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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case No: 7612/2019
(1) REPORTABLE:NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED:
DATE: 05 SEPTEMBER 2025
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
S[...] B[...] K[...] Plaintiff
and
P[...] T[...] K[...] Defendant
This judgment is prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected as
such and is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties / their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for handing down is deemed to be 5 September 2025.
JUDGMENT
RETIEF J
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is a divorce action in which the plaintiff, who is married to the
defendant in community of property, seeks inter alia, partial forfeiture in terms of
section 9(1) of the Divorce Act [ Divorce Act] [forfeiture relief] . The remaining
issues pertain to the maintenance and contact rights in respect of the minor child
settled. The defendant seeks the division of the joint estat e an d denies that the
plaintiff is entitled to her forfeiture relief.
[2] The defendant , in his counterclaim , seeks an equal division of the joint
estate with the appointment of a receiver for assistance.
[3] The common cause facts on the pleadings are that the plaintiff and
defendant were married to each other on the 26 March 1995, but that from
September 2017 they separated. The divorce proceedings were instituted by the
plaintiff in January 2019. Four (4) children were born of the marriage, namely K[...]
K[...], R[...] K[...], A[...] K[...] and O[...] K[...]. O[...] K[...] [the minor] is the only
siblings who has not attained majority by the time the trial commenced.
[4] The triable issues are to be determined by the pleadings. What follows is an
illustration of how both the parties and their respective legal teams failed to
appreciate the issues, as raised on the pleadings . In consequence an
unnecessary lengthy trial followed.
[5] To illustrate the point the Court now considers the trial bundles, the relevant
pre-trial minutes and the pleadings themselves before considering the evidence.
TRIAL BUNDLES
[6] The plaintiff prepared the trial bundles as directed by the pre -trial minute
held in March 2025 . Three bundles were prepared. The first bundle , bundle 1,
contained the pleadings and pre -trial mi nutes. Bundle 2 and 3 contained clearly
marked and paginated documentary evidence prepared by the plaintiff in support
of her forfeiture relief. The status of the documents in these bundles was not in
dispute. The defendant was required an d, was provided an opportunity to
supplement the bundles but, did not. His Counsel made no objection to the content
of the bundles handed up and confirmed that the defendant would not be
supplementing the same. In other words, the trial was to commence solel y on the
documentary evidence provided by the plaintiff and on the state of the pleadings
as contained in bundle 1.
[7] The pleadings in t rial bundle 1 contained the plaintiff’s amended particulars
of claim dated June 2024 , the defendants plea and countercla im dated 21
September 2022 and the plaintiff’s amended plea to the defendant’s counter-claim.
Trial bundle 1 did not contain the plaintiff’s unamended particulars of claim and nor
did a copy thereof appear under the pleading section on Caselines. The defendant
nor his legal team referred the trial Court to the unamended particulars of clai m.
This is an important consideration as the defendant failed to give any context to
his plea in relation to the amended particulars of claim.
[8] Furthermore, the relevance thereof lies in the procedural fact that the
defendant failed to file an amended plea to the plaintiff’s amended particulars of
claim. Such procedural failure appeared to be endorsed by the defendant’s
Counsel’ who failed to raise an objection to the amended particulars and the
placement thereof in trial bundle 1 . His Counsel furthermore failed to deal
paragraph 2.3.1 in the March 2025 pre -trial minutes. In paragraph 2.3.1, the
defendant recorded that the plaintiff’ could not rely on her amended particulars of
defendant recorded that the plaintiff’ could not rely on her amended particulars of
claim of June 2024 . The defendant’s Counsel was recorded as being present at
the pre-trial yet, the statement at paragraph 2.3.1 remained hollow and without any
context. Furthermore, at no point during the hearing , no r in written closing
argument did the defendant’s Counsel raise any objection to the use of the
amended particulars of claim . Conversely, the defendant’s Counsel relied on the
allegations in the plaintiff’s amended particulars of claim in his written closing
argument.
[9] The parties were ready to proceed on the first day of trial and the state of
the pleadings, at that time as contained in trial bundle 1, remained undisturbed.
THE PLEADINGS
[10] On the pleadings , the plaintiff’s basis for the forfeiture relief was clear, and
yet, as mentioned, remained unanswered by the defendant . The consequence ,
thereof is that such failure to plead to material facts results in the admission of
such facts. On the pleadings this translated into the defendant admitting his
conduct giving rise to the basis the plaintiff relies on in support of her forfeiture
relief and an admission that, if the forfeiture relief was not awarded, he w ould
unduly benefit therefrom. This would then be the end of the plaintiffs case if the
Court was to find that the admitted conduct constituted substantial misconduct
which, together with the remaining material factors warranted the relief.
[11] In amplification, admission of material facts are not in in issue between the
parties. The result evident, disputes narrowed and trial duration curtailed. An
obvious result clearly missed by both parties and which, was not appreciated in
written closing argument either when the Court requested each party to address
duration. A factor for consideration when dealing with costs.
[12] Notwithstanding, m oving to the state of the pleadings during the trial, t he
plaintiff initially waived her right to claim 50% of the remaining joint estate after the
forfeiture claim had been applied . However, during the trial she sought to amend
such waiver by moving for an amendment . She sought to the deletion of
paragraphs 13 and 14 of her amended particulars of claim . The defendant did not
object to the sought amendment. The Court ruled that paragraphs 13 and 14 were
so deleted.
[13] The plaintiff having pleaded to the defendant’s counterclaim denied that the
defendant was entitled to 50% of the joint estate.
THE PLAINTIFF’S ONUS
[14] The plaintiff in paragraph 6 of her particulars of claim, sets out the reason
for the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, in paragraph 11 she sets out the
basis for her seeking the forfeiture claim and, in paragraph 12, she clearly sets out
what patrimonial benefits she seeks the defendant to forfeit as a result of the basis
laid in paragraph 11.
[15] In paragraph 6 the plaintiff makes the following material allegations:
15.1. The parties have not resided together as husband and wife since the
11 September 2017, the defendant moving out of the matrimonial
home living a separate life from the plaintiff and the children and
never communicating the details of his life;
15.2. The defendant has psychologically, verbally, emo tionally and
financially been abusive towards the plaintiff since 2010;
15.3. The defendant subjected O[...] K[...] [the minor] to a paternity test on
or about the 7 August 2018 without the knowledge and consent of
the plaintiff;
15.4. The defendant failed to con tribute towards the maintenance and
improvements of the matrimonial home, repayments of the mortgage
bond, rates and taxes;
15.5. The defendant failed to make meaningful contributions towards the
upbringing of the children and little contributions towards the benefit
of the joint estate.
[16] The defendant referring to a paragraph 6 in his amended plea admits the
content. No other context to such admission was given to the trial Court nor
argued before it. The defendant further at paragraph 11 of his amended plea
admits that the marriage relationship between the parties has irretrievabl y broken
down and that no prospect of restoration is possible . Other than that, the
defendant fail ed to deny th e allegation that he failed to contribute towards the
maintenance and im provements of the matrimonial home, repayments of the
mortgage bond, rates and taxes . He too failed to deny that he meaningfully
contributed towards the upbringing of the children and he did not deny that he
made little contribution towards the benefit of the joint estate.
[17] Notwithstanding the admissions on the pleadings, the plaintiff’s testimony in
this regard was supported by documentary proof in which she demonstrated her
contributions towards the upbringing of the children, the joint estate and the
matrimonial home. This evidence not disturb by the defendant’s testimony.
[18] The material allegations in paragraph 6 were then repeated by the plaintiff
in paragraph 11 of her amended p articulars of claim . She added the following
material allegations, which too, were supported by evidence:
18.1. The defendant ha d persistently refused to contribute towards
vocational training of R[...] K[...] while studying at Varsity College,
ETA College and Squadra Corse [Exhibit S, H, I, J, K, L, M, R, V];
18.2. The defendant failed to pay his personal and business income tax to
the detriment of the joint estate [Exhibit ‘Y’];
18.3. The defendant, upon being retrenched in or about 2001, utilised his
pension benefits exclusively for his personal use and not for the
benefit to the joint estate [Exhibit “21”];
18.4. The defendant has concealed financial assets and interest held in
B[...] Commonwealth (Pty) Ltd, B[...] Creations (Pty) Ltd and B[...] HR
Consulting Close Corporations, thereby unlawfully diminishing the
patrimony of the joint estate [Exhibit 5,7,8,9,12] and
18.5. The defendant fail ed to make full and frank disclosure of the
aforesaid business and financial interests as well as the proceeds
thereof during the rule 36 discovery process and interlocutory
proceedings further evidenced his intent to unlawfully enrich himself
at the expense of the joint estate.
[19] The defendant failed to specifically deal with and plead to these further
allegations to sustain the grounds for forfeiture [[sub -paragraphs 11.3 -11.12 of
paragraph 11] . Therefore such are admitted. The plaintiff notwithstanding ,
provided testimony pertaining thereto and documentary evidence.
[20] The defe ndant in his plea, notwithstanding the admissions, pleaded t o a
sub-paragraph 11.1 and 11.2. of as follows:
“AD PARAGRAPHS 11, 11.1 TO 11.2 THEREOF
22.1 The defendant again denies that the plaintiff is entitled to claim for
partial forfeiture in the plaintiff’s favour and puts the plaintiff to the
proof thereof.
22.2 The defendant pleads that the joint estate should be equally
divided between the parties as set out in the defendant’s
counterclaim.”
[21] The weight of the bare denial of paragraph 11.1 and 11.2 must be
considered against his admissions and against the defendant’s failure to plead to
paragraph 12 of the plaintiff’s amended particulars of claim.
[22] In paragraph 12, he failed to deny that he would not unduly benefit if the
forfeiture relief not be granted in respect of:
22.1. The remainder of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial
home in the amount of approximately R1,4 million held in trust by
Snyman De Jager Attorneys;
22.2. The plaintiff’s Haval motor vehicle with registration number L[...];
22.3. The plaintiff’s interest in Satrix shares held with Standard Bank
Limited [Exhibit “G”];
22.4. The plaintiff’s shares in Woolworths held with Standard Bank Limited;
22.5. The plaintiff’s interest in Old Mutual Max Investment Retirement
Annuity with code 1[...] [Exhibit “E”];
22.6. The plaintiff’s interest in Momentum Retirement Annuity with code
P[...] [Exhibit “F”];
22.7. The plaintiff’s interest in Sa nlam’s Umbrella Provident Fund with
number 7[...] [Exhibit “D”];
22.8. The household furniture in the plaintiff’s present possession;
22.9. Each party to pay the debts incurred in their own names.
[23] Notwithstanding the admissions, the plaintiff testified for two days taking the
trial Court through all the documentary evidence to establish the nature and the
extent of the benefit.1 The necessity thereof, on the pleadings, unclear.
[24] Notwithstanding, she testified in support of paragraph 12 of her pleadings
that the defendant would stand to unduly benefit in the amount of R 2 079 697.96
should the forfeiture relief not be granted.
1 Engelbrecht v Engelbrecht 189 (1) SA 597 (C).
[25] It is common cause that the defendant is a businessman with interests i n
B[...] HR Consulting CC, B[...] Creations (Pty) Ltd, B[...] Wealth (Pty) Ltd and P[...]
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the
defendant repeatedly represented that these businesses were not generating an
income a nd thereby justifying his lack of financial contribution to the household,
the joint estate and the meaningful maintenance of the children. The defendant in
pursuit of the narrative in 2024 launched a rule 43 application in which he sought,
inter alia, interim maintenance for the two minor children , A[...] and O[...] K[...]. He
wished the plaintiff to pay their school fees in the amount of R12 100.00 per month
and he sought a contribution towards his legal costs in the amount of R50 000.00.
Under oath, the defendant stated that he was self -employed and that he did not
have a stable monthly salary due to change in his income. This he maintained
under oath whilst, at trial the reverse was demonstrated. According to financial
statements obtained by the plaintiff, his salary and directors drawings in respect of
B[...] HR Consulting CC and B[...] Creations (Pty) Ltd did not accord with what he
stated and the amounts were significantly higher than he had stated under oath in
his rule 43 application.
[26] At the time that the defendant launched the rule 43 application, his financial
statements demonstrated a monthly income in the form of director’s fees and
benefits which far outweighed that of the plaintiff . Over and above h is
misrepresented earnings, the defendant admitted that he failed to pay the agreed
cash contribution of maintenance for his minor children as far back as 2022. This
he did, whilst concealing his earnings and perpetuating the narrative . In this way
he rather elected to allow the plaintiff to single handedly pay for all the household
expenses whilst most of their children still resided with her , he allowed her to
expenses whilst most of their children still resided with her , he allowed her to
single handedly take care of the children and he allowed her to single handedly
carry her own financial responsibilities. The defendant was not only content to
misrepresent his earnings and earning capacity to his family but he was willing to
do the same under oath before a Court of law. This constitutes substantial
misconduct.
[27] The defendant’s misconduct spilled over into his unwillingness to provide
the documentary evidence sought by the plaintiff in preparation for the trial. The
plaintiff had to obtain Court orders in an effort to shift the unwillingness barometer.
Notwithstanding Court orders, the defendant still withheld annual financial
statements for the year ending February 2023 for B[...] HR Consulting CC and
B[...] Creations (Pty) Ltd . He too failed to provide all the source documents that
were used by his accountant for B[...] Commonwealth Financial Statements. Such
failure to fully comply with 2 (two) Court orders was not only clear from the
documents in the trial bundle 2 and 3 but , was readily conceded by the defendant
under cross examination. The defendant has further more failed to disclose values
of his shares in P[...], failed to disclose his role in Let’s Build it Together
Foundation and failed to provide the current value of his shares in B[...],
Commonwealth. This constitutes substantial misconduct.
[28] The defendant’s narrative of his inability to earn sufficient income was again
exposed as a falsehood by Exhibit “Y ,” a personal tax assessment by SARS for
the year ending 2023 in which SARS s ought the payment of the sum of R1 096
145.58 from the defendant as his tax liability for income earned by him personally
during that financial year. The defendant was unable to provide proof of how he
utilised that income earned during that financial year . No evidence was tendered
that he used it for the benefit of the joint estate.
[29] The plaintiff’s counsel argues that the defendant’s conduct is analogous to
the facts of M.P.M v G.P.M 2 where the Court held that pocketing funds for
personal use while the other spouse carries the financial burden amoun ts to
substantial misconduct. He further argued in support of Z v Z 3 where the Court
stated that a lack of meaningful contribution to the joint estate was found to be
substantial misconduct justifying forfeiture.
substantial misconduct justifying forfeiture.
[30] It is furthermore an undisputed fact that the defendant used the proceeds of
his pension fund for his sole benefit after he was retrenched in 2001 without
2 (26016/2017) [2022] ZAGPPHC 439 (15 November 2022) at par 36.
3 (34253/2010) [2024] ZAGPJHC 4 (10 January 2024) at paras 7, 9 and 10.
contributing towards the estate. In this regard, the plaintiff’s counsel referred the
Court to Tsebe v Tsebe 4 in which the Court found that Mr Tsebe committed
substantial misconduct as envisaged in terms of section 9(1) of the Divorce Act, in
that he used the pension solely for himself to the exclusion of the joint estate and
his wife. Furthermore, in this case, it is common cause that the defendant ceased
contributing towards his retirement annuity in 2020 thereby diminishing the joint
estate.
[31] On the pleadings, and considering the evidence the plaintiff has discharged
her onus in respect of undue benefit and substantial misconduct.
[32] As far as the duration of the marriage is concerned this Court accepts that
29 years is a marriage of long duration albeit, that the parties separated from each
other already in 2017. Notwithstanding, this factor must be see n in context. What
transpired during that duration is relevant. Twenty nine years of having to be the
major bread winner, the constant mother, the carer and the responsible partner in
every aspect of the family’s life is a factor. The duration of the marriage has been
considered as a factor and does not tip the scales having regard to all the
evidence over the period.
[33] Having regard to all the factors, the plaintiff’s forfeiture relief succeeds.
THE DEFENDANT’S ONUS
[34] From the defendant’s testimony it is clear that in the beginning of their
marriage he assisted the plaintiff to realise her occupational potential and gave of
his time and support to the children and the joint estate. In other words when he
needed the plaintiff’s earning potential he suppo rted her. However, as soon as he
did not, the plaintiff was left in the dark as to his earnings and earning potential
and he persisted with the narrative that he was unable to contribute. In this way
the plaintiff continued to make her financial contributi on to the household, the
the plaintiff continued to make her financial contributi on to the household, the
children’s maintenance and their interests , the medical aid for the benefit of the
4 [2016] ZAGPPHC 573 (24 June 2016) at par 15.
family and to plan a nest egg for retirement. The defendant conceded under cross
examination that the plaintiff paid the mortgage bond and the school fees for the
first three children whilst he contributed by taking them to school.
[35] To be frank, the defendant and his legal team where unprepared on th e
pleadings, failed to provide documentary evidence which clearly demonstrated his
contribution to the minor children, the household and the joint estate over the
period of the marriage and his testimony was riddled with inconsistencies and half-
baked trut hs considering the documentary evidence placed before Court. The
defendant’s evidence was unreliable. His Counsel’s written argument did not refer
the Court to corroborated evidence in support of his client’s allegations of support
during 2001 to 2017 nor, for that matter 2017 to date. The only reliance was the
defendant’ say-which could not be relied on.
[36] The inevitable is that the defendant and his legal team did not appreciate
his onus vis a vis the counter application nor dire consequence of his pleadings.
They appeared rather, to be fixated on a misrepresented narrative, a rule 43 and
an application in terms of section 20 of the Matrimonial Properties Act 88 of 1984
which he brought in 2024 . In this way they failed to concern themselves with the
task at hand. The defendant has failed to discharge his onus that 50% of the entire
joint estate should accrue to him.
[37] Having said that, what his narrative and actions have illustrated is that, in so
far as the residue of the joint estate is to be divided his call for a receiver may
assist with discerning the true value and the whereabouts of the assets which
make up the joint estate.
COSTS
[38] There is no reason why costs should not follow the re sult. Howeve r,
considering the state of pleadings it is clear that the duration of the trial could and
should have been curtailed for that reason. The court will allow for a day and a half
should have been curtailed for that reason. The court will allow for a day and a half
in respect of recoverable day fees and costs in respect of the plai ntiff’s claim. As
far as the defendant’s counter claim is concerned having regard to all the facts,
each party to pay their own costs.
[39] The following order:
1. A decree of divorce;
2. The parental rights and responsibilities in respect of O[...] K[...] [the
minor child] shall vest both in the Plaintiff and Defendant as
envisaged in terms of section 18 of the Children’s Act, 38 of 2005;
3. Primary residency shall vest with the Plaintiff;
4. The Defendant shall exercise the following contact rights in respect
of the minor child:
4.1 the minor child will spend every alternate weekend with the
Defendant starting from 18h00 on a Friday until 18h00 on the
Sunday alternatively, should the weekend be a long
weekend, from 18h00 of the last school day before the long
weekend until 18h00 on the last day of the long weekend;
4.2 the minor child shall be entitled to have reasonable
telephonic contact with the Defendant when with the Plaintiff
and will be entitled to have reasonable telephonic contact
with the Plaintiff when with the Defendant;
4.3 the short and long school holidays will be equally shared
between the parties;
4.4 Christmas, new year, Easter holidays will alternate between
the parties;
4.5 both parties will have access to the minor child on her
birthday. In the event that the birthday falls on a weekday,
the Defendant will have the minor child after school until
18h00 and will retain the minor child in the evening. In the
event that the birthday is on a weekend, the parties will
arrange with each other to have access to the minor child;
4.6 both p arties will have access to the minor child on the
birthdays, and the minor child will spend Father’s Day with
the Defendant and Mother’s Day with the Plaintiff.
5. In the event that either party wishes to travel overseas with the minor
child, written consent of the other party shall be required, which
written consent will not unreasonably be withheld and/or delayed;
6. The parties shall further have the right to see the minor child at any
reasonable time by prior agreement with each other and with the
minor child;
7. In the event that the parties are unable for whatever reason to have
the minor child with them during any time period allocated to them, in
terms of this order, they will timeously advise the other party
accordingly to enable arrangements to be made if at all possible;
8. The parties will notify each other of any changes in their address or
cell phone numbers;
9. Access to the minor child shall be exercised in the best interests of
the minor child which should create a minimum degree of
disturbance to the minor child’s routine, educational and necessary
extramural activities;
10. Any school which the minor child atte nds shall be informed that both
the Plaintiff and the Defendant are co -holders of parental rights and
responsibilities and jointly involved in all educational issues
concerning the minor child;
11. In terms of section 10 of the Children’s Act, 38 of 2005, wh en the
minor child is of an age, maturity and stage of development to
participate in an appropriate manner regarding decisions that affect
her, her views expressed must be given due consideration under the
circumstances;
12. The Defendant shall retain the min or child until they are self -
sustaining as follows:
12.1 payment of the school fees directly to the school or institution
that the minor child is attending;
12.2 payment of 50% of any tertiary fees, directly to the instituting
where the child will be attending;
12.3 payment of the sum of R3 000.00 per month to the Plaintiff
towards the maintenance of the child, payable on or before
the 1st day of each proceeding month, commencing from the
date of his order;
12.4 payment of the reasonable and agreed extramural activities ,
extra lessons and excursions that the minor child may
require to attend from time to time, directly to the service
provider;
12.5 purchase the minor child’s school uniforms, books and
stationery;
12.6 purchase clothes and shoes for the minor child on a
seasonal basis (twice a year in May and September);
12.7 pay 50% of the shortfall that is not covered by the Plaintiff’s
medical aid;
12.8 pay 50% of R[...] K[...]’s vocational training;
12.9 pay 50% of the same child’s medical contributions.
13. The plaintiff shall maintain the minor children until they are self -
sustaining as follows:
13.1 provide accommodation;
13.2 provide food, toiletries, lunch and grooming;
13.3 retain the minor child on a medical aid;
13.4 pay 50% of all the shortfalls that are not covered by the
medical aid;
13.5 pay 50% of their tertiary fees directly to the institution where
the child will be attending;
13.6 pay 50% of R[...] K[...]’s costs of vocational training;
13.7 pay 50% of R[...] K[...]’s medical contribution;
13.8 pay all the costs of cell phones, WiFi, DSTV and
entertainment.
14. The Defendant is to forfeit his 50% share in the following patrimonial
benefits:
14.1 the remainder of the proceeds from the sale of the
matrimonial home in the amount of approximately R1 ,4
million held in trust by Snyman De Jager Attorneys;
14.2 the Plaintiff’s Haval motor vehicle with registration number
L[...];
14.3 the Plaintiff’s interest in Satrix shares held with Standard
Bank Limited;
14.4 the Plaintiff’s interest in Woolworths shares held with
Standard Bank Limited;
14.5 the Plaintiff's interest in Old Max Retirement Annuity with
code: 1[...];
14.6 the Plaintiff’s interest in Momentum Retirement Annuit with
code: P[...];
14.7 the Plaintiff’s interest in Sanlam Umbrella Provident Fund
with number 7[...];
14.8 the household furniture which is in the Plaintiff’s possession
as at date of the order.
14.9 Each party is to pay their own debts incurred in their own
names as at date of the divorce order.
15. A Receiver for the division of the remaining joint estate is to be
appointed with the following functions and powers:
15.1 to assist both the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the division of
the remaining residue of the joint estate or any part thereof
which cannot conveniently be divided, by agreement
between them and if necess ary, to sell any residue or part
thereof and to divide the proceeds equally between them;
15.2 to demand from both the Plaintiff and the Defendant a true
and correct account of any portion of the assets which either
the Plaintiff or the Defendant may have taken possession of
or have an interest in and/or which can be dealt with;
15.3 to demand from the Plaintiff and Defendant the payment or
delivery of such portion of the assets of the remaining joint
estate which the Plaintiff or the Defendant may have dealt
with which does not form the subject matter of this order;
15.4 both the Plaintiff and the Defen dant are jointly liable for the
costs of the Receiver;
15.5 the division of any net assets, shall be subject to the
protection of the rights and claims of any secured or
preferent creditors of the joint estate, if applicable.
16. The Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff’s party and party costs, taxed on
scale B associated with her claim and the recoverable trial day fee is
the confined 1.5 court days.
17. Each party is to pay their own costs associated with the Defendant’s
counterclaim.
___________________________
L.A. RETIEF
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division
Appearances:
Attorneys for the Plaintiff: Mudenda Incorporated
C/O RG Duba Attorneys
Tel: (011) 675 0343
Email: tendayi@mudendainc.co.za
Counsel for the Defendant: Adv Kabini
Cell: 083 646 0235
Email: Boitumelo@mogajaneattorneys.co.za
Attorneys for the Defendant: Mogajane Attorneys
Tel: (012) 751 8551
Email: bogosi@mogajaneattorneys.co.za
Date of hearing: 10 JUNE 2025
Date of judgment: 05 SEPTEMBER 2025