IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
In the matter between:
THULANI SYLVERIUS MAPHANGA
and
THE STATE
Not reportable
Case no: A 16/2024
APPELLANT
RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Maphanga v S (A16 /2024) [2025] ZAFS H C 298 (17 September 2025)
Coram:
Heard:
Opperman J et De La Rey AJ
11 August 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties'
representatives by email and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is
deemed to be 16h00 on 17 September 2025.
Summary: Appeal against convictions - administering of oath on 17-year-old to turn 18
years of age within two weeks of date of testimony - evaluation of evidence of comp lainant
in sexual offences matter - bare denial by accused.
ORDER
The appeal against the convictions on all three charges is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
Opperman J (De La Rey AJ concurring)
Introduction
2
[1] The case came on appeal after petition was granted on 29 January 2024 by this
Court in that the late filing of the application for leave to appeal was granted and leave
was granted to the applicant to appeal against his convictions. The petition to appeal
against the sentences was dismissed.1 Leave to appeal was dismissed in the court a quo
on the convictions and sentences in October 2023. The convictions and sentencing a quo
happened on 30 March 2022. The appellant was represented by counsel throughout the
trial.
[2] The matter turns on sexual offences in terms of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences
and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (SORMA). The appellant was 53 years
old at the time of his arrest on 30 November 2020. The complainant was 16 years old at
the time when the alleged events occurred that caused the charges against the appellant.
The dates of the perpetration of the alleged offences are reflected on the charge sheet to
be 18 March 2020 and August 2020.
[31 The complainant, born on 27 February 2004, was approximately two weeks shy of
her eighteenth birthday at the time she testified in court on 10 February 2022. The
1 This was dealt with under case no P11/2024.
3
prosecutor applied for her to t~stify under section 1582 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977 (CPA), as her intellectual and emotional development was deemed sufficient and
she did not require an intermediary.3
[4] She attended church devotedly where the appellant is a pastor at the church that
she and her family frequented. The incidents occurred when she assisted the appellant
with chores related to the church. Reading of her evidence shows a mature young lady
with an emotional and moral aptitude that is impressive. I will return to this later.
[5] The appellant was convicted of the following offences:
a. Count 1: Rape in terms of s 34 of SORMA;
b. Count 2: Sexual assault in terms of the contravention of s 55 of SOR MA; and
c. Count 3: 'Exposure or display of or causing exposure or display of genital organs,
anus or female breasts to children ('flashing') in contravention of s 22'6 of SORMA .
[6] On 18 March 2020, the appellant allegedly raped the complainant by penetrating
her vaginally with his finger. In August 2020, he allegedly committed sexual assault of the
complainant by touching her 'breasts and buttocks'. Also, on a separate occasion, in
August 2020, he allegedly 'exposed/displayed his genital organs/penis', to her.
2 'Section 158:
(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Act or any other law, all criminal proceedings in any
court shall take place in the presence of the accused.
(2)(a) A court may , subject to section 153, on its own initiative or on application by the public prosecutor,
order that a witness, irrespective of whether the witness is in or outside the Republic, or an accused, if the
witness or accused consents thereto, may give evidence by means of closed-circuit television or similar
electronic media.'
3 Record pp 17 and 18. Furthermore, the presiding officer was mistaken in the judgment when he noted on
p 176 at lines 15 to 19 that the complainant testified via intermediary.
p 176 at lines 15 to 19 that the complainant testified via intermediary.
4 'Rape .-Any person ("A") who unlawfully and intentionally commits an act of sexual penetration with a
complainant (''B"), without the consent of B , is guilty of the offence of rape.'
5 5. Sexual assault.-(1) A person ("A") who unlawfully and intentionally sexually violates a complainant
(''B"), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of sexual assault.
(2) ... '
6 Page iv of the record: Section 22: '-A person ("A ") who unlawfully and intentionally, whether for the sexual
gratification of A or of a third person ("C") or not, exposes or displays or causes the exposure or display of
the genital organs, anus or female breasts of A or C to a child complainant ("B"), with or without the consent
of B, is guilty of the offence of exposing or displaying or causing the exposure or display of genital organs,
anus or female breasts to a child.'
4
[7] The appellant was sentenced as follows:
a. Count 1: 10 years imprisonment;
b. Count 2: 3 years imprisonment; and
c. Count 3: 12 months imprisonment.
The sentences on counts 2 and 3 were ordered to run concurrently with the sentence
imposed in count 1. The effective sentence is thus 10 years imprisonment.
[8] The appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges and did not present any plea
explanation. The State adduced the evidence of the complainant and her mother and
handed in exhibits A to 0.7 The appellant testified in his defence and his evidence
concluded his case.
The appeal
[9] The appellant questions whether the Court conducted an enquiry to determine if
the complainant understood the nature and import of the oath and secondly, whether the
trial court correctly convicted the appellant on the evidence adduced.
[1 O] On the evidence itself the appellant takes issue with:
a. The fact that the complainant is a single witness;
b. the medical evidence;
c. the complainant's delay in reporting the incident;
d. contradictions; and
e. the appellant's version.
The competence of the complainant as witness
[11] The record indicates that the complainant possesses the intellectual and emotional
capacity to understand the oath and to grasp its consequences. She stated8 that prior to
the incident she performed well in school, which supports her demonstrated intellectual
7 Exhibit A: Birth Certificate, Exhibit B: J88 Medical Report, Exhibit C: Matshediso Mokapela's statement to
the police and Exhibit D : The Victim Impact Statement.
a In Exhibit D .
5
ability during her testimony. She understood the questions and provided direct answers.
At the time, she was two weeks from turning 18; she testified without an intermediary and
communicated deliberately and clearly. It is also trite that she and her family are actively
involved in their church and adhere to their religious beliefs, for which truthfulness and
swearing to speak the truth before God are important aspects.
[12] The law does not require a person to be an adult in law before the oath may be
administered. As was succinctly put by Kruger:9
'The court must be satisfied that a child at least understands the difference between truth and
things which do not exist (S v Mashava 1994 (1) SACR 224 (T) at 228g-h; S v
N 1996 (2) SACR 225 (C) at 229e-g). If the child does not understand the oath, he or she must
be admonished to speak the truth (S v Seymour[1997] 4 All SA 644 (N), 1998 (1) SACR 66 (N)
at 71 b-c).'
[13] The facts and circumstances of the administering of the oath in this case differ from
the cases cited by the appellant. Additionally, the approach taken by the court a quo in
addressing the witness was materially distinct.
a. In Ndaba v S10 the witness was a mere 11 years old. This is what happened:
'[6] The above extract from the record reflects that the court was aware of the complainant's
tender age of 11 years before requesting her to relate what happened to her. Despite this, the
magistrate failed to conduct the competency test, which is the precursor to admonishing a child
witness.
[7] The competency test is often used in relation to child witnesses to determine if they understand
the difference between truth and falsehood. This is a prerequisite for the oath, affirmation and an
admonition in terms of s 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA). PJ
Schwikkard and SE van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4 ed (2016) at 451 state as follows:
'Even very young children may testify provided that they (a) appreciate the duty of speaking the
truth; (b) have sufficient intelligence; and (c) and can communicate effectively.' (Footnote
omitted.) Nowhere in the record does it reflect that the learned Magistrate tried to establish if she
could distinguish between falsehood and the truth.
9 A Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure (SI 18, 2025) at 162.
10 Ndaba v S (AR528/2017) [2018] ZAKZPHC 17 (18 May 2018).
6
[8] Section 192 of the CPA , goes further to state that if a child does not have the ability to
distinguish between the truth and untruth, such child is not a competent witness. It is the duty of
the presiding officer to satisfy himself or herself that the child can distinguish between the truth
and untruth. The maturity and understanding of the child must be established by the judicial
officer, who must ascertain the level of intelligence for the child to give evidence in the trial
proceedings.' (Accentuation added)
b. In Matshiva v S11 the witnesses were 8 and 13 years old and here, it was not clear
from the questioning of the witnesses by the court what its purpose was . 'Was it intended
to establish the capacity of the child witnesses to understand the nature and import of the
oath or was it aimed at establishing their ability to distinguish between truth and falsity?'
The witnesses were simply sworn in before their capacity to understand the nature and
import of the oath was established.
c. The case of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice
and Constitutional Development and Others12 is valuable in the handling of matters of this
nature but the facts and issues of law are significantly different than in casu. Here the
child complainant was about 13 years old when she testified. No application was made to
lead her evidence through an intermediary, nor did the trial court enquire into the
desirability of the appointing of an intermediary. However , it is not clear how the oath
provision (s 164(1 )) arose on the facts. The child was questioned by the court to establish
whether she understood the import of an oath and, secondly, whether she understood the
difference between truth and falsehood. The court was not satisfied that the child
understood the import of the oath but was satisfied that the child knew what it meant to
speak the truth. The child was therefore admonished to speak the truth. On these facts,
speak the truth. The child was therefore admonished to speak the truth. On these facts,
the question whether the provisions of s 164(1) exclude, from testifying, a child who does
not understand the difference between truth and falsehood, simply did not arise.13
d. In S v B 14 the witness was 9 years old and the following happened:
'[5] In her reasons for judgment the magistrate said: "3.1 I do concede that the court never
11 Matshiva v S (656/12) [2013] ZASCA 124; 2014 (1) SACR 29 (SCA); [2014] 2 All SA 141 (SCA) (23
September 2013) para 12.
12 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and
Others (CCT 36/08) [2009] ZACC 8; 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC); 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC); 2009 (7) BCLR 637
(CC) (1 April 2009).
13 See paras 49 and 50.
14 S v B 2003 (1) SACR 52 (SCA).
7
enquired from M. the complainant whether she understood the nature and import of the oath or
whether she considered the oath to be binding on her conscience before admonishing her to tell
the truth. 3.2 The court believed that due to her tender age she would not have understood the
nature and import of the oath and therefore merely admonished her to tell the truth after she was
found to be a competent witness who knew the difference between truth and falsehood."
[6] The court a quo relied on S v N 1996 (2) SACR 225 (C) at 229e and S v Malinga 2002 (1)
SACR 615 (N), a judgment of the full bench of the Natal Provincial Division which was binding on
it. It consequently held that a finding in terms of the section had to be preceded by some form of
inquiry; that it was clear that the magistrate did not inquire from the complainant whether she
understood the nature and import of the oath; and that the evidence of the complainant was
therefore inadmissible. However, in its judgment granting leave to appeal the court a quo said: "It
seems to me that there are reasonable prospects of the Supreme Court of Appeal concluding that
in the circumstances of this case the presiding magistrate, by clear implication, made a finding
which was based on her observation that the witness, because of her self-evident youth and
immaturity, could not understand the actual nature and import of the oath and accordingly it was
only necessary to admonish and warn her and then hear her testimony"
[7) Since the judgments by the court a quo was delivered this court has held in S v B 2003 (1) SA
552 (SCA) that an inquiry is not always necessary in order to make the finding required by s 164
and that the mere youthfulness of a witness may indeed justify such a finding.' (Accentuation
added.)
[14] It is imperative to have regard to the reality that the court a quo observed and
experienced the witness and was convinced of her maturity and insight. He reiterated this
experienced the witness and was convinced of her maturity and insight. He reiterated this
in his judgment.15 This is what the presiding officer did that stands beyond reproach in the
circumstances of this case:16
'2022-02-10
MS B: My name is NB . I was born in 2004, February 27.
COURT : So , you will be 18 years on the 27th of this month?
MS B: That is so Your Worship.
COURT: So, 17 years. Do you have any objection in taking oath? Do you first understand what
oath is?
15 Page 243 of the record.
16 To protect the identity of the complainant, I will employ the initials.
MS B: Yes, I understand what the oath is Your Worship.
COURT: What is oath and I can see you are old enough; I just want to be sure.
MS B: An oath is swearing that you would tell the truth.
8
COURT : Thank you. Do you consider an oath binding on your conscience if you decide to take
an oath?
MS B: Yes , I do You r Worship.
COURT : So , you have no objection in taking oath?
MS B: No objection Your Worship.
COURT : Do you then swear that the evidence you shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth
and nothing else but the truth. If so, please say "So help me God ".' (Accentuation added.)
[15] In conclusion, the legislative prescription supports the manner in which the court a
quo dealt with the situation. She understood the oath and the truth, and it was not
necessary to apply s 164.
Section 162 of the C PA provides:
'(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 163 and 164, no person shall be examined as a
witness in criminal proceedings unless he is under oath, which shall be administered by the
presiding judicial officer or, in the case of a superior court, by the presiding judge or the registrar
of the court, and which shall be in the following form:
"I swear that the evidence that I shall give, shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth, so help me God."
Ands 164 provides:
'(1) Any person, who is found not to understand the nature and import of the oath or the
affirmation, may be admitted to give evidence in criminal proceedings without taking the oath or
making the affirmation: Provided that such person shall, in lieu of the oath or affirmation, be
admonished by the presiding judge or judicial officer to speak the truth.' (Accentuation added.)
[16] The foregoing suggests that considerations regarding the understanding of the
truth and related inquiries become relevant at the s 164-stage. Competent witnesses that
are placed under oath are never investigated on their ability to understand the truth.
are placed under oath are never investigated on their ability to understand the truth.
[17] The first ground of appeal must, in light of the above, be dismissed; the fairness of
the trial was not affected in any manner whatsoever and the witness was competent to
9
testify in terms of s 162 of the GP A.
The single witness
[18] Sexual offences are rarely, if ever, committed in the presence of witnesses - sexual
offences against children even more so. The scenario in casu happened within the realm
of a church and between a pastor and a child. The likelihood that a pastor will perpetrate
offences of this nature in the presence of witnesses is next to nought. If convictions may
not follow on this scenario for the mere fact that the witness is a so-called single witness
and was 16 years old at the time, justice will fail miserably. I said the following in Raleting
vS:17
'[1 O] The case for the State is largely reliant on the evidence of a single child witness.
'1. In S vStevens (417/03) [2004] ZASCA 70; [2005] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) (2 September 2004) the
Supreme Court of Appeal declared the law on single witnesses:
"[1] Courts in civil or criminal cases faced with the legitimate complaints of persons who are victims
of sexually inappropriate behaviour are obliged in terms of the Constitution to respond in a manner
that affords the appropriate redress and protection. Vulnerable sections of the community, who
often fall prey to such behaviour, are entitled to expect no less from the judiciary. However , in
considering whether or not claims are justified, care should be taken to ensure that evidentiary
rules and procedural safeguards are properly applied and adhered to.
[17] As indicated above, each of the complainants was a single witness in respect of the alleged
indecent assault upon her. In terms of s 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act. an accused can be
convicted of any offence on the single evidence of any competent witness. It is, however, a well
established judicial practice that the evidence of a single witness should be approached with
caution, his or her merits as a witness being weighed against factors which militate against his or
her credibility (see, for example, S v Webber 1971 (3) SA 754 (A) at 758G-H). The correct
her credibility (see, for example, S v Webber 1971 (3) SA 754 (A) at 758G-H). The correct
approach to the application of this so-called 'cautionary rule' was set out by Diemont JA in S v
Sauls and Others 1981 (3) SA 172 (A) at 180E-G as follows:
There is no rule of thumb test or formula to apply when it comes to a consideration of the credibility
of the single witness (see the remarks of Rumpff JA in S v Webber ... ). The trial judge will weigh
his evidence, will consider its merits and demerits and, having done so, will decide whether it is
trustworthy and whether, despite the fact that there are shortcomings or defects or contradictions
17 Raleting v S (A69/2021) (2021] ZAFSHC 198 (14 September 2021).
10
in the testimony, he is satisfied that the truth has been told. The cautionary rule referred to by De
Villiers JP in 1932 [in R v Mokoena 1932 OPD 79 at 80] may be a guide to a right decision but it
does not mean "that the appeal must succeed if any criticism, however slender, of the witnesses'
evidence were well-founded" (per Schreiner JA in R v Nhlapo (AD 10 November 1952) quoted
in R v Bellingham 1955 (2) SA 566 (A) at 569.) It has been said more than once that the exercise
of caution must not be allowed to displace the exercise of common sense.'
2. The adjudication of a child witness demands the proverbial Wisdom of Solomon and the
judgement must be given with circumspection and anxious care. A court must articulate the
warning of care and the need for caution and with reference to the circumstances of the case. A
court must examine the evidence in order to satisfy itself that the evidence given by the w itness
is clear and substantially satisfactory in all material aspects. Although corroboration is not a
prerequisite for a conviction, a court will in appropriate circumstances, seek corroboration which
implicates the accused before it will convict beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of
corroboration, a court will look for some feature in the evidence which gives the single child
witness enough veracity to reduce the risk of mistaken reliance.
3. The cautionary rule in sexual assault cases is irrational, outdated and archaic. Minor children
testified in the case of Woji v Sanlam Insurance Company (Ply) Ltd 1981 (1) 1020 (A). The
circumstances of the Woji-case were similar to the matter in hand. Two minor children testified
years after the fact.
'DIEMONT JA: This is an unusual and interesting case. It is unusual in that the only two eye
witnesses are two small boys testifying to an incident which had happened five years before the
trial; it is interesting in that it raises the question of the weight to be given to the testimony of
children in a civil action.
children in a civil action.
Despite his youth -or perhaps because of his youth -Sibonde's evidence was clear, simple and
straightforward.'
The judgment continued and stated that the question which the trial court mus t ask itself is
whether the young w itness' evidence is trustworthy.
1. Trustworthiness depends on factors such as the child's power of observation, his pow er of
recollection, and his power of narration on the specific matter.
2. In each instance the capacity of the particular child is to be investigated.
3. His capacity of observation will depend on whether he appears intelligent enough to observe.
11
4. Whether he has the capacity of recollection will depend again on whether he has sufficient
years of discretion to remember what occurs while the capacity of narration or communication
raises the question whether the child has the capacity to understand the questions put and to
frame and express intelligent answers.
5. There are other factors as well which the court will take into account in assessing the child's
trustworthiness in the witness-box. Does he appear to be honest - is there a consciousness of
the duty to speak the truth?
6. Then also the nature of the evidence given by the child may be of a simple kind and may
relate to a subject-matter clearly within the field of its understanding and interest and the
circumstances may be such as practically to exclude the risks arising from suggestibility.
7. At the same time the danger of believing a child where evidence stands alone must not be
underrated. It is well known, however, that children often have a vivid memory of an unusual or
exciting incident. A motor accident, for instance, is an occurrence that might well arrest the
attention of a child, more particularly if he were directly or indirectly involved and that it would
leave a clear picture on his memory would not be surprising.'
[19] The complainant satisfies all criteria outlined above: She demonstrated
intelligence, consistently understood her obligation to provide truthful testimony, and
presented evidence that appears highly detailed and unlikely to be fabricated. Her account
of events was simple, clear and coherent. Any suggestion of a motive to falsely implicate
the appellant has been effectively refuted. As a child, she had no reason to advance her
father's standing in the church, and in fact, there was reluctance to report the incident.
The absence of the testimony of the father is inconsequential. The mother's testimony
corroborated the complainant's narrative, with only minor inconsistencies deemed
corroborated the complainant's narrative, with only minor inconsistencies deemed
immaterial by the court a quo, that exercised appropriate caution in its assessment. The
slight discrepancies in their corroborative accounts further support the conclusion that
there was no malicious conspiracy or motive.
The medical evidence
[20] It is the case for the appellant that the medical report does not indicate any injuries
and thus the complainant was not supported by objective evidence. The med ical
examination occurred on 1 December 2020 more than eight months after the penetration
12
with the finger. The presence of any injuries would be a physical impossibility at the time
of the forensic examination and the report stated clearly in conclusion that the absence of
genital injuries does not exclude penetration.
The complainant's delay in reporting the incident
(21} Under this heading the statement in the heads of argument of the appellant18 on
the fact that the appellant went back to the complainant's house again in August after the
March incident, 'defies logic why would the appellant go to the complainant's house again
if he had raped the complainant on a previous occasion' and is uncharacteristic of a
person that has raped the complainant; is noted. The issue to be had with the statement
is that conduct of perpetrators of these offences cannot be speculated on by counsel.
What is trite is that the complainant was hesitant to report the incident and the appellant
had to have realised this.
[22] Section 59 of SOR MA defies the argument of the appellant on the reporting of the
complainant. She was faced with a pastor in her church. She was afraid of him. and she
gave her reasons. In S v L. M1 9 the stance of the Constitutional Court was reiterated in
support of s 59:
'[34) I am also mindful that the complainant failed to report on the first occasion she alleges
she was raped to anyone. This, on its own, does not necessarily warrant an adverse
inference. Section 59 of the Sexual Offences Act provides that in criminal proceedings involving
the alleged commission of a sexual offence, the court may not draw any inference only from the
length of any delay between the alleged commission of such offence and the reporting
thereof. The reason for this statutory provision is to ensure that presiding officers do not
unjustifiably draw an adverse inference only due to a reporting delay, and without proper
consideration of psychological and other factors that might have contributed to this. Section 59
should not be unduly interpreted as still requiring that the complaint be made at the first
reasonable opportunity. The complainant in this instance testified about her fear of reporting the
incident and I accept her evidence in that regard, also when considering the family dynamic at
play and the evidence of Ngcofe's conduct towards her.
1s Paras 26 and 27.
19 S v L.M (50/2021) [2022] ZAECGHC 16 (28 February 2022).
13
[35] Confirming this approach, in S v Vilakazi Dambuza JA, on behalf of the majority of the
court, held as follows:
"Firstly, as Milton states, reluctance on the part of rape survivors, or some of them, to report the
rape at the first opportunity is a firmly recognised fact. It is also generally accepted that with young
children the reluctance is compounded . In this case the complainant testified that she was afraid
of the appellant. I am persuaded that the prospect of accusing her mother's friend who used to
assist her in her studies must have compounded the fear."' (Accentuation added)
The contradictions and the appellant's version
[23] As to the contradictions and the version of the appellant; the court a quo pondered
the issues meticulously and with due regard to the law, specifically from pp 185 to 190 of
the judgment. It cannot be faulted. He was cautious in the acceptance of the evidence of
the witnesses for the State and realised that the onus on the State is beyond reasonable
doubt, notwithstanding the very questionable case for the appellant.
[24] The fundamental principle on the evaluation of evidence on appeal is that an
appeal court is not inclined to disturb findings by the trial court on the evaluation of the
evidence. The advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses is difficult to surpass. The
Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated in its judgment on 31 July 2020 in AM and Another v
MEG Health, Western Cape:20
'Such findings are only overturned if there is a clear misdirection or the trial court's findings are
clearly erroneous. That has consistently been the approach of this court and the Constitutional
Court as reflected recently in the following passage from ST v CT :
"In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd the Constitutional Court, in reaffirming the trite principles outlined
in Dhlumayo, quoted the following dictum of Lord Wright in Powell & Wife v Streatham Nursing
Home :
"Not to have seen the witnesses puts appellate judges in a permanent position of disadvantage
"Not to have seen the witnesses puts appellate judges in a permanent position of disadvantage
as against the trial judges, and unless it can be shown that he has failed to use or has palpably
misused his advantage, the higher court ought not to take the responsibility of reversing
20 AM and another v MEC Health, Western Cape (1258/2018) [2020] ZASCA 89.
14
conclusions so arrived at, merely on the result of their own comparisons and criticisms of the
witnesses and of their own view of the probabilities of the case. "'21 (Accentuation added .)
[25) The same was law seventy-seven years ago; and it is still true in the constitutional
epoch. If there was no misdirection of facts by the trial court, the point of departure is that
its conclusion was correct. The general principles according to which a court of appeal
should consider the case are set out in R v Dh/umayo.22 The court of appeal must bear in
mind that the trial court saw the witnesses in person and could assess their demeanour .
[26] The court of appeal will only reject the trial court's assessment of the evidence if it
is convinced that the assessment is wrong. If the court is in doubt, the trial court's
judgment must remain in place.23 Courts of appeal have greater liberty to disturb findings
of a court a quo when dealing with inferences and probabilities;24 in casu, the evidence is
of a direct nature. Furthermore, the court of appeal does not zealously look for points upon
which to contradict the trial court's conclusions and the fact that something has not been
mentioned does not necessarily mean that it has been overlooked.
Conclus ion
[27} On the conspectus of evidence, the convictions on all three the charges are correct
beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo gave a well-reasoned judgment in accordance
with the applicable law.
Order
[28) The appeal against the convictions on all three charges is dismissed.
21 Ibid para 8.
22 R V Dhlumayo 1948 (2) SA 677 (A).
23 S v Robinson 1968 ( 1) SA 666 (A) at 67 5H .
24 Minister of Safety and Security and Others v Craig and Others [2009] ZASCA 97; 2011 (1) SACR 469
(SCA) at 58.
I concur.
Appearances
For the Appellant:
Instructed by:
For the Respondent:
Instructed by:
15
M OPPERMAN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
H DE LA REY
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
TD Diba
Molete Attorneys,
Bloemfontein
AM Ferreira
Director of Public Prosecutions,
Bloemfontein.