THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: 664/2024
In the matter between:
GREATER BLOEMFONTEIN TAXI
ASSOCIATION FIRST APPELLANT
MOFEREFERE SHADRACK MAPHISA SECOND APPELLANT
and
RETSHEDISITSOE ISAAC MAFISA RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Greater Bloemfontein Taxi Association and Another v
Retshedisitsoe Issac Mafisa (664/2024) [2025] ZASCA 135
(18 September 2025)
Coram: MEYER, MATOJANE and WEINER JJA
Heard: 04 September 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, published on the Supreme Court of Appeal
website, released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -down is deemed to be
11h00 on 18 September 2025.
Summary: Section 77 of the Land Transport Act 5 of 2009 –
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whether the court a quo erred in finding that the respondent had proven a clear
right despite the legality of the permit being challenged –whether the court a quo
should have found that the permit was transferred in contravention of s 77 of the
Land Transport Act and was thus unlawful – whether the parties concluded an
agreement pending final determination of the matter
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ORDER
On appeal from: Free State Division of the High Court, Bloemfontein (Mhlambi
J, sitting as court of first instance):
The appeal is upheld in part and the order of the High Court is set aside and
replaced with the following:
‘1 The respondent is interdicted from preventing the applicant's vehicle from
loading at the taxi rank in line with the permit with number LFSLB44201 -5,
held by the applicant for the vehicle in question.
2 The respondent is interdicted from instructing or affecting or causing any
driver of the applicant to vacate the taxi rank where he is supposed to load.
3 The orders in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be subject to the respondent
temporarily loading under the permit of Ms Mei pending a decision by the
GBTA and /or a court on the legality of the permit.
4 The respondent undertakes to only load passengers in accordance with the
rules of the Majakathata Association.
5 Any action, review or application brought by the appellants is to be
instituted within 60 days of the date hereof, failing which the order granted in
prayer 3 shall lapse.
6 Each party is to pay their own costs.’
JUDGMENT
Weiner JA (Meyer and Matojane JJA concurring):
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[1] The respondent applied for an order on an urgent basis interdicting the
appellants from preventing him or his drivers from loading at the taxi rank known
as Majakathata Taxi Rank (the rank). He further sought an order interdicting any
person acting on behalf of or on the instruction of the appellants from preventing
him from loading passengers from the rank. The matter was brought ex parte, and
a rule nisi was issued calling upon the appellant to show cause why the rule nisi
should not be made final. The first appellant is the Greater Bloemfontein Taxi
Association and the second appellant is the Chairperson of the rank.
[2] The respondent's case was that he had bought a permit from a certain Ms
Nontsokolo Mei (Ms Mei), which allowed him to load at the rank. He thus
contended that he had a clear right to the relief he sought. He submitted that the
second appellant had prevented him from loading at the rank and that it had
therefore violated his rights in terms of the permit.
[3] The appellants, on the other hand, argued that the permit relied upon by the
respondent was unlawfully obtained contrary to the provisions of s 77 of the Land
Transport Act 5 of 2009 (the Act). The respondent contended that s77 of the Act
had to be read with s 58. Section 77 states:
No cession, alienation or hiring out of operating licence or permit
(1) The authority conferred by an operating licence or permit may not-
(a) be ceded or otherwise alienated by the holder, except in terms of a transfer under section
58, and no person may be a party to such a cession or alienation; or
(b) be hired out by the holder or be hired by any other person.
(2) A transaction concluded in contravention of subsection (1) is invalid and has no legal force.
[4] Section 58 of the Act provides as follows:
‘58 Renewal, amendment or transfer of operating licence or permit
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(1) The holder of an operating licence issued by a regulatory entity, may apply to whichever of
those entities that issued the licence for renewal, amendment or transfer of the operating
licence.
(2) Where an operating licence or permit was issued by a provincial operating licensing board
or other competent entity before the date of commencement of this Act, the holder may apply
for renewal, amendment or transfer thereof to the relevant entity contemplated in section 54,
but, in the case of a permit, an operating licence must be issued if the application is granted.
(3) Where amendment of the operating licence or permit only involves substituting a different
vehicle with the same capacity or less, section 73 applies.
(4) A person applying to take transfer of an operating licence or permit must have the written
consent of the current holder of the operating licence or permit, or of that holder's executor.’
[5] The respondent accordingly contended that the submission that the
operating licence may not be sold is incorrect and misleading. It can not be ceded
or alienated except in terms of transfer under s 58. Ref erence was made to the
case of Nomna v. Williams and Others 1, where the court stated ‘in my view the
authority granted by a licence may not be alienated in the wider sense of the word,
by the holder thereof. It may, however, be transferred in terms of Section 58.’
[6] The appellants alleged that they were justified in preventing the respondent
from loading as he had violated the standing orders of the rank, and the rules of
the Majakathata Association (the association) of which Ms Mei was a member,
and by which he was bound. He had done so by jumping the queue and seeking
to load passengers first before other members.
[7] The appellants explained that the standard procedure for loading is
determined by membership number and that the respondent could only load under
Ms Mei’s membership number. The appellants also alleged that as members of a
Ms Mei’s membership number. The appellants also alleged that as members of a
voluntary association, they were bound by the rules of the association, and that
1 Nomna v Williams and Others [2020] ZAFSHC 183; 2020 JDR 2312 (FB) para 15.
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by buying the permit, the respondent subjected himself to the protocols and
regulations governing Ms Mei’s membership number 18. The respondent denied
that he had in any way been unruly and or prevented other members or persons
from loading at the rank.
[8] The appellants submitted that their version was more probable, as they
attached a picture of the respondent blocking the queue when it was not his turn
to load, under number 18. Although his permit was issued without conditions, the
appellants contended that their association only has 22 members and therefore his
membership must be encompassed by Ms Mei’s membership as he is not a
separate member of the association.
[9] The respondent denied this and submitted that he was the owner of th e
permit and was not required to operate under Ms Mei’s permit. He alleged that
he had bought an operating license from Ms. Mei and that she and the respondent
had approached the appellant and the association to facilitate the transfer of the
operating license.
[10] The respondent submitted further that both Ms Mei and the first appellant,
had refused to facilitate the transfer. After a court order was obtained, Ms Mei
complied but she was obliged to approach the court by way of an application to
compel the first appellant to sign the relevant documents. An order was obtained
in this regard, and they were ordered to sign the relevant documents which they
duly did. On 19 October 2022, the Free State Licensing Board (the Board) issued
the permit.
[11] As the permit appears to have been validly issued without conditions, a
decision which has not been set aside, the respondent appears to have a clear right
to the relief that he sought. He contended that the permit that he had was valid
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and that the appellants had never challenged this by taking the decision granting
the permit on review. Thus, in accordance with the principle in Oudekraal Estates
(Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others, 2 this decision of the MEC was valid
until set aside.
[12] On 20 October 2022, the respondent went to the rank to load passengers
and he was prevented by the second appellant from loading. He then approached
the first appellant, as the organisation to which he and the second appellant
belonged, to intervene, but was sent back to the rank and told that he had a valid
licence, and therefore he should load. The second appellant continued to prevent
him from doing so.
[13] As a result, the respondent launched his ex parte application on an urgent
basis against both the first and the second appellant for an interdict, preventing
them from interfering with him loading at the designated platform in accordance
with his permit. The order was granted with a return date. On the return date, the
appellants opposed the confirmati on of the rule nisi. Various grounds of
opposition were alleged. They were a lack of urgency, the non-joinder of the MEC
of Police, Roads and Transport and the Board and Ms Mei. The court found that
none of them were required to be joined. It also found that the matter was urgent.
This was because the operating license was received on the 19th of October 2022
and the respondent was prevented from loading at the rank on 20 October 2022.
[14] The respondent also contended that the issue of the validity o f his license
is a moot point at this stage of the proceedings, as the operating license has been
2 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others [2004] ZASCA 48; [2004] 3 All SA 1 (SCA);
2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA).
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transferred to him, and the decision of the Board has never been brought under
review. The respondent argued that he had a clear right, as he was the rightful
owner of a permit that had been issued and had never been set aside.
[15] The appellants submitted that the permit is invalid but have not challenged
the decision of the Board in granting the permit. The respondent submitted that
he has a valid permit that confers on him a right to load and transport passengers
from a specific rank and that the right is being in terfered with by the first
appellant, as a body to which the second appellant is affiliated.
[16] The first appellant has failed to intervene in this impasse. If one has regard
to the permit, there does not appear to be any limitation to the respondent's rights
and accordingly, he contended that the order granted by the High Court allowed
him to load passengers at the rank and transport them to the places set out in his
permit. At this point, the appellants do not necessarily dispute that, but they
submit that the order was too wide in that it failed to take into consideration the
rights of the appellants and the fact that as an association it had the right to enforce
its constitutional regulations, which comprised inter alia the fact that taxis were
obliged to queue and could only load in numerical order. The respondent, they
alleged, could only load under the permit of Ms Mei as number 18, and he had
refused to do so and had jumped the queue in his attempt to be accommodated.
[17] There are vast disputes of fact in this matter. Firstly, whether or not the
license and permit were correctly granted in the terms in which they were.
Although there seems to be a dispute, the permit granted is valid on the face of it
and has never been set aside. The second dispute is whether or not the respondent
was breaching the conditions of the association and whether or not he could load
independently of the rights given to Ms Mei. It is not possible to resolve the
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disputes relating to the permit and /or the respondent’s conduct in these
proceedings.
[18] At this point it is necessary to refer to an agreement which the appellants
rely upon. The appellants referre d to a minute reflecting the conclusion of a
meeting on 26 October 2022 after the urgent application was granted. It reads as
follows: ‘As the Majakathata Group Association, we met today on 26 October 2022. We have
reached a conclusion that Mr. Mafisa will pick up passengers temporarily under Miss
Nontsokolo Mei. This would happen until the case between them ends at the GBTA and the
court. This is the final conclusion of Mokhupi. This was taken while Mr. Mafisa and Ms. Mei
were present. We have reached this conclusion so that there should not be any fight within the
Majakathata. It is noted that both Ms. Mei and the respondent were present at the meeting.’3
The respondent disputed that he agreed to this decision. He stated that he was
present at the meeting but did not agree with any conclusion reached. However,
there was no objection noted by the respondent.
[19] The respondent conceded that he has no intention of violating any of the
rules and regulations of the association and that he is prepared to abide by them.
He accepts that he can only load in a particular place in the queue and cannot
jump the queue, although he disputes, that he is obliged to load under the auspices
of Ms. Mei. This dispute is not one which can be decided on these papers and the
final order should not have been granted. However, if one accepts that an
agreement was concluded, the basis of the final order is not borne out. The version
that an agreement was reached is the more probable version and should be
accepted under the Plascon Evans4 rule.
3 The original text was in Sesotho and was translated. The relevant parts thereof recorded reads as follows:
‘Rele lekhotla la Majakathata re kopane kajeno 26 Oct 2022 re fihlelletse qeto ya hore Mr R Mafisa otla laesha
tlasa Mei for temporary. Sena setla etsahala ho fihlela nyewe pakeng tsa bona e fela mo GBTA le Court. Hona
ke qeto ya Mokgupi kaofela. Qeto ena e nkuwe Mr mafisa aleteng le Miss Mei aleteng. Re nkile qeto ena hore
ho sekaba le njwa kahara Majakathata ’
4 Plascon-Evans Paints (TVL) Ltd v Van Riebeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] ZASCA 51; [1984] 2 All SA 366 (A);
1984 (3) SA 623; 1984 (3) SA 620.
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[20] Accordingly, this appeal must be upheld in part. There was no reason for a
costs order to be granted on the attorney and client scale. The order that was
granted permitted the respondent to load at the rank and not to be prevented from
doing so by any of the appellants. However, as it appears from the conclusion
reached at the meeting, he would do this temporarily under Ms. Mei until the case
between them had ended at the GBTA and the court.
[21] Accordingly, the appeal is upheld in part and the order of the High Court
is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘1 The respondent is interdicted from preventing the applicant's vehicle from
loading at the taxi rank in line with the permit with number LFSLB44201 -5,
held by the applicant for the vehicle in question.
2 The respondent is interdicted from instructing or affecting or causing any
driver of the applicant to vacate the taxi rank where he is supposed to load.
3 The orders in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be subject to the respondent
temporarily loading under the permit of Ms Mei pending a decision by the
GBTA and /or a court on the legality of the permit.
4 The respondent undertakes to only load passengers in accordance with the
rules of the Majakathata Association.
5 Any action, review or application brought by the appellants is to be
instituted within 60 days of the date hereof, failing which the order granted in
prayer 3 shall lapse.
6 Each party is to pay their own costs.’
S E WEINER
JUDGE OF APPEAL
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Appearances
For the first and second appellants: M J Ponoane
Instructed by: Ponoane Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For the respondent: N Bahlekazi
Instructed by: Mlozana Attorneys, Bloemfontein.