IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MBOMBELA
CASE NO: 1673/2022
(1) REPOR TABLE :NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JU DGES : NO
(3) REVISED : YES
01/10/2025
In the matter between:
WONDERBOYBONGANIMHLONGO APPLICANT
and
MINISTER OF POLICE FIRST RESPONDENT
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSIONER SECOND RESPONDENT
PROVINCIAL POLICE COMMISSIONER THIRD RESPONDENT
STATE ATTORNEY FOURTH RESPONDENT
2
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties and/or parties’
representatives by email. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 01 October
2025 at 10:00.
JUDGMENT
Mashile J
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal at the centre of which has become an
application for condonation. The latter application took the centre stage because the
Applicant, Mhlongo, failed to bring the leave to appeal within the period envisaged in
Uniform Rule of Court 49(1), which provides that:
“(a) When leave to appeal is required, it may on a statement of the grounds therefor be
requested at the time of the judgment or order.
(b) When leave to appeal is required and it has not been requested at the time of the judgment
or order, application for such leave shall be made and the grounds therefor shall be furnished
within 15 days after the date of the order appealed against:
Provided that when the reasons or the full reasons for the court’s order are given on a later date
than the date of the order, such application may be made within 15 days after such later date:
Provided further that the court may, upon good cause shown, extend the aforementioned periods
of 15 days.”
[2] The judgment of this Court having been handed down on 17 December 2024, it
follows that Mhlongo should have noted his appeal on 12 January 2025. However,
Mhlongo contends that he could not have launched the application for leave to appeal
punctually for reasons that I shall consider later in this judgment. Mhlongo ultimately
launched his application for leave to appeal on 14 August 2025. The application for
condonation must take precedence over the leave to appeal because if this Court is not
adequately persuaded of the reasons for the delay in launching the condonation
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application and presence of prospects of success of the appeal, it could be dispositive of
both applications.
Terse Factual Background
[3] The sequence of events is that the Court delivered the judgment on 17 December
2024. On 24 January 2025 and following receipt of the judgment, Mhlongo requested a
transcript of the proceedings. On 30 July 2025, the Gauteng Transcribers supplied the
record to Mhlongo. Mhlongo then proceeded to consult his legal representatives for their
opinion on the likely success of his impending appeal. His legal representatives probably
gave him a promising picture of the appeal, if the applications fo r leave to appeal and
condonation are anything to determine Mhlongo’s decision to bring these applications
albeit belatedly.
Issues
[4] Insofar as the condonation application is concerned, the sole decision for this Court
to make is whether Mhlongo has made a case for the late launching of the leave to appeal.
Needless to state that it will be the end of the road for Mhlongo should the Court conclude
that the reasons given for the late launching of the application are not satisfactory or
insufficient.
Legal Framework
[5] Here the starting point has to be Uniform Rule of Court 27(1), which provides that:
“In the absence of agreement between the parties, in terms of Rule 27(1), the court may upon
application on notice and on good cause shown, make an order extending or abridging any time
prescribed by these Rules or by an order of court or fixed by an order extending or abridging any
time for doing any act or taking any step in connection with any proceedings of any nature
whatsoever upon such terms as to it seems meet.”
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[6] An application in terms of Rule 27(1) may be granted provided an Applicant
demonstrates good cause. In an instance where there has been a long delay, a full and
reasonable explanation covering the entire period of delay must be furnished. The reason
given for the full account has always been that condonation is not there for the mere
taking. Thus, an allegation that the other party to the proceedings will not suffer prejudice
will often not be adequate to overcome the hurdle. It should suffice to state that an
exercise in weighing the existence of good cause involves a consideration of whether the
interest of justice requires that condonation be granted, which in turn demands an
evaluation of a number of factors such as the explanation for the delay, the length of the
delay, the absence of prejudice to the other party and the prospects of success on appeal.
[7] In Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority and Another1, the Court held that:
“Although the existence of prospects of success in favour of the party seeking condonation is not
decisive, it is an important factor in favour of granting condonation. The interest of justice must be
determined with reference to all relevant factors. However, some of the factors may justifiably be
left out of consideration in certain circumstances. For example, where the delay is unacceptably
excessive and there is no explanation for the delay, there may be no need to consider the
prospects of success. If the period of delay is short and there is an unsatisfactory explanation but
there are reasonable prospects of success, condonation should be granted. However, despite
the presence of reasonable prospects of success, condonation may be refused where the delay
is excessive, the explanation is non-existent and granting condonation would prejudice the other
party. As a general proposition the various factors are not individually decisive but should all be
taken into account to arrive at a conclusion as to what is in the interest of justice.”
taken into account to arrive at a conclusion as to what is in the interest of justice.”
[8] also relevant in showing whether good cause has been established is a Court’s
exercise of discretion. The statement in Vlok NO v Sun International South Africa Ltd 2
that t he broad discretion enjoyed by a Court when considering whether a litigant has
shown good cause does not extend to incorporate ignorance of an Act of Parliament nor
is it a free -floating power to condone non -compliance with statutory time periods is
significant. The power ought to be exercised circumspectly and judiciously.
1 Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority and Another 2014 (2) SA 68 (CC) at par 50 – 51
2 Vlok NO v Sun International South Africa Ltd 2014 (1) SA 487 (GSJ)
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Evaluation
[9] The first question is whether it will be in the interest of justice to allow the leave to
appeal despite it having been brought late. Mhlongo begins his assertions by defining the
word ‘day’ as stated in the Uniform Rules of Court. I am at a complete loss why he finds
it necessary to do so especially in circumstances where the exclusion of weekends and
holidays are a matter of course. To the extent that he may be seeking to include recess
period in the definition of a day, perhaps it is proper to state tha t the exclusion of the
period between 15 December to 16 January applies to action matters and not motion
court. So, contrary to Mhlongo’s belief, a consideration of the period of delay will
necessarily cover the entire period from 17 December 2024 to the d ate on which he
launched the application for leave to appeal, 14 August 2025. Understood in this manner,
Mhlongo has delayed by almost eight months to launch the leave to appeal.
[10] Mhlongo’s affidavit hopelessly fails to give a single reason why he did not note the
appeal while waiting for the record, as is customary in practice. In a rather feeble and
subtle manner, Mhlongo suggests that following his receipt of the judgment, he proceeded
to apply for the record of the proceedings without noting the ap peal and obtaining any
legal advice from his legal representatives. He also adds that he was unfamiliar with these
processes as a lay person. This is understandable and probably constitutes the reason
why he sought legal advice in the first place when he sued the Minister of Police and the
other Respondents. However, when it became critical to decide whether to appeal or not,
he experienced this moment of blackout.
[11] It is manifest why Mhlongo states that in applying for the record, he acted without
legal advice and only sought one upon receipt of it from Gauteng Transcribers. By doing
so, he seeks to place blame on his lack of legal representation hoping that it will hide the
so, he seeks to place blame on his lack of legal representation hoping that it will hide the
inordinate delay of the period of seven to eight months. All that he says is t hat given his
lack of knowledge of the law, the delay was not unconscionable nor was it prejudicial to
the Minister. This is contrived and requires exposure for what it truly is. Mhlongo comes
short on giving a full account why he failed to launch the leave to appeal during the seven-
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eight-month period. The reason that he was without legal representatives is rejected as
a fabrication because he knew that he could not take the whole process of appeal to
conclusion alone. With regard to prejudice, I need to s tate that the interest of justice
requires that there be finality in litigation.
[12] In deciding whether it will be in the interest of justice were this Court to grant
condonation, I am expected to assess the prospects of success of the appeal. It is at this
point that I turn to determine the prospects of success of the application for leave to
appeal. Mhlongo is seeking leave to appeal in terms of both section 17(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of
the Superior Court Act, 10 of 2013 (“the Act”) The application for leave to appeal is silent
on whether Mhlongo wishes the appeal to be heard by the Full Court of this Division or
the Supreme Court of Appeal. In view of that silence and because in any event, there are
no compelling reasons or even conflicting decisions on the matter, I will assume that the
intention is that it be heard by the Full Court of this Division.
[13] In terms of the Act, Mhlongo must demonstrate:
13.1 That the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success for purposes of
section 17(1)(a)(i). See, Chithi and Others; In re: Luhlwini Mchunu Community v Hancock
and Others3; or
13.2 That there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration, for purposes of section
17(1)(a)(ii).
[14] In Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Another 4, the Court
observed that r egarding section 17(1)(a)(i ): “The test of reasonable prospects of success
postulates a dispassionate decision based on the facts and the law that a court of appeal could
reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the trial court. In other words, the ppellants
3 Chithi and Others; In re: Luhlwini Mchunu Community v Hancock and Others [2021] ZASCA 123 (23
September 2021)
4 Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Another (724/2019) [2021] ZASCA 31 (31 March
2021)
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in this matter need to convince this Court on proper grounds that they have prospects of success
on appeal. Those prospects of succe ss must not be remote, but there must exist a reasonable
chance of succeeding. A sound rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of
success must be shown to exist.”
[15] Regarding section 17(1)(a)(ii): Even if the Court is unpersuaded that there are
prospects of success, it must still enquire into whether there are compelling reasons
which exist why the appeal should be heard such as the interests of justice. Compelling
reason would of course include an important question of law or a discreet issue of public
importance that will have an effect on future disputes. See, the Ramakatsa case supra at
Para 10.
[16] As one of the grounds of the leave to appeal application Mhlongo states that the
Court misdirected itself by holding that he confessed to the police that he had fought with
his neighbours during which both of them sustained injuries. Surprisingly, Mhlongo would
have this Court believe that his clothes were bloodied from the injuries inflicted by his two
neighbours but would not say that he retaliated, which resulted in the complainant
sustaining injuries too. His emphasis is rather that he too had injuries and that the police
officer was biased by attending to the complainant first. So, he never denied that he
injured the complainant.
[17] Mhlongo argued that he was the first to arrive at the police station. That claim is,
however, contradicted by the language that he employed when he made his statement.
The words that he chose were that he went to the police station ‘to lay a counter charge’
or ‘to open a counter case against his neighbours’. The word, counter, suggests that by
the time he got to the police station, he knew that someone had already laid a charge or
opened a case against him. The contention that he was the first to arrive at the police
station stands to be rejected as false.
station stands to be rejected as false.
[18] Mhlongo’s assertion that the complainant walked pass the Matekwani Hospital
situated approximately 600 Metres away from the police station is an indication that she
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did not require med ical assistance. This argument can be throw n right back at him
because, he too passed the same Hospital before entering the police station suggesting
that he could not have been seriously hurt. The evidence concerning w hether:
18.1 the complainant made a statement to the police officer;
18.2 there w as no proof that she w as escorted to Hosp ital by the police and
18.3 that no J88 w as presented to this Court;
w as not challenged in Court. As such, it cannot be raised now. Besides, there is no
application to levy new evidence before this Court. In the circumstances, I do not believe
that another Court w ould reach a different conclusion from that of the Court a quo.
[19] Insofar as the findings of this Court are concerned on Section 40, the judgment is
clear and I stand by w hat is outlined therein. There is a full account of the reasons w hy
this Court held that objectively the police officer's suspicion w as not unconscionable. In
view of the inordinate delay in the launching of the application for condonation, the failure
to give a full honest account of w hat transpired during that period and the absence of
prospects that another Court w ould reach a different conclusion from that of the Court a
quo w ere the leave to appeal to be granted, the application for condonation must fail. The
follow ing order is made :
1. The application is dism issed w ith costs.
8 A MASHILE
JUDGE O F THE HIGH C OURT
MPUMALANGA DIV IS IO N , MBOMBELA
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APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Applicant: Adv DJ Sibuyi
Instructed by: Adv Sibuyi
C/O Thobela Sindy Attorneys Inc
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms FN Dube
Instructed by: Dube N Attorneys Inc
Date of Judgment: 01 October 2025