About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2025
>>
[2025] ZAFSHC 261
|
|
The South African Legal Practice Council v Coetzee and Others (6368/2023) [2025] ZAFSHC 261; [2025] 4 All SA 758 (FSB) (26 August 2025)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable
Case no: 6368/2023
In
the matter between
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL
APPLICANT
And
REHAN
COETZEE
FIRST
RESPONDENT
IZAK
JACOB STEENKAMP
SECOND
RESPONDENT
STEENKAMP
& JANSEN INCORPORATED
THIRD
RESPONDENT
THEUNIS
GOOSEN
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
IN
RE:
REHAN
COETZEE
FIRST
APPLICANT
IZAK
JACOB STEENKAMP
SECOND
APPLICANT
And
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL
FIRST
RESPONDENT
STEENKAMP
& JANSEN INCORPORATED
SECOND
RESPONDENT
THEUNIS
GOOSEN
THIRD
RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
The
South African Legal Practice Council v
Coetzee
and Others
(6368.2023)
[2025] ZAFSHC
261
(26 August 2025)
Coram:
Lekokotla AJ
et
Loubser J
Heard:
7 August 2025
Delivered:
28
August
2025
Summary:
Interpretation of court orders – whether the
court order with number 6176/2022 was automatically uplifted by the
court order
under case number 6368/2023.
ORDER
1
The first
and second
respondents’
temporary suspension pursuant to the order by Naidoo J and Mahlangu
AJ under civil case number 6176/2022 was
not automatically uplifted
on 31 May 2025 in terms of the order by JP Daffue JJ (BB Mahlatsi
concurring) under civil case number:
6368/2023, handed down on 4
December 2024.
2
The first respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application,
on the party and party scale,
the fees of counsel to be on scale C.
JUDGMENT
Lekokotla AJ (Loubser
J concurring)
[1]
The applicant, the
South
African Legal Practice Council (the LPC), seeks a declarator that the
first and second respondents’ temporary suspension
pursuant to
the order by Naidoo J and Mahlangu AJ under civil case number
6176/2022 (the Naidoo J order) was not automatically
uplifted on 31
May 2025 in terms of the order by Daffue J (BB Mahlatsi AJ
concurring) under civil case number: 6368/2023, handed
down on 4
December 2024 (the Daffue J order). The LPC also seeks an order for
costs against the respondents opposing the application.
[2]
The Naidoo J order directed that the first
and second respondents were suspended from practicing as legal
practitioners of the High
Court of South Africa, in terms of s 43 of
the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (the
Legal Practice Act), pending
the finalisation of the investigation against them by the applicant
and any subsequent disciplinary proceedings which may be instituted
in court. The first and second respondents were ordered to
immediately surrender or deliver their certificates of admission and
enrolment as attorneys and/or legal practitioners of this court to
the Registrar of this court. The first and second respondents
were
also directed to pay the costs of the application, jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
[3]
The two respondents subsequently brought an
application against the LPC before this court for an order setting
aside their respective
suspensions from practicing as legal
practitioners pursuant to the Naidoo J order. The primary basis for
seeking to have their
respective suspensions set aside was that the
LPC was dragging its feet and were dilatory in conducting the
relevant investigations
against them arising from the complaints that
were with the LPC against them. According to the respondents, this
merited the setting
aside of their suspensions.
[4]
This application was heard by Daffue J and
Mahlatsi AJ on 28 November 2024. Inasmuch as the presiding judges
acknowledged the dilatoriness
of the LPC in bringing the
investigations against the respondents to finality, they refused to
accede to the respondents’
request that their suspensions
should be set aside. This was on the basis that there were numerous
issues that merited investigation.
As a result, the judges granted
the LPC a final opportunity to get their ‘ducks in a row’.
[5]
Consequently, on 4 December 2024, Daffue J
and Mahlatsi AJ granted the following order:
‘
1.
The first respondent shall, as undertaken, serve its detailed charge
sheets on the
applicants on or before 15 January 2025.
2.
The disciplinary hearings shall, as
undertaken, be scheduled to start no later than 31 March 2025 and
continue until finalised.
3.
The first respondent shall finalise its
disciplinary proceedings against the applicants on or before 31 May
2025, failing which
their suspensions shall lapse automatically.
4.
The application is removed from the roll,
but, in the event of the first respondent failing to comply with
either paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2 supra, leave is granted to the
applicants to set the application down for hearing on the opposed
motion court roll
within 21 days’ notice to the first
respondent, which notice shall be accompanied by their supplementary
affidavits.
5.
In the event of a notice of set down as
envisaged in paragraph 4 supra, the respondent shall file an
answering supplementary affidavit
within 7 days, whereafter the
parties shall file supplementary heads of argument in accordance with
the practice directives of
this court.’
[6]
The LPC subsequently brought the present
application where it sought the declarator that we have set out
above. The application
is opposed by the first and second
respondents.
[7]
However,
only the
first respondent opposed the application actively as the second
respondent chose to abide the decision of the court even
though he
had filed an explanatory affidavit. For this reason, we will only
refer to Mr Coetzee by name as the only participating
respondent in
this application.
[8]
The only issue for determination is the
correct interpretation of the Daffue J order.
[9]
It is
common
cause that the charge sheets in the matters (Tsupane and Mololo)
preferred by the LPC and the hearings and sanctions were
completed
well before 31 May 2025. The LPC made the sanction in respect of the
respondents on 30 April 2025 and 14 May 2025, respectively.
This was
before 31 May 2025. All these processes the LPC contends constitute
disciplinary proceedings.
[10]
Mr Coetzee lodged appeals in those matters
on 23 May 2025 and 29 May 2025, respectively.
[11]
Mr Coetzee contends that, since he launched
appeals to the hearings before 31 May 2025 and since those appeals
were not finalised
by 31 May 2025, the LPC failed to comply with the
Daffue J order and, as a result, the suspensions fell away or lapsed
automatically.
He comes to this conclusion on the basis of what he
calls a proper reading of the Daffue J order, which he argues means
that paragraphs
2 and 3 of Daffue J order are couched in different
terms and therefore ought to be interpreted differently.
[12]
According to Mr Coetzee, paragraph 2 refers
to ‘disciplinary hearings’ and paragraph 3 refers to
‘disciplinary
proceedings’.
[13]
It is common cause that Mr Coetzee attended
the disciplinary hearing no later than 31 March 2025. Therefore, he
takes no issue with
the LPC’s compliance with paragraph 2 of
the Daffue J order.
[14]
However, Mr Coetzee argues that, where
paragraph 3 of the Daffue J order refers to ‘disciplinary
proceedings’, it is
referring to a much broader concept and
does not only include the hearings that are referred to in paragraph
2 of the order, but
also includes appeals, reviews and any other
proceedings that the LPC can conduct after it has given its ruling.
He argues that
paragraph 3 of the order should be read with paragraph
18 of the Daffue J judgment, which states that ‘if finality is
not
reached by 31 May 2025, the suspensions shall lapse
automatically’.
[15]
We need to determine the correct
interpretation of the Daffue J order.
[16]
In
Firestone
South Africa (Ptv) Ltd v Genticuro AG
(
Firestone
),
[1]
the then Appellate court set out the approach to interpreting court
orders, as follows:
‘
The
basic principles applicable to construing documents also apply to the
construction of a court's judgment or order: the court's
intention is
to be ascertained primarily from the language of the judgment or
order as construed according to the usual, well-known
rules. . . [A]s
in the case of a document, the judgment or order and the court's
reasons for giving it must be read as a whole
in order to ascertain
its intention. If, on such a reading, the meaning of the judgment or
order is clear and unambiguous, no extrinsic
fact or evidence is
admissible to contradict, vary, qualify or supplement it.’
The
Constitutional Court has endorsed the
Firestone
approach in
Eke
v Parsons
[2]
and
Electoral
Commission v Mhlope and Others
.
[3]
[17]
Thus,
the purpose of interpreting the Daffue J order is to ascertain his
intention
[4]
in the context of
the language of the judgment and the order as a whole, especially the
reasons for the order.
[18]
Furthermore,
in
Ex
Parte Women's Legal Centre: In Re Moise v Greater Germiston
Transitional Local Council
,
[5]
the Constitutional Court held that a proper interpretation of an
order of court also entails determining the legal context within
which the words in the order were used. The legal context here is the
words that were used by Daffue J in his order.
[19]
In
Lutchman
N.O. and Others v African Global Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others,
the
Supreme Court of Appeal stated as follows:
[6]
‘
Very
recently, this court in
HLB
International (South Africa) v MWRK Accountants and Consultants
,
held that the now well-established test on the interpretation of
court orders is that the starting point is to determine the manifest
purpose of the order, and that in interpreting the order the court's
intention is to be ascertained primarily from the language
of the
order in accordance with the usual well-known rules relating to the
interpretation of documents. As in the case of a document,
the order
and the court's reasons for giving it must be read as a whole in
order to ascertain its intention. The manifest purpose
of the order
is to be determined by also having regard to the relevant background
facts which culminated in it being made.’
(Footnote omitted).
[20]
What Mr Coetzee is effectively doing is
imputing the LPC’s ‘administrative process’ into
Daffue’s J judgment
and order. This is impermissible.
[21]
In light of the above authorities, we
cannot divorce the judgment of Daffue J from his order as it gives
context to the order that
is under attack in this application. The
Daffue J judgment and order are clear that what it contemplated to be
completed by 31
May 2025 was, in fact, the disciplinary hearing and
the imposition of a sanction relating to the conduct that was the
subject of
the disciplinary hearing. All these processes constitute
disciplinary proceedings, which are referred to in paragraph 3 of the
Daffue order. They were all completed before 31 May 2025.
[22]
Mr Coetzee also raised other issues that
relate to the question how the LPC conducted its disciplinary hearing
against him and how
it fell short of the empowering provisions, in
particular
ss 43
,
44
and
45
of the
Legal Practice Act. He
then
submitted that, as a result of these alleged shortcomings, the review
application that he has launched against the LPC bears
reasonable
prospects of success and therefore we should consider this in our
judgment. Because of these alleged shortcomings, the
suspension
should be uplifted, the judgment went.
[23]
The
question
whether the LPC complied with the provisions of the
Legal Practice
Act when
it conducted its disciplinary hearing against Mr Coetzee is
not before us and therefore it is beyond the scope of this judgment.
[24]
The dispute before us is not for the
upliftment of the suspension. It is only for the interpretation of
the Daffue J order. Therefore,
the prospects of success in the review
are of no consequence to the question that we have been called upon
to decide. There is
also no counter application for the relief sought
by the respondents to uplift the suspensions. Therefore, we do not
deal with
this issue in this application as it is not before us.
[25]
The Daffue J judgment provides a clear
indication of what is meant in the order. The use of the word ‘
its
disciplinary proceedings’ in paragraph 3 of the order, can only
refer to the proceedings that had to be conducted by the
LPC (which
is the hearing and imposition of a sanction) and not proceedings that
were instituted by Mr Coetzee because he was not
satisfied with the
LPC’s ruling, which the LPC issued well before 31 May 2025.
[26]
In our view, there is no merit in the
argument that the use of the words ‘disciplinary hearing’
in paragraph 2 and,
‘disciplinary proceedings’ in
paragraph 3 means that Daffue J had different proceedings in mind,
and that, when using
the latter, he was in fact referring to a much
broader process than the disciplinary hearing that he directed the
LPC to conduct
and the sanction that it had to impose within the
timelines set out in his order to avoid any further delays.
[27]
In conclusion, paragraph 3 of the Daffue J
order clearly states what it means by disciplinary proceedings and it
does not include
time periods for appeals and reviews.
[28]
In light of the above the declaration
application has to succeed.
[29]
We therefore give the following order:
1
The first
and second
respondents’
temporary suspension pursuant to the order by Naidoo J and Mahlangu
AJ under civil case number 6176/2022 was
not automatically uplifted
on 31 May 2025 in terms of the order by Daffue JJ (BB Mahlatsi
concurring) under civil case number:
6368/2023, handed down on 4
December 2024.
2
The first respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application,
on the party and party scale,
the fees of counsel to be on scale C.
LEKOKOTLA AJ
I concur:
LOUBSER J
Appearances
For
the appellant:
N
Snellenburg SC
Instructed
by:
Symington
& De Kok Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For
the respondent:
In
person.
[1]
Firestone
South Africa (Ptv) Ltd v Genticuro AG
1977
(4) SA 298
(A) at 304D-E.
[2]
Eke
v Parsons
[2015] ZACC 30
;
2015 (11) BCLR 1319
(CC);
2016
(3) SA 37
(CC) (
Eke
v Parsons
)
para 29.
[3]
Electoral
Commission v Mhlope and Others
[2016] ZACC 15
;
2016 (8) BCLR 987
(CC);
2016
(5) SA 1
(CC) paras 33-36.
[4]
Eke
v Parsons
para
63.
[5]
Ex
Parte Womens' Legal Centre: In re Moise v Greater Germiston
Transitional Local Council
[2001] ZACC 2
;
2001
(4) SA 1288
(CC);
2001 (8) BCLR 765
(CC) para 11.
[6]
Lutchman
N.O. and Others v African Global Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others;
African Global Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Lutchman
N.O. and
Others
[2022] ZASCA 66; [2022] 3 All SA 35 (SCA); 2022
(
4
)
SA
529
(SCA)
para 44.