IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MBOMBELA
(1) REPOR TABLE : YES /NO
(2) OF INTERES T TO THE JUD GES : YES/NO
(3) RE VISED
02 Oc tober 2025
DA TE
In the matter between:
DN SIBANYONI
A nd
... • 'J
SIGNA TURE
THE SPEAKER OF THE CITY OF MBOMBELA
THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MBOMBELA
THE CITY MANAGER OF THE CITY OF MBOMBELA
THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF MBOMBELA
THE MEC FOR COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE
CASE NO: 2107/2025
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
THIRD RESPONDENT
FOURTH RESPONDENT
FIFTH RESPONDENT
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2
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS AND TRADITIONAL
AFFAIRS, MPUMALANGA PROVINCE SIXTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Mangena AJ
[1] Ms Delight Ntombifuthi Sibanyoni ( the applicant) was employed by the City of
Mbombela as a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) with effect from 1 February 2023 . The
contract was to endure for a period of 5 years until 31 January 2028. The appointment
has not been without difficulty , as the facts below will demonstrate. Those with power
instigated the termination of her appointment , and the Municipal Council of the City of
Mbombela succumbed to the pressure on 30 April 2025 and summarily terminated her
contract. She approached this court for urgent relief , challenging the lawfulness of the
decisions of the Council and its instigators.
Background
[2] The background facts are as follows: The City of Mbombela advertised a post of a
CFO. At the time of the advertisement, the applicant was acting in the position of the CFO.
The minimum requirements listed in the advertisements were the following: Bachelor’s
degree in the fields of accounting, financial management, economics or chartered
accountant, a valid driving licence and no criminal record, and 5 years of management
experience at the middle management level.
[3] She applied for the post and went through all the recruitment process es until the
Council confirmed her appointment in its sitting on 31 January 2023, in accordance with
the applicable legislative prescription.
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[4] In compliance with the provisions of section 56(5) of the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (“the System s Act”), the Municipal Council informed
the then MEC for local government, Mr Mandla Msibi (Msibi), of the appointment process
and its outcome within the prescribed time limit of 14 days. At this point, the applicant had
already assumed her position.
[5] On 12 April 2023 , Msibi dispatched a letter to the Mayor informing him that the
Department of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs had received allegations
of misrepresentation on the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the CFO. He requested the
municipality to conduct an investigation regarding the CV of the CFO and submit a report
to his office by 18 April 2023, a mere period of 5 days.
[6] Acting on the dictates of the MEC, the Executive Mayor conducted the
investigation and submitted a report to the MEC for noting. The report is dated 12 May
2023, and it is not clear from the papers when the same was received by Msibi.
[7] On 12 July 2023, Msibi, having received the report from the Executive Mayor,
notified the municipality that he does not concur with the appointment of Ms Sibanyoni
(the applicant) as the CFO of the City of Mbombela Local Municipality based on
misrepresentation. He then directed the Municipal Council to rescind its decision on the
appointment of the CFO and inform his office regarding the implementation within 30
days. This did not happen as the Speaker of the Council did not agree, as according to
him, the MEC had 14 days within which to indicate if there was any contravention of the
law in the appointment of the CFO. When the MEC did not indicate any issues, the Council
proceeded with the appointment , and the MEC was free to approach the court for any
relief he desired.
[8] Msibi took the guidance of the Speaker and instituted legal proceedings against
the municipality, the Executive Mayor, the Municipal Manager, the Municipal Council, the
the municipality, the Executive Mayor, the Municipal Manager, the Municipal Council, the
Speaker and Ms Sibanyoni, in which he sought the following orders:
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8.1 Condonation of any delay, if any, occasioned by his failure to timeously launch this
application as envisaged in section 56(5) of the Systems Act.
8.2 A declaration that the appointment of Ms Sibanyoni to the position of C FO by the
first Respondent is null and void in terms of sub-sections 2(a) and (b) of the Systems Act.
8.3 Alternatively, directing the Speaker of the Council of the Municipality to convene a
Special Municipal Council meeting in terms of section 37 of the Local Government:
Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 , to consider the validity of the appointment of
Ms Sibanyoni to the position of CFO.
[9] In the affidavit filed in support of the prayers, Msibi found his powers in section 56
of the Systems Act as well as section 41 of the Constitution dealing with Co -operative
Government and Intergovernmental Relations. He believed that the Systems Act provides
for his concurrence in the appointment of the CFO and other section 56 managers directly
accountable to the Municipal Manager.
[10] The CFO, who was the sixth respondent, opposed the application and filed an
opposing affidavit in which she comprehensively dealt with the allegations regarding her
suitability for the post , namely, the alleged misrepresentation in her CV. She insinuates
unwarranted interference by Msibi in the affairs of the municipality due to the financial
interests he has in the allocation of tenders. She says Msibi agreed to her appointment
as he was represented throughout the recruitment process. Lastly, she says Msibi was
actuated by malice and vindictiveness due to their love relationship that started in 2016
when he was the Speaker of the Council of the Municipality of Mbombela and ended in
2018. Msibi is accordingly using his official power to settle personal scores and is
determined to derail her career progress whenever he can.
[11] Msibi was removed from the portfolio of Co-operative Governance and Traditional
[11] Msibi was removed from the portfolio of Co-operative Governance and Traditional
Affairs and was succeeded by Mr Speedy Katisho Mashilo (Mashilo). Almost a year after
Msibi’s institution of the legal proceedings, Mashilo withdrew the application through his
lawyers on 29 October 2024. Ordinarily , this would have been the end of the ordeal for
the applicant, but not in the Mbombela Municipality, which has become a feeding trough
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for avaricious politicians and business people alike. The withdrawal was a temporary
reprieve as Mashilo was to strike again, and this time without notice to the applicant as to
what led to the change in position. He owed her no explanation – after all, he is in charge.
He is the MEC.
[12] On 4 April 2025, Mashilo addressed a letter to the Executive Mayor in which he
stated as follows:
“[2] The municipality was advised through the office of the Executive Mayor that, the
office of the MEC was not supporting the appointment of the Chief Financial Officer due
to the misrepresentation on the curriculum vitae. The municipality was further advised to
take the matter to council so that, a decision can be made to reverse the appointment of
the Chief Financial Officer and that within 30 days the municipality to inform the office of
the MEC in this regard.
[3] The Department still maintains that, the advice that was provided through a letter
dated 12 July 2023 still stands.”
[13] The Executive Mayor did not disappoint. He cajoled the Speaker to convene a
council meeting on 30 April 2025 , where he surreptitiously sneaked in the report calling
for the rescission of the decision taken in 2023 for the appointment of the CFO. The report
was adopted by the Council and brought to an end the appointment of the applicant as
CFO of the City of Mbombela, effective from 1 June 2025.
This Application
[14] The a pplicant brought an urgent application against the Speaker of the
Municipality, the Mayor, the City Manager, Council and the MEC for the Department of
Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, in which she sought the following relief:
14.1 Declaring the directive of the fifth respondent to the fourth respondent unlawful and
setting it aside.
14.2 Declaring the report of the third respondent unlawful and setting it aside.
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14.3 Declaring the resolution of the fourth respondent dated 30 April 2025 unlawful and
setting it aside.
[15] The application is opposed by the Mayor , the Council, as well as the MEC. The
Speaker filed an explanatory affidavit on the advice of his legal representatives. He aligns
himself with the case of the applicant and says that the Council does not have the power
to rescind its own decision. Only a court of law can do so. The other Respondents defend
the position of the Council and submit that the MECs (Mashilo and Msibi) were entitled to
act in the manner they did in order to ensure that there is compliance wi th legislative
prescripts.
Preliminary Points
[16] This matter came before me in the urgent court on 9 September 2025. It was the
second time that it was enrolled in the urgent court, and the following paragraphs indicate
how it happened.
[17] The applicant first enrolled the matter in the urgent court on 13 May 2025 before
Fourie AJ, who struck it from the roll for want of urgency. He ordered the applicant to pay
the costs of the opposing respondents on a party and party scale B , which costs shall
include the costs of two counsel where employed. The second to fourth respondents were
ordered to pay costs to the applicant in respect of the withdrawn application. The parties
were directed to approach the Registrar for the allocation of a trial date on the normal
motion court roll.
[18] The applicant, through her attorneys, approached the office of the Judge President
for a special allocation. The Judge President, writing in response to the request, said: The
parties can re-enrol their matter on the urgent court roll should they wish to do so.
However, they are directed to comply with the Rules of Court and the Practice Directive.
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[19] At the commencement of the hearing, I enquired from the parties if urgency is still
an issue in view of the order of Fourie AJ. The respondents took the view that the
applicant still has to pass the urgency test since the matter was in the urgent court and
the provisions of Rule 6(12) are applicable. The applicant, through his counsel, contended
otherwise and submitted that the matter , properly contextualised, is a special allocation
by the Judge President who has designated the urgent court to be the forum to hear it.
Even if the respondents do not agree with this interpretation, the matter is still urgent in
view of the subsequent events, in particular, the pending recruitment process the
municipality has embarked on. If the matter were to be heard on the normal roll, there
would not be substantial redress in due course. I gave an order that the matter is urgent,
and that my reasons will follow with the judgment.
[20] The principles governing urgency are trite, and the requirements thereof have been
the subject of many cases. There is a general consensus that the ultimate test , as
espoused in East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd
and Others,1 is whether the applicant will obtain substantial redress if the matter were to
be heard on a normal roll. The determination of whether or not the applicant will obtain
substantial redress in due course is made on a case -by-case basis, depending on the
facts. As it is often said, substantial redress is not the same as irreparable harm.
[21] On the facts of this case, the respondents argued strenuously that the applicant
cannot use financial hardship as a reason to support her contention for urgency and urged
me to consider the relief she may possibly get at the CCMA or in the Labour Court. As I
listened to the respondents, they did not seriously contest the applicant’s submission that
she is suffering harm as a result of the impugned decision taken by the respondents.
she is suffering harm as a result of the impugned decision taken by the respondents.
Indeed, it is so that harm alone does not determine urgency but needs to be assessed
against the possible redress in future if it is not eradicated instantly.
1 East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others [2011] ZAGPJHC
196.
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[22] The applicants countered the respondents on the need for the court to vindicate
the rule of law as an incident of the principle of legality. People employed to exercise
public power should at all material times observe the limits of their power and exercise it
within the bounds of the Constitution. The violation of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights should not be tolerated. With this, I agree. It is for this reason that I ruled that the
matter is urgent and deserves to be heard in time in order to erad icate the continuous
harm the applicant was being subjected to in violation of her rights by the people
employed to exercise public power for lawful purposes and not for self -enrichment, and
personal vindictiveness disguised as legislative oversight. As stated in Apleni v President
of the Republic of South Africa and Another:2
“Where allegations are made relating to abuse of power by a Minister or other public
officials, which may impact upon the Rule of Law, and may have a detrimental impact upon
the public purse, the relevant relief sought ought normally be urgently considered.”
[23] In Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson , Tender Board:
Limpopo Province and Others ,3 Jafta J urged the High Courts to give priority to review
applications. He said the following:
“In conclusion there is one further matter that needs to be mentioned. It appears that in
some cases applicants for review approach the High Court promptly for relief but their
cases are not expeditiously heard and as a result by the time the matter is finally
determined, practical problems militating against the setting -aside of the challenged
decision would have arisen. Consequently the scope of granting an effective relief to
vindicate the infringed rights become s drastically reduced. It may help if the High Court,
to the extent possible, gives priority to these matters.”
[24] The second preliminary point related to the lack of jurisdiction. The respondents
[24] The second preliminary point related to the lack of jurisdiction. The respondents
argued that this Court does not have jurisdiction and that the applicant should have
instituted proceedings in the Labour Court. There is simply no merit to this tired argument.
2 Apleni v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another [2018] 1 All SA 728 (GP) para 10.
3 Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province and Others
2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA).
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The Constitutional Court has authoritatively stated in Baloyi v Public Protector and
Others4 that:
“… the mere fact that a dispute is located in the realm of labour and employment does not
exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court. As this court held in Gcaba:
‘(T)he LRA does not intend to destroy causes of action or remedies and s 157 should not
be interpreted to do so. Where a remedy lies in the High Court, s 157(2) cannot be read
to mean that it no longer lies there and should not be read to mean as much ... If only the
Labour Court could deal with disputes arising out of all employment relations, remedies
would be wiped out, because the Labour Court (being a creature of statute with only
selected remedies and powers) does not have the power to deal with the common-law or
other statutory remedies’.”
[25] The a pplicant challenges the power of the MEC to dictate that the Municipal
Council rescind its decision. Aligned to this, whether the MEC is in law required to concur
in the appointment of a section 56 manager. These are matters located in the constitution
as they implicate an exercise of public power. Absent lawful power, the decision is
unlawful and a court of law, including the High Court, has jurisdiction to review and set it
aside on the basis of the principle of legality. The point on the lack of jurisdiction is
dismissed.
[26] The MEC (Mashilo) raised the point of res judicata, and I will assume it was in
relation to urgency, as the merits were not argued before Fourie AJ. I have already made
an order on urgency , and the reasons are furnished above. The merits are not res
judicata.
Merits
[27] The applicant approached this court to vindicate the rule of law. She alleges that
the two MECs (Msibi and Mashilo) are exercising their powers outside the law , more
especially when it comes to the appointment of section 56 managers. The legislation does
4 Baloyi v Public Protector and Others 2022 (3) SA 321 (CC) para 45.
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not provide for their concurrence in the appointment of the incumbent to the section 56
position. She also says the Municipal Council of Mbombela does not have the power to
rescind its own decision. Once a decision is taken, it is binding until reviewed and set
aside by a court of law.
[28] I propose to consider this matter from the decision of Msibi dated 12 April 2023 ,
when he requested the Executive Mayor to conduct an investigation regarding the CV of
the CFO. The letter does not state the source of his power to make the “request”. There
is, however, nothing wrong with an MEC responsible for Co -operative Governance and
Traditional Affairs acting on allegations of maladm inistration and irregular appointments
in a municipality falling under his jurisdiction. The law allows him to do so. It is unfortunate
that his advisors used the wrong word , “concurrence”. Section 56 does not require an
MEC to concur in the appointment of the manager. All that it says is that the Municipal
Council must , within 14 days of the date of appointment , inform the MEC for local
government of the appointment process and outcome. Nowhere does it use the word
“concur”, nor does it give him/her power to play any role in the appointment process.
[29] If it comes to the attention of the MEC that a section 56 post was filled in
contravention of this ( the Systems Act and not any other Act ), the MEC for local
government must take steps to enforce compliance. The steps may include an application
to the court and must be done within 14 days of becoming aware of the contravention.
[30] When the MEC wrote a letter to the Executive Mayor , he was acting in terms of
section 56(6), taking an appropriate step to ensure that the Municipal Council complies
with the Act by ensuring that a suitable, qualified person is appointed to the post.
[31] Section 106 of the Systems Act empowers the MEC to request the Municipal
Council or Municipal Manager to provide a report in cases where he or she believes that
Council or Municipal Manager to provide a report in cases where he or she believes that
the municipality does not perform a statutory obligation or that there is maladministration
or serious malpractice occurring i n the municipality. He or she may also designate a
person to investigate the matter. The purpose of section 106 was explained in MEC for
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Local Government, Western Cape v Matzikama Local Municipality and Others 5 as
follows:
“It is part of the system for the monitoring , by provincial executive, of local governments
so that the performance of local governments may be strengthened and improved, and
municipal officials be held accountable for their administration. Section 106 is therefore a
mechanism by which an MEC may investigate allegations that serious problems have
arisen relating to the administration and governance of a municipality. The purpose of
activating the mechanism is to obtain the necessary facts so that the source of the problem
can be identified, with a view to remedying the weakness in the system.”
[32] Msibi was correct to request the Council, through the Executive Mayor, to conduct
the investigation and furnish him with a report. The timeline given was too short for anyone
to conduct a meaningful investigation , and this suggests in the strongest way that the
request was more of a compliance than a need to conduct a fair, objective and
independent investigation on the allegations he received. The applicant decries this
“investigation” and contends that it was malicious and not for a lawful purpose. When one
has regard to the fact that Msibi, as the MEC, was represented throughout the recruitment
process, it is difficult to dismiss this contention. The applicant has a point.
[33] Upon receipt of the report, Msibi, believing that he has a legal weapon in his hands
to reinstate the removal of the CFO , wrote to the Executive Mayor that he does not
“concur” with the appointment. As stated above, this was an exercise of power he did not
have. He was wrong to think that he was required to concur. All actions following this
erroneous belief were consequent upon his exercising an unlawful power. His direction
to the Municipal Council to rescind its decision on the appointment of the CFO was based
on the wrong reading of the law. He had no power to direct the Municipal Council to
on the wrong reading of the law. He had no power to direct the Municipal Council to
rescind its decision. In any event , councillors of the municipality perform constitutional
duties and are , in law, not allowed to submit to unlawful instructions of the MEC. They
5 MEC for Local Government, Western Cape v Matzikama Local Municipality and Others 2023 (3) SA 521
(SCA) para 17.
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should, in the performance of their duties, be independent and act in the best interests of
the municipality.
[34] When the municipality did not act on his dictates, Msibi launched a court
application where the issue relating to the appointment of the CFO was placed at the
centre stage. At the heart of this application was a challenge to the lawfulness of the
Municipal Council’s resolution to appoint the applicant as the CFO of the municipality. All
relevant parties were invited to participate in these proceedings, including the Mayor, the
Municipal Manager, the Speaker, the Council itself, as well as the applicant.
[35] Only the CFO ( applicant) joined issue with Msibi. She was supported by the
Speaker. In opposing the application, the applicant sets out in detail her qualification s,
experience and the process she underwent before being appointed. This application was
not pursued until Msibi left office.
[36] The new MEC (Mashilo), in his capacity as the successor in rights and obligations,
considered the facts surrounding the application, including the allegations levelled against
the applicant and decided to withdraw the application. The withdrawal of the application
brought to an end a legal dispute between the applicant and the MEC (Mashilo) insofar
as her appointment to the position of the CFO is concerned. This is predicated on the
doctrine of finality.
[37] In Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State
Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State and
Others,6 the Constitutional Court opens its judgment with the following instructive words:
“[1] Like all things in life, like the best of times and the worst of times, litigation must , at
some point, come to an end ... legal certainty and finality of judgments are the oxygen
without which the rule of law languishes, suffocates and perishes”.
without which the rule of law languishes, suffocates and perishes”.
6 Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and
Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State and Others 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC) para 1.
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[38] I am aware that a withdrawal of court proceedings cannot be equated to a judgment
of the court. The point I am simply making is that Mashilo made a decision to withdraw
the application. The applicant and all other parties participating in the court action acted
on the basis of that decision and arranged their lives and operations in line with it. Once
an administrator makes a decision, he or she is bound by it.
[39] In Mncwabe v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others , 7 the
Constitutional Court dealt extensively with the doctrine of finality and said:
“Functus officio
[42] … this doctrine entails that once something is done, it cannot be undone, reversed or
otherwise altered by the decision-maker. This is because the decision-maker would have
exhausted her authority and relinquished her jurisdiction over the matter by taking a final
decision. The finality of a decision is central to the doctrine’s operation. The doctrine
promotes certainty and stability and it ameliorates prejudice and injustice occasioned to
those who would rely on otherwise wavering decisions.
[40] In Retail Motor Industry Organisation and Another v Minister of Water &
Environmental Affairs and Another,8 the Supreme Court of Appeal held the following with
regard to the doctrine:
“… first, the principle applies only to final decisions ; secondly, it usually applies where
rights or benefits have been granted – and thus when it would be unfair to deprive a
person of an entitlement that has already vested ; thirdly, an administrative decision -
maker may vary or revoke even such a decision if the empowering legislation authorises
him or her to do so (although such a decision would be subject to procedural fairness
having been observed and any other conditions) ; fourthly, the functus officio principle
does not apply to the amendment or repeal of subordinate legislation.
7 Mncwabe v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2024 (1) SACR 447 (CC) para 42.
8 Retail Motor Industry Organisation and Another v Minister of Water & Environmental Affairs and Another
2014 (3) SA 251 (SCA) para 25.
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[41] A useful exposition of the doctrine is advanced by Pretorius:9
“The functus officio doctrine is one of the mechanisms by means of which the law gives
expression to the principle of finality. According to this doctrine, a person who is vested
with adjudicative or decision -making powers may, as a general rule, exercise those
powers only once in relation to the same matter. This rule applies with particular force, but
not only, in circumstances where the exercise of such adjudicative or decision -making
powers has the effect of determining a person’s legal rights or of con ferring rights or
benefits of a legally cognizable nature on a person. The result is that once such a decision
has been given, it is (subject to any right of appeal to a superior body or functionary) final
and conclusive. Such a decision cannot be revoked or varied by the decision-maker.”
[42] The MEC (Mashilo) took a decision that the appointment of the applicant as the
CFO is legal, and is put beyond doubt by the explanatory affidavit filed by the Speaker of
the municipality. He states as follows:
“Mr Mashilo, the current MEC withdrew the review application and that withdrawal brought
finality to the matter... shortly after his appointment as MEC, and after he was appraised
of the review application internally the MEC convened a meeting with the Applicant, Mayor,
Municipal Manager, Chief Director of the Department and HOD. In that meeting he asked
the Applicant to make a representation regarding the alleged misrepresentation so that he
could make a decision. The Applicant made the representation in that meeting.
The next meeting, the MEC convened shortly before he withdrew the review application
on the same issue was with me, the Mayor, the Chief Whip, the Municipal Manager, and
the eight full time Council lors who are appointed MMCs. In that meeting, the MEC was
accompanied by the HOD of the Department. He informed us he has considered the
accompanied by the HOD of the Department. He informed us he has considered the
matter and the representations that were made to him by the Applicant and as the
Department, they have done their own in ternal investigations and have concluded that
there was no merit in the allegation that the Applicant has misrepresented in her CV.”
9 D M Pretorius ‘The origins of the functus officio doctrine, with specific reference to its application in
administrative law’ (2005) 122 SALJ 832 at 832.
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[43] The Municipal Manager and the Mayor have not disputed the assertions made by
the Speaker. In motion proceedings, affidavits serve as evidence, and what comes from
the Speaker is unchallenged evidence. The MEC (Mashilo) himself chose not to say
anything on this recording of events and what was said in his name. I therefore find
without hesitation that the MEC (Mashilo) has properly applied his mind to the issue
regarding the suitability of the applicant to assume the position of the CFO. Council of the
municipality, represented by the Speaker , the Executive Mayor , and the Municipal
Manager, agreed with the MEC (Mashilo) that the decision by the Council to appoint the
applicant was valid and no legal basis existed for its challenge. They, in support of the
decision, agreed to the withdrawal of the application , fully aware of its effects on the
municipality.
[44] The subsequent decision by MEC (Mashilo) on 4 April 2025 to still require the
Council to table the issue for discussion was unlawful. The decision made previously that
there was no merit to the allegations against the CFO remained valid until reviewed or
set aside.
[45] The decision by the Executive Mayor to table a report without notice to the Speaker
and the applicant violated the applicant’s right to be heard on an issue where she had a
vested right.
[46] Finally, the termination letter by the City Manager written to the applicant records
that the Council resolved to terminate the appointment “as a result of MEC for CoGTA not
concurring with your appointment”. The termination was effected for the wrong reason
and unrelated to the allegation of misrepresentation. The Council relied on a non-existent
law to terminate the appointment of its employee, acting on the dictates of the MEC, who
does not clearly understand his powers and duties , or he simply acted ignorant ly to
perpetuate an unlawful removal of the CFO.
[47] It is concerning that an MEC with unlimited exposure to legal advice both internally
[47] It is concerning that an MEC with unlimited exposure to legal advice both internally
and externally can choose to be so reckless in the execution of his duties and risk
plunging the mun icipality into financial chaos. The removal of the CFO w as, based on the
facts before me , actuated by malice, sinister motives and desire to perpetuate illegality.
It w as not for a lawful purpose.
[48] It follow s that the application should succeed, and the resolution of the Mun icipal
Co uncil of the C ity of Mbombe la dated 30 April 2025 is declared unlawful and set aside.
[49] The m unicipality, more especially the Executive Mayor and the Counc il, failed in
their duties and allow ed themselves to be dictated to by the M EC , Mas hilo. They should
all be liable for the costs on an attorney and client scale, jointly and severally liable, one
paying the other to be absolved.
M.I. MANGENA AJ
AC TING JUDG E OF THE H IG H COUR T
MPUMALANGA DIVISIO N , MBOMB ELA
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Appearances
For the Applicant: Adv. T.S Ngwenya
Instructed by: Nthabiseng Madoa Attorneys INC.
For the First Respondent: Gerhard Lourens INC.
For the Second - Fourth Respondents: Adv. Zwane
Instructed by: WS Nkosi Attorneys INC.
For the Fifth Respondent: Adv. M.W Dlamini
Instructed by: Office of the State Attorney Mbombela
Heard On: 09 September 2025
Delivered On: 02 October 2025