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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 146861/2025
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES/NO
12 SEPTEMBER 2025
In the matter between:
E[…]: F[…] C[…] Applicant
and
CRAWFORD INTERNATIONAL SANDTON First Respondent
PREPARATORY SCHOOL
PINTO: LUCINDA Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
NDLOKOVANE AJ
[1.] This is an opposed urgent application wherein the Applicant, the biological
mother of two minor children, namely I.R.E (aged 7) and P.E (aged 9), seeks relief
following the “expulsion” of the children by the First Respondent on 30 July 2025.
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The minor children are enrolled as learners in Grades 2 and 3 respectively with the
First Respondent for the 2025 academic year. The Applicant seeks, inter alia:
(i) Condonation for non-compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court; and
(ii) An order directing the First and Second Respondents to allow the
minor children to return to school with immediate effect from 3 September
2025, and to permit them to complete the remainder of the 2025 academic
year and to pay costs of this application, (my own emphasis).
[2.] It emerged during the hearing that the Second Respondent had been
erroneously cited, as she is not the headmaster of the current school at which the
Applicant’s minor children are enrolled. Rather, she is the principal of the pre-primary
section of the same institution, which the children previously attended.
[3.] In light of this, the Applicant withdrew the application against the Second
Respondent and elected to proceed only against the First Respondent, an
independent educational institution, in terms of the provisions of the South African
Schools Act 84 of 1996. For ease of reference, the First Respondent shall be
referred to as such throughout this judgment.
[4.] This position is further confirmed in the answering affidavit deposed to by Mr
Ryan Haigh, the principal currently employed by the First Respondent.
[5.] I heard argument from counsel on the issue of urgency only. Judgment was
then reserved for determination of urgency. The merits, if appropriate, would be
considered thereafter.
[6.] The Notice of Motion is dated 25 August 2025. The founding affidavit was
commissioned on the same day. The application was served on 26 August 2025,
following an amendment to correct the Applicant’s surname.
[7.] The Applicant set truncated time periods for the filing of opposing papers: the
Respondents were required to file their notice to oppose by 27 August 2025 at
18h00, with answering affidavits by 28 August 2025 at 11h00. The Applicant’s
18h00, with answering affidavits by 28 August 2025 at 11h00. The Applicant’s
replying affidavit was filed on 2 September 2025.
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[8.] The First Respondent's notice to oppose was dated 28 August 2025 and the
answering affidavit was served electronically and filed on the same day. Heads of
argument were filed by the First Respondent on 2 September 2025. The Applicant
did not file heads of argument.
[9.] In the case of SARS v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd
1the Court, held that
before the merits of an application brought on an urgent basis can be considered,
the applicant must first satisfy the Court that the matter is indeed urgent and that
substantial redress cannot be obtained in the ordinary course.
[10.] In terms of Uniform Rule 6(12), a court may dispense with the for ms and
service provided for in the Rules and dispose of the matter at such time and in
accordance with such procedure as it deems fit. However, an Applicant bears the
onus to establish that the matter is urgent and that it cannot wait to be heard in the
ordinary course
2.
[11.] It is also established that urgency must not be self -created and must be
properly explained. A party cannot create urgency by its own inaction.
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[12.] The Applicant avers that urgency arose on 30 July 2025, when the minor
children were removed from school due to non- payment of school fees. She
contends that the children are currently at home, receiving no formal education or
sporting activity, and that their academic and emotional wellbeing are being
adversely affected.
[13.] It is submitted that should the matter not be heard on an urgent basis, it would
only be enrolled around December 2025, by which time the children would have
missed a significant portion of the academic year. The Applicant argues that the
children have been enrolled with the First Respondent since kindergarten and are
1 2006 (4) SA 292 (SCA),
2 East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others [2011] ZAGPJHC 196).
3 Lindeque and Others v Hirsch and Others, In Re: Prepaid24 (Pty) Limited (2019/8846) ZAGPJHC
122.
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well-integrated into the school environment. She further contends that no other
school would admit the children at this stage of the year.
[14.] The Applicant states that she attempted to engage the school telephonically
and via SMS, in the hope of securing a payment arrangement. She approached her
attorneys on 31 July 2025 but alleges that financial constraints delayed the institution
of proceedings until 25 August 2025.
[15.] The First Respondent argues that the application lacks urgency and that the
Applicant has failed to disclose material facts. It contends that the enrolment
contracts were terminated on 6 June 2025, and the request for the children to be
collected on 30 July 2025 was a final administrative step.
[16.] From paragraph 47 and all sub- paragraphs, the First Respondent annexes
correspondence dating back to February 2025, evidencing repeated warnings about
the consequences of non-payment of fees and available options to the applicant.
[17.] The respondent further submitted that the Applicant was not without
alternative remedies. Public schooling is available in the area where the applicant
resides, and if financial difficulty prevented earlier legal action, she could have
approached Legal Aid or other support mechanisms. The delay of almost a month
before launching the application, despite knowledge of the facts, is therefore
unreasonable and self-created.
[18.] While I accept that matters involving minor children often invoke constitutional
protections under section 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
such rights do not render every application urgent per se. Urgency must still be
assessed contextually.
[19.] In my view, the explanation offered by the Applicant for the delay in launching
proceedings is neither complete nor satisfactory. Financial hardship, though
unfortunate, does n ot excuse a delay of nearly one month in the context of the
urgent relief sought.
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[20.] Further, the Applicant was aware as early as June 2025 that the schooling
arrangement was at risk. The record reflects repeated notices from the school to
support this, and there is no evidence that the Applicant took prompt and effective
steps to prevent the consequences she now complains of , except an allegation
denied by the respondents that she telephonically and via SMS system approached
the respondent for payment options . Unlike the respondent, this contention is not
supported by supporting annexures.
[21.] As contended by the respondent, the applicant could still approach public
schools. The mere fact that children’s rights are implicated does not, in and of itself,
create urgency. Each case must be assessed contextually, and in this case, the
Applicant had alternative options.
[22.] I accordingly find that the urgency relied upon is self-created, and the
matter does not meet the threshold under Rule 6(12). Additionally, I am not satisfied
that the Applicant has shown that she will not obtain substantial redress in due
course.
[23.] While the First Respondent has succeeded on the issue of urgency, the
matter implicates the rights of minor children, and the facts indicate that the
Applicant is under financial strain. I am not persuaded that a punitive costs order is
warranted. In my discretion, I consider it just that each party bear their own costs.
[24.] The following order is made:
1. The application is struck from the roll for lack of urgency.
2. Each party shall pay their own costs.
N NDLOKOVANE AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Delivered: this judgment was prepared and authored by the judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically and by circulation to the parties/their
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legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of his matter
on Caselines. The date for handing down is deemed to be 12 September 2025.
APPEARANCES
FOR THE APPLICANT: MR KWINIKA
FOR THE RESPONDENTS: ADV KRIEK
HEARD ON: 04 SEPTEMBER 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12 SEPTEMBER 2025