-taken.
[19] Secondly, the applicant failed to furnish a certificate of outcome issued by
the second respondent under section 135(5) of the LRA, certifying the
outcome that the dispute has not been resolved. Section 135(3) is
peremptory.4 It has been described as conferring upon the aggrieved party
‘immediate entrée to the Labour Court ’.5 The applicant failed to deal
substantively with this point. Instead, it dismissed it as ‘ over-technical and
not constructive’ . It relied upon the oft -quoted dictum of Schreiner JA in
Trans-Africa Insurance Co. Ltd v Maluleka, 6 namely that ‘technical
Trans-Africa Insurance Co. Ltd v Maluleka, 6 namely that ‘technical
2 HOSPERSA & another v Northern Cape Provincial Administration (2000) 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC) at
para 10.
3 Department of Home Affairs v Public Servants A ssociation and Others (2017) 38 ILJ 1555
(CC) at para 13.
4 Louw v Micor Shipping (P86/98) [1999] ZALC 188 (14 June 1999) at para 8.
5 J Grogan, Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution, 2nd ed, at p 142.
6 1956 (2) SA 273 (AD).
6
objections to less than perfect procedural steps should not be permitted’ .7
The applicant’s reliance is misplaced. Jurisdiction determines the court’s
competence to adjudicate upon a dispute between parties. 8 Either it exists
or it does not. It is therefore hardly a mere technical objection. This is the
more so since the Court’s jurisdiction is framed in and limited by section
157 of the LRA. Accordingly, this objection is likewise well-taken.
[20] Yet even if I am wrong in this regard, the applicant’s case lacks merit.
The relief sought is moot
[21] I was informed from the bar by the f irst respondent’s attorney that it s
relocation decision was implemented several months ago, on 1 January
2025. That fact has overtaken this matter and has accordingly rendered
this dispute moot.
[22] Nevertheless, in its heads of argument the a pplicant maintained that there
is nothing precluding the Court from reversing the f irst respondent’s
decision. No authority is cited for that contention. The applicant neither
amended its n otice of m otion to ask for that relief , nor did it allege any
facts in support thereof. There is simply no basis upon which the Court
can ‘reverse’ the first respondent’s decision. The applicant’s contention on
this score is thus without merit.
[23] Significantly, from the bar, the first respondent’s attorney indicated that the
applicant has referred a dispute to the second respondent regarding the
implementation of the f irst respondent’s decision. That being so, t he
applicant has implicitly conceded its submission on this score lacks merit.
The merits
[24] The applicant seeks an order compelling the f irst respondent to allow the
applicant’s participation in the consultation process regarding the
(implemented) relocation of the a pplicant’s affected members . In other
7 278F–G.
8 Graaff-Reinet Municipality v Van Ryneveld’s Pass Irrigation Board 1950 (2) SA 420 at 424.
7
words, the applicant seeks, in substance, a positive or mandatory interdict
(mandamus).
[25] However, the applicant’s case is opaque. It appears to ground its right to
relief upon two bases.
25.1 The first is the Constitutional Court’s decision in NUMSA & others v
Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & another .9 Its contention appears to be that the
Constitutional Court affirmed that any trade union, regardless of the
extent of its representivity, is entitled to participate in consultations
with an employer in relation to organisational rights. However, as the
first respondent’s attorney correctly pointed out, that contention is
misconceived. What the Constitutional Court held in Bader Bop i s
that a trade union, even one with a minority of members, is entitled to
the organisational rights framed in Chapter 1 of Part A of the LRA .
10
Yet, those rights were conferred upon the a pplicant under the
agreement of 11 October 2023. This contention thus lacks merit.
25.2 The second basis is the alleged agreement in relation to the
continuation of the consultation process on 8 November 2024. As
found above, the applicant’s allegation is untenable, not borne out by
the evidence and is, as it must be, trumped by the first respondent’s
version.
25.3 No other right was alleged. Accordingly, the a pplicant failed to
establish any right to the relief sought.
[26] Secondly, the applicant’s case for prejudice was not one based upon fact,
but rather upon generalised and sweeping statements of prejudice. It did
not make even a single factual averment bearing out the alleged prejudice.
That, as the first respondent argued, is demonstrably deficient.
[27] Thirdly, the founding affidavit is entirely silent regarding any adequate
alternative remedy. Again, as the f irst respondent’s attorney correctly
pointed out, the relocation has no substantive effect upon the affected
9 (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC).
10 Bader Bop, at paras 39–40.
8
members. Clause 4 of the Minimum Services Agreement retained all
affected employees’ rights under section 74 of the LRA.
[28] In sum, this application lacks all semblance of merit. It must fail.
Costs and the conduct of the applicant’s attorney
[29] The first respondent’s attorney correctly pointed out that the Court’s
jurisdiction regarding costs is governed by section 179 of the LRA. The
ordinary rule that costs follow the result does not apply in this Court .11
However, in this matter, the Court considers that the patent lack of merit in
this application in itself justifies that the applicant be ordered to pay the
first respondent’s costs.
[30] Regrettably, it is also necessary to comment upon the conduct of the
applicant’s attorney , Mr Ramabu of Ramabu Attorneys . Despite being
informed by the Registrar per e -mail that this matter would commence at
09:00 instead of 10:00, and despite an additional 30 minutes – as well as
the best efforts by the f irst respondent’s attorney to contact him – Mr
Ramabu failed to appear when this matter was finally called at 10:30.
[31] The first respondent’s attorney submitted that Mr Ramabu ought to pay the
costs of this application personally ( de bonis propriis ). She made the
following submissions in support thereof.
31.1 Firstly, this application clearly lack s merit and is fundamentally ill-
conceived.
31.2 Secondly, the a pplicant’s heads of argument were filed
considerably out of time and at any rate after the f irst respondent
had delivered its heads of argument.
31.3 Thirdly, Mr Ramabu’s failure to appear in accordance with the
Court’s directive.
31.4 Finally, the Court was informed form the bar that the applicant had
ostensibly launched an urgent application to interdict the f irst
11 Union for Police Security and Corrections Organisation v South African Custodial
Management (Pty) Ltd and Others [2021] 12 BLLR 1173 (CC).
9
respondent from implementing its relocation decision. The f irst
respondent acted prudently by preparing its opposition thereto.
However, on attempting to deliver its answering papers , the first
respondent was informed that the Registrar had no record of the
urgent application.
[32] The first respondent’s attorney also directed the Court’s attention to the
unreported judgment of the Western Cape Division of the High Court in
Van Louw v Nedbank Limited 12 which also condemned Mr Ramabu’s
conduct. The Honourable Mr Acting Justice Montzinger granted costs de
bonis propriis against Mr Ramabu. However, those circumstances are
altogether distinguishable to those at hand. There, Mr Ramabu had failed
to comply with a court order, sought the last -minute withdrawal of counsel
and condonation for the submission of irrelevant heads of argument and
had acted unprofessionally in the conduct of the court appearance.
[33] I do not consider that Mr Ramabu’s conduct in this matter justifies costs de
bonis propriis . Significantly, the notice of m otion was signed by a
representative of the a pplicant, and not by Mr Ramabu. Mr Ramabu was
only appointed after the matter was ripe for hearing. Yet, o ne might
nevertheless criticise Mr Ramabu for persisting with this application after
coming on record. It may well have been withdrawn had Mr Ramabu
properly considered this matter and advised the a pplicant accordingly.
Likewise, one might criticise the late filing of the applicant’s heads of
argument. However, unless there is negligence to a serious degree, mere
ineptitude or incompetence on the part of a legal practitioner does not per
se warrant costs de bonis propriis .13 Nor for that matter did Mr Ramabu’s
absence affect the Court’s determination of this matter. It was ripe for
hearing with heads of argument from both parties. The Court was
therefore not disadvantaged in its adjudication hereof.
[34] Finally, w hile the a pplicant’s conduct regarding the urgent application is
[34] Finally, w hile the a pplicant’s conduct regarding the urgent application is
prima facie concerning, it is not a matter that is before the Court . But for
the submissions from the bar by the f irst respondent’s attorney, there is
12 (21341/243) [2024] ZAWCHC 241 (3 September 2024).
13 Mathimbane and Another v Normandien Farms (Pty) Ltd [2014] JOL 32048 (LCC) at para 28.
10
nothing before the Court upon which this submission can be properly
considered and an order made.
[35] At any rate, fairness dictates that Mr Ramabu would had to have been
given a chance to explain his conduct. At a time when the rolls are already
overly-burdened, I consider that Court s should guard against wasting
precious judicial time and resources in dealing with matters that do not
genuinely merit consideration of such an extraordinary costs order.
[36] However, lest I be misunderstood, Mr Ramabu’s conduct in this matter is
to be deprecated. Legal practitioners have a duty to the Judiciary to
ensure the efficient and fair administration of justice.
14 Mr Ramabu’s
conduct as a legal practitioner is clearly a cause for some concern. While
the Court is ultimately responsible for determining whether a legal
practitioner is fit and proper, the day-to-day regulation of legal practitioners
is a task falling to the Legal Practice Council.
[37] In the circumstances, a copy of both this judgment and that in Van Louw
will be transmitted to the offices of the Western Cape Legal Practice
Council for its attention and, if necessary, further action.
Order
[38] In the result, the following order is made:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant will pay the first respondent’s costs of suit.
_______________________
PS MacKenzie
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
14 Toto v Special Investigation Unit and Others 2001 (1) SA 673 (E) at 683A–F.
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Appearances:
For the applicant: No appearance
Instructed by: Ramabu Attorneys
For the first respondent: M Cogger of Bowman Gilfillan Inc