SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
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THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case No: 1191/2023

In the matter between:
MARIA JOHANNA KRUGER APPELLANT
and
TATE MATTHEW SIBANYONI &
SIBANYONI FAMILY FIRST RESPONDENT
MINISTER OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT
AND LAND REFORM SECOND RESPONDENT
PROVINCIAL HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT
AND LAND REFORM THIRD RESPONDENT
ESKOM HOLDINGS(PTY) LTD FOURTH RESPONDENT
STEVE TSHWETE MUNICIPALITY FIFTH RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Kruger v Sibanyoni and Others (1191/2023) [2025] ZASCA
127 (9 September 2025)
Coram: MOKGOHLOA and SMITH JJA and TOLMAY, MOLITSOANE and
NORMAN AJJA
Heard: 6 May 2025
Delivered: 9 September 2025

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Summary: Constitutional law – Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997
(ESTA) – installation of electricity – whether electricity is a reasonably necessary
improvement to make a dwelling habitable – whether the consent of the landowner
is required before an occupier, as defined in terms of ESTA , may install or connect
electricity to his /her dwelling – the fundamental right to human dignity
contemplated in s 5 of ESTA entitles occupiers to install and connect electricity to
their homes.

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______________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________
On appeal from: The Land Claims Court , Randburg (Meer AJP sitting as a court
of first instance):
The appeal is dismissed with costs , including the costs of two counsel where so
employed.
__________________________________________
JUDGMENT
__________________________________________
Molitsoane AJA (Mokgohloa and S mith JJA and T olmay and Norman AJJA
concurring):
[1] This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the Land Claims Court
of South Africa, Randburg (the Land Court1) directing the appellant (Ms Kruger)
to consent to the connection of electricity to the residential dwelling of the first
respondent Mr Tate Mathew Sibanyoni (Mr Sibanyoni or the Sibanyonis
depending on context ), as well as interdicting her from preventing the installation
of electricity to the ir residential home . The appeal is with leave granted by that
court. The appeal concerns whether:( a) electricity is a reasonably necessary
improvement to make a residential home habitable; and (b) whether the consent of
the landowner is required before an occupier as defined in the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) may install or connect electricity to his
residential dwelling.

[2] Mr Sibanyoni was born on the farm Mooiplaas , Hendrina , Mpumalanga.
This farm is about seven kilometres from another farm known as Portion 1[...]
V[...] 1[...] J[...] (V[...]), also in Mpumalanga . The late Mr MJC van der Merwe

1 Established in terms of s3 of the Land Court Act 6 of 2023 and replaced the Land Claims Court which, save for
certain provisions, commenced on 5 April 2024.

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(Mr van der Merwe) , who is the father of Ms Kruger, was the previous owner of
V[...]. On the version of Mr Sibanyoni, he was relocated to V[...] by the late Mr
Van der Merwe. It is not in dispute that he had been residing on the farm since
2011. He and his family ha d even erected a permanent structure on V[...]. It is
common cause that he and his family are occupiers on V[...] as defined in s 1 of
ESTA.2

[3] The principal cause of the dispute between the Sibanyonis and Ms Kruger is
the supply of electricity to the Sibanyonis’ dwelling. Mr Sibanyoni alleges that he
discussed his intention to install electricity at his dwelling with Mr Vincent Schalk
(Mr Schalk), who was in charge of V[...] at the time. Mr Schalk was the son-in-law
of the late Mr Van der Merwe . Mr Sibanyoni averred that Mr Schalk granted him
permission to instal l electricity and also signed a consent form which was handed
to the municipality.

[4] Ms Kruger denied that any consent was given and she alleged that Mr
Sibanyoni failed to produce a copy of the consent form alleged. According to her,
Mr Van der Merw e’s son-in-law is Mr Vincent Schulz and not Mr Vincent Schalk
as alleged by Mr Sibanyoni . To avoid confusion, and not out of disrespect, I shall
refer to the son-in-law as Vincent. Nothing turns on the issue of the surname as it is
not in dispute that Mr Van der Merwe’s son-in-law also attended the meeting at
Hendrina police station where the issue of electricity was discussed. According to
Mr Sibanyoni, it was at this meeting that he was given permission by Vincent to
install the electricity.


2 According to s 1 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997:
‘“occupier” means a person residing on land which belongs to another person, and who, on s4 February 1997 or
thereafter had consent or another right in law to do so, but excluding-
(a) . . .
(b) a person using or intending to use the land in question mainly for industrial mining, communal or commercial

farming purposes, but including a person who works the land himself or herself and does not employ any person
who is not a member or his or her family; and
(c) a person who has an income in excess of the prescribed amount . . .’

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[5] Following th e meeting at the police station , Eskom officials attempte d to
deliver poles to V[...] to be used to connect the Sibanyonis’ dwelling to the grid .
Ms Kruger took issue with the delivery of the poles as she contended that she had
never been consulted about the installation of the electricity at the home of the
Sibanyonis and had not granted consent to either Mr Sibanyoni or Eskom to do so.
She prevented Eskom from delivering the poles . In her opposing affidavit, she
states that:
‘. . . in order for Eskom to establish electricity supply to any portion on private land, the consent
of the landowner would be required particularly as the effect on the environment and the
operations of the landowner would have to be considered before such electricity supply is
provided.’

[6] The Land Court held that the installation of electricity is an improvement
which was reasonably necessary to make th e Sibanyonis’ dwelling habitable, and
thereby give effect to the right to human dignity.

[7] Regarding the issue of consent, the Land Court held that the right of the
Sibanyonis to bring their dwelling to a standard that conform ed with conditions of
human dignity, which, in this case, entailed the right to receive electricity, was not
dependent on the owner’s consent. Although the court found that occupiers like the
Sibanyonis did not require consent to have access to electricity, it nevertheless
directed Ms Kruger to grant such consent.

[8] Before us , it was submitted , on behalf of Ms Kruger that while it was
conceded that the Sibanyonis established a need for electricity , that could not be
elevated to the status of a fundamental right. It was submitted that th e Land Court
erred in holding that the right to human dignity as set out in s 5(a) of ESTA
included the installation and supply of electricity as an improvement which is
reasonably necessary to make a dwelling habitable. In the end, it was thus

reasonably necessary to make a dwelling habitable. In the end, it was thus
submitted that Mr Sibanyoni had failed to demonstrate how he is impacted by the

6


lack of electricity as he led no evidenc e demonstrating how access to electricity
would make his dwelling humanely habitable.

[9] Ms Kruger also contended that the right of access to electricity is only
enforceable against the municipality. Therefore, it was the duty of the munici pality
to enter into agreements with landowners. The argument advanced in the heads of
argument that: ‘[if] no such agreement can be reached, the municipality has the obligation to
then, either expropriate the servitude or approach the court to enable it to give effect to its
constitutional duties by granting a servitude.’
Ms Kruger further submitted that it is for the municipality or Eskom to seek an
agreement by way of a servitude failing which, the owner of the land may be liable
for the electricity consumed by the occupier. Lastly, the Land Court’s judgment is
assailed on the basis that it erred in finding that the meeting at the Hendrina police
station constituted meaningful engagement as contemplated in Daniels v Scribante
and Another (Daniels).3 This finding of the Land Court accords with Daniels
which held that:
‘Although consent is not a requirement, meaningful engagement of an owner or person in charge
by an occupier is still necessary. It will help balance the conflicting rights and interests of
occupiers and owners or persons in charge. In this regard I agree with the submissions of the
amicus curiae, which argued for the need for meaningful engagement between an owner and
occupier.

In Hattingh v Zondo J said:
‘‘In my view the part of section 6(2) that says: ‘balanced with the rights of the owner or person
in charge’ calls for the striking of a balance between the rights of the occupier, on the one side,
and those of the owner of the land, on the other. This part enjoins that a just and equitable
balance be struck between the rights of the occupier and those of the owner. The effect of this is
to infuse justice and equity in the inquiry.”’4

to infuse justice and equity in the inquiry.”’4

[10] The Sibanyonis, on the other hand , submitted that they had a right to make
improvements to their dwelling by installing or connecting electricity. They

3 Daniels v Scribante and Another [2017] ZACC 13; 2017 (4) SA 341(CC); 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC) (Daniels).
4 Ibid paras 62 and 63. Citations omitted.

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submitted that occupiers on farmland s should not be left to struggle without
electricity.

[11] In this appeal, the issue for determination is whether the Land Court was
correct in granting final relief. The requirements for the granting of final relief are
trite. In order to succeed with a claim for a final interdictory relief, the applicant
must establish (a) a clear right; (b) an injury actually committed or reasonably
apprehended; and (c) a lack of an acceptable alternative remedy. The crisp question
for determination in this appeal is whether the Sibanyoni family has a right to
effect improvements in the form of electricity installation to make their residential
home habitable and thereby give effect to their right to human dignity. Should that
question be answered in the affirmative, then it stands to reason that they w ill have
established a clear right.

[12] The Land Court held that electricity was part of modern life and its
deprivation led to daily inconveniences like the benefit of safe lighting and use of
modern electrical appliances. The court took judicial notice that electricity
‘improved living conditions, habitability and welfare.’ It found that the Sibanyonis
were entitled to an order which permitted improvement s which were necessary to
render their residential home habitable in the exercise of their human righ t to
dignity.

[13] In Daniels,5 the Constitutional Court recognised that private landowners are
enjoined by s 25(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of
1996,6 through ESTA, to accommodate occupiers on their land. In recognition of
this obligation , ESTA, in turn , seeks, inter alia, to provide for measures at State

5 Ibid para 49.
6 Section 25(6) provides that ‘A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled to the extend provided by an Act of Parliament , either to tenure

which Is legally secure or to comparable redress.’

8


expense to facilitate the long -term security of the land tenure and to re gulate the
conditions of residence on certain land.7 Section 5 of ESTA states:
‘Fundamental rights
Subject to limitations which are reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity , equality and freedom, an occupier , an owner and a person in charge
shall have the right to –
(a) human dignity;
(b) freedom and security of the person;
(c) privacy;
(d) freedom of religion, belief and opinion and of expression:
(e) freedom of association; and
(f) freedom of movement, with due regard to the objects of the Constitution and this Act.
with due regard to the objects of the Constitution and this Act.’

[14] It is common cause that the Sibanyonis are occupiers as defined in ESTA
and thus are entitled to the protection provided by ESTA. As occupiers, they are
entitled, together with landowners and persons in charge of land, to fundamental
rights as provided for in s 5 and , more particularly, the right to human dignity.
Since the occupiers are entitled to the fundamental rights in s 5 of ESTA , the
enjoyment of those rights may invariably encroach on the property rights of the
landowners as envisaged in s 25(1) of the Constitution. 8 For this reason,
landowners and occupiers equally enjoy the same fundamental rights in terms of
ESTA. A balancing act is thus required in dealing with their competing
fundamental rights.9

[15] As a starting point , it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary issue raised
before us during the hearing, namely, that the Sibanyonis have failed to establish
who the person in charge of V[...] was for the purpose of ESTA. It is submitted in
the founding affidavit, that Ms Kruger is referred to as the person in charge of

7 See preamble of ESTA.
8 Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that: ‘No one may be deprived of property except in terms of l aw of
general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.’

general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.’
9 Daniels para 61.

9


V[...] while in the same affidavit, Vincent is referred to as the person in charge.
This point was , however, not raised pertinently as a preliminary point regarding
standing, misjoinder or non-joinder.

[16] Nothing turns on this issue of standing for the following reasons . In the
founding affidavit, Ms Kruger is described as the owner of the land, and only in the
alternative, is an assertion made that she is also the person in charge thereof. In her
answering affidavit, Ms Kruger alleges that she is the heiress in the estate of Mr
van der Merwe and thus in control of V[...]. She further alleges that the landowner
is the executrix seized with the administration of the estate. While Ms Kruger
disputes ownership of V[...], she does not dispute that she is also the person in
charge of it. She curiously chose, as she is entitled, not to disclose where she
resides.

[17] Much as Mr Sibanyoni also asserts that Vincent was the person in charge of
V[...], the evidence reveals that it was Ms Kruger who complained to Eskom about
the electricity poles being delivered to V[...]. She is also the person who resisted
the Sibanyonis ’ application in the Land Court and the appeal before us is also
prosecuted by her. The executrix , as the representative of the estate , played no role
in the litigation between these parties . This begs the question as to why she would
resist the application and prosecute the appeal when she is neither a landowner nor
a person in charge. In my view, only ownership or being in charge of land as
contemplated in ESTA could give her standing in these proceedings. Vincent is not
a party to these proceedings. As alluded to above, Ms Kruger is not the owner of
V[...] and her conduct concerning these proceedings compels the inescapable
inference that she was the person in charge of V[...] and has been correctly
described in the founding affidavit.

[18] It is worth mentioning that Mr Sibanyoni asserts that Vincent, in his capacity

[18] It is worth mentioning that Mr Sibanyoni asserts that Vincent, in his capacity
as the person who was in charge of V[...] at the time when the meeting was held at

10


the Hendrina police station , had given him permission to instal electricity and had
signed the relevant consent form which was submitted to the municipality . Ms
Kruger denied this allegation and, attached the confirmatory affidavit of Vincent
evincing the denial. The affidavit of Vincent does not confirm or support the denial
of consent as it simply states that he was ‘[a]n adult male and the person referred to
in the Opposing Affidavit of Maria Johanna Kruger.’ It says nothing more. Vincent
does not expressly or tacitly deny that he was the person left in charge of V[...]
when the owner passed on or did not give consent to Mr Sibanyoni to instal
electricity.10 He also does not deny that he signed the consent form. In light of lack
of denial of the averments made by Mr Sibanyoni in this regard, they must be
accepted as true.

[19] ESTA does not expressly give an occupier the right to make improvements
to his/her dwelling. The right to electricity is also not explicitly provided for in the
Constitution and ESTA . However, it cannot be argued otherwise that its provision
entitles an occupier to make the dwelling habitable thus allowing an occupier to
live in a home with dignity . The Land Court, in Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen and
Others,11 said the followin g with regard to the occupiers’ rights to dignity as
contemplated in ESTA:
‘. . . section 5 includes the rights of occupiers to dignity. In relation to farm dwellers , dignity
cannot be restricted to personal dignity. It must include the entitlement to a dignified standard of
living despite the meagre and sometimes pitiful resources at their disposal.’
It follows thus that an occupier has a right to make improvements to his dwelling
in order to make it habitable , thus allowing him to enjoy its occupation with
dignity.

[20] In Daniels the court stated that:

10 ‘Consent’ in terms of ESTA means ‘ express or tacit consent of the owner or person in charge of the land in
question.’

question.’
11 Sibanyoni v Holtzhausen and Others [2019] ZALCC para 55.

11


‘. . . like the notion of “reside”, security of tenure must mean that the dwelling has to be
habitable. That in turn connotes making whatever improvements that are reasonably necessary to
achieve this. Of what use is a dwelling if it is uninhabitable? None.’12
The Sibanyonis do not necessarily aver that their home is not habitable. What they
seek is to make improvements for its better beneficial use by installing electricity.
In the heads of argument, it was submitted on behalf of Ms Kruger that ‘[t]he
property in question is a farmland, where electricity has not historically been
supplied.’ This is said in the context of the submission that the Sibanyonis failed to
place facts before the Land Court to show the impact on their lives of the lack of
electricity.

[21] This submission disregards the fact that electricity is necessary for an
occupier to live in a dwelling in a dignified way. In modern times where things like
mobile phones, electrical appliances are used in our daily life, it is difficult to
understand why anyone would believe that people in ‘farmland’ should explain
how they are impacted by lack of electricity. To even suggest that refusal to access
electricity for the purposes of s 5 of ESTA does not establish apprehension of
irreparable harm for the purposes of a final interdict is worrisome. This submission
is akin to anyone claiming that a person who resides in a mud house in rural areas
must prove how he is impacted by residing under those circumstances when he/she
seeks a house made up of mortar and bricks. One may take judicial notice of the
impact on anyone’s life of living without electricity or in a mud house, unless one
is oblivious of the plight of the people living in abject poverty on farms and rural
land. It cannot be seriously disputed that p eople living on farmlands are entitled to
human dignity.

[22] I agree with the following sentiments expressed in Makeshift 1190(Pty) v
Cilliers:13

12 Daniels para 32.

Cilliers:13

12 Daniels para 32.
13 Makeshift 1190 (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers [2020] ZAWCHC 41; [2020] 3 All SA 234 (WCC); 2020 (5) SA 538 (WCC)
para 25.

12


‘In the modern day, the supply of electricity and water to a residential propert y is a practical
necessity in order for the occupant to use the property as a dwelling. When such supply is
terminated, the occupant experiences a significant disturbance in his possession.’
To deny the Sibanyonis the right to make improvements to the dwelling access to
electricity in order to make the ir residential home habitable, is to deprive them of
their right to human dignity as set out in s 5 of ESTA.

[23] On the issue of whether the Sibanyonis require the consent of the landowner
to instal the electricity , Ms Kruger contends that such consent is require d. The
reason, so it is contended, is that the installation of electricity will attract liabilities,
responsibilities and duties to the landowner in terms of the municipal by laws and
the provisions of s 118 of the Local Government : Municipal Systems Act 32 of
2000 (the Systems Act). This is incorrect and I will address this misconception by
dealing with the concerns of Ms Kruger.

[24] It needs to be mentioned that the case that was argued before us differed
materially from that which was before the Land Court. ‘It is trite law that in
application proceedings the notice of motion and affidavits define the issue s
between the parties and the affidavits embody evidence .’14 In the answering
affidavit, the nub of the opposition is captured as follows:
‘5.29 I respectfully submit that Mr Sibanyoni does not have a clear right to demand the supply of
electricity by [Eskom] where [Eskom] does not have the consent of the land owner neither has he
or Eskom complied with their environmental obligations for the erection of an electrical supply
line.’

[25] Counsel for Ms Kruger raised, for the first time in the application for leave
to appeal, the following:
‘. . . the simple issue is, it is not necessarily whether people has electricity or not , the question is

whether it is accessible or not, that is a different question…First of all one cannot force a party to
enter into an agreement with the other. . .’

14 Molusi and Others v Voges N .O. and Others [2016] ZACC 6; 2016 (3) SA 370 (CC); 2016 (7) BCLR 839 (CC)
para 27.

13


This culminated in the submissions before us to the effect that the Sibanyonis
needed to have the consent of Ms Kruger before installing the electricity. The
submission in the Land Court was that it was Eskom wh ich was required to obtain
consent from the owner before proceeding with the installation of electricity.
Counsel for the Sibanyonis did not take issue with this change of goal posts. This
notwithstanding, I will deal with all issues raised.

[26] As a starting point , s 118 of the Systems Act is not implicated at all. This
section seeks to prohibit the transfer and registration of immovable property where
the levies, rates, surcharges and duties owed to the municipality had not been paid
in full at the time of registration of transfer.15 This section will only be of relevance
when the landowner seeks to transfer the property to a new owner. The Sibanyonis
do not seek transfer and registration of the property of the landowner . What they
seek is simply a basic improvement to enable them to live a dignified l ife by
having electricity supplied to their home.

[27] In Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others ,16 the
Constitutional Court dealt with the constitutional and statutory obligation of the
municipality to provide electricity and the concomitant right of citizens to receive
it, as a municipal right. The Constitutional Court said:
‘The provision of basic municipal services is a cardinal function, if not the most important
function, of every municipal government. The central mandate of local government is to develop
a service delivery capacity in order to meet the basic needs of all inhabitants of South Africa,
irrespective of whether or not they have a contractual relationship with the relevant public -
service provider. The respondents accepted that the provision of electricity is one of those
services that local government is required to provide, indeed they could not have contended

15 Section 118(1) of the Systems Act provides:

15 Section 118(1) of the Systems Act provides:
‘A registrar of deeds or other registration officer of immovable property may not register the transfer of property
except on production to that registration officer of a prescribed certificate-
(a) issued by the municipality or municipalities in which that property is situated; and
(b) which certifies that all amounts due in connection with that property for municipal service fees, surcharges and
fees, property rates and other municipal taxes, levies and duties during the two years preceding the date of
application for the certificate have been fully paid.’
16 Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others [2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC); 2010 (4) SA
55 (CC) para 34.

14


otherwise. In Mkontwana Yacoob J held that “municipalities are obliged to provide water and
electricity to the residents in their area as a matter of public duty .” Electricity is one of the most
common and important basic municipal services and has become virtually indispensable, -
particularly in urban society.’

[28] Because of the obligation to provide municipal services , the municipalities
are enjoined to take measures to ensure that services like electricity are provided to
the communities in an economically efficient manner .17 The Constitutional Court ,
in Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd ,18
held that the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 (ERA) recognised the
importance of municipalities and contained provisions that gave effect to the
‘constitutional duty of municipalities to supply electricity to their residents .’19 The
court went further and said that in terms of ERA, municipalities are the customers20
of Eskom while the residents are end users 21 who are supplied with electricity by
the municipalities. Eskom contracts with the municipality for the supply of
electricity while the municipality contracts with residents. The residents are
accordingly not Eskom’s customers . Therefore, Ms Kruger ’s contention that she,
as the landowner , stood the risk of attracting liability in respect of the moneys or
levies which might become due by the Sibanyonis is untenable.

[29] Prior to 1 April 2024, when the matter was heard in the Land Court, ESTA
provided for payment of subsidies. Section 4(1) (c) provided that the ‘Minister
shall. . . grant subsidies for the development of land occupied or to be occupied in
terms of on -site or off - site developments. ’ I can see no reason why Ms Kruger
could not make an application for this subsidy if she felt concerned about incurring
liabilities to Eskom in circumstances where the Sibanyonis wanted to make
improvements to their residential home . The situation is today even better due to

improvements to their residential home . The situation is today even better due to

17 See s 9(1)(a)(iii) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997.
18 Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd and Others [2022] ZACC 44; 2023 (5)
BCLR 527 (CC); 2023 (4) SA 325 (CC).
19 Ibid para 84.
20 In terms of the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 (ERA), ‘customer’ means ‘a person who purchases electricity
or a service relating to the supply of electricity.’
21 In terms of ERA ‘end user’ means a user of electricity or a service relating to the supply of electricity.

15


an amendment brought by the Extension of Security of Tenure Amendment Act 2
of 2018 which came into effect on 1 April 2024. The amended s4(1)(e) obliges the
Minister to ‘provide tenure grants to compensate owners or persons in charge for
the provision of accommodation and services to the occupiers and their families .’
(Emphasis added.)

[30] There is the refore no basis for Ms Kruger ’s concern about incurring
liabilities as a consequence of the installation of electricity which seems to be the
only reason to withhold her consent . In any event , as was held in Daniels, the
Sibanyonis had no obligation to seek consent from her. Having found that the
Sibanyonis required no consent from Ms Kruger to instal the electricity , the Land
Court erred when it nevertheless ordered Ms Kruger to grant such consent.

[31] However, because the installation of electricity also affected the property
rights of Ms Kruger , what was expected of all concerned was to engage
meaningfully. It is common cause that a meeting was arra nged at the Hendrina
Police station where all the concerned parties were in attendance. What is in
dispute is whether a consent was given to the Sibanyonis . On the version of Ms
Kruger, there was no engagement as the executrix of the estate had indicated that
the issue of electricity could only be addressed after the finalisation of the
administration of the estate. On the Sibanyoni s’ version, consent was given. As
already alluded to above, the permission and consent form allegedly signed by
Vincent is not disputed at all.

[32] There is no dispute that there was an engagement. I do not understand
meaningful engagement to be elevated to the status of an agreement. The purpose
of the engagement is surely to find common ground with the aim of achieving an
agreement and, subsequently, consent. However, there will be circumstances in
which an agreement will be difficult to achieve. In some instances, such

which an agreement will be difficult to achieve. In some instances, such
engagement might be obstructive or hurdles may in some instances be put in the

16


way of achieving consensus. In this case, it is difficult to understand how Eskom
could have gone to V[...] without the necessary engagement with the municipality
with whom it ou ght to contract. The inescapable inference is that the municipality
had consented to supply the Sibanyonis with electricity as end users and Eskom
must have been engaged to install the necessary equipment for their supply, hence
the delivery of the poles to V[...]. I am satisfied that the meeting, as was found by
the Land Court, constituted meaningful engagement for the purposes of resolving
the issue of the supply of electricity to the Sibanyonis’ home. The Sibanyonis have
no alternative remedy and are entitled to an interdict.

[33] I am accordingly of the view that the Land Court did not err in finding that
the installation of electricity was an improvement that was reasonably necessary to
make the Sibanyonis home habitable so as to enable them to exercise their right to
human dignity as contemplated in s 5 of ESTA. In conclusion , I find that the
Sibanyonis do not need th e landowner’s consent to instal electricity to the ir home.
The appeal must accordingly fail.

[33] In the result I make the following order:
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so
employed.


__________________
P E MOLITSOANE
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

17


Appearances
For the appellant: M Snyman SC
In4tructed by: Brandmullers Inc, Middelburg
Bezuidenhouts Inc, Bloemfontein

For the first respondent: N Gama with S Kunene
Instructed by: Mthimunye Attorneys, Embalenhle
Honey Attorneys Inc, Bloemfontein.