IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Not reportable
Case no: A72/2024
In the matter between:
MANGAUNG METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY APPELLANT
and
HILLANDALE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION t/a
WOODLAND HILLS WILDLIFE ESTATE FIRST RESPONDENT
MEC: CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE AND
TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS, FREE STATE PROVINCE SECOND RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality v Hillandale Homeowners
Association t /a Woodland Hills Wildlife Estate & Ano ther
(A72/2024) [2025] ZAFSHC 297 (18 September 2025)
Coram: MHLAMBI ADJP and LOUBSER J and DE LA REY AJ
Heard: 25 July 2025
Delivered: 18 September 2025
Summary: Appeal – against court order declaring that a private security estate
shall be responsible for the removal of household refuse from the estate, and not the
municipality.
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ORDER
___________________________________________________________________
The appeal is dismissed with costs, such to include the costs of two counsel
where so employed on scale C.
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
Loubser J (Mhlambi ADJP and De La Rey AJ concurring):
[1] This is an appeal against the judgment and orders handed down by a single
judge of this d ivision, declaring that the first respondent shall be responsible for the
removal of household refuse from the Woodlands Hill s Wildlife Estate to a
designated landfill site in Bloemfontein. It was further ordered that the appellant shall
forthwith cease to charge fees related to refuse removal services in respect of all
immovable properties situated within the Woodland Hills Estate.
[2] The first respondent featured as the applicant in the court a quo, moving for
the orders handed down by the trial j udge. Only the appellant, who was the first
respondent, opposed the application. Having been dissatisfied with the outcome of
the application, the appellant then initiated appeal proceedings, and the appeal came
before this Court with leave of the court a quo.
[3] Before venturing into the issues that c ame before the court a quo and this
Court, it needs m entioning that the first respondent is a popular security estate
situated a few kilometers outside the city of Bloemfontein, but still within the
municipal boundaries of the appellant. It boasts large residential areas within a
natural environment with an abundancy of wildlife.
[4] The history of the relationship between the appellant and the first respondent
appears from the record of papers filed in the application in the court a quo, and is
mostly common cause between the parties. It all started in August 2000 when the
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developers of the Woodland Hill s Township, which later became known as the
Woodland Hills Wildlife Estate, applied for the establishment of a township to the
second respondent. On 20 August 2000, the Head of the Department of Local
Government and Housing approved the application in terms of s 10 of the Township
Ordinance No 9 of 1969. This approval was made subject to a number of conditions,
one of which was that a signed service agreement had to be c oncluded between the
developer and the municipality of Bl oemfontein comprising the rendering of all
services before proclamation takes place.
[5] On 16 April 2004, Phase 1 of the Woodland Hill s development was included
in the municipality as Bloemfontein Extension 166 by way of a Proclamation
published by the responsible Member of the Executive Council of the second
respondent. Years later, on 9 March 2018, Phase 2 of the development was also
included in the municipality as Bloemfontein Extension 275, by another Proclamation
published on that date. Both the Proclamations contained certain conditions in terms
of which Woodland Hill s became established. One of the conditions appearing in
both Proclamations provided that ‘ the Town Owner shall be responsible for the
removal of household refuse in the town’.
[6] Before the publication of the first Proclamation, the appellant and Woodland
Hills duly concluded a signed Service Level Agreement to fulfill the condition of
approval referred to above. Although this agreement dealt pertinently with the supply
of electricity, water , sewerage effluent and other services, no reference whatsoever
was made to the aspect of the refuse removal. Likewise, before the publication of the
second Proclamation, the parties signed an Extension to the prior Service Leve l
Agreement, in which they again omitted any reference to the removal of refuse. As
already pointed out, it was only in the pursuant two Proclamations itself that it was
already pointed out, it was only in the pursuant two Proclamations itself that it was
specifically stated that the town owner shall be responsible for the removal of
household refuse in the town.
[7] Curiously enough, the appellant did nothing to record its di sapproval or
objection to the removal of refuse stipulation when the application for the
establishment of the tow nship was published in t he Government Gazette in terms of
the applicable procedure.
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[8] As things turned out, the appellant at all material times w ent on to render the
refuse removal service by itself or by hiring private contractors to do so. It was the
case for the appellant in the court a quo that this was done in terms of the Service
Level Agreement and it s Extension, subject to the authority of Woodland Hills. In
terms of the said two agreements, all services were rendered by the appellant, it was
contended. Woodland Hills was therefore prevented from relying on the
Proclamations, the argument w ent. It further transpired from the papers before the
court a quo that the appellant chose to oppose the application for a declarator mainly
because it did not want to lose the income it generated by the removal of household
refuse from Woodland Hills.
[9] On the other hand, it was the case for Woodland Hills in the court a quo that it
needed to enforce the stipulation in the two Proclamations that the town owner shall
be responsible for the removal of household refuse in the town. This stipulation was
a condition of the township establishment, but was never implemented.
Consequently, there was now a need for the relief sought, it was contended in the
court a quo.
[10] In his judgment, the trial j udge firstly referred to s 76( b) of the Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (Municipal Systems Act) , which
provides that the provision of services may be given by the municipality itself, or may
be provided by the municipality through other arrangements with other municipal
service partnerships. For that reason, he found that the provision of refuse removal
services is a municipal executive and legislative co mpetency and a service that
municipalities usually render, but not a right of a municipality.
[11] Secondly, the trial j udge referred to correspondence between the parties and
came to the conclusion that the appellant apparently did not want to lose the income
it generated from the refuse removal, as opposed to the contention that it has the
it generated from the refuse removal, as opposed to the contention that it has the
exclusive authority to render the refuse removal service.
[12] Thirdly, the trial j udge referred to the fact that, while the Service Level
Agreement and its Extension deal with the rendering of all sorts of services, no
reference whatsoever was made to the removal of refuse. Taken together with the
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fact that the appellant never objected to the reservation of refuse removal for the
town owner in the Proclamations, the trial j udge found that the refuse removal was
reserved for the Woodland Hills Estate, and was never intended to be a service to be
performed by the appellant.
[13] When the appellant later made application for leave to appeal against the
judgment and orders handed down, the trial judge granted leave to appeal to this
Court for the following reasons:
‘The dispute between the parties lies in the interpretation of the letter of approval in terms of
s 10 of the Township Ordinance No . 9 of 1969 as well as the two subsequent proclamations
by the Member of the Executive Council for the second respondent in the main application.
For this reason, I hold the view that leave to appeal should be granted.’
[14] At the hearing of the appeal in this C ourt, it was submitted on behalf of the
appellant that the court a quo had erred by approaching the issue between the
parties from the angle of a right that the appellant had or did not have to refuse
removal. That approach was wrong, it was submitted, because the issue did not
concern a right, but a constitutional obligation to provide services. In this respect the
Court was referred to s s 152 and 156 of the Constitution and to Chapter 8 of the
Municipal Systems Act. Consequently, the removal of refuse is rather an exclusive
obligation of a municipality, and not a right as such. Because of this wrong approach
by the trial j udge, the judgment of the court a quo ought to be set aside, it was
contended on behalf of the appellant.
[15] Now, to begin with, the Service Level Agreement and its Extension both deal
specifically with the various services by name, but not with the removal of refuse.
The fact that the Approval of the township was made subject to the condition that a
signed service agreement had to be concluded between the developer and the
signed service agreement had to be concluded between the developer and the
appellant comprising the rendering of all services cannot be of any consequence in
the determination of this appeal. This is so because of the fact that the removal of
refuse was eventually not mentioned in any of the two service agreements, and the
conditions in the Approval can therefore take the matter no further.
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[16] In contrast thereto, the two Proclamations leave no doubt as to their meaning.
They both expressly state that the town owner shall be responsible for the removal of
household refuse. The trial j udge can therefore not be faulted in his finding that the
refuse removal was never intended to be a service to be performed by the appellant.
However, it goes further than that. As a result of the Supreme Court of Appeal
decision in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others ,1 the
decision of the MEC to determine by way of the Proclamations that Woodland Hills
shall effect refuse removal in the township, should be given effect to, since it
comprised of a valid and legally determined public law right. Unless revoked by a
competent court, its substantive validity is accepted as a fact. Whether or not it was
indeed valid, is of no consequence.
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[17] In casu, the two Proclamations in question have not been challenged in any
manner by the appellant and have not been set aside. Its substantive validity must
therefore be accepted as a fact. The Proclamations and their terms and or conditions
remain in full force, including the condition that the town owner shall be responsible
for the removal of household refuse. This position became confirmed by s 60(1) of
the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013, which provides that
the repeal of laws referred to in s 59 or by a provincial legislature in relation to
provincial or municipal planning does not affect the validity of anything done in terms
of that legislation. The conclusion is then justified that the appellant has not shown
any right or the exclusive obligation to remove the household refuse from Woodland
Hills on the facts that served before the court a quo and before this C ourt. The
appeal consequently stands to be dismissed.
[18] In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary to evaluate in general the rights
or the exclusive obligations of municipalities as far as the rendering of services is
or the exclusive obligations of municipalities as far as the rendering of services is
concerned. The following order is made:
The appeal is dismissed with costs, such to include the costs of two counsel where
so employed on scale C.
1 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others [2004] ZASCA 48; [2004] 3 All SA 1
(SCA) 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) paras 27 and 37.
2 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and Another v Harrison and Another [2010]
ZACC 19; 2011 (2) BCLR 121 (CC); 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC) at para 62.
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____________________
P J LOUBSER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I concur.
____________________
J J MHLAMBI
ACTING DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT
I concur.
____________________
H E DE LA REY
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
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Appearances
For the appellant: W Mokare SC, assisted by M C Louw
Instructed by: Hill, McHardy & Herbst Incorporated
Bloemfontein
For the first respondent: S Grobler SC, assisted by J S Rautenbach
Instructed by: Symington & De Kok
Bloemfontein.