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JUDGMENT
ALLY AJ
1. This is an opposed application which served before this Court as an interlocutory
application for the following relief in terms of Rule 30A ( 2) having served the
Respondents with a notice in terms of Rule 30A(1):
1.1. The Respondents’ defence in the main review application is hereby
struck out.
1.2. `The 1st Respondent’s decision of 14 December 2023, summarily
dismissing the Applicant’s complaint (received by the 2nd Respondent
under Complaint No JSC/1103/2023), is hereby reviewed and set
aside.
1.3. The 2nd Respondent’s decision of 3 September 2024, dismissing the
Applicant’s appeal against the summary dismissal of the Applicant’s
complaint (received by the 2nd Respondent under Complaint No
JSC/1103/2023), is hereby reviewed, set aside and substituted with
the following order;
1.3.1. The impugned Matojane J (as he then was) ‘further dismissal’
order handed down on 18 March 2022 in HC16715/2018 is
found to be invalid and illegal.
1.3.2. As contemplated in Section 16 and/or Section 17 of the
Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994, the Applicant’s
complaint is deemed to be valid.
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1.3.3. The 2nd Respondent is hereby directed to invoke Section 17 of the
Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994.
2. Mr Dlodlo appeared in person and the Respondents were represented by Adv. L
Monthso-Moloisane SC.
3. The parties were directed to deal with the application for condonation as well as
the application in terms of Rule 30A (2) during their respective submissions in
order to save time.
4. The Respondents had launched a formal application for the late filing of their
answering affidavit in the main application to strike out their defence which
application was opposed by the Applicant.
5. It is therefore necessary to first deal with the application for condonation.
6. The Respondents contend that the delay in filing the answering affidavit, which
they accept should have been 15 April 2025, was because of circumstances
beyond their control. In this regard they submit that the Candidate Attorney in the
Office of the State Attorney, dealing with the matter, informed them that the senior
counsel dealing with the matter was unavailable.
7. The Respondents submit that the senior counsel had been dealing with this matter
since its inception and it would have taken time and resources to have different
counsel briefed.
8. Factually, the Respondents filed their notice of intention to defend on 25 March
2025 and should have then filed their answering affidavit on 15 April 2025.
However, the answering affidavit was served together with an application for
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condonation on 15 May 2025. The Applicant served his replying affidavit on the
Respondents on 18 May 2025.
9. The Applicant contends broadly that the Respondents should have made use of
Rule 27(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court when they realised that they would not
be able to file their answering affidavit in time and furthermore the application for
condonation is ‘well out of time and premised on inadequate reasons’.
10. The Applicant contends further that giving an opportunity for the Respondents to
file their answering affidavit is incongruent with the interests of justice.
11. The Applicant’s reliance on Rule 27 of the Uniform Rules of Court is confusing in
that the Respondents’ application for condonation which is before this Court, is in
accordance with Rule 27. The adjudication of whether the Respondents have
complied with the requirements for condonation is set out hereinafter as well as
whether the Respondents should be provided an opportunity to ventilate their
case, in the interests of justice.
12. Our Courts1 have set out the requirements for granting of condonation in any given
case. In this regard Melane’s case2 makes mention of the factors such as the
extent of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the prospects of success and the
importance of the case. It must further be noted that ultimately, the Court has a
discretion and such discretion must be exercised judicially, taking into account all
1 Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (4) SA 531 (A) @ 532 C -F; Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital
and Another 2008 (2) SA 472 (CC) @ 477 A-B; Competition Commission of South Africa v Pickfords
Removals SA (Pty) Ltd 2021 (3) SA (1) SA (CC) @ para 54
2 supra
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the facts. It has also become trite that a Court must consider an application for
condonation within the realm of the interests of justice3.
13. Applying the law to the abovementioned requirements for condonation I am
satisfied that the Respondents have fulfilled the requirements for condonation and
furthermore, it is in the interest of justice that the Respondents be given an
opportunity to ventilate their case. Accordingly, condonation for the late filing of the
Respondents’ answering affidavit is granted.
14. This means brings the Court to the main application in terms of Rule 30A(2) of the
Uniform Rules of Court.
15. The Applicant has requested this Court to strike out the defence of the
Respondents and certain ancillary relief.
16. It was common cause during argument that in order to consider the Rule 30A(2)
application, this Court must consider whether the Respondents have complied
with the Order4 of my sister Mahomed J.
17. The Applicant contends that the abovementioned Order is clear and that the
Respondents have by their own admission not complied with the Order.
18. It is thus appropriate to set out the relevant portions of the Order for purposes of
determining whether there has been compliance with the said Order:
“1. The Respondents are ordered to compy [sic] with rule 53(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of
Court by delivering within 10 (ten) days of this order, the full record of the decisions
sought to be reviewed in the main application, including
3 Van Wyk supra
4 CaseLines: Section 04-1
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1.1. Any notes that the 1st Respondent may have made as she read and considered
the Applicant’s complaint affidavit, if available, and
1.2. The full recording (audio and/or video) together with the transcript and/or minutes
of the 2nd Respondent’s 24 April 2024 meeting.”
19. It is now trite that an Order of Court stands to be interpreted in order to give effect
to its manifest purpose and the same principles apply as to construing
documents5.
20. The Applicant contends that the Order is clear an unambiguous and no
interpretation can be given that will indicate that it was not ordered that the full
record of proceedings of ‘that day’ be disclosed. The problem I have with this
submission is that it appears that on ‘that day’ the Applicant’s matter was not the
only matter that was dealt with. When pressed on whether the Order meant that
the Applicant was entitled to information of other parties dealt with on the same
day, Mr Dlodlo answered in the affirmative.
21. In my view, it cannot be that the Applicant can lay claim to a portion of the
proceedings held by the Respondents which are and were not of relevance to him.
In my view, the Order of my sister Mahomed J cannot be interpreted to mean that
the Applicant is entitled to information not relevant to him. Such an interpretation
5 Martrade Shipping and Transport GmbH V United Enterprises Corporation and MV ‘Unity’ 2020
SCA 120 @ para 2:
“The principles which apply to the interpretation of court orders are well established. Trollip JA
observed in Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Gentiruco AG1 that the same principles apply as
apply to construing documents. Thus, ‘..(T)he court’s intention is to be ascertained from the
language of the judgment or order as construed according to the usual, well-known rules… Thus,
as in the case of a document, the judgment or order and the court’s reasons for giving it must be
read as a whole to ascertain its intention.’ ”; Finishing Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Coal
South Africa Ltd & Others 2013 (2) SA 204 SCA @ para 13; Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC)
@ para 29 B-C; Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 @
603 para 18
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as sought by the Applicant is incongruent with the principles set out above
regarding the interpretation of Court Orders.
22. The Respondents contend6 that the Applicant has invoked Rule 30A(2) read with
paragraph 27.11 of the Gauteng Division Practice Manual, 2024, erroneously in
that the Applicant was duly provided with copies of the proceedings and audio
recordings in accordance with the Order by Mahomed J. The Applicant’s response
to the contention of the Respondents is, as outlined above regarding what the
Applicant claims he is entitled to and what he received is not in accordance with
Mahomed J’s Order. I have dealt with this contention by the Applicant above and
will not repeat it save to state that I am in agreement with the Respondents that
they have complied with the Order of Mahomed J as correctly construed.
23. Accordingly, having held that the Respondents have complied with Mahomed J’s
Order, it follows that the Applicant has failed to make out a case for, firstly, that the
Respondents’ have not complied with the Order and secondly, having held that the
Respondents’ have complied with the Order, the ancillary and consequential relief
claimed by the Applicant does not arise and must fail.
24. This brings me to the costs of the application as well as the costs of the Rule 30A
(2) application. It is trite that any costs to be awarded fall within the discretion of
the Court which discretion must exercised judicially upon a consideration of all the
facts.
6 CaseLines: Section 04-65 @ para 14
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25. The Respondents submit that if the application to strike out their defence is
dismissed then the Court should order the Applicant to pay the costs and costs of
Counsel on Scale C.
26. The Applicant contends that in the event of a dismissal, that costs be reserved for
the main application or alternatively that costs be costs in the cause.
27. It is also trite that usually costs will follow the result unless there are exceptional
circumstances to hold otherwise. In my view, no exceptional circumstances have
been shown nor argued. Accordingly, costs of the Rule 30A (2) application must
be paid by the Applicant.
28. Whilst the Respondents have been successful in the application for condonation it
is my view that the Respondents should pay for the costs of the application for
condonation.
29. As a result, the following Order will issue:
a). the application for condonation for the Respondents to file an answering
affidavit is granted;
b). the costs of the application for condonation are to be paid by the
Respondents;
c). the application in terms of Rule 30A (2) by the Applicant is hereby
dismissed with costs which costs of Counsel shall be paid on Scale C.
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