Dlodlo v Acting Chairperson Judicial Conduct Committee and Others (111031/24) [2025] ZAGPJHC 846 (21 August 2025)

57 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Interlocutory Application — Condonation — Late filing of answering affidavit — Respondents’ application for condonation granted despite delay — Court satisfied that interests of justice warrant opportunity for Respondents to ventilate their case — Main application under Rule 30A(2) dismissed as Respondents complied with prior court order — Costs awarded against Applicant.

Comprehensive Summary

Case Note


Dlodlo v Judicial Service Commission and Others

[2025] ZAGPJHC 345 (21 July 2025)


Reportability


This judgment is reportable because it clarifies the threshold for condonation of late procedural steps in motion proceedings and, more particularly, the manner in which the courts will balance the interests of justice against dilatory conduct by organs of State. The judgment synthesises several Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal authorities on condonation, thereby providing a consolidated statement of principle that will guide future litigants and judges alike.


In addition, the court gives detailed guidance on the proper interpretation of an order compelling delivery of a rule 53 record. That guidance is of immediate practical importance to practitioners conducting judicial-review proceedings, especially in the Gauteng Division where rule 53 disputes are common. By treating the order as a document to be construed in the same way as any other legal instrument, the court adds doctrinal coherence to what was previously an uncertain area of practice.


Finally, the judgment has broader constitutional significance. It delineates the limits of an applicant’s entitlement to internal deliberative material from the Judicial Service Commission, striking a careful balance between openness, relevance and institutional integrity. Its reasoning on the scope of discoverable material will influence analogous disputes involving other oversight or disciplinary bodies.


Cases Cited


Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (4) SA 531 (A)


Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital and Another 2008 (2) SA 472 (CC)


Competition Commission of South Africa v Pickfords Removals SA (Pty) Ltd 2021 (3) SA 1 (CC)


Martrade Shipping and Transport GmbH v United Enterprises Corporation and MV ‘Unity’ [2020] ZASCA 120


Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Gentiruco AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A)


Finishing Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Coal South Africa Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 204 (SCA)


Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC)


Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court: rule 27, rule 30A, rule 53(1)(b)


HEADNOTE


Summary


The applicant, Mr Dlodlo, sought an order striking out the respondents’ defence in a pending review and obtaining far-reaching declaratory relief arising from a complaint he had lodged with the Judicial Service Commission. He relied on rule 30A on the basis that the respondents had failed to comply with an earlier order compelling them to deliver the full rule 53 record. The respondents resisted the strike-out and simultaneously applied for condonation for the late filing of their answering affidavit.


The court first addressed the condonation application. After traversing the authorities, it concluded that the delay—one month—was satisfactorily explained by the unavailability of senior counsel and that the respondents enjoyed reasonable prospects of success. Granting condonation, the court emphasised that the interests of justice favoured a determination of the matter on its merits rather than by default.


Turning to the rule 30A application, the court interpreted the earlier order of Mahomed J. It held that the order, properly construed, obliged the respondents to furnish only material relevant to the applicant’s complaint and not the entire recording of the JSC meeting concerning unrelated matters. Finding that the respondents had indeed complied, the court dismissed the strike-out application with costs.


Key Issues


The first issue concerned whether the respondents had shown “good cause” for the late filing of their answering affidavit and whether the interests of justice warranted the grant of condonation.


The second issue was the proper interpretation of the earlier court order compelling production of the record under rule 53(1)(b) and, relatedly, whether the respondents had complied with that order.


The third issue, contingent on the second, was whether non-compliance (if any) justified the drastic remedy of striking out the respondents’ defence and granting the substantive relief sought by the applicant.


Held


The court held that condonation should be granted because the delay was short, satisfactorily explained and non-prejudicial, the respondents possessed arguable prospects of success, and the importance of the matter, coupled with the public-law setting, required a full ventilation of the issues.


It further held that, properly interpreted, Mahomed J’s order did not entitle the applicant to material irrelevant to his complaint. On the facts, the respondents had complied by furnishing the relevant extracts and recordings.


Consequently, the application in terms of rule 30A(2) failed. The court ordered the applicant to pay the costs of that application on scale C, while directing the respondents to bear the costs of their successful condonation application.


THE FACTS


Mr Dlodlo lodged a complaint with the Judicial Service Commission alleging that a High Court judge had issued an invalid “further dismissal” order in prior litigation. The Secretariat of the JSC summarily dismissed the complaint on 14 December 2023. An internal appeal to the full JSC met a similar fate on 3 September 2024. Aggrieved, Mr Dlodlo instituted review proceedings in the High Court, contending that both decisions were unlawful and seeking declaratory relief that the impugned judicial order was invalid.


An interlocutory skirmish ensued over the production of the rule 53 record. On 14 March 2025 Mahomed J ordered the respondents to deliver, within ten days, the full record of the decisions under review, including any notes made by the first respondent and the audio-recording of the JSC meeting on 24 April 2024. The respondents delivered what they considered to be the relevant portions, redacting or withholding unrelated segments.


The respondents filed their notice of intention to oppose on 25 March 2025, but owing to the unavailability of senior counsel, they delivered their answering affidavit only on 15 May 2025—one month out of time. On the same day they sought condonation for the delay. The applicant responded with a rule 30A notice and, later, the present application to strike out the respondents’ defence, contending that the record remained incomplete and that the delay in filing the answering affidavit demonstrated disregard for the rules.


THE ISSUES


The court was required first to decide whether the respondents had made out a proper case for condonation under rule 27. This entailed assessing the length of the delay, the adequacy of the explanation, the prospects of success, and the broader interests of justice.


The second issue was whether the respondents had complied with Mahomed J’s order compelling discovery under rule 53(1)(b). Central to this enquiry was the correct construction of the order: did it require disclosure of the entire recording of the 24 April 2024 JSC meeting, including matters unrelated to the applicant, or only the portions germane to his complaint?


Depending on the resolution of the compliance question, the third issue was whether the respondents’ defence should be struck out, and whether the court should grant the sweeping substantive relief sought by the applicant without a full ventilation of the merits in the review application.


ANALYSIS


In dealing with condonation, the court applied the classic Melane factors, reinforced by subsequent Constitutional Court jurisprudence. It noted that the delay was modest, the explanation credible, and that the matter raised issues of public administration and judicial accountability—considerations that tilt the scales in favour of hearing the matter. The court rejected the applicant’s contention that mere recourse to the condonation procedure, rather than a prospective extension under rule 27, was abusive. Procedurally, an after-the-fact condonation application was perfectly competent.


Turning to the interpretation of the Mahomed J order, the court invoked the well-established principles in Firestone, Endumeni and Martrade. It stressed that an order must be construed like any other legal instrument, reading the text in context to ascertain its manifest purpose. The words “full recording … of the 2nd respondent’s 24 April 2024 meeting” had to be understood against the backdrop that the applicant’s complaint was only one of many items on the JSC agenda. The manifest purpose was to give the applicant material relevant to his complaint, not to breach the confidentiality of unrelated disciplinary deliberations.


Having accepted that construction, the court assessed compliance on the facts. The respondents had supplied the audio and transcript segments dealing with the applicant, together with the first respondent’s notes. The court found no basis to conclude that additional material relating to third parties was either relevant or ordered to be produced. Consequently, the premise of the rule 30A application collapsed.


REMEDY


On condonation, the court granted the relief sought by the respondents, permitting the late filing of the answering affidavit. While the respondents succeeded, the court took the view that their own delay warranted an adverse costs order, and it therefore directed them to pay the costs of the condonation application. In doing so, the court underscored that condonation is not granted as of right and that parties must bear the costs of their procedural lapses.


On the strike-out application, the court dismissed it in its entirety. Because the application was ill-founded and unnecessarily protracted the proceedings, the court ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs on scale C, including the costs of senior counsel. The scale-C award reflected the complexity of the issues and the public importance of the institutions involved.


No declaratory or substantive relief was granted on the merits of the review. Those issues remain to be determined in the main application, which will now proceed with the pleadings closed.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment reaffirms that condonation is a discretionary remedy governed by a flexible but rigorous enquiry into delay, explanation, prospects of success and, above all, the interests of justice. Courts should incline towards substance over form but must still mark their disapproval of non-compliance through appropriate costs orders.


It clarifies that an order compelling the rule 53 record must be interpreted purposively. Applicants are entitled only to material relevant to the decisions under attack; they cannot, under the guise of a “full record”, demand confidential or collateral information unrelated to their cause of action. This holding harmonises procedural fairness with institutional confidentiality.


Finally, the judgment emphasises that the striking-out of a defence is a drastic measure. It will not be granted where a less intrusive remedy—such as an adverse costs order—will suffice, particularly in public-law disputes implicating the administration of justice. Pre-emptive substantive relief on motion is therefore disfavoured unless non-compliance is flagrant and incurable.

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JUDGMENT

ALLY AJ
1. This is an opposed application which served before this Court as an interlocutory
application for the following relief in terms of Rule 30A ( 2) having served the
Respondents with a notice in terms of Rule 30A(1):
1.1. The Respondents’ defence in the main review application is hereby
struck out.
1.2. `The 1st Respondent’s decision of 14 December 2023, summarily
dismissing the Applicant’s complaint (received by the 2nd Respondent
under Complaint No JSC/1103/2023), is hereby reviewed and set
aside.
1.3. The 2nd Respondent’s decision of 3 September 2024, dismissing the
Applicant’s appeal against the summary dismissal of the Applicant’s
complaint (received by the 2nd Respondent under Complaint No
JSC/1103/2023), is hereby reviewed, set aside and substituted with
the following order;
1.3.1. The impugned Matojane J (as he then was) ‘further dismissal’
order handed down on 18 March 2022 in HC16715/2018 is
found to be invalid and illegal.
1.3.2. As contemplated in Section 16 and/or Section 17 of the
Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994, the Applicant’s
complaint is deemed to be valid.

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1.3.3. The 2nd Respondent is hereby directed to invoke Section 17 of the
Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994.
2. Mr Dlodlo appeared in person and the Respondents were represented by Adv. L
Monthso-Moloisane SC.
3. The parties were directed to deal with the application for condonation as well as
the application in terms of Rule 30A (2) during their respective submissions in
order to save time.
4. The Respondents had launched a formal application for the late filing of their
answering affidavit in the main application to strike out their defence which
application was opposed by the Applicant.
5. It is therefore necessary to first deal with the application for condonation.
6. The Respondents contend that the delay in filing the answering affidavit, which
they accept should have been 15 April 2025, was because of circumstances
beyond their control. In this regard they submit that the Candidate Attorney in the
Office of the State Attorney, dealing with the matter, informed them that the senior
counsel dealing with the matter was unavailable.
7. The Respondents submit that the senior counsel had been dealing with this matter
since its inception and it would have taken time and resources to have different
counsel briefed.
8. Factually, the Respondents filed their notice of intention to defend on 25 March
2025 and should have then filed their answering affidavit on 15 April 2025.
However, the answering affidavit was served together with an application for

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condonation on 15 May 2025. The Applicant served his replying affidavit on the
Respondents on 18 May 2025.
9. The Applicant contends broadly that the Respondents should have made use of
Rule 27(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court when they realised that they would not
be able to file their answering affidavit in time and furthermore the application for
condonation is ‘well out of time and premised on inadequate reasons’.
10. The Applicant contends further that giving an opportunity for the Respondents to
file their answering affidavit is incongruent with the interests of justice.
11. The Applicant’s reliance on Rule 27 of the Uniform Rules of Court is confusing in
that the Respondents’ application for condonation which is before this Court, is in
accordance with Rule 27. The adjudication of whether the Respondents have
complied with the requirements for condonation is set out hereinafter as well as
whether the Respondents should be provided an opportunity to ventilate their
case, in the interests of justice.
12. Our Courts1 have set out the requirements for granting of condonation in any given
case. In this regard Melane’s case2 makes mention of the factors such as the
extent of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the prospects of success and the
importance of the case. It must further be noted that ultimately, the Court has a
discretion and such discretion must be exercised judicially, taking into account all

1 Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (4) SA 531 (A) @ 532 C -F; Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital
and Another 2008 (2) SA 472 (CC) @ 477 A-B; Competition Commission of South Africa v Pickfords
Removals SA (Pty) Ltd 2021 (3) SA (1) SA (CC) @ para 54
2 supra

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the facts. It has also become trite that a Court must consider an application for
condonation within the realm of the interests of justice3.
13. Applying the law to the abovementioned requirements for condonation I am
satisfied that the Respondents have fulfilled the requirements for condonation and
furthermore, it is in the interest of justice that the Respondents be given an
opportunity to ventilate their case. Accordingly, condonation for the late filing of the
Respondents’ answering affidavit is granted.
14. This means brings the Court to the main application in terms of Rule 30A(2) of the
Uniform Rules of Court.
15. The Applicant has requested this Court to strike out the defence of the
Respondents and certain ancillary relief.
16. It was common cause during argument that in order to consider the Rule 30A(2)
application, this Court must consider whether the Respondents have complied
with the Order4 of my sister Mahomed J.
17. The Applicant contends that the abovementioned Order is clear and that the
Respondents have by their own admission not complied with the Order.
18. It is thus appropriate to set out the relevant portions of the Order for purposes of
determining whether there has been compliance with the said Order:
“1. The Respondents are ordered to compy [sic] with rule 53(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of
Court by delivering within 10 (ten) days of this order, the full record of the decisions
sought to be reviewed in the main application, including

3 Van Wyk supra
4 CaseLines: Section 04-1

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1.1. Any notes that the 1st Respondent may have made as she read and considered
the Applicant’s complaint affidavit, if available, and
1.2. The full recording (audio and/or video) together with the transcript and/or minutes
of the 2nd Respondent’s 24 April 2024 meeting.”
19. It is now trite that an Order of Court stands to be interpreted in order to give effect
to its manifest purpose and the same principles apply as to construing
documents5.
20. The Applicant contends that the Order is clear an unambiguous and no
interpretation can be given that will indicate that it was not ordered that the full
record of proceedings of ‘that day’ be disclosed. The problem I have with this
submission is that it appears that on ‘that day’ the Applicant’s matter was not the
only matter that was dealt with. When pressed on whether the Order meant that
the Applicant was entitled to information of other parties dealt with on the same
day, Mr Dlodlo answered in the affirmative.
21. In my view, it cannot be that the Applicant can lay claim to a portion of the
proceedings held by the Respondents which are and were not of relevance to him.
In my view, the Order of my sister Mahomed J cannot be interpreted to mean that
the Applicant is entitled to information not relevant to him. Such an interpretation

5 Martrade Shipping and Transport GmbH V United Enterprises Corporation and MV ‘Unity’ 2020
SCA 120 @ para 2:
“The principles which apply to the interpretation of court orders are well established. Trollip JA
observed in Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Gentiruco AG1 that the same principles apply as
apply to construing documents. Thus, ‘..(T)he court’s intention is to be ascertained from the
language of the judgment or order as construed according to the usual, well-known rules… Thus,
as in the case of a document, the judgment or order and the court’s reasons for giving it must be

read as a whole to ascertain its intention.’ ”; Finishing Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Coal
South Africa Ltd & Others 2013 (2) SA 204 SCA @ para 13; Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC)
@ para 29 B-C; Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 @
603 para 18

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as sought by the Applicant is incongruent with the principles set out above
regarding the interpretation of Court Orders.
22. The Respondents contend6 that the Applicant has invoked Rule 30A(2) read with
paragraph 27.11 of the Gauteng Division Practice Manual, 2024, erroneously in
that the Applicant was duly provided with copies of the proceedings and audio
recordings in accordance with the Order by Mahomed J. The Applicant’s response
to the contention of the Respondents is, as outlined above regarding what the
Applicant claims he is entitled to and what he received is not in accordance with
Mahomed J’s Order. I have dealt with this contention by the Applicant above and
will not repeat it save to state that I am in agreement with the Respondents that
they have complied with the Order of Mahomed J as correctly construed.
23. Accordingly, having held that the Respondents have complied with Mahomed J’s
Order, it follows that the Applicant has failed to make out a case for, firstly, that the
Respondents’ have not complied with the Order and secondly, having held that the
Respondents’ have complied with the Order, the ancillary and consequential relief
claimed by the Applicant does not arise and must fail.
24. This brings me to the costs of the application as well as the costs of the Rule 30A
(2) application. It is trite that any costs to be awarded fall within the discretion of
the Court which discretion must exercised judicially upon a consideration of all the
facts.

6 CaseLines: Section 04-65 @ para 14

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25. The Respondents submit that if the application to strike out their defence is
dismissed then the Court should order the Applicant to pay the costs and costs of
Counsel on Scale C.
26. The Applicant contends that in the event of a dismissal, that costs be reserved for
the main application or alternatively that costs be costs in the cause.
27. It is also trite that usually costs will follow the result unless there are exceptional
circumstances to hold otherwise. In my view, no exceptional circumstances have
been shown nor argued. Accordingly, costs of the Rule 30A (2) application must
be paid by the Applicant.
28. Whilst the Respondents have been successful in the application for condonation it
is my view that the Respondents should pay for the costs of the application for
condonation.
29. As a result, the following Order will issue:
a). the application for condonation for the Respondents to file an answering
affidavit is granted;
b). the costs of the application for condonation are to be paid by the
Respondents;
c). the application in terms of Rule 30A (2) by the Applicant is hereby
dismissed with costs which costs of Counsel shall be paid on Scale C.

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