IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MTHATHA)
CASE NO.: 2725/2025
In the matter between:
AFRICAN HAWKERS ASSOCIATION Applicant
and
KING SABATA DALINDYEBO LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY 1st Respondent
THE MUNICIPAL MANAGER
FOR KSD LOCAL MUNICIPALITY:
NGAMELA PAKADE 2nd Respondent
RURAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
KING SABATA DALINDYEBO LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY 3rd Respondent
DIRECTOR OF SAFETY AND SECURITY:
KING SABATA DALINDYEBO LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY 4th Respondent
JUDGMENT
ZONO AJ:
Introduction
[1] Applicant approached this court in terms of an application that is said to be in
two parts. Part A of the application was intended to be brought on urgent
basis in terms of which the interdictory relief is sought. In Part B the applicant
appears to be purs uing a challenge on the constitutionality of the Municipality
(KSD) By-Law on informal trading, published under local authority notice 1066
of 2024. However, applicant’s notice of motion is structurally not a model of
clarity in that it does not divide the relief sought in Part A from the one sought
in Part B. This unorthodox and unconventional approach in the drafting of
notice of motion is only clarified in the founding affidavit.
[2] In distinguishing Part A from Part B the founding affidavit is framed as follows:
“PART A
(d) Cause of Action
13. On or about 29 th May 2025 and again the 30 th May 2025,
Municipal Officials acting under the authority and direction of the
respondents, forcibly removed us from our lawful trading spaces
in York Road and Sutherland Street in Mthatha. These removals
were done without any notice, without affording the affected
traders an opportunity to be heard and without a court order
authorising such actions.
14. Furthermore, during the said operation cleaning Mthat ha,
officials acting on behalf of the respondents confiscated various
goods and equipment belonging to the traders. These items
include perishable goods, clothing merchandise and other goods
critical to our daily operations.
15. The conduct of the 1 st respondent’s officials on both days was
aggressive and intimidating, and it has left many of us in a state
of fear and financial despair. Our only means of survival has
been unlawfully taken from us, without any due process or a
notice.
16. These actions constitute an ongoing and unlawful pattern of
harassment directed at us, who are being systematically driven
off from our places of business by Municipal Officials under the
purported authority of non -existent or uncommunicated legal
instruments, such as t he King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipal
informal trading By-Laws they keep referring to”. (sic)
[3] The relief in the notice of motion that is consistent with the set of facts outlined
under Part A in the founding affidavit appears in paragraph 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 , 3.4
and 3.4 which is crafted in the following terms:
“3.1 That the respondents be and are hereby interdicted, restrained
and prohibited from interfering with the street trading business of
the applicant’s members at Sutherland(R61) Street and York
Road in future without being ordered by a court to do so.
3.2 That respondents be and hereby interdicted from intimidating
the applicant’s members and harassing them in an attempt to
stop them from trading in the aforesaid streets without obtaining
a court order authorising them to drive the applicant’s members
from selling in these streets forthwith.
3.3 That an order be issued by this honourable court interdicting the
respondents’ officials and restraining them from interfering with
lawful trading of the applicant’s members.
3.4 That applicant further seek an inte rdict and restrain the
respondents from interfering with applicant’s members trading
businesses without any court order authorised them to do so.
3.5 The applicant further seeks an interdict and restraint court order
against the respondents for interferin g with their trading
business of fruits and vegetables, clothes, sewing services and
photocopy services at York Road and Sutherland Streets
without any court order given to them to show that they have
been authorised by the court.”(sic).
[4] The rest of the paragraphs in the notice of motion deal with the constitutional
challenge against the By-Law relating to the informal trading, which challenge
relates to Part B as demonstrated in the founding affidavit. Regarding Part B
the founding affidavit states as follows:
“PART B
THE ISSUE OF THE BY-LAWS: THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY
43. I wish to pause there and state, under oath, that no copy of
those “purported” by -laws has ever been served or
communicated to me or our members, nor has there been any
consultation with the affected parties regarding their adoption.
44. It is therefore clear that the respondents rely on laws that I am
not aware of and that have not been promulgated or published
in accordance with the requirements of the law and prin ciples of
administrative justice. Failure to properly communicate or
publish the bylaws renders them unenforceable against me and
invalid in their application to the facts at hand” (sic)
[5] The parties agreed that the matter at this stage is for determi nation of
interdictory relief set out or outlined in paragraph 3 herein above. Applicant’s
Rule 15A practice note delivered on 24 th July 2025 is to the same effect.
Having been directed to deal with the interdictory relief outlined in paragraph 3
herein above, I set out to discuss principles and relevant facts herein below.
Discussion and Analysis
[6] An interdict is not a remedy for past invasion of rights, but is concerned with
present or future infringements 1. It is now apposite to examine th e kind of
conduct the applicant seeks to prohibit. The applicant contends that on 29 th
May 2025 and again on 30 th May 2025 KSD officials forcibly removed its
members from their stalls at York Road and Sutherland Street. It is again
contended that KSD offic ials intimidated and harassed applicant’s members
1 National Council of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Openshaw 2008 (5)
SA 339 (SCA) at 346 H-I.
on the same dates. It is therefore not apparent from the applicant’s papers
that applicant’s members returned to their trading stalls after their removal by
the KSD officials. It therefore means that, as th e intimidation, harassment and
interference were taking place not only in the context of the removal, but also
contemporaneously with the removal of applicant’s members from their
trading places, all those acts were done and finished on 29 th May 2025 and
30th May 2025 respectively. No subsequent conduct or utterances by the KSD
officials have been alleged to have occurred.
[7] The founding affidavit is silent about the fact that the same events or acts will
happen in the future, or it is reasonably apprehended that such harm is likely
to occur in the future. There is no assertion pointing to the fact that presently
and or in the future applicants’ members will be removed, intimidated or
harassed by the KSD officials. Papers, as they serve before me, demonstrate
that applicants’ members are at their homes or at places other than the ones
from which they were allegedly removed, intimidated or harassed. My humble
view is that the conducts sought to be interdicted relate to the alleged past
invasions and that they cannot justifiably be interdicted. Application for
interdictory relief cannot succeed on this ground alone.
[8] There is yet another reason why applicant’s application cannot succeed. The
applicant seemingly accepts that the interfer ence with their business was
done in terms of the KSD informal trading By -Law promulgated in 2024/2025.
Paragraph 42 of the applicant’s founding affidavit reads as follows:
“42. The respondents have claimed that their conduct is authorised
by the newly ad opted municipal by -laws. It is alleged that these
by-laws were drafted in 2024 and passed in January 2025, and
that they form the legal basis for our removal from our trading
areas and the confiscation of our trading goods” (sic).
areas and the confiscation of our trading goods” (sic).
[9] This brings me to another point. Whilst it is accepted that KSD officials were
acting in terms of the informal trading By -Law, a prohibitory interdict is a
remedy available for the prohibition of illegitimate activities. A court should be
loath to restrai n a person from exercising a statutory power 2. There is no
justification for prohibiting the Municipality from enforcing its informal trading
By-Law, especially in the light of the fact that the said By -Law is still extant,
valid and enforceable. It has n ot been impugned or declared invalid yet. This
put paid to the applicant’s complaint about Municipality’s interference with
their business. The interference for as long as it is in terms of the informal
trading By -Law, is lawful. I will return to this poin t in the course of this
judgment. A prohibitory interdict, may be described as an order requiring a
person to abstain from committing a threatened wrong or from continuing an
existing one 3. A lawful conduct of the Municipality or a conduct that is
performed in terms of the Law cannot be interdicted. On this basis too this
application must fail.
[10] Applicant’s notice of motion together with the founding affidavit may be
interpreted and understood to be seeking a final interdict. I say this because it
does appear from the papers that the relief is sought to be granted without
any limitation as to time. A final interdict is one which is granted without any
limitation as to time.4 It is granted in order to secure a permanent cessation of
an unlawful course of conduct, or state of affairs. Regard should be had to the
substance rather than the form of the relief 5. On the other hand, an
interlocutory interdict is one which is granted pendente lite6. It is a provisional
order designed to protect the rights of the complainant party pending an
action or application to be brought by him to establish the respective rights of
the parties. It does not involve a final determination of the rights of the parties
and does not affect such determination 7. Its effect is t o freeze the position
until the court decides where the right lies8.
2 Tiger Trading Co v Garment Workers Union 1932 WLD131.
2 Tiger Trading Co v Garment Workers Union 1932 WLD131.
3 Natures Choice Properties (Alrode) Pty Ltd v Ekuirhuleni Municipality 2010 (3) SA 581 (SCA)
at 588 B-D.
4 Estate Edwards v Sinchair 1918 EDL 12 at 18; Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947
(1) SA 514 (A).
5 BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) at 55 A -F; Knox D’ Archy Ltd v
Jamieson 1995 (2) SA 579 (W) at 600 G- 602E.
6 Botha v Maree 1964 (1) SA 168 (O).
7 Pikoli v President of the republic of South Africa 2010 (1) SA 400 (GNP) at 403I-404A.
8 Jordan v Penmill Investments CC 1991(2) SA 430E at 438F.
[11] Nothing tells me, from the relief sought in the notice of motion, that once that
court order is granted it will survive for and also be limited to a specific time or
period. Secondly, it does not appear both in the notice of motion and founding
affidavit that the relief, if granted, will endure pending final determination of
Part B. Accordingly a relief categorised as Part A is self -standing with no
bearing at all to the part categ orised as Part B. The distinction between the
final interdict and interlocutory interdict is important for purposes of
determining the requisites applicable in this application for interdict.
[12] There are three requisites for the grant of a final interdict, all of which must be
present9 namely,
“(a) A clear right on the part of the applicant.
(b) Injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended.
(c) The absence of any other satisfactory remedy available to the
applicant”.
Clear Right
[13] The applicant relies on the provisions of section 22 of the Constitution which
provides for freedom of trade, occupation and profession in the following
words:
“Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or
profession freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may
be regulated by law.”
Thereanent to this matter, what immediately comes out of this provision is that
the right that is available in terms thereof is the right to freely choose a trade.
Secondly, the practice of a trade may be regulated by law. In my view once a
person chooses a trade, the matter becomes more about the practice of a
trade than a choice of a trade. Afte r the exercise of the choice, a citizen must
9 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221.
subject him or herself to the law that regulates the practice of that particular
trade. In my view this matter is more about the practice of a trade than a
choice of trade. Contrary to what Ms Nyobole submitted that her client has a
right to trade freely, a proper construction of this provision demonstrates that
the choice to trade must be made freely. The practice of a trade must be
regulated by Law. Accordingly, there is no merit in the submission that the
applicant has a right to trade freely. There is authority for proposition that
informal trade must be regulated by law10. Informal trade must comply with the
law. Informal trading is subject as to the strictures of the law.
[14] Antecedent to that is the m andatory requirement of citizenship. I deal with
this aspect more fully hereafter. It bears repetition that in terms of section 22
of the Constitution “Every Citizen has the right to choose their trade.” Once
that citizen chooses the trade, he or she is en joined to subject him or herself
to the laws regulating the practice of a trade. Citizenship is contextually dealt
with in section 3 of the Constitution thus:
“3. Citizenship-
(1) There is a common South African citizenship.
(2) All citizens are-
(a) equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of
citizenship; and
(b) Equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of
citizenship
(3) National legislation must provide for the acquisition, loss and
restoration of citizenship.”
This application is clearly deficient and bereft of an allegation stating the
citizenship of applicant’s members so as to understand if this provision is
available to them. This deficiency raises a question of locus standi. In my
view one must establish locus standi by alleging his citizenship if he
wishes to invoke the provisions of this section. This section seeks to
distinguish citizens from non-citizens. It is available to citizens. The word
10 Section 2 of KSD Informal Trading By-Law.
citizen in the section cannot be i gnored or treated as tautologous or
superfluous11. That word must be given a meaning. One cannot treat that
word as if it does not exist12.
[15] A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that the words in a statute
must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do so would
result in an absurdity13. The ordinary grammatical meaning of the word citizen
is obtainable from “South African Concise Oxford Dictionary” to mean:
“1. A legally recognised subject or national of or commonwealth.
2. An inhabitant of a town or city.”
The first definition or meaning is more apposite. It is now plain that the
applicant’s members have not alleged or disclosed their citizenship to ensure
that the provisions of section 22 of the Constitution are available to them. With
locus standi not having been established it stands to reason that the
application is defective and cannot succeed on this basis only. Assuming that I
am wrong, which is not the case, applicant’s application would still fail on
other grounds which are dealt with hereinafter.
[16] The second leg of section 22 of the Constitution requires that the trade must
be regulated by law. Section 156 of the Constitution provide thus:
“1. A Municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has the
right to administer -
(a) the local government matters listed in Part B of schedule 4
and Part B of schedule 5; and
(b) Any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial
legislation;
2. A municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective
administration of the matter which it has the right to administer.
11African Product (Pty) Ltd v AIG South African Ltd 2009 (3) SA 473 (SCA) Para 123; National
Credit Regulator v Opperman & Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) Para 99.
12 Ndaba v Ndaba 2017 (1) ALL SA 33 (SCA); 2017 (1) SA 342 (SCA) Para 54.
13 SATAWU and another v Garvas and others 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC; 2012 (8) BCLR 840 (CC) Para
13 SATAWU and another v Garvas and others 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC; 2012 (8) BCLR 840 (CC) Para
37.
[17] Section 75 of L ocal Government Municipal System Act No 32 of 2000
provides:
“(1) A municipal council must adopt by -laws to give effect to the
implementation and enforcement of its tariff policy.
(2) By-laws in terms of subsection (1) may differentiate between
different categories of users, debtors, service providers,
services, service standards and geographical areas as long as
such differentiation does not amount to unfair discrimination.
[18] On 06th May 2024, under Provincial Gazette no 5095, the Municipality, having
adopted the informal trading By-Law published same. I consider this By-law to
be the law referred to in Section 22 of the Constitution, which seeks to
regulate the practice of informal trading 14. It seeks to ensure that the informal
trading is conducted in an orderly manner. In what follows I deal with relevant
provisions of the By -Law so as to determine if a clear right has been
established.
[19] Section 8 of the By -Law15 broadly prohibits informal or street trading at a
place or in an area in which informal or street trading is prohibited. The
section provides as follows:
“8.1 No person shall, within the municipal area of the King Sabata
Dalindyebo Municipality:
(a) Carry on the business of an informal / street trader:
(i) at a place or in any area declared by the Municipality in
terms of section 6A(2)(a) of the Act as a place or area in
which informal / street trading is prohibited;”
14 Section 2 of the By-Law provides thus:
“The object of this By–Law is to regulate informal trading in a manner which
(a) ensures informal trading is conducted in an orderly manner;”
15 King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality Informal Trading By-Law, 2023/2024.
[20] Section 7 of By -Law provides for restricted and prohibited areas. The section
provides thus:
“(a) The Municipality may, by resolution and in terms of section A (2) of
the Act, declare any place in its area of jurisdiction to be an area in which
street trading is restricted or prohibited, and must, to enable compliance
therewith, prescribe or make signs, markings or other devices indicating:
i. specified hours, places, goods or services in respect of which street
trading is restricted or prohibited;
ii. the locations of boundaries of restricted or prohibited areas;
iii. the boundaries of a stand or area set apart for the purposes of the
carrying on of the business of informal / street trading;
iv. the fact that any such stand or area has been let or otherwise
allocated; and
v. any restriction or prohibition against street trading in terms of this by -
law.
(b) prohibited trading area in any manner it deems appropriate and fit.
(c) Any sign erected in terms of this by -law or any other law, shall serve
as sufficient notice to a street trader of the prohi bition or restriction of the area
concerned; and
(d) Any sign may be amended from time to time and displayed by the
Municipality for purpose of this by-law and shall have the same effect as a road sign
in terms of the National Road Traffic Act, 1996.
(e) Trading in the following streets is strictly prohibited:
(i) SUTHERLAND (R61) and
(ii) YORK ROAD Streets
(iii) No container allowed as places of business within the Mthatha and
Mqanduli Central Business District. All business operation oper ated on mobile,
containers must be granted Consent by local Authority.
(iv) No mobile containers allowed to obstruct pedestrians from
designated walkways.”
[21] It appears to be known to the applicant that Sutherland Street and York Road
were declared to be restricted or prohibited to be the places or areas in which
street trading is to be conducted or carried on. Whilst paragraph 3.8 of the
notice of motion deals with the passing of the resolution declaring York Road
and Sutherland Street as restrict ed areas for trading without affording the
applicants an opportunity to make representations, paragraph 3.9 and 3.10
thereof contain the following relief:
“3.9 That since the respondents have already declared Sutherland
street and York Road as restricted areas for street trading, the
respondents are hereby ordered to grant the applicant ‘s members
trading permits and inform them the amount they have for such permits
as it is only people who are selling in prohibited and restricted areas
who are supposed t o have permits for trading in terms of the business
act. So the applicants’ members cannot escape having permits for wish
they have to pay for.
3.10 That the first and second respondents are ordered and directed
to issue permits to the applicants’ memb ers with the necessary payment
for them to make since they are trading in an area which has been
declared prohibited or restricted area for street trading as in terms of the
business Act of 1993, as it is only such people operating in area which
have been declared as prohibited or restricted who are to carry permits
for street trading” (sic).
[22] It admits of no doubt that the applicant and its members are aware that
Sutherland Street and York Road are restricted or prohibited areas or places
in or at which to carry on business of street or informal trading. In terms of
section 7(e) of the By -Law the trading in the two Streets is strictly prohibited.
The word strictly does not only demonstrate that the provisions are
peremptory, it also demands the exactness, sternness and strictness with
which the provision must be followed and complied with. Acco rdingly, this
word must be given its ordinary grammatical meaning as failure to do so will
result in an absurdity 16. A statutory requirement construed as peremptory
result in an absurdity 16. A statutory requirement construed as peremptory
usually needs exact compliance for it to have the stipulated legal
16 SATAWU and Another v Garvas and others 2013 (1) SA 83; 2012 BCLR 840 CC Para 37.
consequences17. It is unlawful to contravene peremptory provisions of section
7(a) of the By -Law. The law cannot and does not countenance an ongoing
illegality. Courts have a concomitant duty to uphold the doctrine of legality, by
refusing to Countenance an ongoing statutory contravention18.
[23] It is the duty of courts to apply and enforce legislation19. If the validity of the
legislation is not impugned there can be no justification for not enforcing it.
Allowing the applicants and its members to trade in a prohibited area amounts to
giving legal effects to a prohibited act 20. An act that has been performed in
violation of a statutory prohibition may, generally have no legal consequences. It
is basic principle of our law that a court can never lend its aid to the enforcement
of an illegal act 21. It is a fundamental principle of our law that a thing done
contrary to the direct prohibition of the law is void and of no effect 22. The
applicant prides itself for having carried on business in the prohibited areas for
the longest of times. That conduct, unlawful as it is, cannot confer any rights to
the applicant and its members.
[24] The conduct of the applicant and its members is an unauthorised and illegal
conduct. That conduct militates against the object o f the By -Law, to wit , “ to
ensure that informal trading is conducted in an orderly manner” 23. The
unauthorised and illegal conduct of the applicant is contra boni mores and
contrary to public policy and cannot be condoned by the court. It militates
against the doctrine of legality, which forms an important part of our legal
system, and more especially since the Constitution became the Supreme law
of the country 24. It would be unjustifiable to constrain the local authority from
exercising its powers in ter ms of the law when exigencies of a particular case
require it. That would amount to undermining the legality principle which is
require it. That would amount to undermining the legality principle which is
17 Shalala v Klerksdorp Town Council and Another 1969 (10 SA 582 (T) at 587 A-C.
18 Lester v Ndlambe Municipality 2014 (1) ALL SA 402(SCA); 2015 (6) SA (SCA) Para 23, 24 and
28.
19 Section 165(2) of the Constitution.
20 Pottie v Kotzie 1954 (3) SA 719 (A) at 726H-727A.
21 Cool Ideas 1186 (CC) v Hubbard and another 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC) Para 77.
22 Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99 at 109.
23 Section 2 (a) of the King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality Informal Trading By-Law.
24 Standard bank of South Africa Ltd v Swartland Municipality 2010 (5) SA 479 (WCC) Para 22.
inextricably linked to the rule of law. The court is prohibited from giving licence to
the performance of an illegal Act.
[25] I therefore come to a conclusion that the applicant has failed to demonstrate a
clear right. Even if it can be said that I was wrong in characterising this
application as an application for a final relief to come to a conclusion that the
applicant must satisfy a requirement of a clear right; I would still hold that there
is no right at all even at a prima facie level if we were to talk about an
interlocutory interdict. In the light of the finding I made above, it is neither here
nor there that this is an a pplication for final or interlocutory relief; the matter of
the fact is that there is no right of whatever nature that has been established or
proved by the applicant.
[26] It is important to note that section 22.1 of the By -Law criminalizes
contravention or failure to comply with any provision of the By -Law. Any
person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of the By -Law
shall be guilty of an offence. Trading in a prohibited area is a criminal offence
which cannot conceivably give rise to any right. This disposes of any quest for
a determination of a right the applicant and its members thought that they
have.
[27] To bury the point, section 8(1)(i) of the By-Law prohibits any person within the
Municipal area to carry on the business of an informal or street trader in an
area or at a place declared as a place or area in which informal or street
trading is prohibited. Section 8(g) of the By -Law prohibits carrying on
business of an informal or street trader on a stand or in any area demarcate d
if he or she is not in possession of written proof (permit/token) that he or she
has hired such a stand or area from the Municipality or such stand has
otherwise been allocated to him or her. Trading from a mobile caravan or
container without being grant ed consent by local authority is prohibited by
container without being grant ed consent by local authority is prohibited by
section 8(k) of the By -Law. I have dealt above with the fact that the applicant
is carrying on a business of an informal trader in a prohibited area.
Thereanent to section 8(g) of the By -Law, it is a common ca use that the
applicant and its members have no written permit or token showing or proving
that they hired the stands or areas from the Municipality. They have not shown
that the stands were otherwise allocated to them by the Municipality. In the
event that they trade using mobile caravans or containers, no consent has
been shown to have been given to them by the Municipality.
[28] Applicant’s remedy lies with section 12 of the By -Law which deals with the
application for and allocation of lease and permit/ token for street trading
stands. No applications were made by the applicant or its members to the
Municipality for the allocatio n of stands 25. No lease agreement was entered
into between the Municipality and the applicant and its members 26. No permit
or token were issued to the applicant or its members by the Municipality. In
addition to section 22 of the By -Law referred to above, section 12.5 thereof
makes it an offence for a street or informal trader to be unable to produce a
valid lease agreement or permit or token when carrying on business of a
street trade.
[29] With regard to harassment and intimidation, the contention is vehemently
denied. Accordingly, Plascon–Evans Rule27 applies.
[30] In conclusion, I find that there is an adequate and satisfactory remedy
available to the applicant and its members who are trading without consent,
permit or token to appr oach the Municipality and apply accordingly. In the
circumstances applicant’s application cannot succeed. Mr Maswazi, Counsel
for the respondents, informed by the fact that the applicant sought to invoke
constitutional provisions 28, did not insist on the general principle that costs
should follow the event. He submitted that Biowatch principle29 is applicable.
No order as to costs shall be made.
Order
25 Section 12.1 of the KSD Municipality informal trading By-Law.
26 Section 12.4.1 of KSD Municipality informal trading By-Law.
27 Plascon Evans Paints v Van Riebeek Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634-635.
28 Section 10 and 22 of the Constitution.
28 Section 10 and 22 of the Constitution.
29 Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Re sources and others 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC); 2009 (10)
BCLR 1014 (CC) Para 54-60.
[31] In the result I would make the following order
31.1 The application is dismissed.
31.2 There shall be no order as to costs.
________________________________
A.S ZONO
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT (ACTING)
APPEARANCES:
For the applicants :ADV NYOBOLE
Instructed by : MNQAYANA ATTORNEYS
55 Nelson Mandela Drive
Unit 6 Block E9
Mthatha
Cell:078 349 9887
Email: msamnqayana@gmail.com
For the respondent : ADV MASWAZI
Instructed by : TL LUZIPHO ATTORNEYS
Cnr Victoria and Madeira Street
First Floor, Steve Motors Building
Mthatha
Cell: 083 353 7960
Tel: 047 531 1511
Email: tluziphoattorneys@telkomsa.net
Matter heard on : 14 August 2025
Delivered on : 05 September 2025