IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
In the matter between:
ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS
and
MINISTER OF FINANCE
COMMISSIONER, SOUTH AFRICAN
Reportable
Case no: 2025-078807
APPLICANT
18T RESPONDENT
REVENUE SERVICE 2 ND RESPONDENT
SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 3RD RESPONDENT
CHAIRPERSON OF THE NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF PROVINCES 4™ RESPONDENT
CHAIRPERSON OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON FINANCE AND THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE 5n1 RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Economic Freedom Fighters v Minister of Finance &
Others (Case no 2025-078807) [2025] ZA WCHC (22
September 2025)
Coram: ERASMUS J, NUKU J, MA YOSI AJ
Heard: 3 June 2025
Delivered: 22 September 2025
2
Summary: Order sought suspending the first respondent's decision
Urgent Part A suspension and interdictory relief sought relating to the first
respondent's decision to increase the fuel levy, pending the final
determination of review relief sought in Part B - whether extreme urgency
justified -the requirements for interim interdictory relief-whether case made
out for the suspension relief sought.
ORDER
1 The application is dismissed with costs.
2 The applicant is to pay the First Respondent's costs.
3 Costs to include that of two counsel where so employed, on Scale B.
JUDGMENT
3
Mayosi AJ:
Introduction and brief background
[l] This application was heard by a Full Court of this Division on 3 June
2025 and the order recorded above was made on the same day, after the
hearing of full argument. This judgement contains the reasons for the above
order.
[2] The application was brought on an extremely urgent basis against the
following background.
[3] On Wednesday 21 May 2025, the first respondent (the Minister)
delivered his annual budget speech in which he proposed, amongst other fiscal
measures, an increase to the general fuel levy. He proposed to increase the
petrol levy by 16 cents per litre, and diesel by 15 cents per litre. The increased
fuel levy was to take effect exactly two weeks later, on 4 June 2025.
[4] Five days later, at 18h29 on Monday 26 May 2025, the Treasurer
General of the applicant (the EFF), who is also a member of Parliament's
Standing Committee on Finance, addressed email correspondence to the
Minister, with regards to the fuel levy increase. The email was sent from the
EFF Chief Whip's address, and it had attached to it a letter of demand from
the EFF's Treasurer General.
[5] At 19h09 on the same day, the EFF's Chief Whip addressed a further
email to the :Minister, requesting him to disregard the letter sent earlier, on the
4
grounds that it contained a date error. An updated and corrected letter from
the EFF's Treasurer General was attached to this email.
[6] Later on - on that same evening - at 21h00, the EFF's Chief Whip
addressed yet another email to the Minister, requesting him to further
disregard the letter sent to him earlier. The latter withdrawal was made for
the reason that the earlier letter(s) contained a "technical and computational
material error". A third iteration of the letter of demand to the Minister was
attached to the 21h00 email, which appears to fonn the basis of the EFF's
complaints regarding the fuel levy increase.
[7] This final letter of demand addressed to the Minister on 26 May 2025,
after hours ( as was the case with the previously retracted letters, for that
m11tt~r)_.r~n:u.~t~d )1i1_n _to _withdraw, and not give effect to. the proposed fuel
levy increase, based on what the EFF characterised as economic, legal and
political arguments that it set out in the letter of demand. The Minister was
given 48 hours to provide a written response to this letter.
(8] The Minister's office acknowledged receipt of this letter at 09h46 on
Tuesday 27 May 2025.
[9] The unissued papers in this urgent application were emailed to the
various parties on Wednesday 28 May 2025, at 10.28pm. This of course did
not signal the start of the litigation, as unissued papers have no Jegal standing
unless, as can happen in some instances, there is some kind of agreement
between the parties, which there was none in this case.
5
[10] The issued papers were sent via email on the morning of Thursday 29
May 2025, some four calendar days before the fuel levy was to come into
effect- two court days before the hearing on 3 June. The Minister -the only
respondent opposing the application-received the papers at 13h10 on the 29th.
He was given until 17h00 on the next day, Friday 30 May 2025 within which
to file both his notice of intention to oppose and his answering affidavit so
that, on this timeline imposed by the EFF, the latter could deliver its replying
affidavit by 17h00 on Saturday 31 May 2025. The Minister was therefore
given one court day within which to, in essence, consider the founding papers,
form a view regarding the merits of the case, procure counsel, consult and take
advice, have an answering affidavit drafted and set aside the time to consider
its contents and file same, if he intended to oppose the application.
[ 11] As was the Judge President of this Division for that matter, in the sense
that she too had one court day -Friday, 30 May 2025 -to urgently constitute
a Full Court, which she did and which, with the judicial resources at her
disposal, comprised of at least one judge who had to postpone a running
criminal matter scheduled for hearing on 3 June 202 5 in order to accommodate
the EFF' s extremely urgent set down date. Furthermore, these judges had to
reserve themselves over that week-end, constantly on the look-out for papers
which never came as per the EFF 's set deadlines, in order to place themselves
in a state of readiness to deal with the EFF's application come 3 June 2025.
The wait was in vain, as nothing happened and no papers were filed in
accordance with these deadlines.
[ 12] As it turned out, and unsurprisingly, the Minister was unable to comply
with the applicant's timelines as he was overseas on official business. To
6
further demonstrate the EFF's haphazard approach to this litigation, there was
no provision made in its notice of motion for when the parties' respective
heads of argument were to be delivered, on such a tight schedule.
[ 13] The only time line that was met was the delivery of the Minister's notice
of intention to oppose the application. This was delivered on his behalf on 30
May 2025, as per the EFF's programme. The third, fourth and fifth
respondents filed notices to abide on Monday, 2 June 2025. And so it was
that the lis was really between the EFF and the Minister.
[14] The Minister's extensive 75 page (with annexures) answering affidavit
was delivered on 2 June 2025. The EFF's replying affidavit was delivered on
3 June 2025, on the morning of the hearing, as were the parties' respective
heads of argument. By the time the judges convened to hear the matter on 3
June, some had not received the heads of argument or the replying affidavit,
either physically or on case lines. Life nevertheless went on, as the saying
goes.
[15] I set out this timeline because at the hearing of the matter on 3 June
2025, th.e Court questioned the extreme urgency with which this application
was brought by the EFF.
[16] I accept that the issues raised in this application had to be addressed on
an urgent basis. The issue I have with the EFF's approach relates to the
question of when the urgency arose. It did not arise on 26 May at 21h00, nor
did it arise 48 hours later on 28 May. It arose on 21 May 2025, as soon as the
Minister made his announcement.
7
[17] There are degrees of urgency as we well know, and in my view, the
urgency of this matter was apparent, or ought reasonably to have been
apparent to the EFF on 21 May 2025 after the Minister made his
announcement, given that the increased fuel levy was to come into operation
a mere two weeks later, on 4 June 2025. In litigation terms, a period of two
weeks is already so truncated as to induce immediate action. In its replying
affidavit, the EFF's deponent asserts that after the Minister's announcement
on 21 May 2025, the EFF immediately identified the constitutional crisis
attendant upon his announcement. One wonders why, if the constitutional
crisis was identified immediately after the announcement, the EFF did not act
with the concomitant immediacy that the circumstances required. It addressed
its letter of demand to the Minister five days after the announcement, having
bungled two previous attempts at a letter of demand that was clearly meant to
set up this application. It then delivered the issued papers in this application
a whole eight days after the Minister's announcement and two court days
before the hearing, and gave any respondents who wished to oppose it
effectively one court day within which to deliver their papers. These time
frames were unreasonable in the extreme.
[18] To reiterate, the urgency of this application occurred on 21 May 2025
as soon as the announcement was made. The laxity with. which the EFF acted
thereafter is unexplained given the circumstances. In my view, the extreme
urgency with which the EFF brought this application was entirely self-created
and unwarranted, and the inconvenience to the Court, and unfain1ess and
potential prejudice to the participating party and other litigants in this Division
is patent. The fact that the Minister managed to file papers and heads of
8
argument, albeit outside of the deadlines set by the EFF, does not remove the
inherent unfairness to him caused by the EFF's unexplained conduct in
bringing this application on the extremely urgent basis that it did.
[ 19] This is not the first time that this litigant has approached this Court in
this manner. Although the facts of those cases were not the same as here, the
manner in which the EFF approached the previous Full Courts of this Division
in those cases is materially similar. The nature of the relief sought from those
Full Courts is simi1ar to that which is sought presently, also on an extremely
urgent basis. I am referring to the cases of EFF v & Others v The
Chairperson of the Powers & Privileges Committee N.O. & Others1
(EFFl) and EFF & Others v The Chairperson of the Powers & Privileges
Committee & Others2 (EFF2), both heard by Full Courts of this Division
within a week of one another.
[20] As in the present case, in those cases too unreasonable timeframes were
unilaterally imposed by the EFF on the respondents involved; the cases were
brought on extreme urgency; in one of them (as in the present matter) one of
the judges had to be removed from a matter with which he was seized in order
to constitute the Full Court for the purposes of expediting the EFF's
application. And in those cases, as in the present matter for the reasons more
fully set out below, the EFF's applications were fundamentally defective.
[21] The EFF's conduct was frowned upon in both cases. In EFFl, our
brother Erasmus, leading the Full Court,3 emphasised the need for an applicant
1 (2024) ZA WCHC 16 (30 January 2024)
2 [2024) ZAWCHC 31 {8 February 2024)
3 Thulare J dissented.
9
who applies for a date for a matter that they foresee will be opposed to ensure
that the timelines they set are not only reasonable in the particular
circumstances but that the matter will be ripe for hearing on the date so
chosen.4 The timeframes in this matter were not reasonable. That application
was struck from the roll with costs ordered against the EFF.
[22] In EFF2, which came to be heard by another Full Court virtually a week
later, after the EFF re•enrolled EFFl for hearing, Sher J writing for the Full
Court (which was comprised of judges that were on duty in the motion and
urgent Court in that week) expressed his general disapproval of the EFF' s
conduct in failing to act with the urgency that the circumstances called for in
order for the matter to be heard for a second time, and its laxity in that regard. 5
This feature appears in the present matter. The EFF attracted a punitive costs
order for its conduct in that matter.6 It is hard to resist the conclusion that this
manner of litigating, with the prejudices and unfairness inherent in it both for
the opponents involved and other litigants in the Division, and the judges
hearing those matters, has become a pattern for the EPP.
[23] As things turned out, and notwithstanding the defects inherent jn the
application before us, the exigencies of the situation demanded that this Full
Court nevertheless deal with the application, self-created extreme urgency
aside, as was the case in EFF2. Whilst the self-created extreme urgency ought
properly to have warranted that the application be struck from the roll,
however, given the importance of the issues involved and the need to do
justice to the parties, and the fact that striking the matter from the roll would
4 EFFl, para [19]
5 Para [20)
6 Para [42]
10
not provide a solution to the immediate dispute relating to the fuel levy, the
implementation of which was imrninent,7 the Court decided to proceed to
consider the merits of the matter.
The interim interdictory relief sought by the EFF
[24] The essence of what we are faced with here is an application for interim
relief. The EFF seeks the suspension of the Minister's decision to increase the
fuel levy. It also seeks an interdict preventing the Minister from giving effect
to his decision. Both orders are sought pending the finalisation of the relief
sought in Part B of the present application.
[25] This, of necessity given the dictum in Economic Freedom Fighters v
Gordhan and Others; Public Protector and Another v Gordhan and
Others8 (EFF3), takes us to a consideration of the review relief sought by the
EFF in Part B of its application, and the grounds for that review relief.
[26] Herein lies the first fatal flaw in the EFF's application. In this regard, it
faces an insurmountable EFF3 problem, in relation to which, I daresay, this
particular applicant ought to have known better.
[27] In EFF3, the Constitutional Court held as follows:
[ 42] In addition, before a comt may grant an interim interdict, it must be
satisfied that the applicant for an interdict has good prospects of success in
the main review. The claim for review must be based on strong grounds
7 At midnight on 4 June 2025
8 2020 (6) SA 325 (CC), para [42)
11
wruch are likely to succeed. This requires the court adjudicating the
interdict application to peek into the grounds of review raised in the main
review application and assess their strength. It is only if a court is convinced
that the review is likely to succeed that it may appropriately grant the
interdict. The rationale is that an interdict which prevents a functionary
from exercising public power conferred on it impacts on the separation of
powers and should therefore only be granted in exceptional circumstances.
[28] The founding affidavit contains no review grounds at all. This Court,
which is adjudicating the interim interdictory relief sought, is therefore unable
to peek into the review grounds, as none are advanced whatsoever in the
founding affidavit. This Court is, in the circumstances, unable to assess the
strength of the review grounds for the purposes of detennining whether or not
to grant the interim interdictory relief sought. Given that the EFF was the
applicant in the seminal EFF3, this is why I say that this particular applicant
ought to have known better than bring an application for interim interdictory
relief pending a review, that is completely devoid of any review grounds.
[29] In fact, to confirm the absence of any review grounds advanced by the
EFF, in paragraph 12 of the founding affidavit, its deponent boldly states that:
"At this stage, the EFF is in no position to definitively set out to this Court
what the nature of our Part B would be because to date, the Minister has not
responded to the EFF letter." The only interpretation that can be given to this
statement is that the EFF, at the time of drafting the founding affidavit, had
not as yet formulated its review grounds. This is indeed borne out by the
contents of the remainder of the founding affidavit.
12
[30] This is fatal to the EFF's application. More time was spent on this issue
during argument than ought to have been the case, because Mr Ka-Siboto for
the EFF could not find his client's way out of this conundrum.
[31] The second fatal flaw to the EFF's application for interim interdictory
relief arises after the application of the now trite Setlogelo9 test. It is trite that
for interdictory relief, the EFF was required to show: 1) that it has a prima
facie right, albeit open to some doubt, which; 2) if not protected by an interdict
would suffer irreparable harm; 3) the balance of convenience favours the
granting of the interdict it seeks; and 4) it has no other reasonable, satisfactory
alternative remedy. No such case has been made out by the EFF.
[32] Ifno primafacie right is established, even one open to some doubt, the
interim interdictory rdi~f sought i::, stillborn for this reason alon~, and we sc::e
no reason for this Court to delve into the remaining requirements for such
interim interdictory relief, and so we do not do so. Suffice to say that ifthere
is no primafacie right established, there can be no right which, if not protected
by an interim interdict, will suffer irreparable harm. In our view, the remaining
considerations fall away for consideration.
[33] In its attempts make the case for aprimafacie right, the EFF rightfully
asserts that this Court must consider its prospects of success in Part B, and
that the more possibilities of its success therein the more this Court should be
inclined to grant the relief it seeks. We have already stated that there is no
Part B review relief properly foregrounded in the founding affidavit at all (and
this is conceded by the EFF), and so this Court is incapable of assessing the
~ Setlogelo v Setlogelo 19 l 4 AD 221 at 227
13
strength or weakness (i.e.; the prospects of success) of any review grounds
when none have been placed before it. The EFF's own statement in the
founding affidavit that the more possibilities of its success in its Part B review
relief, the more this Court should be inclined to grant the application is itself
dispositive of the interim interdictory relief sought, as far the establishment of
a prima facie right is concerned, given that it has advanced no review grounds
in the founding affidavit to enable an assessment of its prospects of success in
the review.
The suspension relief sought by the EFF
[34] The EFF's further assertions regarding its primafacie right to the relief
that it seeks relate to its assertion that the Minister's decision is contaminated
primarily by an ultra vires exercise of power. This argument, which is the
foundational legal argument of this application in particular in relation to the
suspension relief sought, is that by his announcement to increase the fuel
levy, the Minister imposed a tax in terms of section 77(3) of the Constitution.
The argument goes that this means that the Minister must introduce a Money
Bill which imposes a tax and/or a levy as characterised in section 77(1) and
(2) of the Constitution. The EFF argues that this would then trigger a section
75 parliamentary process before the Money Bill can take legal effect, which
the Minister has not undertaken, and which can practically not be undertaken
before the Minister's announcement takes effect on 4 June 2025.
[35] I state upfront that given the fact that the suspension relief too is sought
in the interim pending Part B, the flaws inherent in the interdictory relief that
are set out above, in addition to what is stated below, also permeate the
suspension relief sought.
14
[36] According to its founding affidavit, the EFF contends that the fact that
the Minister took the decision that he did on 21 May 2025 does not in itself
render his decision unlawful. This is not an insignificant concession made by
the EFF, under oath in its founding affidavit, for it confinns that, on its own
version, it does not view the Minister's decision as unlawful.
[37] The EFF says that what it takes issue with is the Minister's failure to
engage what the EFF describes as the mandatory parliamentary process to
give effect to his decision, i.e., the process set out in section 75 of the
Constitution that regulates ordinary bills not affecting provinces.
[38] This is the third fatal flaw in the EFF's application.
[39] With the EFF having conceded that the Minister's decision is not
unlawful but nevertheless having stated that its problem is the mechanism for
implementing it, it falls on this Court to then have regard to that mechanism.
It bears mentioning that the statutory mechanism for increasing the fuel levy
was known to the EFF before the institution of these proceedings, and its
legality is not challenged herein.
[ 40] According to the Minister, the fuel levy adjustment is not a Money Bill,
and accordingly section 77 of the Constitution does not apply. He contends
that his decision and power to adjust the fuel levy was based on his legislated
power in terms of section 48 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 ( the
Act). The Minister contends that the statutory mechanism for adjusting the
fuel levy is provided by the Act, rather than section 77 of the Constitution.
15
[ 41] This argument carries convincing weight when regard is had to the
relevant provisions of the Act. The fuel levy is defined therein to mean "any
duty leviable under Part 5 of Schedule 1 on any goods which have been
manufactured in or imported into the Republic. " The fuel levy increase was
levied under Part 5A of Schedule 1 of the Act.
[ 42] Section 48 of the Act regulates amendments to Schedule I of the Act.
We now know that pursuant to his announcement on 21 May 2025 regarding
the increase in the fuel levy, on 1 June 2025 the Minister approved the
amendment of Part SA of Schedule 1 and Part 3 of Schedule 6 of the Act, and
signed the requisite Notices to be published in the Government Gazette, thus
giving effect -with the amendment of Part SA of Schedule 1-to the fuel levy
increase. The preamble to the Notice giving effect to the fuel levy increase
reads thus:
In terms of section 48 of the Customs and Excise Act, 1964, Pait SA of
Schedule l to the said Act is hereby amended, with et1ect from 4 June 2025
to the extent set out in the Schedule hereto.
[43] From a reading of section 48, together with the Government Gazette
Notice attached to it, it seems evident to me that the Minister was empowered
to increase the fuel levy by amending Part SA of Schedule 1, by the provisions
of section 48(2) of the Act which stipulate that:
The Minister may from time to time by like notice amend or withdraw or,
if so withdrawn, insert Part 2, Part 4 or Part 5 of Schedule 1, whenever he
deems it expedient in the public interest to do so: Provided that the Minister
may, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so, reduce
16
any duty specified in the said Parts with retrospective effect from such date
and to such extent as may be determined by him in such notice.
[ 44] We are told by the Minister that this is not the first time that the general
fuel levy has been increased. It has occurred repeatedly, including seven times
over the past ten years whilst the EFF has held seats in Parliament. At no point
during that period did the EFF object to the statutory mechanism through
which such increases are implemented, nor has it taken steps to challenge the
legal framework of which it was, and remains, aware.
[ 45] The EFF did not dispute these assertions in its replying affidavit. As
stated previously, it does not challenge this applicable statutory framework,
of which it appears to have been aware all this time, in this litigation.
[ 46] The fact that the EFF was aware of the statutory mechanism
empowering the Minister to impose and implement the fuel levy increase is
apparent from the contents of paragraph 32.2 of the letter of demand sent to
the Minister belatedly on 26 May 2025, where the BFF demanded, in terms,
that the Minister refrain from issuing any Gazette or regulatory notice under
the Customs and Excise Act for the purpose of implementing the increase in
the fuel levy.
[ 47] Jn my view therefore, this is clearly not a section 77 Money Bills matter.
The increased fuel levy was not jntroduced by a Bill, and there is no legal
requirement that it must be subjected to the parliamentary process envisaged
in section 75 of the Constitution. In this regard, the basic premise of the EFF's
application is fatally defective.
17
[48J In Nu Africa,10 the Constitutional Court confirmed that section 48 is a
valid form of subordinate fiscal law-making, subject to legislative oversight
through the mechanism provided for in section 48(6) of the Act, which
stipulates that any amendment, withdrawal or insertion made under section 48
in any calendar year shall, unless Parliament othenvise provides, lapse on the
last day of the next calendar year, but without detracting from the validity of
such amendment, withdrawal or insertion before it has so lapsed.
[ 49] In his judgment in Nu Africa, Mathopo J held as follows regarding this
legislative scheme:
[99] I agree with the Commissioner that these amendments to the
Sche<lul~s are ne;:cessary for 1::anooth fiscal law-making and to enable
the Executive to act speedily and effectively in capping mischief or
abuse. Parliament's involvement under 48(6) of the Customs Act is
necessary to make the measures long-term or permanent. In sum, the
legislative delegation for the Minister to amend the Schedules is not
constitutionally impermissible. The following factors are key this
conclusion:
(a) Section 75(15)(a)(i)(bb) of the Customs Act provides that the
M inister may amend Schedules 3, 4, 5 and 6 amongst other reasons
"whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so"
(Emphasis added.)
(b) Amendments made to the Schedules (Customs Act and VAT Act)
are subject to parliamentary oversight in tenns of section 48(6). If
rn Nu Afiica Duty Free Shops (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Finance and Others 2024 {l) SA 567 (CC)
18
Parliament does not intervene then there is an automatic lapsing of
the amendment to the Schedules and, as a consequence, the lifespan
of the amendments is limited.
( c) In practical terms, if Parliament does not approve the amendment of
a particular Schedule that amendment will be withdrawn. This
clearly shows that the power of the Minister is subject to
parliamentary scrutiny and control.
[100] The Executive is in a much better position than Parliament to
appreciate the day• to-day needs and demands of administering the matters
contained within the Schedules to the Customs and the VAT Act.
Parliament's delegation promotes co-operative governance and actually
enhances efficient governance, both of which are constitutional imperatives.
Parliament made the conscious choice that the prevailing circumstances
dictated that the law-making work in the fo1m of amending the Schedules
be best left to the expertise and proximity of the Executive. In the
circumstances, I see nothing constitutionally impermissible with that. This
is especially so since Parliament retains sufficient oversight.
[101] It is against this backdrop that I hold that Parliament's delegation in
respect of the Customs Act and the VAT Act is constitutionally permissible.
I say this based on the cumulative effect of the following considerations:
(a) The Schedules run to hundreds of pages and contain enormous
amount of detail which could permissibly have been left from the
outset to the Minister to be determined by regulation.11
(b) ll1e Schedules by their nature contain detail, which is likely to
require frequent amendment. From time to time the classification
details of the Haimouised System, on wl1ich all customs
11 As published on the SARS website, the current Schedules 1 to 8 run to some 1475 pages. The
agreements and protocols published as part of Schedule 10, and which the Minister may amend in tem1s of
section 49(5)(d), run to nearly 3000 pages.
19
classification globally (including the Schedules) is based, are
amended by the World Customs Organization in Brussels. South
Africa must then bring the Schedules promptly into line.
Additionally, the government may wish promptly to alter rates for
reasons of industrial or economic policy.
(c) II1 some cases, retroactive national legislation, preceded by a
budget or other public announcement, is sufficient for amendments
to tax legislation. Rates of customs and excise duties and VAT arc
different, because the taxes are collected at the time of the relevai1t
transactions, so it is not practicable to adjust them retroactively.
Imported and excise goods are held in customs and excise
warehouses until the relevant duties and VAT are paid. Retroactive
national legislation would thus not suffice. It follows that the public
have to know, in real time, what the rates and exemptions are.
(d) The Ministerial amendments apply for a limited period,
after which, if they are to be continued, they must be adopted by
Parliament pursuant to section 48( 6).
[50] To the extent that the EFF's complaint is that the Minister has failed to
engage the mandatory parliamentary process to give effect to his decision, that
process is not what is set out in section 75 of the Constitution. Within the
statutory scheme empowering the Minister to increase the fuel levy, the
involvement of Parliament appears to be provided for by the provisions of
section 48(6) of the Act, in that the delegation given to the Minister under
section 48 is not an open-ended one. It is time-bound and structured, and
section 48(6) ensures parliamentary contro1, so that any amendment to the
Schedule lapses unless Parliament enacts a law to confirm or substitute it.
20
[51] The EFF in reply does not engage meaningfully with the Minister's
answer to its challenge. Save to complain that section 48( 6) dates back to the
pre-constitutional era, it does not seek to challenge its constitutionality or for
that matter, the constitutionality of the other relevant aspects of that
framework. Given what the Constitutional Court held in Nu Africa in relation
to similar provisions in the Act and the parliamentary safe guards provided by
section 48(6) within that statutory framework, this Court finds no merit to the
EFF's complaints.
[52] No legal basis has been established for the suspension relief that the
EFF seeks.
Conclusion
[53] For all the reasons set out above, the Full Court found that the
application lacked merit, and the following order was made on 3 June 2025:
[53.1] The appJication is dismissed with costs.
[53.2] The applicant is to pay the First Respondent's costs.
[53.3] Costs to include that of two counsel where so employed, on Scale
B.
I agree, and it was so ordered.
V NMAYOSI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree.
21
~ NtiffASMUS
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
~v LNUKU
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For applicant:
Instructed by:
Msondezo Ka-Siboto
Tongayi Masvikwa
Eng land Slabbert Attorneys Inc.
For first respondent: Kameel Prehmid
Mpendulo Mfeka
Instructed by: The State Attorney, Cape Town
22