L.E.C v Road Accident Fund (15124/2022) [2025] ZAWCHC 407 (4 September 2025)

57 Reportability

Brief Summary

Delict — Loss of support — Claim by surviving spouse for loss of support following husband's death in a motor vehicle accident — Dispute over deceased's pre-morbid career path and deductions for plaintiff's earnings and remarriage prospects — Court held that the deceased would likely have been promoted to Regional Manager within three to five years, and that the plaintiff's earnings should be considered only up to the point of the deceased's anticipated promotion, with no additional deduction for remarriage prospects justified due to lack of evidence — Defendant liable to pay R4 906 290 in damages.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

JUDGMENT

Not Reportable
Case no: 15124/2022

In the matter between:

L[...] E[...] C[...]

PLAINTIFF
And

ROAD ACCIDENT FUND DEFENDANT

Neutral citation: C[...] v Road Accident Fund (Case no 1 5124/2022) [202 5]
ZAWCHC 402 (04-09-2025)
Coram: NUKU J
Heard: 28-9 June 2025
Delivered: 04 September 2025
Summary: Delict – action for damages – loss of support – mother claiming loss of
support for herself and two minor children resulting from her husband's death – whether

her income should be considered when calculating the loss of support claim – whether a
separate contingency deduction should be applied regarding remarriage prospects in
the absence of evidence establishing such prospects.


ORDER

1 The defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff the sum of R 4 906 290 together with
interest and costs, in terms of the draft order attached hereto marked “X”.


JUDGMENT


Nuku J

[1] The plaintiff is the surviving spouse of the late Ryan John Linderboom
(“deceased”), with whom she has two minor children , born in 2016 and 2018. The
deceased sustained fatal injuries on 9 March 2020 when he was hit by a motor vehicle ,
with registration C[...] (“insured vehicle ”), which was being driven by Mr Reggie Ntakana
(“insured driver”) at the time.

[2] The plaintiff has in stituted this action both in her personal capacity and in her
capacity as the mother and natural guardian of her two minor children. She claims a
loss of support for herself and her children resulting from the death of the deceased.

[3] The defendant a dmitted liability but disputed the amount claimed by the plaintiff.
The main point of disagreement between the parties concerns the deceased's pre -
morbid career path. Secondary issues relate to the deductions to be made in calculating
the loss of support. These include the deductibility of the plaintiff’s earnings, the
contingency deduction to be applied in computing the loss, and whether there should be

an additional contingency deduction that considers the plaintiff's prospects of
remarriage.

[4] The plaintiff’s stance on the main issue, which I discuss in more detail below, is
that the deceased would have advanced to the position of Regional Manager within
three to f ive years from the date of his death, whereafter he would have remained for
the rest of his life, with his income increasing annually in line with inflation.

[5] The defendant's position, on the other hand, is that the deceased would not have
progressed beyond his role at the time of his death and that his income would have
increased annually in line with inflation.

[6] Regarding the secondary issue about deductions, the plaintiff’s position was that
only general contingencies for life's uncertainties should be considered. It was argued
that her earnings should be accounted for only up to the point at which the deceased
would have been promoted to the Regional Manager position. This contention was
based on evidence indicating that she planned to retire upon the deceased's promotion
to Regional Manager. Additionally, it was argued that the evidence did not justify an
additional contingency deduction for the plaintiff’s prospects of remarrying.

[7] The defendant, on the other hand , argued that, in addition to general
contingencies for life's uncertainties, a further deduction should be made to account for
the possibility of the plaintiff’s remarriage. The defendant also disagreed with the
plaintiff regarding the percentages to be applied , as well as the deductibility of the
plaintiff’s earnings.

[8] The questions for determination by this Court are: (a) the pre-morbid career path
of the deceased, which will be used in calculating the plaintiff’s loss of support claim; (b)
whether and to what extent should the plaintiff’s earnings be factored in calculating the
loss of earnings, (c) whether an additional contingency deduction should be applied to

account for the plaintiff’s prospects of remarriage; and ( d) the percent age rates to be
applied.

[9] The plaintiff testified in support of her claim. She also called one lay witness, Ms.
Stephanie Dippenaar (“Ms Dippenaar”), and one expert witness, Ms. Lindy Emsley (“Ms
Emsley”), an industrial psychologist. For its part, the def endant called one expert
witness, Ms. Sandra Moses (“Ms Moses"), also an industrial psychologist.

[10] The plaintiff’s evidence was that the deceased was employed at the time of his
death as a Roaming Site Manager at RSC Retail Supply Chain Consulting Services
(“RSC”), where he had worked since 2015. She had had several discussions with the
deceased about his career progression, and it was from these discussions that she
learnt about the possible promotion of the deceased to the position of R egional
Manager. She had also learnt from the deceased that Mr Renier Blom (“Mr Blom”), who
was the immediate supervisor of the deceased, had been mentoring the deceased in
preparation for a possible promotion to the position of Regional Manager.

[11] The plaintiff also testified about the plans she and the deceased had if he were
appointed as a Regional Manager. She stated that they intended for her to stop working
so she could focus on raising their two children. According to the plaintiff, this plan was
based on the belief that the deceased's income would be enough to support the family.
Additionally, it would have helped her manage her pre-existing mental health condition.
However, the death of the deceased meant she could no longer afford to stop working,
as she became the sole breadwinner.

[12] According to the plaintiff, the deceased was a hardworking and dedicated worker,
and the fact that he had only achieved a grade 9 level of education would not have been
an obstacle to the deceased’s progression. This was based on the plaintiff’s knowledge
that the deceased was being mentored by Mr. Blom, at the time to prepare him for that
possibility.

[13] The plaintiff further testified that they wanted their children to pursue tertiary
education and were content with having only two children, with no plans for more. She
testified that she has not remarried since the death of the deceased and that she has no
interest in getting remarried. This is because her primary focus is on raising the children
and looking after her mental wellbeing.

[14] Ms Dippenaar was employed at RSC as a Human Resources Manageress until
2023 and knew the deceased as they had worked together for three years. Ms
Dippenaar also knew Mr Blom because they both reported to the General Manager
responsible for the Western Cape. She testified that a succession plan was in place,
and according to that plan, the deceased had been identified for promotion to the role of
Regional Manager. She stated that the promotion of the deceased to the po sition of
Roaming Site Manager was the first step in implementing that plan. This promotion
would allow the deceased to build relationships with clients and staff.

[15] Ms Dippenaar testified that establishing the succession plan was part of her
responsibilit ies. She also confirmed that Mr Blom had been mentoring the deceased.
She stated that there were no prescribed minimum educational qualifications for the
position of the Regional Manager. She further explained that the deceased having a
grade 9 level of ed ucation would not have hindered his progression, due to his
operational aptitude as a dedicated, ambitious, and quick learner. According to her, the
deceased ‘was going places’.

[16] According to Ms Dippenaar, the deceased possessed a strategic mindset, was
skilled at motivating others, and would have made a good Regional Manager. This is
based on the positive feedback that RSC had received from clients who had interacted
with the deceased.

[17] Ms Dippenaar also provided evidence regarding the corporatisation of RSC. In

[17] Ms Dippenaar also provided evidence regarding the corporatisation of RSC. In
this regard, she stated that it is likely the deceased would have already been appointed
as a Regional Manager when this occurred, and therefore, it would not have affected

him. She explains that the positions are first advertised internally bef ore looking outside
of the company.

[18] Finally, Ms Dippenaar testified that she, along with Mr Blom and the General
Manager, had identified the deceased for a possible promotion to the position of
Regional Manager . According to her, the deceased would have become a Regional
Manager in less than five years from the time he was promoted to the position of
Roaming Site Manager.

[19] Ms Emsley formally placed her qualifications and experience on record before
confirming the contents of the two reports she prepared, dated 14 March 2023 and 24
July 2025. She confirmed the deceased’s employment history, including that he was
employed as a Roaming Site Manager at the time of his death. According to her, the
deceased demonstrated a strong work ethic and had made significant progress since
joining RSC.

[20] Ms Emsley testified that the search she conducted on the RSC website gave her
the impression that RSC has a programme aimed at upskilling previously
disadvantaged individuals. According to her, this is one of the factors that would have
worked in favour of the deceased.

[21] Ms Emsley also provided evidence regarding job grading. She explained that the
lowest level on the scale is the Paterson Band A. The role of Roaming Site Manager
falls within the Paterson Job Grading levels from B5 to C3, depending on the complexity
of the tasks. According to Ms Emsley, the position of Regional Manager falls within the
Paterson D band, but for the purpose of calculating the deceased’s p re-morbid
earnings , she used the Paterson Bands C2 to C3. This was due to the less formal
nature of the position at RSC, as well as the deceased’s level of education. She
concluded that the deceased would have progressed to the position of Regional
Manager within three to five years of his promotion to Roaming Site Manager.

[22] Ms Emsley was asked why she did not consult the deceased's previous
employers before joining RSC, and she explained that her decision was based on the
fact that the deceased had been with RSC for some time. When questioned about the
deceased leaving school due to learning difficulties, she readily conceded that this may
be true. However, she pointed to the deceased's career history to suggest that he was
able to progress despite having left school because of learning difficulties. She
disagreed with the pre -morbid career path postulated by Ms Moses. That concluded the
evidence on behalf of the plaintiff.

[23] Ms Moses formally placed her qualifications and experience on record before
confirming the details of her report dated 26 April 2024. She expressed the impression
that the deceased was a hard-working man. She believed that the deceased’s limited
education would have hindered his career progression beyond the position he held at
the time of his death. This was also because competition increases as one advances
through the grades.

[24] According to Ms Moses, individuals with a grade 9 typically perform unskilled
work, while those with grades between 10 and 11 undertake semi -skilled work. She
described the deceased as somewhat of an anomaly because he had advanced to
performing semi -skilled w ork despite his limited education. However, she believed that
the deceased would not progress beyond Paterson Band B3, primarily due to his limited
education.

[25] She regarded the position of Regional Manager as generally senior and believed
the deceased wou ld find it difficult to meet the demands of that role. Her view was
further supported by her knowledge that the deceased left school due to learning
difficulties. In her opinion, the deceased would probably have remained in his role at the
time of his death until retirement, receiving only annual inflationary increases. At best,
he would have progressed to Paterson Band B5. However, Ms Moses did not provide a

he would have progressed to Paterson Band B5. However, Ms Moses did not provide a
timeline regarding this possibility.

[26] During cross -examination, Ms Moses stated that she had not obtained any
collateral information other than from the plaintiff. She explained that she did not
consider it necessary to obtain collateral information, and in any event, she is always
very sceptical about collateral information.

[27] When questioned about the feedback received by Ms Emsley regarding the
deceased's work performance, Ms Moses stated that the deceased might have had
hidden talents that he did not showcase during his school years. She acknowledged
that the information su ggests the deceased had been functioning at a level equivalent to
a person with a Grade 12 education. Ultimately, she agreed that the deceased could
have progressed to the level of Paterson Band C2/3. This concluded the evidence upon
which the issues in this matter are to be determined.

[28] It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the evidence of the two experts was
diametrically opposed and that the evidence of Ms Emsley should be preferred. This
was because Ms Emsley’s evidence and opinions are based on collateral information
she obtained at RSC, as opposed to Ms Moses, who deemed it unnecessary to obtain
any collateral information other than from the plaintiff. It was further submitted that Ms
Moses was not fully informed of the facts, including the succession plan in place at
RSC.

[29] Based on Ms Emsley’s evidence, it was submitted that the deceased would have
likely advanced to the position of Regional Manager within two to five years of his death,
and that he would have earned between R40 000 and R50 000.

[30] An actuarial calculation was prepared by Munro Forensic Actuaries based on the
assumption that the deceased would have been promoted to the position of Regional
Manager by March 2024 with a salary of between R40 000 and R50 000. It was also
assumed that the plaintiff w ould have continued working until March 2024 in accordance
with her plans with the deceased.

[31] It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that a contingency deduction based on
half a per cent for each year that the deceased would have worked until retire ment at
the age of 65 was appropriate. Under this approach, two and a half per cent would be
applied to the past loss of support and sixteen per cent to the future loss of support.
Two further alternative scenarios were presented based on five per cent and twenty per
cent for past and future loss of support in one, and ten per cent and thirty per cent in the
other.

[32] Turning to the issue of an additional contingency deduction to account for the
plaintiff’s prospects of remarriage, it was submitted that this Court should follow the
decision in LD v Road Accident Fund1 which held that , ‘Unless the facts of a particular
case clearly demonstrate that a higher than normal, and, special contingency for
remarriage is to be deducted, such further contingency ought not be deducted .’ The
submission was that no evidence was presented to justify the deduction of a special
contingency for remarriage.

[33] Regarding the plaintiff’s earnings to date, it was submitted that her earnings
should be considered up to March 2024, when she would have retired following the
promotion of the deceased to the position of Regional Manager. It was submitted that
this would place her in the same position she would have been in had the deceased not
died.

[34] Mr Goosen, who appeared for the defendant, conceded that the calculation of the
plaintiff’s loss of support should rely on applying contingencies to the actuarial report
prepared by Munro Forensic Actuaries. This was because of the compelling evidence
presented by Ms Dippenaar and the concessions made by Ms Moses that the deceased
would have likely advanced beyond his position at the time of his death. It was argued
that a hi gher-than-normal contingency deduction is justified given the restructuring at
RSC between 2020 and 2025. A deduction of seven per cent and twenty -five per cent

RSC between 2020 and 2025. A deduction of seven per cent and twenty -five per cent

1 LD v Road Accident Fund (14606/2016) [2018] ZAGPPHC 181 (5 February 2018) at para [37].

for past and future loss of earnings, respectively, was suggested as appropriate in the
circumstances.

[35] It was further submitted that an additional deduction should be applied to account
for the plaintiff’s remarriage prospects. In support of this argument, the defendant relied
on two decisions of the Appellate Division in Hulley v Cox 2(Hulley) and Peri-Urban
Areas Health Board v Munarin3(Peri-Urban Areas) .

[36] In Hulley, Innes CJ , dealing with deductions that may be justified in the
computation of a loss of support claim:

‘The dependants are entitled to be compensated for the pecuniary loss involved
in the reduced income and a restricted provision for the supply of what they had
been accustomed to . But the object being to compensate the n for material loss ,
not to improve their material prospects, it follows that allowance must be made
for such factors as the possibility o f re-marriage. Account must also be taken of
eventualities which would have operated in any case.’4

[37] In Peri-Urban Areas , Holmes JA simply recognised, with reference to the
decision of the Appellate Division in Hulley, that it is appropriate to consider remarriage
prospects when assessing a claim for loss of support.

[38] The implications of the concession by the defendant that the actuarial report
prepared by Munro Forensic Actuaries should be used as the basis for quantifying the
plaintiff’s claim were that it became unnecessary to determine the following issues: (a)
the deceased’s pre -morbid career path, (b) the deductibility of the plaintiff’s earnings
from March 2024, and (c) a separate contingency deduction for the plaintiff’s remarriage
prospects. In fact, the defendant proceeded to quantify the plaintiff’s claim by applying a
seven per cent deduction and a twenty -five per cent deduction, in respect of past and

2 1923 AD 234.
3 1965 (3) SA 367 (A).
4 At 244.

future loss of support, respectively, to the figures prepared by Munro Forensic
Actuaries.

[39] The concession regarding the deceased’s pre -morbid career path , h ad been
explicitly made having regard to the evidence of Ms Dippenaar and the concessions
made by Ms Moses.

[40] No explicit concession was made regarding the deductibility of the plaintiff’s
earnings beyond March 2024, but the actuarial report, as recorded above, was prepared
on the assumption that the plaintiff would have ceased working upon the appointment of
the deceased as a Regional Manager.

[41] As stated above, the plaintiff has had to continue working to support her family.
For the period before March 2024, her loss of support has been reduced in proportion to
her earnings, and the law clearly states that her earnings must be considered when
calculating her loss of support.

[42] There has been a period from March 2024 to the present during which her
earnings have been disregarded, based on the assumption that she would have
stopped working once the deceased was promoted. On the surface, it appears that she
receives compensation for more than her loss and that the distinction between the
periods before and after March 2024, to the extent that she is still working, may be
artificial. However, this aspect was not explored by the defendant, who was content to
calculate the plaintiff’s loss based on a contingency deduction.

[43] Whether the plaintiff’s evidence that she would have stopped working upon the
deceased’s promotion justifies disregarding her income is not straightforward. I say this
because this aspect seems to fall somewhere between the dependant’s income that
should b e considered and the dependant’s earning capacity that should not be taken
into account. As Holmes JA stated in Peri-Urban Areas5 stated:

5 At 376B-C.

‘A widow is therefore entitled to compensation for loss of maintenance
consequent upon the death of her husband , but any pecuniary benefits, similarly
consequent, must be taken into account. To suggest that she is obliged to
mitigate her damages by finding employment is to mistake the nature of her
loss…. She cannot be required to mitigate that loss by incurring the du ty of
supporting herself . If she does obtain employment, it is more appropriate to
regard her earnings as being the product of her own work than as consequent
upon her husband’s death .’

[44] The answer to the question ultimately depends on whether the plaintiff's earnings
are considered the result of her own work, given the circumstances, in which case they
should be disregarded, or if they are due to the deceased's death , in which event they
must be taken into account. However, given the defendant’s approach to the matter as
set out above, it has become unnecessary to decide this issue.

[45] Again, the defendant did not explicitly abandon the issue of a special contingency
deduction for rema rriage prospects. However, the authorities cited by the defendant, in
my view, do not support the idea that an additional contingency deduction for
remarriage prospects should always be applied. On the contrary, the discussion of
contingencies regarding th e possibility of remarriage is included under general
contingencies. This aligns with the decision in LD v Road Accident Fund, which states
that a special contingency deduction should only be made where evidence shows
remarriage as a likely prospect. No su ch evidence was presented in the current matter,
and, in any event, the defendant was content to quantify the plaintiff’s claim on the basis
of a higher -than-normal contingency deduction.

[46] That leaves only the question of contingencies to be applied to the actuarial
calculation prepared by Munro Forensic Actuaries. As stated, the defendant argued for

calculation prepared by Munro Forensic Actuaries. As stated, the defendant argued for
a higher -than-normal contingency deduction to account for the changes that have
occurred at RSC since then .

[47] The defendant’s approach, however, overlooks the evidence presented showing
that the changes at RSC would not have affected the deceased, as his path to
promotion was already underway. This includes the evidence of Ms Dippenaar, one of
the individuals resp onsible for the succession plan that identified the deceased as a
potential candidate for the role of Regional Manager. The evidence also shows that the
deceased was in the process of being mentored by Mr Blom, who was a Regional
Manager at the time and ha s since left RSC. In my view, a higher than usual
contingency cannot be justified.

[48] One of the plaintiff’s alternative scenarios proposed a contingency deduction of
five per cent for past loss of support and twenty per cent for future loss of support. This
scenario, in my view, offers a reasonable basis for calculating the claim. While th e
evidence strongly suggested the deceased was likely to be promoted to the position of a
Regional Manager, one cannot ignore the possibility that he would face stiff competition
if he were to lose his job at RSC. This scenario also considers what may appe ar to be
an improvement in the plaintiff’s position, given that she has remained employed and is
entitled to compensation for the period after March 2024.

[49] In terms of this scenario, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation in the sum of
R4 906 290 which is made up as follows:

a) R207 860 for past loss of support and R2 961 280 for past loss of support in her
personal capacity; and

b) R151 335 for past loss of support and R6 64 720 for past loss of support in her
representative capacity as the mother and natural guardian of her minor child
RL; and

c) R151 335 for past loss of support and R 769 760 for past loss of support in her
representative capacity as the mother and natural guardian of her minor child
LL.

[50] Regarding costs, the plaintiff has succeeded, and the usual rule that costs follow
the result should apply. Such fees are to include the expenses occasioned by the
employment of counsel, whose fees shall be taxed, for the relevant period, on scale B.

Order

[51] Therefore, I issue an order in accordance with the draft order attached hereto
marked “X”.


_____________________________
LG NUKU
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT


Appearances

For plaintiff : Mr W Coughlan
Instructed by: Sohn and Wood Attorneys, Cape Town

For Defendant: Mr FS Goosen
Instructed by: State Attorney, Cape Town