IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case no: 9521/2019
In the matter between:
JILL LOUISE ALLEN Plaintiff
And
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Respondent
Coram: Pangarker J
Hearing dates: 12 June 2025 and 21 August 2025
Judgment delivered: 12 September 2025
JUDGMENT
PANGARKERJ
Introduction
[1] On 25 February 2018, the plaintiff was running with friends along the shoulder
of Northshore Drive, Hout Bay, when she was struck by a vehicle driven by Mr Ntokozo
1
Shabala. The collision was caused solely as a result of the negligence of the insured
identified driver, with the result that the plaintiff sustained the following serious injuries:
facial injuries and lacerations, facial bone fractures, traumatic pneumothorax, multiple
rib fractures, fibula fractures, severe left eye injury, skull fracture, right shoulder
fracture and left index fracture. As a result of the injuries, the plaintiff was permanently
disfigured.
[2] Furthermore, the plaintiff experienced hypovolemic shock, anaemia due to
severe blood loss, polyuria and pneumonia while hospitalized. She underwent
emergency surgery and thereafter extensive and varied medical interventions and
treatment in what has been a long and arduous road to recovery.
[3] In June 2019, the plaintiff instituted a civil action against the defendant, the
Road Accident Fund (RAF), for damages suffered as a result of the bodily injuries
which she sustained in the collision and the sequelae thereof. Her total claim for past
hospital and medical expenses, as amended, was R2 844 660, 59. The plaintiff's
claims for future medical expenses1, past and future loss of income and general
damages were all settled.
The pleadings
[4] As indicated in the Amended Particulars of Claim, the claim for past medical
and hospital expenses was not settled in its entirety. It is evident from the Rule 37
process and orders granted subsequently that the bulk of the past medical and hospital
expenses were also settled. The only outstanding amount relates to the payment of
the cost of laser therapy treatment {laser treatment) incurred by the plaintiff through
the services of Libby Roos, described as a skin care therapist or aesthetic skin health
expert. The amount claimed in respect of such expense, for laser treatment to the
plaintiff's facial scars, amounts to R239 450.
(5] The plaintiff pleads that amongst the injuries she sustained as a result of the
(5] The plaintiff pleads that amongst the injuries she sustained as a result of the
collision, she suffered facial injuries and lacerations, facial bone fractures, severe left
1 Defendant provided a section 17{4)(a) undertaking provided
2
eye injury, a skull fracture and is permanently disfigured. The defendant conceded that
she suffered a serious injury, which entitled her to claim general damages 2•
[6] The defendant, in relation to the averment that the plaintiff claimed past medical
and hospital expenses, pleaded that it had no knowledge of the allegations, did not
admit same and required proof of the expenses as alleged in Annexure E , the plaintiff's
schedule of past medical and hospital expenses.
Issue in dispute
[7] The amount which the plaintiff paid for laser treatment for her facial scars, as
constituting a past medical expense in her claim against the defendant, is the only
issue in dispute between the parties. The defendant disputes that it is under any
obligation to pay for the costs pertaining to the plaintiff's laser treatment for the facial
scars caused by injuries which she sustained in the collision.
[8] Subsequent to various Court orders granted between 2021 and 2023, which
indicate that the matter was partially settled and that only the balance of the past
medical expenses and quantum remained in dispute, the defendant maintained its
position that it was not liable for the payment of the laser treatment expense.
[9] The defendant did not amend its Plea to specifically indicate its stance on the
balance of the past medical expenses in respect of the laser treatment expense and
its actual basis for refusing to pay for such expense only became apparent during the
trial and subsequent closing submissions.
The plaintiff's experts
[10) Before considering the oral evidence in the trial, it is a good starting point to
refer to the important aspects set out in the expert reports related to the plaintiff's facial
injuries, medical treatment and the efficacy of laser treatment for the plaintiff.
2 See Dr C Edelstein's assessm ent, 12 April 2019, Annexures C and D
3
[11] It is common cause that Dr Arnold Douglas, a plastic surgeon, was the plaintiff's
treating plastic surgeon upon her emergency admission to Constantiaberg Mediclinic
immediately after the collision and remained her treating plastic surgeon thereafter.
He was not called as a witness in the plaintiff's case as he was not keen to testify in
the matter. However, as part of the documents filed and referred to during the trial3, Dr
Douglas confirmed that he advised and recommended laser treatment to improve the
plaintiff's facial scarring, which yielded very satisfactory results.
[12] The plaintiff called Dr Keith Cronwright as a witness. Dr Cronwright is a plastic
and reconstructive surgeon who was placed in possession of all relevant medical,
medical legal reports and documents pertaining to the matter as well as the
photographic evidence of the plaintiffs facial injuries including "before and after" laser
treatment photographs. Furthermore, despite filing a rule 36 (9)(b) summary regarding
testimony which Ms Roos would tender, the plaintiff did not call her as a witness. Dr
Cronwright's testimony and report are discussed below.
The defendant's expert
[13] The defendant appointed Dr Kaja! Lutchminarian, specialist plastic,
reconstructive and aesthetic surgeon based in Durban, to assess and provide a report
on the plaintiff. Dr Lutchminarian consulted the plaintiff in March 2024 and
subsequently compiled a report based on her consultation and assessment of the
plaintiff, clinical data received and photographic evidence available in the matter. The
plaintiff's counsel placed on record at the .commencement of proceedings that the
content of Dr Lutchminarian's report was admitted and accepted.
[14] According to Dr Lutchminarian, the plaintiff had, as a result of the collision,
sustained inter alia, extensive facial fractures, lacerations and degloving injuries. Her
traumatic brain injury was managed conservatively. Furthermore, the initial
traumatic brain injury was managed conservatively. Furthermore, the initial
management of the plaintiffs facial injuries included facial reconstructive surgery with
titanium mesh fixation, rhinoplasty, left eye ocular surgical intervention and
3 Part B, p49
4
rehabilitation. The sequential management of facial injuries are recorded as being
numerous outpatient visits, ophthalmic surgical intervention and laser scar and skin
rejuvenation.
[15] Dr Lutchminarian notes that the plaintiff consulted Libby Roos skin care clinic
for her facial scarification, requiring 50 laser session treatments with a total cost of
approximately R200 000. As confirmed by photographic evidence presented in the
matter, and which the experts were privy to and considered, the plaintiff presented with
the following residual deformities: an overt left eye and socket deformity, left zygoma
prominence and left enophthalmos with mild facial asymmetry.
[16] Dr. Lutchminarian also recorded that the plaintiff was employed as a tourism
consultant, involved in safari tours and returned to work after approximately a year
post-hospitalisation. The facial injuries and scars had a significant impact on the
plaintiff's self-esteem. According to Dr Lutchminarian, she believed the plaintiff would
benefit from non-surgical scar therapy which would require financial outlay.
Furthermore, the non-invasive scar management in the form of laser genesis over an
extended period had yielded excellent results which significantly reduced and
minimized the scars on the plaintiff's face.
[17] Dr Lutchminarian's opinion was that surgical scar revision and plasty, as a low
priority procedural option, would be aesthetic in nature. While the doctor noted that
this procedure would have been more cost effective than the laser treatment which the
plaintiff underwent, she considered that such surgical intervention was contraindicated
for the plaintiff as there was a high risk of intra and post-operative bleeding due to the
plaintiff's use of anticoagulant for her thrombosis.
[18] Insofar as Dr Lutchminarian discussed skin rejuvenation and laser practice in
South Africa, at the time of compiling her report in early 2024, she indicated that there
South Africa, at the time of compiling her report in early 2024, she indicated that there
were no set guidelines nor strict regulation on skin laser administration and
management in the country and that the minimum requirement documented was that
any cosmetologist certified by the suppliers with a minimal number of hours of training,
qualified him/her to offer the service, provided that the laser equipment was approved.
5
[19] Dr Lutchminarian concluded that the plaintiffs high impact facial trauma with
pan-facial fractures required reconstructive surgery. The facial scarring was noted and
regarded as "highly visible, extensive and disfiguring and was managed non
operatively by means of a laser genesis system"4. She also agreed with Dr Douglas
that the laser treatment had yielded exceptional results with minimum residual scars
and that there was an improvement in scar and skin quality. Significantly, Dr
Lutchminarian recognized that Ms Roos was not a medically qualified doctor, but that
"minimal requirements would entail a certification and equipment SAPHRA approva/'15•
The joint expert minute
[20] In the joint minute of the parties' experts dated 25 October 2024, Doctors
Douglas and Lutchminarian agreed that:
"1 . Plaintiff consulted Libi Roos Skin Care Clinic for her facial scarification and
required a total 50 Laser session (sic) at a cost of ±R230 000.00 following a
motor vehicle accident on 28 February 2018.
2. Plaintiff required extensive surgery to her facial bones and facial skin. This left
her with significant scars to her face.
3. Laser scar and skin rejuvenation are excellent non-invasive modalities for scar
management with the aim of minimizing and concealing scars.
4. The laser modality has yielded exceptional results with minimal residual
scarification with improvement in scar and skins (sic) quality in the case of the
plaintiff.
5. Laser treatment of the scars does not only improve the appearance of the scars
but improves the negative functional effects that scars have on especially the
face.
6. Scars, when they contract, become thick, can peel various facial structures of
the face e.g. nose, mouth and eyes, causing distortion and functional
impairment."
4 Dr Lutchminarian report, pll
5 Dr Lutchminarian report, pll. The reference in the report to "SAPHRA" is incorrect and should read SAHPRA,
the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority
6
[21) Significantly, the experts agreed on the use of laser treatment for scar
management and the positive outcome of such treatment in the plaintiff's case. In See
v Road Accident Fund6, the majority judgment emphasized that unless a trial Court
was dissatisfied with the parties' experts' agreement contained in a joint minute and
wished to hear further evidence on those aspects, the trial Court would be bound and
entitled to accept the material upon which the experts had agreed in the minute.
The plaintiff
[22] At the time of the collision, the plaintiff was employed at a tourism company in
safari planning which included international trade shows. She explained that her role
in the industry was to "sell Africa" to locals and tourists alike. She would accompany
clients on their safari trips around the world and interacted with other members of the
global tourism industry, as well as local and international guests and tourists.
[23] On the 28 February 2018, she was running with friends opposite the beach in
Hout Bay when she heard the screech of brakes, looked up and in a split second, the
insured's vehicle had made contact with her body. As a result of the massive impact,
she found herself lying face down in the sand and had a vague recollection that she
was drifting in and out of consciousness. She was transported per ambu lance as a
trauma victim to Constantiaberg Mediclinic for emergency medical treatment and
underwent a 12-hour emergency operation.
[24] The plaintiff testified that she was in intensive care for 18 days and she
confirms the injuries which she sustained as indicated above and as set out in the
various medical and expert reports. After discharge from the intensive care unit (ICU),
she was in a general ward for another 1 O days and explained that Dr Doug las was her
treating plastic and reconstructive surgeon. With reference to the letter addressed by
Dr Douglas 7, the plaintiff confirmed that she had the last surgery on her face in June
6 [2018] ZASCA 52 par [73)
6 [2018] ZASCA 52 par [73)
7 Exhibit B, p49
7
2024. In total, and as a result of the injuries sustained to her face during the collision,
she underwent approximately 12 or 13 operations to her face.
[25] The plaintiff testified and identified the photographs included in Dr Cronwright's
report as depicting an MRI scan taken shortly after she was brought into hospital and
the horrific facial injuries she had sustained8. She explained that the first two years
after the collision saw most of the surgical and reconstructive work done to her face
and that a prosthesis was placed under her left eye in order to keep it in place and
support the eye.
[26] The plaintiff testified that the first time she saw her face/herself after the collision
was when an ICU nurse wheeled her into the shower room where she left her. It was
then that the plaintiff saw the horror of her face in the bathroom mirror. In an
unemotional, clear fashion, she testified that there were huge scars from her forehead
along and down her nose over her lips and ending on her chin.
[27] The plaintiff was questioned about her facial appearance before and after the
collision. She explained that prior to the collision, she was proud of her looks and that
people considered her to be pretty. However, after the collision, she thought that her
life would never be the same again, in that her appearance had altered, her face was
lopsided and scarred and she was concerned about how friends, family, colleagues,
and guests with whom she interacted, would respond to her changed facial features.
The plaintiff thought that she would have to hide for the rest of her life.
[28] Prior to the incident, the plaintiff regularly went to Ms Roos for anti-aging facials,
and she was aware of the latter's previous positive laser treatment outcome with a
client who had also suffered multiple facial injuries and scars in a motor vehicle
collision. According to the plaintiff, she was terrified of doing more damage to her face
and discussed all her facial scar treatment with Dr Douglas, who supported and
and discussed all her facial scar treatment with Dr Douglas, who supported and
recommended laser treatment for the management of her severe scars. As a result of
8 See par 1.4, Dr Cronwright report; the same photographs appear in Dr Lutchminarian's report (pages are un
numbered)
8
Dr Douglas' "go-ahead," the plaintiff's husband attended to contacting Ms Roos and
three other persons regarding laser treatment for the plaintiff9.
[29] Shortly after her discharge from hospital, the plaintiff commenced laser
treatment offered by Ms Roos. She described the treatment as initially being quite
tricky because of the insertion of metal implants in her face as a result of the fractures
sustained in the collision. Treatment thus commenced very slowly, as the implants
would heat up during laser treatment, which Ms Roos would then halt. Furthermore,
the plaintiff was always mindful that more treatment to her face could cause further
damage, having already undergone 12 or 13 prior facial surgeries but she trusted Ms
Roos's capabilities and expertise in the field of laser treatment.
[30) Initially the laser treatment was every two to three weeks for very short spurts
of time and as the treatment started improving her scarring, the plaintiff attended Ms
Roos's clinic once a week, and thereafter, sessions were more regular. In total, the
plaintiff underwent 50 laser treatment sessions over 18 months.
[31) The Plaintiff testified furthermore that as the treatment progressed, she was
able to look at herself in the mirror and started regaining her self-confidence. The
improvement in her facial scars gave her the motivation and confidence to return to
work and socialize again. As an illustration of the success of the laser treatment, the
plaintiff referred to photographic evidence which depicts her scars before laser
treatment and the appearance of the scars after treatment10. Consequently, she stated
that she was thrilled at the outcome and results of the laser treatment and proud that
she had made the decision to undergo such treatment at Dr Douglas'
recommendation.
9 It is unclear whether the three people were skin care therapists, cosmetologists or medical practitioners
10 Exhibit A, photographs 31 and 32, depict the facial scarification when the laser treatment had
already commenced and photograph 33 indicates the plaintiff's face after laser treatment. Photograph
39 shows the plaintiff (face only) as at 29 January 2025.
9
[32] The plaintiff also testified that she felt that she could put the accident behind
her and that her life was back to normal. She explained that she would receive
pleasant comments from people regarding her looks and this occurred without them
knowing what she had looked like prior to the collision. She was always mindful that
laser treatment was not affordable to everyone and grateful that she was able to
access it. She was proud of the steps she had taken and explained that the outcome
of the laser treatment caused her to regain her dignity and self-worth.
[33] The plaintiff testified further that her medical aid scheme did not pay for the
laser treatment and with reference to schedule 2 of Exhibit A, she confirmed that she
had spent R239 450 on laser treatment by Ms Roos 11 . Most payments were made in
cash by her or her husband from their emergency fund. With reference to the various
invoices from Ms Roos, the plaintiff also testified that because she was a longstanding
existing client, she did not pay at every session as they had a relationship built on
trust. Sometimes payments were made at the end of the month, in cash, and others
were made by electronic funds transfer (EFT)12.
[34) During cross examination, the plaintiff was steadfast that the decision to
undergo laser treatment for her facial scars only occurred after a discussion with and
recommendation by Dr Douglas. She and her husband then discussed the possibility,
and he attended to contact Ms Roos and other potential service providers who offered
laser treatment. According to the plaintiff, Dr Douglas did not have the necessary laser
equipment to offer the laser treatment and after he saw the progress of the treatment
undertaken by Ms Roos, Dr Douglas visited the latter as he, too, was amazed at the
results which the laser treatment had achieved for the plaintiff.
[35) The plaintiff was asked why she did not shop around for laser treatment quotes.
[35) The plaintiff was asked why she did not shop around for laser treatment quotes.
He response was that she had a relationship of trust as a client with Ms Roos and was
aware of the positive results achieved with a previous client who was also involved in
a collision. The defendant's legal representative put to the plaintiff that the RAF's issue
with the claim in relation to the laser treatment was that there was no practice code on
11 Proof of invoices from Ms Roos for the period during wh ich the plaintiff received laser treatment
12 Exhibit A, pl 7, 19, 20, 21-29
10
any of Ms Roos's invoices. In response, the plaintiff stated that she believed that Ms
Roos did not have an ICD code, and on her understanding, Ms Roos was not a
member of a professional health body, which was (to the plaintiff) irrelevant to the issue
and condition of her face was at the time.
[36] The plaintiff also confirmed that when she consulted with Dr Lutchminarian, the
defendant's expert, she had already undergone and completed laser treatment13 •
According to the plaintiff, all the plastic surgeons agreed that the laser treatment had
yielded excellent results and was not a waste of time insofar as the management of
the plaintiff's facial scars were concerned.
[37) On the Court's questions as to the effect of the facial injuries, the plaintiff
testified that because of the horrific injuries to her face at the time, she did not wish to
have people visit her while she was in hospital but understood that one could not stop
people from visiting. She had a husband and stepchildren, she was in her 50s and she
was grateful and happy that she could still walk, that she was not brain damaged and
that she was still alive. Finally, the plaintiff explained that when she considered her
situation and condition from that perspective, she had to be positive about effect of the
laser treatment on her scars.
Dr Keith Cronwright
[38] Dr Keith Cronwright, a plastic and reconstructive surgeon based in Claremont,
testified to his report and referred to the photographic evidence, explaining that the
plaintiff's serious cranial facial injuries were the worst such injuries he had seen in all
his years of experience, which stretched back to 199614•
[39] According to Dr Cronwright, the laser treatment was to assist in the healing of
the plaintiff's multiple cutaneous scars and the machine used by Ms Roos was a
Cutera laser genesis with multiple wavelengths (NdiYag laser)15. He explained that a
13 The plaintiff explained that the laser treatment concluded in 2020, as it was not necessary to undergo more
treatment and the country was entering into the early stages of the COVID pandemic
14 Exhibit B
15 Exhibit C, Basic principles of lasers, Steven Stenhoff and Jane Mills, p135
11
laser is not a one-size-fits-all. Dr Cronwright testified that the ridged scar on the
plaintiff's face, which ran from her forehead down the length of her nose was thermally
ablated by laser treatment with the result that the ridge and redness around the scar
eventually dissipated, in what he described as "an amazing outcome"16•
[40] As a further illustration of the positive outcome of laser treatment, the witness
referred to the plaintiff's cutaneous scars pre-laser therapy on 7 April 2018 versus the
appearance of her face more recently in January 202517• He described the remarkable
difference in the appearance of her face in the photographs as being like "chalk and
cheese". In paragraph 3.8 of his report, Dr Cronwright states:
"Comparison of the below photographs (2018 vs 2025) is chalk and cheese.
The prominent curvilinear scar that traversed from claimant's g/abella along the
nasal bridge, onto the upper and lower lips ad terminated on her chin - is now
virtually imperceptible!"
[41] Furthermore, he expressed the view that the results of laser treatment on the
plaintiff's scars were quite exceptional and as far as he was concerned, the success
rate of the laser treatment was 95%.
[42] During cross-examination, Dr Cronwright was questioned about the
registration of Ms Roos with a professional body. He testified that he was not aware
that the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) required a person/service
provider to be registered with it to provide laser treatment to a third party such as the
plaintiff. He elaborated that, in his opinion, laser treatment was a technician's job and
questioned whether a plastic surgeon ( such as himself) would have the time and/or
inclination to go to the trouble of offering laser treatment. He also stated that if a plastic
surgeon wished to offer such service, they could. He also confirmed that the NdiYag
laser was a scar management laser.
laser was a scar management laser.
16 Dr Cronwright report, par 1.5 plus photographs before and after laser treatment (17 April and 26 June 2018
laser treatments)
17 Dr Cronwright report, par 3.8 plus photographs
12
[43] The defendant's legal representative put to Dr Cronwright that the RAF did not
dispute that the plaintiff had laser treatment for her facial scars, but it was of the view
that she could or should have sought such treatment from a registered service
provider. Whilst he conceded that Ms Roos was not the only service provider whom
the plaintiff could have approached for laser treatment, Dr Cronwright reiterated that
the HPCSA did not require registration of a professional for the purpose of offering
laser treatment. On a question posed by the Court, Dr Cronwright testified that
generally, plastic surgeons would not have the NdiYAG laser readily available.
Nizaamudien Abdul
[44] Mr Abdul, a bill reviewer employed by the RAF , was the sole witness for the
defendant. His role is to assess medical expenses which are claimed from the
defendant. He explained that in respect of medical expenses, the third party could
claim any expenses which are linked to the accident in which he/she was involved and
was required to provide invoices to this effect wh ich would strengthen his/her case.
Once the invoices are assessed, the claim is either approved or queried.
[45) With reference to the plaintiff, Mr Abdul stated that the problematic aspect of
the plaintiff's claim related to the laser treatment expense because the treatment was
not provided by a registered healthcare professional. He thus rejected the plaintiff's
claim for this expense on the basis that the laser treatment was offered by a service
provider who was not registered with the HPCSA and described this as the first
rejection.
[46] Mr Abdul then escalated and transferred the laser treatment expense to the
RAF's executive department which assessed the claim. He testified that the executive
department had no issue with the laser treatment and its outcome for the plaintiff but
that there was no indication in any of the reports as to why she was not referred to a
that there was no indication in any of the reports as to why she was not referred to a
registered healthcare provider, such as a dermatologist. The plaintiff's claim for laser
treatment was thus rejected again.
13
(47] Mr Abdul testified that insofar as the approval and payment of medical
expenses were concerned, the RAF operates within a framework and had Ms Roos
been a registered healthcare provider, there would have been no issue and no dispute
regarding the plaintiff's payment of such expense for laser treatment. He elaborated
that the outcome of the laser treatment had no bearing on the RAF's rejection of such
an expense, but rather, as seen from his testimony, the issue was simply that Ms Roos
was not a registered health care provider or practitioner.
[48] During cross examination, Mr Abdul confirmed that the RAF's executive
department indicated to him that it did not pay for services provided by an unregistered
service provider based upon the RAF Act. However, he could not direct the Court to
a/the specific part of the legislation which supported this view. It was put to him that it
was not a requirement that the person who provided laser treatment had to be
registered with the HPCSA and that there was no legislative provision in the RAF Act
which excluded the payment for laser treatment.
[49] In response, Mr Abdul indicated that he did not know if the statement was
correct or not. In this regard, counsel for the plaintiff specifically referred Mr Abdul to
sections 17 and 19 of the RAF Act, with the result that the witness admitted that it was
clear that the Act did not provide for the exclusion of payment for laser treatment. Mr
Abdul was also not aware of any other legislation which excluded the RAF from making
such payment to a third party.
[50] Mr Abdul was unable to comment on the statement put to him that had the
plaintiff not gone for laser treatment and hence returned to work, the general damages
claim would have been much larger.
The plaintiff's submissions
[51] Counsel for the plaintiff emphasized that when claiming for damages suffered
because of the unlawful actions of another party, the aim is to put the plaintiff in a
because of the unlawful actions of another party, the aim is to put the plaintiff in a
similar position financially which she would have been in had the unlawful action not
14
occurred. Patrimonial damages constitute damages for patrimonial loss, that is, actual
pecuniary loss sustained by the wronged victim 18.
[52) The Court was requested to consider sections 17 and 19 of the RAF Act, and
the main thrust of the argument was that an expense such as laser treatment does not
fall w ithin the exclusions in section 19 of the Act. Furthermore, the Court was urged
to consider the purpose of the RAF Act, the common law and section 1 0 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The plaintiff's view was that the
money spent on paying for the laser treatment service in order to address her serious
scarring may be recouped from the RAF since the plaintiff's estate suffered a loss in
having to pay a service or health care provider for such treatment.
[53] It was submitted that the Court should be able to find that the positive results
achieved by the laser treatment largely succeeded in ensuring the plaintiff's restoration
of dignity, which is guaranteed by section 10 of the Constitution. Counsel for the
plaintiff submitted that section 19 of the RAF Act is the only section which deals with
the exclusion of liability of the defendant, but significantly, that the section contains no
grounds/provisions for the exclusion of a claim for past medical expenses related to
laser treatment.
[54] Thus, on behalf of the plaintiff, her counsel submitted that w ith reference to
section 17, a third party ( such as the plaintiff) was entitled to claim as past medical
expenses, laser treatment for facial scars, consequent upon bodily injury sustained in
a motor vehicle collision.
[55] The Court was requested to interpret the RAF Act broadly, in favour of the
plaintiff, and that the reference to "any loss" in section 17, supports the granting of the
plaintiff's claim for laser treatment. To the extent that the Act refers to medical tariffs, it
was submitted that such tariffs refer to those prescribed in terms of the National Health
was submitted that such tariffs refer to those prescribed in terms of the National Health
Act 61 of 2003 for future medical costs and future loss of income in section 17(4B) of
the Act, read with sub-sections 4(a), 5 and 6 thereof, which do not apply in this matter.
18 The Qua ntum of Dam ages in bodily and fatal injury cases: Ge neral principles, Vol. 1, Fourth edition, MM
Co rbett, JJ Gauntlett, p4
15
[56] Finally, the plaintiff urged the Court to accept that there was no impediment to
her claim for laser treatment for the serious scars to her face. In support, the plaintiff's
counsel reiterated that the RAF, without demur, pays for carers, gardeners, domestic
services, drivers, and the like, when such services are recommended on the advice of
medical experts. The submission is that these service providers are not registered
health professionals and not registered service providers. Finally, the plaintiff
submitted that the defendant did not plead reliance on an internal directive or any
section of the RAF Act in support of its view.
The defendant's submissions and the plaintiff's reply thereto
[57] The defendant's legal representative submitted that section 4 of the RAF Act
vests the defendant with powers to stipulate terms and conditions upon which claims
for compensation shall be administered. She submitted that section 4 requires that a
service provider be registered with the relevant overseeing body of his/her profession.
In this regard, the defendant relies on the recent judgment in this Division in Fookwe
v Road Accident Func:1'9, as authority which disallowed payment for a past medical
expense on the basis that there was no evidence that the service provider in question
was registered with his professional organization/body.
[58] The defendant's submissions and stance are also based on the concern that
unregistered service providers cannot or would not be held accountable should the
treatment they render to the patient be incorrect or problematic. In this matter, the
defendant did not deny that the laser treatment was successful, but it was argued, this
was not the yardstick by which payment by the RAF was allowed. To drive home the
point, the RAF's legal representative stated that the plaintiff elected to use Ms Roos
for laser treatment when there were other options available to her. In view of the
for laser treatment when there were other options available to her. In view of the
Fookwe decision, the Court was requested to dismiss the plaintiff's claim in respect of
the laser treatment expense, with costs.
19 (2024) ZAWCHC 115 per Cloete J
16
[59] Counsel for the plaintiff, replying to the defendant's submissions, alerted the
Court to the distinction that must be drawn between Fookwe and this matter. The
Court in Fookwe was referred to a directive of the RAF, which was not the case in this
matter as the defendant did not rely on a directive in its Plea, nor present any evidence
to that effect. Furthermore, no submissions were made in Fookwe as to why an
acupuncturist's20 expense should or should not be included in Mr Fookwe·s claim.
Instead, the assumption was made that there was a specific professional body for
acupuncturists. In that regard, it was submitted, the Court was reminded that Fookwe
was distinguishable from this plaintiff's matter on a few grounds.
Common cause or undisputed facts
[60] Having considered the evidence in this trial, the indications are that the
defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff was left with horrific and severe facial
scars caused by the serious injuries and fractures to her face and skull which she
sustained in the collision. Furthermore, she was advised by Dr Douglas that laser
treatment was recommended to address, manage and reduce her facial scars.
[61] In addition, the defendant accepts that Dr Douglas visited Ms Roos once he
observed the progress and positive results from the laser treatment. It is also
undisputed that the plaintiff underwent 50 sessions of laser treatment with Ms Roos,
and that the results were excellent and remarkable in reducing her scars. Ms Roos
was known to the plaintiff through their previous interaction as a skin care therapist
and client, and they had built up a relationship of trust.
Laser treatment as scar management
[62] At the outset, and considering the ma jority view in Bee 21 , the parties'
agreements as contained in the joint minute of Dr Douglas and Dr Lutchminarian, are
accepted by the Court. There was thus no reason for these experts to testify orally on
20 Unregistered health care / service provider
21 Par (71)-[73]
17
any of the aspects forming part of their agreements. Secondly, the Court takes account
of the fact that the plaintiff admitted the content of Dr Lutchminarians' report, which
materially agrees with or follows the views of the plaintiffs experts22• The only issue,
albeit slight, relates to Dr Lutchminarian's table addressing different types of laser
treatment and a reference to cosmetologists and doctors. This aspect is addressed
below but was not an issue forming part of the agreements in the joint minute.
[63] In summary then, all the plastic and reconstructive surgeons in this matter
agreed that the outcome of the laser treatment had yielded excellent results, in that
the massive curvilinear scar which ran from the bridge of the plaintiff's nose, downward
over her lips to her chin, was all but unnoticeable. They also agreed that because of
the success of the laser treatment, the plaintiff had regained her self-confidence and
dignity sufficiently to return to work and has been working in the tourism industry ever
since.
[64] From the plaintiff's testimony that Dr Douglas visited Ms Roos, it would not be
unreasonable for me to conclude that the doctor must have satisfied himself that Ms
Roos was sufficiently qualified and/or experienced and had the correct and necessary
tools and equipment to offer laser treatment to the plaintiff. In the event that this was
not the case23, and even where Dr Douglas did not testify in the trial, it would not have
made sense for him to have reached agreement with Dr Lutchminarian in the joint
minute as to the excellent outcome of the laser treatment, as was indeed the case.
[65] In the circumstances, there was no evidence presented that Ms Roos did not
have the necessary and correct equipment to offer the plaintiff laser treatment to
manage her scars. To add, Dr Cronwright's testimony that Ms Roos used the NdiYAG
laser for the plaintiff's treatment was also unchallenged.
22 Dr Douglas and Dr Cronwright
laser for the plaintiff's treatment was also unchallenged.
22 Dr Douglas and Dr Cronwright
23 In other words, if Ms Roos was ill equipped, untrained or inexperienced, did not have the correct equipment,
etc.
18
[66] Turning attention to the need or purpose for the laser treatment, it is common
cause from the medical reports that the plaintiff suffered extensive facial fractures,
deg loving facial injuries and multiple soft tissue injuries to her face24• Furthermore, the
CT scan image of her face and head25 illustrates the severity of the numerous cranio
facial fractures which she sustained because of the collision.
[67] The plaintiff underwent extensive and prolonged emergency surgery on
admission to hospital, which comprised the following procedures:
"Open reduction and internal fixation of all facial fractures
Nasal reconstruction using costochondral graft (Dr A Douglas)
Removal of teeth with hopeless prognosis
Debridement and repair of lacerations and degloving injuries
Surgical packing of profuse bleeding from pterygoid region. ''26
[68] In addition to the above, the plaintiffs testimony that the surgery was 12-or 13-
hours further illustrates how extremely serious her facial injuries were. Dr Cronwright's
statement that the plaintiff's injuries were the worst cranio-facial injuries he had seen
since he commenced practicing in the 1990s, also confirms the severity of the
numerous serious facial injuries and fractures which the plaintiff sustained in the
collision.
[69] From the evidence, it is apparent that the plaintiff also underwent several
subsequent extensive surgeries to address her facial injuries until her discharge from
hospital at the end of March 2018. Aside from maxillo-facial and plastic surgery, she
was also treated by a prosthodontist for the various oral complications suffered and
had five operations to her left eye, which she explained, was supported by metal
plates. Thus, numerous internal fixations were needed to stabilize the plaintiff's cranio
facial fractures27•
24 Dr A Mohamed, Maxillo-facial and oral surgeon, Part B, pSO . The content of the report was not disputed.
2.s CT scan, pSl -52
26 Dr Mohamed, maxillo-facial and report, p52
27 Dr Cronwright report, p2
19
[70) To the extent that it is possible in a judgment to properly attempt a description
of her face or facial features after the extensive surgical interventions prior to the
commencement of laser treatment, and without being disrespectful to the plaintiff, the
most fitting description is that her face was deformed and her skin was badly scarred.
The photographs prior to commencing laser treatment depict a massive, ridged scar
travelling from the plaintiffs forehead down her nose and over both lips, ending on her
chin. Other scars are also apparent on the left side of the plaintiffs face, near her
problematic left eye.
[71] The plaintiff's scars were bold and red and, objectively considered, anyone
meeting or observing her in April 2018, would certainly have been struck by the
unmistakably large scars running down the middle of her face.
[72] According to the evidence, the available treatment options to address the facial
scarification were either further surgery or laser treatment. Ultimately, there was only
one option available to the plaintiff: laser treatment. This is because when I consider
Dr Lutchminarian's view on the surgery option, namely scar revision and plasty, it
becomes clear that the surgical option held serious medical risks of bleeding during
and after surgery due to the plaintiffs use of coagulants for thrombosis.
[73] It is also notable that while Dr Lutchminarian appreciated that scar revision and
plasty would have been a more economical option for the plaintiff, considering the
medical risks accompanying further surgery, the Court's view is that the serious
complications to the plaintiff, had she undergone such procedure, outweighed the
cost-effectiveness thereof. Thus, for these reasons, the only option available to
address and manage the plaintiffs scars was laser treatment.
[7 4] The experts recognized that laser treatment, as a non-invasive modality for scar
management, was hugely successful in addressing the plaintiff's scars which had all
management, was hugely successful in addressing the plaintiff's scars which had all
but dissipated by the conclusion of the treatment. This view is supported by the
photographic evidence and Dr Cronwright's testimony and at the time of her
appearance in Court, there were no visible scars on the plaintiff's face.
[75] Having regard to the above, it is thus evident that the motivation for choosing
to undergo laser treatment, as recommended by Dr Douglas, was not based on
20
aesthetic reasons. In the plaintiffs circumstances, the extensive surgeries on her facial
bones and skin left her with significant and prominent facial scars which required scar
management and skin rejuvenation, which laser treatment caters for28•
Referral to dermatologist or plastic surgeon
[76] The next aspect to consider is the defendant's submission that the plaintiff could
or should have approached a registered health care provider who offered laser
treatment, for example, either her own plastic surgeon or a dermatologist. Considering
the evidence in this matter, it is accepted that none of the experts indicated that the
plaintiff was referred to a dermatologist or plastic surgeon for laser treatment.
Furthermore, it is apparent from Dr Cronwright's testimony that laser treatment really
amounted to a "technician's job" 29 and not a medical doctor's, such as a plastic
surgeon.
(77] Dr Cronwright's responses to questions posed in cross-examination as to
whether the plaintiff could have received laser treatment from a plastic surgeon, were
reasonable, especially since he explained that because the type of laser treatment
which the plaintiff received was scar managem ent, it was questionable whether a
plastic surgeon would go to the trouble of offering such a service.
[78] Certainly, one may ask whether a plastic and reconstructive surgeon, who is a
specialist in his/her field of practice, would have the time or inclination to offer laser
treatment. To be clear, this discussion in no way suggests that there are no specialists
who offer this kind of service, but in the plaintiff's specific circumstances, it is evident
that Dr Douglas certainly did not offer laser treatment and did not refer his patient to a
dermatologist either.
[79] When considering the matter with specific reference to the plaintiff's situation in
2018, her decision to undergo laser treatment was clearly not undertaken arbitrarily or
28 Joint Minute, para 2-3
29 Dr Douglas - cross-examination
21
upon a whim . She was concerned that laser treatment, after having undergone
numerous surgeries to her face, could damage her face and skin further. Secondly, Dr
Douglas had recommended laser treatment as it would assist with scarring. Thirdly,
accepting the plaintiff's unchallenged testimony regarding Dr Douglas's visit to Ms
Roos when he saw improvement in her scars, it must follow that in all probability he
was satisfied that Ms Roos was sufficiently capable and experienced to provide
treatment to the plaintiff.
[80] The plaintiff's testimony on these aspects remained steadfast and was not
rebutted by the defendant in any way. Furthermore, neither of the three plastic
surgeons indicated that laser treatment for scar management should have been
provided by a doctor, whether a plastic surgeon or dermatologist.
[81] Thus, having regard to these findings, the defendant's submission that the
plaintiff should have seen a dermatologist or her own plastic surgeon for laser
treatment ignores the circumstances of the plaintiff's case, the advice and
recommendation provided by Dr Douglas and the testimony of Dr Cronwright.
Accordingly, the submission that the plaintiff was required to have been referred to a
dermatologist or plastic surgeon, is unsustainable.
[82] In addition to the above, the plaintiff's version that she went to Libby Roos
based on the latter's previous positive outcome with laser treatment for another patient
who was scarred in a motor vehicle collision, and due to her relationship of trust with
Ms Roos, is accepted as a reasonable and logical explanation. It must be remembered
that the plaintiffs husband not only approached Ms Roos but also contacted three
other individuals regarding laser treatment services before deciding on Ms Roos 's
services.
[83] Accordingly, therefore, no negative inference or conclusion is drawn for any
suggested failure on the part of the plaintiff to "shop around" for quotes for laser
treatment.
22
Legislative provisions
[84] This brings me to the further contention that the RAF's issue and its two
rejections30 were because Ms Roos was not registered as a health care provider.
Considering this issue, the plaintiff admitted that Ms Roos' practice did not have an
ICD code and from the expert evidence, joint minute and Mr Abdul's testimony, it is
common cause that Ms Roos was not registered with the HPCSA.
[85] In support of its rejections of the laser treatment claim and its stance that
registration with the HPCSA is obligatory, the defendant relies on section 4 of the RAF
Act, which it was submitted, vests the RAF with powers to stipulate the terms and
conditions upon which claims for compensation shall be administered. The submission
by the RAF's legal representative was that one of these requirements is/was that the
service provider should be registered.
[86] Section 4( 1 ) sets out the powers and functions of the RAF, as follows:
4. Powers and functions of Fund -4. (/) The powers and functions of the
Fund shall include-
(a) the stipulation of the terms and conditions upon which claims for the
compensation contemplated in section 3, shall be administered; '
(b) the investigation and settling, subject to this Act, of claims arising from I
loss or damage caused by the driving of a motor vehicle whether or not
the identity of the owner or the driver thereof, or the identity of both the
owner and the driver thereof, has been established;
(c) the management and utilisation of the money of the Fund for
purposes connected with or resulting from the exercise of its powers or
the pelformance of its duties; and •
(d) procuring reinsurance for any risk undertaken by the Fund under this
Act.
3° Firstly, by Mr Abdul and secondly, by the RAF 's executive department
23
[87] Certainly, section 4(1 )(a) allows the defendant to stipulate terms and conditions
on which claims for compensation by third parties shall be administered, and section
4(2) sets out the mechanisms available to the RAF to achieve the objectives in section
4(1 )(a) to (d).
[88] Bearing in mind Mr Abdul's testimony, the RAF rejected the laser treatment
claim twice because Ms Roos was not registered with the HPCSA. However, the
testimony of Dr Cronwright, which was not disputed, was that a skincare therapist or
cosmetologist such as Ms Roos, was not required to be registered with the HPCSA.
Although not referring to the HPCSA registration, Dr Lutchminarian noted a similar
view in her report, wherein she indicated that:
"Currently there are no set guidelines nor strict regulation on skin laser
administration and management in South Africa.
Minimum requirements documented is that any cosmetologist certified
by the suppliers with a minimal number of hours of training qualifies
these providers to offer these services and provided that the equipment
is approved by SAPHRA3 1."
[89] Dr Lutchminarian provides a small table below her comment wherein she lists
procedures such as microdermabrasion, chemical skin peels, fractional CO2 lasers
and IPL (pulse dye) laser, plus costs, provider and sessions. She indicates that the
two laser procedures are provided by either a medical doctor or a cosmetologist. With
respect to the expert, it is unclear what the Court is to make of the reference or the
table, particularly in relation to the plaintiff's circumstances at the time she attended
laser treatment in 2018.
[90] The point is, that to the extent that the defendant may rely on these statements
and table in its expert's report, presumably (though it is not clear) as an indication that
the plaintiff should have attended a dermatologist, herein lies another difficulty: the
table lists CO2 laser and IPL, neither of the two being the laser used on the plaintiff,
31 Dr Lutchminarian report, pG
24
which was an NdiYAG laser. Thus, the table and its relevance to the plaintiff, if any,
and/or Ms Roos, was left unclarified by the defendant.
[91] A further point is that in any event, the experts, including Dr Lutchminarian, did
not indicate in their reports that the plaintiff should only be referred to a dermatologist
or plastic surgeon for laser treatment. Ultimately, the Court's decision does not tum on
this aspect, particularly as Dr Cronwright was clear in his testimony regarding the type
of laser used on the plaintiff, and the aspect regarding referral to a dermatologist or
the exclusivity of offering laser treatment did not arise in the joint minute either.
[92] Returning to the Act, it is clear that section 17(1} imposes an obligation on the
RAF or its agent to compensate any claimant for any loss or damage they suffered as
a result of any bodily injury to themselves or the death of or any bodily injury to any
other person, caused by or arising from the driving of a motor vehicle by any person,
if the injury or death is due to the negligence or other wrongful act of the driver or the
owner of the motor vehicle or his or her employee in the performance of the
employee's duties as such.32
[931 The liability of the RAF in section 17 is subject to the rest of the Act, more
specifically section 19. Section 19 sets out the instances where the RAF's liability is
excluded33 . Thus, having regard to section 19 (a) to (g), the plaintiff's counsel's
submission that the section does not refer to past medical expenses and/or laser
treatment claims, nor to claims where a health care provider was not registered with
the HPCSA at the time of providing the claimant with the relevant treatment, is quite
correct. Section 19 therefore, is of no assistance to the defendant in its case that it
was entitled to reject the laser treatment claim as a past medical expense.
[94] The defendant also referred to section 17(4B) (a) to support its case that the
[94] The defendant also referred to section 17(4B) (a) to support its case that the
claim for laser treatment is to be excluded. However, the reference to section 17(48}
(a) relates to health services provided by public health care facilities, and the
32 Summary of section (1). Further detail in sl7, not relevant
33 Section 18 also refers to the RAF's liability w hich is limited in certain instances, but the section is not relevant
to this matter
25
applicable tariffs related thereto. It goes without saying that the reference to section
17(4B) is also not helpful to the defendant as the section plays no role in the disputed
issue in this matter.
[95] In the interpretation of the provisions of the RAF Act, the Court must be
cognisant of section 3 of the Act which refers to the object of the RAF, as follows:
3. Object of the Fund - The object of the Fund shall be the payment of
compensation in accordance with this Act for loss or damage wrongfully caused
by the driving of motor vehicles.
[96] Read with section 17, section 3 generally promotes a wide or broad
interpretation of the provisions of the legislation34. As such, a Court should be mindful
that the object of the Act is compensation to a third party for loss or damage wrongfully
caused by the driving of motor vehicles.
[97] While the plaintiff's counsel addressed why a wide interpretation of the Act's
provisions should be adopted, in view of the findings in this matter there is no need to
address the approach to interpretation of the RAF Act's provisions, in detail. Suffice to
indicate that the Constitutional Court in Coughlan NO v Road Accident Fund 35
emphasized that the purpose of the RAF is to "give the greatest possible protection to
claimants'136. As such, the interpretation of the provisions of the Act are undertaken as
extensively as possible in favour of the plaintiff as claimant.
[98] In my consideration of section 17 therefore, the facts indicate that the plaintiff
has fulfilled its requirements in that: in terms of section 17(1 )(a) she established the
identity of the insured driver; she is a third party who sustained bodily injuries to herself
in a collision caused by the identified driver of a motor vehicle; the collision was caused
by the sole negligence of the aforesaid driver; the plaintiff suffered loss and damage
to her estate; and she was assessed as having suffered a serious injury.
34 RAF Practitioner's Guide, HB Klopper, A17-20
34 RAF Practitioner's Guide, HB Klopper, A17-20
35 [2015) ZACC 9; Engelbrecht v RAF 2007 (S} BCLR 457 (CC) par 23
36 Coughlan NO, par [59)
26
[99] Furthermore, the plaintiff successfully lodged a claim with the RAF in terms of
Regulation 1 (a) read with section 24 and proved that she suffered patrimonial and non
patrimonial loss. In this regard, therefore, the plaintiff has complied with all the
requirements in terms of the Act.
[100] The defendant's stance that the laser treatment should have been performed
by a health care professional registered with the HPCSA has, in the Court's view, no
basis in terms of the legislation referred to above. To the extent that the defendant
referred to section 4(1) and (2) of the Act, there is no dispute that the RAF is entitled
to take steps and actions incidental or conducive to the exercise of its powers or
functions, to manage its affairs and administer compensation37•
[101] Howeve r, the reference to section 4(1) and 4(2) provides no basis for the view
and submission that a claim for past medical expense such as laser treatment, is to
be rejected because the health care provider was not registered with the HPCSA at
the time of providing the treatment. While the defendant argued that it works within a
"framework", it has simply failed to provide any evidence to indicate the legal basis
upon which it holds the view that the provision of laser treatment should have been by
a registered medical practitioner.
[102] At the risk of repetition, no directive38 or reliance on legislation was pleaded nor
was Dr Cronwright's testimony discredited insofar as the registration issue was
concerned. Furthermore, Mr Abdul could also not explain the RAF's basis for requiring
registration with the HPCSA , when Ms Roos , as a skin care therapist or cosmetologist,
was not required to be registered with the HPCSA.
[103] In addition, the submission by the defendant that registration of the health care
professional was required in case there is/was a problem with the service or laser
treatment provided is a vague and unsubstantiated statement, and there is no way of
treatment provided is a vague and unsubstantiated statement, and there is no way of
knowing what exactly is meant by this submission. The point to be reminded of is that
37 RAF Practioners' G uide, H B Klopper, Issue 43, A-24
38 N o reference w as m ade to a directive during the trial or argumen t
27
in any event, the laser treatment provided by Ms Roos was indeed highly successful,
and the outcome thereof for the plaintiff was met with approval from all three experts,
including the defendant's. As can be seen from the facts of this case and the expert
opinions, by all accounts, Ms Roos rendered an exceptional service, with remarkable
results particularly when the Court considers the plaintiffs large, unsightly scars after
the series of surgeries to her face.
[104] In view of the above findings, there is/was no legislative requirement or
provision that laser treatment had to be provided by a registered medical practitioner
nor is there any provision in the Act which indicates that laser treatment, such as was
required by the plaintiff who suffered horrific facial injuries, should be excluded.
The RAF's reliance on the Fookwe judgment
[105] In Fookwe, the Court was faced with submissions from the plaintiff only, after
the RAF's legal representative was absent from the hearing when closing argument
was to be heard. All heads of damages were agreed but for the past hospital and
medical expenses. The Court considered the evidence, including that of Mr Abdul for
RAF and thereafter dealt with the various past med ical expenses.
[106] In paragraph [16] of the judgment, Cloete J disallowed a claim for payment to
an acupuncturist which was previously rejected by RAF as there was no proof nor
indication on his invoices that he was registered with his professional body39• I have
considered the parties submissions in respect of Fookwe, and the distinctions in the
two matters must be drawn.
[107] In this matter, the Court is dealing with payment to a skin care therapist or
cosmetologist, where the accepted evidence presented is that at the time of rendering
the treatment in 2018 until its conclusion, there was no requirement that Ms Roos be
39 Pa r [12.3] of the judgm ent
28
registered with the HPCSA. Furthermore, at the time of Dr Lutchminarian's report in
2024, the situation seemed unchanged as the indications are that there were no set
guidelines or regulations on skin laser treatment.
[108] Thus, while it would seem from Fookwe that acupuncturists are/were required
to be registered with a professional body, there was no evidence in this matter that Ms
Roos, as skin care therapisUcosmetologist, was required to belong to a professional
body or that such service providers even had a professional body in 2018. In my view,
counsel for the plaintiff is correct in that Fookwe is distinguishable, and with respect,
is not considered as binding this Court in its decision as to whether to allow the
plaintiff's claim related to laser treatment.
[109] Mr Abdul could not counter Dr Cronwright's testimony that registration with the
HPCSA was not a requirement for Ms Roos. The plaintiff's position was always that
the Act did not exclude her claim for laser treatment and that Ms Roos was not required
to be registered with the HPCSA. In addition, from my limited research regarding the
cosmetology and skin care therapy practice in the country, the indication is that there
was no requirement for registration with the HPCSA nor, it seems, was there a
governing or professional body overseeing such practices in 2018, and possibly even
presentJy4°.
[11 0] As the defendant's stance has been that registration with the HPCSA was
indeed a requirement or (it would seem) registration with a professional body, it was
up to the defendant to present evidence supporting its view. At the very least, it was
up to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's version that Ms Roos was not required to be
registered with the HPCSA. Yet, it failed to do so, and its reliance on Fookwe does not
assist its case.
40 See salonbridge.co.za; www. onet.co.za How to become a licensed cosmetologist
29
Conclusion and costs
[111] Ultimately, the RAF Act's purpose as set out in section 3 must be read with
section 17 and section 10 of the Constitution. The plaintiff's estate was indeed reduced
because of the loss and expense in relation to laser treatment which, as found above,
was necessary in her circumstances. The laser treatment not only managed her scars
but effectively erased them and in so doing, its success clearly restored the plaintiff's
dignity and self-confidence to return to work and face the world again.
[112] From the evidence in this matter, and the submissions which were considered,
the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has fulfilled the requirements of section 17( 1) of
the RAF Act. Ms Roos's invoices and description of the treatment indicated therein
were also considered, w ith reference to the 50 sessions which the plaintiff attended41 •
[113] On closer scrutiny, the Court excludes two amounts: R1850 on 14 September
201842 and R3500 on 16 October 201843 which refer to neck treatments, and not laser
treatment. This wou ld therefore reduce the plaintiff's claim for laser treatment as a past
medical expense to R234 100. As far as costs are concerned, counsel's fees on scale
B are certainly warranted.
Order
[114] In the result, the following order is granted:
The plaintiff's claim is upheld in the amount of R234 100, together with costs
(counsel's fees on scale B).
41 Exhibit A
42 Invoice 36
43 Invoice 38
PANGARKER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
30
Appearances:
For Plaintiff:
Instructed by:
For Defendant:
Instructed by:
Adv C Bisschoff
Lowe and Petersen Attorneys
Cape Town
Ms C Thomas
State Attorney
Cape Town
31