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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Reportable/Not Reportable
Case no: 2025-102039
In the matter between:
ASI FINANCIAL SERVICES (PTY) LTD FIRST APPLICANT
ASI WEALTH WESTERN CAPE (PTY) LTD SECOND APPLICANT
and
MICHAEL GERLAD ESLICK FIRST RESPONDENT
JANICE ESLICK SECOND RESPONDENT
Neutral citation:
Coram: MPHEGO, AJ
Heard: 12 August 2025
Delivered: 26 August 2025
Summary:
This is an application for the provisional sequestration of the estate of the first
respondent.
______________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________
1. The following order is made in relatio n to the Notice of Motion
(Rule 30(A)):
a) The second applicant (and Gerhold & Van Wyk Attorneys) is
found to not be properly before this court in relation to this
application.
b) This application will proceed in respect of the first applicant.
2. The following order is made in relation to the relief sought in the
Notice of Motion:
a) The estate of the first respondent is placed under provisional
sequestration.
b) A rule nisi is hereby issued calling on all interested parties to
appear and show cause, if any, to this court on 9 October 2025
as to: (1) why the estate of the first respondent should not be
placed under final sequestration; and (2) why the costs of this
application should not be costs in the administration of the
estate of the first respondent.
c) That service of such order be effected by the Sheriff upon: (1)
the respondents at S[…] Village, […] C[…] Road, Sunset Beach,
Cape Town; (2) the South African Revenue Service, 2 […] H[…]
S[…] Avenue, Cape Town and; (3) any employees of the
respondents and any trade unions or bargaining councils to
which they belong (if any).
d) That service of such order be effected on the Master of the High
Court, Dullah Omar Building, 4[…] C[…] Street, Cape Town.
e) That service of such order be effected by registered mail on all
known creditors with claims exceeding R25,000.00, if any.
f) The Sheriff shall attach all movable property of the first
respondent and shall immediately after effecting the attachment
report to the Master in writing that the attachment has been
effected and shall submit with such report a copy of the
inventory in terms of Section 19 (1) of the Insolvency Act, 1936.
______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________
Mphego AJ:
[1] This is an application for the provisional sequestration of the estate of
the first respondent. The first and second applicants seek an order on the
following terms:
a) That the estate of the first respondent be placed under provisional
sequestration in the hands of the Master of the High Court.
b) That a rule nisi do issue, calling upon the respondents to show cause,
if any, to this court, on a date to be fixed by this court, as to: (1) why
the estate of the first respondent should not be placed under final
sequestration; and (2) why the costs of this application should not be
costs in the administration of the estate of the first respondent.
c) That service of such order be effected upon: (1) the respondents at
S[…] Village, […] C[…] Road, Sunset Beach, Cape Town; ( 2) the
South African Revenue Service, 22 Hans Strijdom Avenue, Cape
Town (3) the Master of the High Court, Dullah Omar Building, 4 […]
C[…] Street, Cape Town (4) any employees of the respondents and
any trade unions or bargaining councils to which they belong (if any);
and (5) all known creditors with claims exceeding R25,000.00, if any.
d) That such further and/or alternative relief be granted as the court may
deem fit.
Background facts
[2] On 24 July 2023, the first applicant entered into a Sale and Purchase
Agreement with the first respondent and Reginald Bath (“Mr Bath”) to
purchase 51% of the equity and 20% of the right to income of two companies
controlled by the first respondent and Mr Bath, namely the second applicant
(previously named, Rockfin Wealth Management (Pty) Ltd ) and Myfin1237
(Pty) Ltd (“the Companies”).
[3] The Sale and Purchase Agreement included various warranties and
indemnities provided by the first respondent to the first applicant as follows:
a) Clause 5.8: The first respondent warranted that any liabilities arising
before the effective date would be settled , and indemnified the first
applicant in this regard.
b) Clause 1.4: The first respondent warranted that the Companies would
generate a minimum revenue of R9,085,000 per annum excluding
VAT.
c) Clause 5.5: The first respondent warranted that there were no current
or pending litigation agains t the Companies , and indemnified the first
applicant against any claims.
d) Clause 5.6: The first respondent warranted that there were no
suretyship, indemnity, and/or guarantee agreements in favour of any
third parties.
e) Clause 5.9: The first respondent warr anted that the Companies were
tax and regulatory compliant.
[4] As stated above, the second applicant, was previously named Rockfin
Wealth Management (Pty) Ltd.
[5] The effective date in the Sale and Purchase Agreement was 1 August
2023 and it was extended by the first applicant to 1 December 2023 . T he
indemnities were triggered when the breaches of warrant ies were established
as follows:
a) The first respondent allowed a default judgment to be taken by First
National Bank (“FNB”) in respect of indebtedness that had arisen
before 1 December 2023, amounting to R 438,175.52. This amount
was payable by the second applicant as at December 2023. The first
respondent has not settled this liability or any part thereof.
b) On 1 November 2024, FNB served a s ummons on Rockfin Wealth
Management (Pty) Ltd and the first respondent for an overdraft facility
due as of 1 December 2023, claiming R526,054.14 plus interest and
costs. The first respondent failed to settle this liability.
c) On 12 December 2024, the first a pplicant discovered that the
Companies were in substantial arrears with the South African
Revenue Services (“SARS”) for unpaid Value Added Tax (“VAT”) and
Pay-As-You-Earn (“PAYE”) dating back to 2021, amounting to
R2,749,431.91. The first respondent failed to disclose and settle this
liability.
d) On 14 November 2019, the first respondent bound the second
applicant (previously, Rockfin Wealth Management (Pty) Ltd) as a
surety for a loan granted to Ci rrus Financial Services (Pty) Ltd,
amounting to R11,025,316.00 plus interest and costs. This suretyship
agreement was not disclosed to the first applicant.
[6] The founding affidavit in these proceedings was deposed to by a
director of the first applicant, Mr Paul Swanepoel (“Mr Swanepoel”) who
asserted that he was authorised to depose the affidavit on behalf of both the
first and second applicants.
[7] Mr Swanepoel asserted that the first respondent’s failure to settle the
liabilities coupled with the intentional misrepresentation, indicate an inability to
meet his financial obligations and that the aforementioned amounts are
liquidated claims. It was further stated in the founding affidavit that the first
applicant also became aware of a further claim against the first respondent
amounting to approximately R1million plus costs and interest involving an
entity called Webram Four (Pty) Ltd.
[8] The applicants asserted that the first respondent committed an act of
insolvency under Section 8(c) of the Insolvency Act, 1936 (“the Insolvency
Act”) when he sold an immovable property which he owned with his wife on
29 May 2025. After the sale, the first respondent ad mitted to giving his half
share of the proceeds to the second respondent (his wife), who, the applicant
submits is a creditor and thereby preferring her over other creditors . It was
stated that these circumstances have the effect of prejudicing the general
body of creditors or preferring the second respondent above other creditors.
[9] Mr Swanepoel further asserted that the first respondent in
communications (including WhatsApp messages and during meetings),
acknowledged his inability to pay his debts as they became du e and that the
first respondent admitted he did not have sufficient personal funds to pay and
would need to borrow or obtain funds from a "family trust," indicating a lack of
liquidity and inability to meet his obligations . It was submitted on behalf of the
applicants that the aforesaid statements constitute an act of insolvency in
terms of Section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. The applicants also contend that
the first respondent’s factual insolvency is demonstrated by his liabilities
(including FNB judgments, SARS debts, and other claims ) far exceeding his
assets.
[10] The respondents have disputed that the claims as highlighted by the
applicants, are liquidated . They stated that the applicants have failed to
establish a liquidated claim as required under section 9(1) of the Insolvency
Act because the claims presented by the applicants are disputed and are
currently subject to determination by other courts and arbitration. The
respondents highlighted that the applicants approached the court without
disclosing the ongoing litigation involving these claims, which is a significant
non-disclosure.
[11] The respondents challenge the applicants' assertion of an act of
non-disclosure.
[11] The respondents challenge the applicants' assertion of an act of
insolvency under section 8(c) of the Insolv ency Act. They emphasize that the
applicants have not provided sufficient evidence to support the claim of an act
of insolvency. They also dispute the applicants' claim of factual insolvency,
where the applicants estimate that the first respondent’s liabil ities exceed his
assets. The respondents contend that the applicants have arrived at this
estimation based on liabilities that are all subject to litigation in other courts
and have not been finally determined.
[12] In relation to the sale of the immovable pro perty, the respondents
asserted that the second respondent paid R1 million of her inheritance
towards the purchase of the immovable property in 2016 . They state d that,
pursuant to their antenuptial contract, the inheritance the second respondent
paid towards the property is excluded from the joint estate, justifying the
second respondent’s entitlement to the proceeds of the sale. They denied that
the transfer of funds to the second respondent amounts to an act of
insolvency.
The Notice in terms of Uniform Rule 7(1) in respect of the second
applicant and the Notice of Motion (Rule 30(A))
[13] Prior to the hearing date of 12 August 2025 the respondents issued a
Notice in terms of Uniform Rule 7 (1) regarding the authority of the applicants’
attorneys (Gerhold & Van Wyk Attorneys) to act on behalf of the second
applicant in these proceedings.
[14] Thereafter the respondents brought an application in terms of Uniform
Rule 30(A) for an order that, due to Gerhold & Van Wyk Attorneys’ non -
compliance with Uniform Rule 7(1), the second applicant’s claim should be
struck out.
[15] At the commencement of oral submissions on 12 August 2025 the
respondents’ counsel submitted that the above point in limine was dispositive
of the application in its entirety.
[16] The Notice in terms of Uniform Rule 7(1) is dated 3 August 2025 and it
was in terms of such Notice that the applicants furnished round robin board
resolutions, annexures “AA2.1” and “AA2.2” which the respondent s argued,
do not meet the requirements of the second applicant’s Memorandum of
Incorporation (“MOI”) . The respondents argue d that annexures “AA2.1” and
“AA2.2” as relied upon by the applicants to authorise the launching of the
sequestration application are irregular because the MOI of the second
applicant requires that the institution of litigation (such as a sequestration
application) is to be authorized by a special resolution of shareholders, not by
a board resolution.
[17] The respondents highlighted that paragraph 7.3.8 and Schedule 2 of
the MOI of the second respondent stipulates that “a special resolution,
supported by at least 75% of the voting rights at a shareholders’ meeting, is
required for such litigation” and that annexures “AA2.1” and “AA2.2” are round
robin board resolutions, not special resolutions of shareholders and thus do
not meet the requirements of the MOI of the second respondent.
[18] The respondents submit ted that the individuals who purported to pass
the resolutions (Messrs Govender, Ross, and Mostert) were not authorised to
do so in the absence of a valid special resolution. As such, the launching of
the sequestration application was beyond their powers (ultra vires) . The
respondents argued that be cause the applicants themselves were not
properly authorised to bring the application, it follows that their attorneys were
also not properly authorised to act on their behalf. The respondents maintain
that if the a pplicants were not properly authorised, the application must fail in
its entirety, and the only remaining issue would be that of costs.
[19] The applicants , on the other hand, relied on the Sale and Purchase
Agreement in terms of which the first applicant purc hased 51% of equity and
20% of the right to income in the second applicant (previously, Rockfin Wealth
Management (Py) Ltd) and Myfin1237 (Pty) Lt d. They submitted that it is in
fact the first respondent that provided various warranties and indemnities to
fact the first respondent that provided various warranties and indemnities to
the first applicant as part of the transaction and that the indemnities are
contractual undertakings by the first respondent to compensate the first
applicant for losses arising from breaches of specific warranties.
[20] The applicants asserted that the indem nity was triggered when the
breaches of warranty were established such as the several breaches which
have occurred relating to undisclosed debts, tax liabilities and suretyship s.
The applicants submitted that the first applicant is the petitioning party in
terms of the Insolvency Act and is properly before this court. In addition the
counsel for the applicants highlighted that t he authority of the first applicant
was not challenged and even if such challenge was to be successful, it would
not be fatal to the entire application.
[21] Counsel for the applicants further argued that the Uniform Rule 7(1)
Notice is out of time (served on 3 August 2025), as the application was
launched on 30 June 2025 and served on the first respondent on 9 July 2025.
He disputed that the Uniform Rule 7(1) Notice can be raised in support of a
dismissal of a claim, and stated that it can at the very least cause this matter
to be postponed.
Evaluation of the challenge to the authority relating to the second applicant
[22] Uniform Rule 7(1) is typically invoked when there is a challenge to the
legal standing or authority of the party bringing an application, requiring proof
that the person acting for a party is duly authorised to do so.
[23] In the present matter the authority that is challenged is that relating to
the second applicant in that Messrs Govender, Ross, and Mostert did not
have the authority to authorise the sequestration application on behalf of the
second applicant and that any actions taken by them, or by the attorneys
based on those resolutions, are beyond their legal power or authority.
[24] This court agrees with the submission made on behalf of the
respondents that annexures “AA2.1” and “AA2.2” do not meet the
requirements of the MOI of the second applicant and thus the second
applicant (including Gerhold & Van Wyk Attorneys) lack the authority to
prosecute this application.
[25] This court also agrees with the submission by the applicants’ counsel
that the first applicant is the petitioning party for purposes of the Inso lvency
Act and that the first applicant is properly before this court.
[26] Counsel for the applicant submitted that a successful challenge to the
second applicant’s authority is not fatal to the entire application. There is case
law which support the view that the lack of authority of one applicant does not
necessarily vitiate the entire application1.
[27] This court has the discretion to (1) adjourn the hearing of the
application in order to enable a party to satisfy the court that it has authority to
act (2) strike out the unauthorised applicant and allow the proceedings to
continue in the name of the properly authorised applicant . Provided that the
remaining applicant ha s the necessary locus standi and the relief sought can
be granted to it.
[28] In this application, the provisional sequestration order, if granted,
benefits all creditors because the provisional sequestration is a single,
indivisible order. In Meskin & Co v Friedman 1948 (2) SA 555 (W) at 559, the
court explained that the right to investiga te the insolvent’s affairs and the
administration of the estate is for the benefit of the general body of creditors,
not just the petitioning creditor.
[29] Given that - (1) the deponent of the founding affidavit is a director of
the first applicant (2) the first applicant is a party to the Sale and Purchase
Agreement (no t the second applicant) (3) the basis of the second
respondent’s indebtedness to the first applicant is the breach of contractual
warranties and indemnities given in the Sale and Purchas e Agreement (4) the
rule nisi and/or provisional sequestration order, if granted, benefits all
creditors – second applicant (and Gerhold & Van Wyk Attorneys) is found to
not be properly before this court in relation to this application and this
application will proceed in respect of the first applicant.
application will proceed in respect of the first applicant.
1 Mall (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Merino Ko-operasie Bpk 1957 (2) SA 347 (C)
[30] From this point onwards I shall refer to the first applicant.
The first respondent’s insolvency
[31] The support for granting a provisional sequestration order is firmly
rooted in the Insolvency Act and developed through case law. The next phase
of the enquiry entails this court establishing whether (1) the petitioning creditor
has established a claim as contemplated in section 9(1); ( 2) the debtor has
committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent; and (3) whether there is reason
to believe that sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors.
Has the first applicant , as the petitioning creditor , established a claim as
contemplated in section 9(1) Insolvency Act?
[32] The first applicant has submitted that it has liquidated claims which it
submits are capable of prompt ascertainment by speedy proof , these are
rooted in the indemnities which were trigge red when the breaches of
warranties were established as follows.
a) The judgment obtained by FNB for R438,175.52 (plus interest and
costs).
b) The s ummons issued by FNB for an overdraft facility due as at 1
December 2023, in the amount of R526,054.14 (plus interest and
costs).
c) The o utstanding VAT and PAYE liabilities owed by the second
applicant Myfin1237 (Pty) Ltd to SARS, quantified at R2,749,431.91.
d) The s uretyship claim by Momentum Metropolitan Life Ltd in the
amount of R11,025,316.00 (plus interest and costs).
[33] There is a further claim by Webram Four (Pty) Ltd against
Transformation Capital Group (for which the first respondent signed as
surety), amounting to approximately R1 million. The first applicant claims that
the first respondent’s failure to disclose and indemnify it for this liability
constitutes a breach of the Sale and Purchase Agreement, and it is entitled to
claim against the first respondent for any loss or liability the first applicant
would suffer as a result.
[34] The applicants relied on the authority in First National Bank of SA Ltd v
Myburgh 2002 (4) SA 176 (C) which confirms that a liquidated claim is one
where the amount is fixed or can be determined by simple calculation, without
the need for further evidence or judicial assessment . The applicants fur ther
relied on the Badenhorst Test, firstly that a "liquidated claim" is one where the
amount owed is either agreed upon or can be determined by simple
calculation or reference to a fixed standard.
[35] The respondents argued that the claims against the first respondent
are disputed and subject to ongoing litigation and arbitration, and therefore
cannot be relied upon to establish insolvency or acts of insolvency. Relying on
Kurz NO and Another v Van den Berg [2017] JOL 37250 (KZP) the
respondent argue that the applicants have not established a liquidated claim
(because the claims are disputed and subject to other proceedings) and have
not shown an act of insolvency or advantage to creditors.
[36] The respondent s relied on Investec Bank Limited and Another v
Mutemeri and Another (O9/22247) [2009] ZAGPJHC 64 to support their
contention that these sequestration proceedings are being improperly utilised
to enforce disputed claims, which is not the purpose of the Insolvency Act.
They submitted that because the underlying claims are disputed and subject
to other proceedings, sequestration is not appropriate.
Did the first respondent engage in an act of insolvency or is he factually
insolvent?
[37] It was submitted on behalf of the first applicant that the first respondent
has committed an act of insolvency by disposing of his assets in a manner
that prejudices creditors or prefers one creditor above another. Specifically,
that prejudices creditors or prefers one creditor above another. Specifically,
the first respondent sold an immovable property he owns jointly with second
respondent (his wife). The first respondent admitted to giving his share of the
proceeds to the second respondent because she contributed R1 million of her
inheritance towards the purchase of the immovable property back in 2016.
[38] The first respondent refused to provide an undertaking to hold the
proceeds in trust pending litigation . It was submitted on behalf of the first
applicant that this refusal, followed by the transfer of the f unds to the second
respondent supports the inference of an act of insolvency.
[39] Counsel for the first applicant argued that the transfer of the funds to
the second respondent constitutes an act of insolvency under section 8(c) of
the I nsolvency Act, as it has the effect of prejudicing creditors or preferring
one creditor (his wife) over others and that the intention behind the disposition
is irrelevant but the effect matters.
[40] The respondents argued that the sale of the property and th e transfer
of proceeds to the second respondent “has nothing to do with this matter” and
does not constitute an act of insolvency and denied that the transaction was
intended to prejudice creditors or prefer one over another.
[41] The first applicant relied on Reynolds NO v Mecklenberg (Pty) Ltd 1996
(1) SA 75 (W) to support the submission that even if there is a dispute of facts,
the court can still find, on a prima facie basis, that an act of insolvency has
been committed. The case highlights that a court must consider whether, on
the affidavits, a balance of probabilities favours the conclusion that the
requirements of section 10 of the Insolvency Act (including the commission of
an act of insolvency) have been satisfied.
[42] The first applic ant contends that the first respondent has , in writing,
acknowledged his inability to pay his debts, which constitutes an act of
insolvency under section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act . The first respondent’s
admission to his need to borrow funds from a family trust, and his admission
admission to his need to borrow funds from a family trust, and his admission
that his international investments are depleted, support the argument that he
is unable to pay debts.
[43] It was also submitted that the first respondent is factually insolvent
because his liabilities far exceed his assets, and he has not provided proof of
assets sufficient to meet his debts. Relying on ABSA Bank Ltd v Rhebokskloof
(Pty) Ltd and Others 1993 (4) SA 436 (C) it was submitted that the best proof
of solvency is the ability to pay debts, the first respondent’s failure to do so is
evidence of his prima facie insolvency.
[44] The first respondent asserted that he has income in excess of
R65,000.00 per month and asserts that he is a director of various companies,
suggesting ongoing earning capacity. He denied the calculation of liabilities
and the submission that he is hopelessly insolvent , however, he did provide
detailed evidence of his assets on a balance sheet.
Does a provisional sequestration order provide any advantage to the
creditors?
[45] It was submitted that granting a provisional sequestration order will
provide an advantage to creditors for the following reasons:
a) It will prevent the first respondent from dissipating or preferring
certain creditors over others, as he has already disposed of the
immovable prop erty he owned with his wife and transferred the
proceeds thereof to his wife.
b) It will establish a concursus creditorum ensuring that all creditors
are treated equally and that any available assets are distributed
according to the law.
c) An independent trust ee can investigate the respondent’s affairs,
potentially uncovering concealed or undisclosed assets for the
benefit of all creditors.
[46] The case of Hill & Co v Ganie 1925 CPD 242 was relied upon to
support the argument that the first respondent’s conduct an d financial position
justify sequestration. This case law highlights that, prima facie, if creditors
cannot get their debts paid in the ordinary way, it is to the advantage of
creditors that the debtor’s estate should be sequestrated.
[47] The first applicant relied on London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair 1957 (3)
SA 591 (D) to argue that the c ourt need s to be satisfied only that there is
reason to believe (not necessarily a likelihood, but a prospect not too remote )
that as a result of an investigation and inquiry, assets might be unearthed that
will benefit creditors.
[48] The respondents deny that the provisional sequestration order will
bring any advantage to creditors , arguing that the estate of the second
respondent is modest, the claims are disputed, and the costs of sequestration
may outweigh any benefit. They further asserted that there are no realisable
assets, that there is no prospect of uncovering further assets, and that the
application is an abuse of process.
Evaluation
[49] At the provisional sequestration stage, the party bringing the
application must establish the requirements under section 10 of the
Insolvency Act, on a prima facie basis, i.e., that the balance of probabilities on
the affidavits is in their favour 2. A respondent may oppose by showing a bona
fide and reasonable defence, but mere denial or technical objections are
insufficient3. This court is of the respectful view that the defences advanced by
the respondent do not assist them:
a) First, the claims are fixed and readily ascertainable sums of money,
arising from contractual inde mnities and warranties, supported by
judgments or official assessments. The respondents have not raised
bona fide reasonable grounds that the claims are not fixed, certain, or
readily ascertainable save to state that “the claims are subject to
2 Pieters N.O v Pienaar and another and related matters [2025] JOL 68786 (WCC) para [151]
3 Astra Constantine Inc v Jones and Another (25801/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 238 (3 June
3 Astra Constantine Inc v Jones and Another (25801/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 238 (3 June
2025), para [20] -[22] referring to the Badenhorst Test in Badenhorst v Northen Construction
Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1956 (2) SA 346 (T)
determination by other courts and arbitration”. This court is of the
respectful view that a claim as contemplated in section 9(1) of the
Insolvency Act has been established.
b) Second, in relation to section 8 of the Insolvency Act, this court finds
that the sale of the immovable property and the inability of the first
respondent to pay his debts are both standard acts of insolvency
under the Insolvency Act and these acts justify the launching of this
urgent application for provisional sequestration . The conduct
demonstrates that the respondent is either actively prejudicing
creditors or is unable to meet his financial obligations.
c) Third, the applicants have set out facts suggesting that such an
advantage exists. This court is satisfied that a provisional
sequestration order will provide an advantage to creditors in that,
such an order would ensure that assets are preserved, recovered,
and distributed fairly among creditors. The court in Meskin & Co v
Friedman 1948 (2) SA 555 (W) stated that the facts put before the
court must satisfy it that there is a reasonable prospect - not
necessarily a likelihood, but a prospect which is not too remote - that
some pecuniary benefit will result to creditors. The court further stated
that it is not necessary to prove that the insolvent has any assets, and
even if there is none at all, but there are reasons for thinking that as a
result of the enquiry under the Act some may be revealed or
recovered for the benefit of creditors, that is sufficient.
[50] In Pieters N.O v Pienaar and another and related matters [2025] JOL
68786 (WCC) at para [178] the court stated that: ‘Once the applicant for a
provisional sequestration order has prima facie established the jurisdictional
requirements for such an order, the court has a discretion whether to grant the
order. Where the conditions prescribed for the grant of a provisional order are
satisfied then, in the absence of some special or unusual circumstances, the
satisfied then, in the absence of some special or unusual circumstances, the
court should grant the order .’ To this end, it is clear that t his court retains the
discretion, but it should can grant the provisional sequestration order if
requirements are met, unless special circumstances exist.
[51] This court is satisfied that the jurisdictional requirements for the order
sought by the first applicant have been satisfied and no special or unusual
circumstances have been raised by the respondents.
Order
The following order is made in relation to the Notice of Motion (Rule
30(A)):
1. The second applicant (and Gerhold & Van Wyk Attorneys) is found to
not be properly before this court in relation to this application.
2. This application will proceed in respect of the first applicant.
The following order is made in relation to the relief sought in the Notice
of Motion:
1. The estate of the first respondent is placed under provisional
sequestration.
2. A rule nisi is hereby issued calling on all interested parties to appear
and show cause, if any, to this court on 9 October 2025 as to: (1) why
the estate of the first respondent should not be placed under final
sequestration; and (2) why the costs of this application should not be
costs in the administration of the estate of the first respondent.
3. That service of such order be effected by the Sheriff upon: (1) the
respondents at S […] Village, […] C[…] Road, Sunset Beach, Cape
Town; (2) the South African Revenue Service, 2 […] H[…] S[…]
Avenue, Cape Town and; (3) any employees of the respondents and
any trade unions or bargaining councils to which they belong (if any).
4. That service of such order be effected on the Master of the High Court,
Dullah Omar Building, 4[…] C[…] Street, Cape Town.
5. That service of such order be effected by registered mail on all known
creditors with claims exceeding R25,000.00, if any.
6. The Sheriff shall attach all movable property of the first respondent and
shall immediately after effecting the attachment r eport to the Master in
writing that the attachment has been effected and shall submit with
such report a copy of the inventory in terms of Section 19 (1) of the
Insolvency Act, 1936.
_____________________________
TR MPHEGO
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
For the applicants : Adv C. Cutler
Instructed by : Gerhold & Van Wyk Attorneys & Conveyancers
For the respondents : Adv S. Cohen
Adv M. Botha
Instructed by : Alhadeff Attorneys
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
representatives by email.