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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2025-147868
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED. NO
DATE 17 September 2025
In the matter between:
OCEAN WIND DEVELOPMENTS (PTY) LTD First Applicant
RESILUT PROPERTY DEVELOPMENTS (PTY) LTD
Second Applicant
TABANE RAMASALA
Third Applicant
GAVIN MARK MESKIN
Fourth Applicant
and
GEORGE PROKAS
First Respondent
SUBROWARE (PTY) LTD
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
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This judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email and by being uploaded to CaseLines. The date and time for
hand down is deemed to be 17 September 2025.
MAHON AJ:
Introduction
[1] This is an application brought by a group of applicants, comprising both
corporate entities and individuals associated with the promotion and management of
a residential property development, against the respondent s, Mr George Prokas and
his company. The applicants are engaged in advancing the development, securing
finance, obtaining regulatory approvals, and marketing units to purchasers.
[2] The application arises out of what the applicants characterise as a pattern of
unlawful and intimidating conduct by the first respondent. They allege that Mr Prokas
has, without lawful cause, contacted one of the funders of the development to
convey his version of a dispute with the applicants, and has threatened to approach
further stakeholders , including purchasers, estate agents, the landowner, and the
local authority, with the express purpose of obstructing or frustrating the progress of
the project. On the applicants’ version, this conduct constitutes unlawful interference
in their business relationships, designed to sabotage the development and to secure
leverage in support of a disputed monetary claim.
[3] The applicants also allege that the first respondent’s conduct went further,
extending to personal threats and intimidation directed at individual applicants. In
particular, they point to hostile emails, Whatsapp messages and telephone calls,
which, they say, created a reasonable apprehension of physical and other harm to
themselves and their families.
[4] The notice of motion, as initially formulated, sought an interdict restraining the
respondent from contacting, harassing, threatening, intimidating, or in any way
interfering with the applicants, their families, their business, and those with whom
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they have commercial or professional relationships, including funders, purchasers,
the landowner, estate agents and regulatory authorities. The respondent tendered
certain undertakings, but these were partial and did not address the full ambit of the
applicants’ concerns.
[5] The applicants therefore persist in seeking relief aligned with their notice of
motion, subject to such refinement as may be required to confine the order to the
unlawful conduct established on the papers. The application is opposed.
Background
[6] The first respondent’s involvement with the applicants arose from preliminary
discussions concerning his possible participation in a residential property
development being undertaken by the applicants. Those discussions culminated in
the execution of a document styled a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”). The
first respondent has sought to place considerable reliance on that document,
contending that it conferred upon him binding rights in relation to the development.
The applicants, on the other hand, maintain that the MOU is devoid of legal efficacy,
pointing out that it was executed by an erstwhile director acting without authority, and
was never ratified by the board.
[7] The terms of the MOU, in broad outline, contemplated that the respondent
and his associates would have a role in facilitating aspects of the development,
including the introduction of potential investors or financiers. The applicants
consistently rejected any suggestion that the MOU imposed enforceable obligations,
and denied that it created any entitlement on the part of the respondent to
remuneration.
[8] Nevertheless, the respondent s came to assert that the applicants’ alleged
non-compliance with the MOU gave rise to a right to payment of R10 million. That
sum does not appear anywhere within the text of the MOU itself. It was initially
described by the first respondent as a “penalty” said to flow from the applicants’
described by the first respondent as a “penalty” said to flow from the applicants’
supposed breach. In subsequent affidavits and correspondence, he shifted ground
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and characterised the amount as “damages” which he claimed to have suffered. The
applicants deny that any such claim is cognisable in law. For present purposes, it is
neither necessary nor appropriate to determine the validity of the MOU, nor the
viability of the respondent’s monetary demand.
[9] What is material is the conduct to which the claim gave rise. On or about 1
August 2025, the first respondent, asserting a right to R10 million, took it upon
himself to directly contact one of the applicants’ funders. He conveyed to the funder
his version of the dispute, implying, of course, that the applicant’s have reneged on
their obligations arising from the MOU . The applicants regarded this as an
unwarranted and unlawful intrusion into their commercial arrangements and
addressed a cease-and-desist letter to the first respondent on 7 August 2025.
[10] Matters did not end there. On 21 August 2025, the respondent sent a series of
communications to one of the applicants’ directors. In one, he wrote: “We are going
to have a very nice fight. Let’s go.” In another, he threatened: “Also a heads up. I’m
going to call every single buyer. The fun is just starting.”
[11] The following day, 22 August 2025, the respondent telephoned the third
applicant. According to the applicants, the call was both hostile and intimidating. It
began with the enquiry whether the applicant was “ready to talk and settle, or ready
to fight”, and included reference to confidential information which the respondent
claimed to have obtained. The applicants say that the tenor of the call created a
genuine apprehension of physical harm, extending beyond commercial intimidation
to personal threats directed at them and their families.
[12] On 25 August 2025 the applicants’ attorneys dispatched a further letter of
demand. The respondent’s reply was defiant. He challenged the applicants to bring
proceedings, stating: “I challenge u (sic) to launch an immediate application … I’m
proceedings, stating: “I challenge u (sic) to launch an immediate application … I’m
up for a good fight. Please let me know when you want to launch, so you can give
the sheriff the correct address.” Later the same day he added: “One more thing … I
am going to approach the estate agents, all the clients, the City of Cape Town, plus
the land seller. All I am doing is playing open cards with all parties myself.”
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[13] It was in the aftermath of these communications that the present urgent
application was instituted. The founding papers point not only to the grave
commercial risks which the respondent’s threatened interventions posed to the
development — including the potential disruption of relationships with funders,
buyers, and regulators — but also to the personal intimidation and apprehension of
harm experienced by the individual applicants.
[14] Upon service of the application, the respondent, through his legal
representatives, tendered certain undertakings. These included that he would not
harass, threaten, intimidate or extort the applicants, nor approach them or their
families directly. However, the undertakings were conspicuously incomplete. They
did not extend to several of the stakeholders identified in the founding papers as
being at risk of interference. No undertaking was given that the respondent would
refrain from contacting the local authority in relation to building approvals; nor that he
would abstain from approaching the estate agents responsible for marketing the
development; nor that he would desist from further communications with the funder.
[15] Moreover, the undertakings were not unqualified. They were accompanied by
emphatic denials of wrongdoing and by assertions of the respondent’s supposed
right to communicate with third parties about his disputes with the applicants. He
insisted that such communications constituted “full disclosure” rather than threats,
and reserved to himself the right to institute proceedings to interdict the continuation
of the development.
[16] The applicants contended that these caveats rendered the undertakings
wholly inadequate. In their submission, far from providing comfort, the undertakings
confirmed that the respondent intended to persist in contacting third parties in a
manner calculated to place the development at risk. It was in those circumstances
manner calculated to place the development at risk. It was in those circumstances
that the applicants persisted in seeking substantive relief from this Court.
Issues
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[17] The application falls to be determined against the factual matrix already
outlined. It is unnecessary for the Court to resolve the contractual controversy
regarding the MOU or the legitimacy of the respondent’s monetary demand. Those
matters may, if the respondent be so advised, be ventilated in proceedings properly
directed to that end. What is before this Court is a discrete application for interdictory
relief arising from the respondent’s conduct.
[18] Three central questions present themselves:
[18.1] First, whether the respondent’s conduct — in contacting the
applicants’ funder, threatening to approach other stakeholders, and engaging
in communications which the applicants experienced as hostile and
intimidating — constitutes unlawful interference with the applicants’ rights,
both commercial and personal.
[18.2] Second, assuming the answer to the first question is in the
affirmative, whether the applicants have established a basis for interdictory
relief, and, if so, how such relief should be tailored. The applicants’ notice of
motion was cast in wide terms. The respondent, for his part, proffered
undertakings of considerable breadth — in some respects extending further
than the applicants could legitimately demand — but leaving critical lacunae
and accompanied by denials and qualifications. It is therefore incumbent upon
the Court to confine the relief to the true mischief established, in a manner
that strikes the necessary balance and does justice between the parties.
[18.3] Third, whether the applicants are entitled to their costs, and on what
scale. Although the respondent furnished undertakings once the application
had been launched, their adequacy is disputed. It must therefore be
determined whether the applicants were justified in persisting with the
litigation, and whether costs should follow the result.
Analysis
[19] The first question is whether the respondent’s conduct constituted unlawful
Analysis
[19] The first question is whether the respondent’s conduct constituted unlawful
interference with the applicants’ rights. On his own version, the respondent
contacted one of the applicants’ funders directly to present his side of the dispute.
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He sought to justify this on the basis that “no harm” resulted, as the funder did not
withdraw its support. That justification cannot stand. As was put during argument, the
critical point is not whether the funder acted upon the approach, but that the
respondent “had no business contacting the funder” at all. To do so was an
unjustified intrusion into the applicants’ commercial relationships and one that the
law cannot countenance.
[20] The respondent’s subsequent communications make his intention even
clearer. On 21 August he threatened to “call every single buyer” and informed the
applicants that “the fun is just starting.” On 25 August he added that he would
approach “the estate agents, all the clients, the City of Cape Town, plus the land
seller.” He reserved to himself the right to “interdict” the completion of the
development. These threats were not made in a vacuum. They followed upon his
insistence that he was owed R10 million and his demand that the applicants settle
with him. The only reasonable inference is that the threats were made with the object
of creating leverage: to imperil the applicants’ development until his demand was
met.
[21] The respondent has sought to characterise his combative language as mere
bravado and to insist that when he spoke of a “fight” he meant only litigation. That
explanation does not sit comfortably with the tenor of his messages. Even if he
genuinely intended to pursue litigation, that did not entitle him to interfere with the
applicants’ dealings with funders, buyers, or regulators. Litigation is pursued in court,
not through approaches to third parties in a manner designed to frustrate a
commercial venture.
[22] The applicants also allege that the respondent’s conduct extended to personal
threats and intimidation. Particular reliance was placed on the telephone call of 22
August, which began with the question whether the applicant was “ready to talk and
August, which began with the question whether the applicant was “ready to talk and
settle, or ready to fight”, and on the tenor of certain emails. The applicants say this
created a reasonable apprehension for their safety and that of their families. In my
view, seeking an interdict directed specifically at preventing physical assault may
have been an over -reaction. The respondent’s repeated reference to a “fight” can
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plausibly be understood, in context, as a reference to litigation rather than to physical
violence. Importantly, the applicants’ own affidavits stop short of alleging that the
respondent expressly threatened harm to them or their families. They record instead
that his communications “incited fear” in the light of their tone.
[23] That being said, the respondent has, through his legal representatives,
provided an undertaking not to harass, threaten or intimidate the applicants or their
families, and not to approach them directly. That undertaking was repeated in open
court. In these circumstances, it is not necessary for me to decide whether such
relief would ultimately have been justified; it suffices that the respondent has
consented to it, and the order will reflect that consent. The real focus of the case lies
in the respondent’s persistent attempts to interfere with the applicants’ commercial
relationships in order to jeopardise the progress of the development.
[24] Apart f rom this, the respondents have consented to an order in terms of
prayers 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 of the draft order prepared by the applicants . These prayers
are reflected in paragraphs 1.2 to 1.4 of the order which I grant below.
[25] The applicants also sought, in their notice of motion, orders compelling the
respondent to retract certain statements and to desist from publishing allegedly
defamatory allegations. In my view, this relief is neither appropriate nor necessary in
the present proceedings. The interdict granted is directed at the true mischief,
namely the respondent’s attempts to interfere with the applicants’ commercial
relationships and to jeopardise the development. To go further and compel the
respondent to retract or apologise for statements already made would extend the
scope of this application into the terrain of defamation proceedings, which raises
distinct considerations of fact, motive and damages, and ordinarily requires trial -type
distinct considerations of fact, motive and damages, and ordinarily requires trial -type
procedures, including oral evidence and cross-examination.
[26] Moreover, the case for interdictory relief rests on the unlawfulness of the
respondent’s threatened conduct rather than upon the truth or falsity of what he has
said about the applicants. It is not the function of this Court, in motion proceedings of
this nature, to adjudicate whether past statements were defamatory or to compel
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their withdrawal. Should the applicants consider that they have been defamed, they
retain their remedies under the common law by way of a separate action. For
present purposes, the grant of appropriately tailored interdictory relief affords
adequate protection of their rights and renders orders for retractions or defamation
unnecessary.
[27] The second question is whether, in light of the undertakings provided, further
relief is required. The respondent, after being served with the application, tendered
undertakings not to harass, threaten, intimidate, or extort the applicants, and not to
approach them or their families. In some respects, those undertakings went further
than what the applicants might strictly have been entitled to claim. However, the
undertakings left significant gaps. They did not include any assurance that the
respondent would refrain from contacting the local authority in relation to building
approvals, nor did they cover the estate agents, the funder, or the purchasers of
units. When invited to explain these omissions, the respondent insisted that he was
“within his rights” to inform such parties of his claims, that this amounted to “full
disclosure” rather than a threat, and that he reserved to himself the right to institute
proceedings to prevent the completion of the development.
[28] This stance renders the undertakings inadequate. Far from resolving the
matter, they confirmed the applicants’ concern that the respondent intended to
persist in a course of conduct designed to jeopardise the development. The Court
cannot leave the applicants exposed to the very risk which the respondent has
openly threatened to bring about. At the same time, it is not appropriate to grant the
wide-ranging prohibitions sought in the notice of motion. As was observed in the
course of argument, “the mischief is sabotaging the development.” The relief must
therefore be tailored so as to restrain that mischief, and no more.
therefore be tailored so as to restrain that mischief, and no more.
[29] The appropriate balance is struck by restraining the first respondent, whether
on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, from conducting himself in his
interactions with any person in a manner which is intended directly or indirectly to
give rise to any consequences which would serve to jeopardise or undermine the
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success or progress of the development, other than as part of legal proceedings for
the legitimate pursuit of the respondents’ rights.
[30] Such an order gives effect to the applicants’ legitimate interest in protecting
their project while ensuring that the respondent is not unduly restrained in his
ordinary liberty to communicate or in his right to pursue lawful proceedings in court.
[31] The final question is costs. The respondent argues that because undertakings
were provided, the applicants ought not to have persisted with the application. I am
unable to agree. The undertakings, though broad in some respects, were materially
deficient in others. They failed to address the key concerns raised in the founding
papers and were qualified by denials and reservations which left the applicants
without the certainty to which they were entitled. In those circumstances, the
applicants were justified in approaching the Court and in persisting until appropriate
relief was granted. Costs should follow the result.
[32] In the circumstances, the following order is made:
1. The first respondent, whether so acting in his personal capacity or in a
representative capacity in respect of the second respondent, or through any
agent, representative, or other person acting on his instructions, is interdicted
and restrained from:
1.1. conducting himself in his interactions with any person, in a manner
which is intended directly or indirectly to give rise to any consequences which
would serve to jeopardise or undermine the success or progress of the
development situated at: Subdivided portion of Erf 3[…] , Hout Bay,
Registration Division IR: Westerns Province, situated at 3[…] B[…] V[…]
Road, Hout Bay, Cape Town, other than as part of legal proceedings for the
legitimate pursuit of the respondents’ rights;
1.2. harassing, threatening, intimidating and/or extorting the first and
second applicants' directors, including (but not limited to) the third and fourth
second applicants' directors, including (but not limited to) the third and fourth
applicants, shareholders and/or personnel;
1.3. making use of, or in any manner utilizing, any confidential or
proprietary information belonging to the first and/or second applicants;
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1.4. approaching, whether personally or through any agent, representative,
or other person acting on his instructions, within 200 meters of the first
applicant's property development construction site of the La' Mare
development situated at: Subdivided portion of Erf […], Hout Bay, Registration
Division IR: Westerns Province, situated at 3[…] B[…] V[…] Road, Hout Bay,
Cape Town;
2. The respondents are to pay the applicants’ costs of the application, on
scale B.
D MAHON
Acting Judge of the High Court
Johannesburg
Date of hearing: 3 September 2025
Date of judgment: 17 September 2025
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Adv R Kriek
Instructed by: VDM Attorneys
For the Respondent: Adv J van der Merwe
Adv R Lewis (Pupil)
Instructed by: Keith Sutcliffe & Associates