IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG

Case no: 14916/2024P
In the matter between:

BRETT CECIL WILLIAMS APPLICANT

and

ANDANTE VILLAS BODY CORPORATE FIRST RESPONDENT
THE TRUSTEES FOR THE TIME BEING OF THE SECOND RESPONDENT
ANDANTE VILLAS BODY CORPORATE
SCA PROPERTY MANAGEMENT (PTY) LTD THIRD RESPONDENT
MARTHINUS JOHANNES REINECKE FOURTH RESPONDEDNT
ALAN HOLMES FIFTH RESPONDENT
ATTLEE AGENCY (PTY) LTD SIXTH RESPONDENT


Coram: MOSSOP J
Heard: 27 August 2025
Delivered: 27 August 2025


ORDER


The following order is granted:
1. The urgent application is struck off the roll for want of urgency.
2. The applicant shall pay the respondents ’ costs on the attorney and client
scale.

2


JUDGMENT


MOSSOP J:

Introduction
[1] This is an ex-tempore judgment.

[2] This matter first came before my brother P Bezuidenhout J o n 25 June 2025
as an urgent application (the urgent application). Bezuidenhout J ultimately did not
deal with the urgent application on that day but, instead, granted an order (the order)
which reads, in part, as follows:
‘1. The application and relief sought in the matter set down on 25 June 2026 be and is
hereby adjourned to the opposed roll for 27 August 2025.’1
Today is 27 August 2025.

[3] The applicant in the urgent application is an owner of immovable property
located within the Andante Villas body corporate (the body corporate). There are six
respondents cited in the urgent application. The first respondent is the body
corporate itself, the second respondent is the trustees of the body corporate for the
time being, the third respondent is a property management company, the fourth and
fifth respondents are former trustees of the body corporate, and the sixth respondent
is another property management company. When referring to any of these parties ,
whether in the urgent application or in any other application, I shall refer to them by
the number that they have been allocated in the urgent application.

The order
[4] One may wonder why Bezuidenhout J framed the order in th e way that he
did: the learned judge could just as easily have said that ‘this’ or ‘the’ application is
adjourned to the opposed roll on 27 August 2025 instead of saying that ‘the matter
set down on 25 June 2025’ was so adjourned. But there was a good reason for him

1 This was not the full range of the order. Bezuidenhout J also fixed the dates by when the answering
and replying affidavits were to be delivered and the supplementary heads of argument.

3
expressing himself that way. Th is is because there are a number of other self-
standing applications before this court involving the same parties. These include:
(a) An application brought by the applicant for the appointment of an
administrator to the first respondent (the main application);
(b) An application brought by the respondents in which they seek an order that
the applicant put up security to the value of approximately R800 000 for the
proceedings that he has instituted (the security application);
(c) A counter application in terms of Uniform Rule 7 brought by the applicant
against the respondents challenging the authority of the attorneys representing them
to act on their behalf (the rule 7 application); and
(d) An application brought by the second respondent seeking to set aside a
default order of the High Court that was granted to the applicant after he had
secured a decision in his favour from the Community Schemes Ombudsman (the
rescission application).

[5] In framing the order as he did, i t would appear therefore that Bezuidenhout J
wanted there to be no confusion about which matter was adjourned to 27 August
2025.

The practice directives of this division
[6] Unfortunately, something must yet again be said about the Practice
Directives of this division and, more particularly, their non-observance.

[7] The urgent application is now before me as a special opposed motion. I
called upon the Registrar of this division to send me the application papers less than
12 days before the matter was due to be argued and perused them in order to
properly prepare for the coming argument. It then became apparent to me that the
applicant’s attorneys, who are not based in this division, had paid no regard to the
provisions of Practice Directive 9.4.4 of this division, which reads as follows:
‘If any of the aforesaid matters is of such a nature by reason of the volume of the record or

‘If any of the aforesaid matters is of such a nature by reason of the volume of the record or
the research involved or otherwise that the judge allocated to hear the matter would, in order
to prepare for the hearing, reasonably need to receive the papers earlier than he or she
would normally do, the party responsible for enrolling the matter shall notify the Registrar in
writing to that effect not less than fourteen clear court days before the day of the hearing.

4
Failure to do so could result in the matter not being heard on the allocated day. Practitioners
are advised to use their own discretion in interpreting this sub -rule but in the ordinary course
it ought to apply to all matters where the record exceeds approximately 200 pages (including
annexures).’ [Underlining added]

[8] The record in th e urgent application alone is contained in six volumes
running to some 499 pages. The party responsible for enrolling the matter was the
applicant. The fact that I had to seek the delivery of the application papers 12 days
before the hearing meant there had not been compliance with Practice Directive
9.4.4.

[9] Having considered the papers , I confess that I was none the wiser about
what I was required to determine . This stemmed from the fact that the urgent
application appeared to simply be an amalgam of all the other applications between
the parties referred to earlier, garnished with further submissions relating to urgency
and further facts that allegedly occurred after Bezuidenhout J adjourned the matter .
As Mr Ender, who appears for the respondents , adroitly put it in his heads of
argument, the applicant appeared to have ‘rolled up’ all the other applications before
this court into one application which was now presented as an urgent application.
But it is important to note that none of the other applications were enrolled before
Bezuidenhout J on 25 June 2025.

[10] To try and discern a way forward, I wrote to the parties’ legal representatives
on 15 August 2025 and requested that I be advised of what was to be dealt with on
27 August 2025 and I requested a joint minute from the parties on what was to
occur. I also specifically directed the attention of the parties’ legal representatives to
the provisions of Practice Directive s 9.4.2 and 9.4.3 and indicated that I required
strict compliance with them.

[11] Those two mentioned Practice Directives read as follows:

strict compliance with them.

[11] Those two mentioned Practice Directives read as follows:
‘9.4.2 By no later than noon five clear court days before the day of hearing the party
responsible for enrolling the matter shall notify the registrar in writing whether the matter will
be argued, and if not what alternative relief (for example postponement, referral to evidence,
etc.) will be sought, in which case the notification shall be accompanied by a draft setting out

5
the Order to be sought. The party responsible for enrolling the matter shall, at the same time,
deliver a list, agreed to by all the parties, of those issues in dispute and those which are
common cause.
9.4.3 Unless condonation is granted on good cause shown by way of written application,
failure to comply with this directive will result in the court making such order as it deems fit,
including an appropriate order as to costs.’ [Underlining added]

[12] I duly received a joint reply to my letter, about which more shortly. I did not
receive the anticipated statement of issues and common cause facts contemplated
by Practice Directive 9.4.2.

[13] The Practice Directives of this division are not an optional set of
requirements to the conducting of litigation that legal practitioners are at liberty to
follow, or ignore, as they choose. It is concerning that I should be required to visit
this topic again. In Dodd NO and Others v Duff,2 I had cause to state the following:
‘If an attorney lacks the capacity to deal with matters in the high court and is not familiar with
the Uniform Rules of Court or the practice directives of this division, then he has no place
litigating before this court. This court has exacting standards and they are jealously
enforced. Those standards will be maintained. Those who cannot meet those standards
should either bring themselves up to that standard immediately or litigate elsewhere where a
premium is not placed on excellence.’

[14] As Pitman AJ correctly stated in B.F.M v H.P.N.P: 3
‘Practice Directives constitute procedures carefully weighed and prepared by each Division
to ensure its effective and smooth running. It would surprise me to hear any Advocate say
that they are not aware of this, or that they do not know that different Divisions have different
Practice Directives. I am well aware of how intensive and comprehensive the advocacy
pupillage programme for aspirant advocates is, and that it covers such topics. Counsel for

pupillage programme for aspirant advocates is, and that it covers such topics. Counsel for
the plaintiff conceded she knew as much and apologised “ profusely” and stated she had
“learned her lesson .” Whilst I accept her apology as being sincere and genuine, it is
necessary in my view to voice the displeasure of the Court in a salutary manner, which I do
in the costs Order I make.’


2 Dodd NO and Others v Duff [2024] ZAKZPHC 62 para 14.
3 B.F.M v H.P.N.P [2024] ZAKZPHC 8 para 21.

6
[15] Despite all these comments and admonishments , practitioners on a daily
basis ignore the Practice Directives and seemingly do as they please, satisfied that if
apologies are offered for errant conduct all will be well. I think that I received an
attempt at an apology from Ms Coetsee , who appears for the applicant , although I
cannot be entirely sure of this . But as the old saying goes, fine words butter no
parsnips. The Practice Directives are in place to be observed, and they have not
been observed in this matter . This non-compliance will reflect in the costs order that
is to follow.

What is set down?
[16] The response that I received to my letter to the parties indicated that there
was dissensus on precisely what had been adjourned to 27 August 2025 . Thus, the
response that I received from the parties was a document that contained two distinct,
and competing, versions instead of a single, agreed version.

[17] Counsel for the applicant , i n a longwinded treatise on the history of the
matter, which I did not ask for, submitted that the urgent application, together with all
the other applications, was to be heard. Counsel for the respondents , Mr Ender,
responded to this by stating that an attempt had been made to secure such an order
from Bezuidenhout J by the applicant’s legal representatives on 25 June 2025, but
the learned judge had considered, and upheld, an objection from the respondents
that the only application that they had been called upon to meet on 25 June 2025
was the urgent application. That is why the order granted by Bezuidenhout J
specifically referred to ‘the matter set down on 25 June 2025’ being adjourned to 27
August 2025.

[18] The relevant portion of the order granted by Bezuidenhout J has already
been narrated at the commencement of this judgment. The correct approach to
interpreting a judgment of a court was discussed in Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v
Genticuro AG,4 where the Appellate Division held that:

Genticuro AG,4 where the Appellate Division held that:
‘[t]he basic principles applicable to construing documents also apply to the construction of a
court's judgment or order: the court's intention is to be ascertained primarily from the
language of the judgment or order as construed according to the usual, well -known rules.

4 Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A) at 304D-H.

7
Thus, as in the case of a document, the judgment or order and the court's reasons for giving
it must be read as a whole in order to ascertain its intention. If, on such a reading, the
meaning of the judgment or order is clear and unambiguous, no extrinsic fact or evidence is
admissible to contradict, vary, qualify, or supplement it. Indeed, it was common cause that in
such a case not even the court that gave the judgment or order can be asked to state what
its subjective intention was in giving it.’ [Authorities and citations omitted]

[19] It would not provoke any controversy to acknowledge that the only matter
enrolled before Bezuidenhout J on 25 June 2025 was the urgent application. It was
the enrolment of that matter that had brought the parties to that courtroom on that
day and there is no evidence that any of the other applications were set down and
were before Bezuidenhout J on that day. Moreover, the wording of the order is clear
and excludes the possibility of the court having ordered that all the matters not
before the court were also to be considered on 27 August 2025. I am therefore
satisfied that the wording of the order supports the understanding of the
respondents. It was the urgent application that was adjourned to 27 August 2025,
and no other matter.

[20] However, it seems to me that this constitutes a pyrrhic victory for the
respondents. This is because, technically, both parties are correct in what they
contend. Because the urgent application is made up of all the other applications
presently before this court, it is correct to say , as the applicant does, that all those
applications are to be considered today albeit in the form of the urgent application .
The respondents insist that only the urgent application is before court but in making
that submission they are compelled to acknowledge the constituent parts of the
urgent application, which are the other applications that are already before this court.

urgent application, which are the other applications that are already before this court.
It thus seems to me that a consideration of the urgent application, as urged upon me
by the respondents, will require consideration of all the other applications. However,
what distinguishes the urgent application from all the other already existent
applications is , naturally, the alleged presence of urgency allowing the urgen t
application to be heard ahead of other applications (including the applicant’s other
identical applications) awaiting a date of hearing.

A brief history of the matters

8
[21] It is necessary to briefly consider a potted history of the rancorous dispute s
between the parties.
[22] The dispute is centred upon the affairs of the body corporate and what the
applicant contends is unlawful conduct on the part of those who voluntarily
administer its affairs and those who have been employed to assist with that function .
The dispute has its origin in a decision by the trustees of the body corporate to instal
individual water meters at each unit forming part of the body corporate. The decision
to do so was taken in 2018 and that was the pebble that started rolling and which led
to the avalanche of litigation that was to follow. 5 Initially, proceedings were
conducted before the Community Schemes Ombudsman. I was advised in argument
by Mr Ender that the applicant has launched another application this last Friday
against the respondents before the self-same Community Schemes Ombudsman.

[23] The main application, which seeks to appoint an administrator to the body
corporate because of the allegedly unsatisfactory management of the affairs of the
body corporate , was launched in 20 24. That application was opposed by the
respondents. The respondents then brought an application in which they sought
security for costs from the applicant. The applicant is a British citizen and resides in
the United Kingdom and thus, so the respondents reasoned, was a peregrinus and
ought to be required to put up security. The fact that the applicant owned a full y paid
for immovable property valued at approximately R2,5 million 6 within the body
corporate did not appear to have been considered or acknowledged by the
respondents.

[24] The application for security provoked the applicant to bring a counter
application in which he sought leave to dispute the authority of the attorneys who
placed themselves on record on behalf of the respondents to act for them . The
application was therefore preceded by a notice in terms of Uniform Rule 7(1). This

application was therefore preceded by a notice in terms of Uniform Rule 7(1). This
challenge appears to be based upon an allegation that one of the trustees of the first
respondent had not been informed of the need to instruct attorneys and had not

5 This other litigation also includes contempt of court proceedings initiated in the Durban High Court
by the applicant and a review application brought by the applicant to set aside a decision of the
Community Schemes Ombudsman granted in favour of the previous trustees of the body corporate.
6 Being the estimated value of the applicant’s immovable property mentioned by the applicant ’s
attorney in his answering affidavit delivered on behalf the applicant in the security application.

9
given his consent for this to occur. There are five trustees in all , according to Ms
Coetsee, six according to Mr Ender.
[25] The dispute between the applicant and the respondents is thus of long
standing and appears to have become progressively more bitter and spiteful over
time. Mr Ender, in his supplementary heads of argument , explained that the ongoing
dispute has driven the body corporate to the precipice of bankruptcy because of the
amount of money that has had to be collected, and spent, in opposing the litigation
brought against it by the applicant. Mr Ender makes the point that the applicant has
proclaimed that he is moti vated to come to the rescue of the body corporate and to
free it from deplorable leadership and its consequences , when, in fact, his conduct
has had quite the opposite effect, and the body corporate now faces financial
ruination largely because of his predilection for litigation.

Urgency
[26] And so, to the issue of urgency. The issue of urgen cy was obviously not
debated when the matter was before Bezuidenhout J. As indicated previously, dates
for the exchange of further pleadings were fixed by the learned judge to allow all the
issues in, and opposition to, the urgent application to be considered on 27 August
2025. These affidavits have now been delivered, as have supplementary heads of
argument.

[27] The fact that the matter is now complete in the sense that all the necessary
affidavits have been exchanged does not necessarily mean that the matter is now
enrolled and can be argued without further let or hindrance. This is because the
issue of urgency was specifically raised by the respondents in their answering
affidavit. The fact that Bezuidenhout J did not consider the issue of urgency before
adjourning the urgent application does not mean the issue of urgency has lost its
potency. That point has not been withdrawn, and I ascertained from Mr Ender this
morning that it remains very much an issue as far as the respondents are concerned.

morning that it remains very much an issue as far as the respondents are concerned.
The urgency of the matter must therefore be considered first.

[28] The applicant contends that the main application was urgent from the outset.
In the supplementary affidavit that it delivered on the issue of urgency , which fills

10
some 46 pages, the applicant raises four principle grounds upon which it alleges that
all the matters already in existence have now become even more urgent.

[29] The first ground is that the appointment of an administrator has become
critically necessary because of the first respondent’s worsening financial situation .
However, n othing additional to what was already stated in the self -standing
application claiming the same relief has been mentioned in the urgent application.
This was always the applicant’s case.

[30] The second ground is that the respondents have opposed the main
application (and the other applications that the applicant has brought) at great cost to
the body corporate and, in doing so, have allegedly lacked proper authorisation to do
so, hence the rule 7 application.

[31] The rule 7 application is difficult to understand. The notice in terms of
Uniform Rule 7 , already referred to , records that the challenge relates to the
authority of:
‘… Talbot Attorneys to act as Attorneys of record on behalf of the First, Second, Third, Fifth
and Sixth Respondents herein.’
In conformity with this, the counter application indicates that it is directed at:
‘… the authority of Talbot Attorneys to act on behalf of the respondents as per the applicants
notice in terms of rule 7, dated 14 February 2025;’

[32] Thus, it would seem that the counter application excludes the fourth
respondent from its sweep, for he is not mentioned in the Uniform Rule 7 notice. Yet,
relief is sought against the fourth respondent in the notice of counter application,
where the following is stated:
‘That the Third to Sixth Respondents are declared liable for any and all costs incurred in the
current proceedings…’

[33] The third ground mentioned is that the respondents intend seeking the
rescission of a default order of the High Court that was granted to the applicant after
he secured a decision in his favour from the Community Schemes Ombudsman.

he secured a decision in his favour from the Community Schemes Ombudsman.
Indeed, this appears to be regarded by the applicant as being exceptionally

11
provocative conduct by the respondents on the issue of urgency , for he states the
following:
‘What compounded the urgency in this matter is the institution of the recission application on
21 May 2025 and the notice of the AGM delivered on 3 June 2025, evidencing that
substantial relief will not be available in the normal course.’

[34] The conduct of the fourth and sixth respondents in particular has, according
to the applicant, had the effect of ‘obstructing’ the relief sought by him. The
applicant’s argument goes that the attorneys acting for the first respondent and the
fourth and sixth respondents have disregarded the requirements of the Act and have
chosen to:
‘… litigate on matters of personal principle’ to the detriment of the body corporate.’

[35] The final ground alleged is that the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the
first respondent is scheduled for 5 July 2025 at which meeting it is intended,
according to the applicant, to present resolutions that will:
‘… entrench the unlawful conduct and cause irreversible harm if passed.’

[36] The applicant’s argument then proceeds that if the AGM takes place before
the application for the appointment of the proposed administrator, then the same
members will remain in place at the helm of the body corporate which will remain
‘captured’ by them and they will then be able to:
‘… ratify or retrospectively avoid the relief sought in the Notice of Motion ….’

Analysis
[37] It seems to me that the applicant has a distorted and imperfect
understanding of what makes a matter urgent. The essential quality of urgency is a
compelling necessity for immediate action. In other words, a matter is urgent
because of the imminence and depth of harm that the applicant will suffer if relief is
not given.7 The applicant has stated that the respondents are seeking to set aside a
default judgment in his favour and that they have opposed and obstructed his

default judgment in his favour and that they have opposed and obstructed his

7 Volvo Financial Services Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Adamas Tkolose Trading CC [2023] ZAGPJHC
846 para 8.

12
applications. None of these forms of conduct create urgency in my view . The
urgency must exist prior to any opposition to what is claimed.

[38] Our system of law generally requires that notice be given to parties when
legal proceedings are commenced against them because our law is suffused with
the fundamental principle of audi alteram p artem.8 There are two consequences of
the giving of notice of intention to litigate : the targeted party may not oppose the
relief claimed, or they may oppose it. In this instance, the relief claimed has been
opposed. That does not escalate an otherwise ordinary dispute to the level of now
being urgent: opposition is an entirely predictable consequence of the giving of
notice.

[39] The applicant contends that the first respondent will be left in a potentially
terminal financial condition if the urgent application is to be heard in the normal
course. I remain unpersuaded that this is the case. The urgency of having the matter
heard before the AGM is held on 5 July 2025, appears to me to have come and gone
and that horse has bolted and is to be observed grazing contentedly in another
paddock. The AGM was held on that date, and resolutions were proposed, and votes
were taken. It appears that the applicant remains discontented with what occurred at
the AGM . It would serve the applicant well to consider that he owns property in a
communal scheme, and his opinion of events may be his alone and not necessarily
those of his co -residents and co -owners. A court accordingly should hesitate to re -
write the bargain struck by the members with each other, especially where the
impetus to do so is at the instance of a minority of members.9

[40] The respondents, naturally, submit that the matter is not urgent at all. They
submit that the issues raised in the urgent application are already before the court in
separate applications that have individually advanced significantly towards being

separate applications that have individually advanced significantly towards being
argued. That is undoubtedly correct, as is the submission that there is nothing
disclosed in the urgent application that establishes the presence of any lately
emerging urgency.

8 Sibiya and Others v Road Accident Fund [2023] ZASCA 171 para 14.
9 Wilds Home Owners Association and others v Van Eeden and others [2011] ZAGPPHC 101 para
205.

13

[41] In Mlezana and Others v South African Civic Organisation ,10 Plaskett J
observed as follows:
‘The judicial system, not unlike the private individual, does not take kindly to people who
push to the front of the queue. The doctrine of urgency was developed and encapsulated in
the rules of court in order to allow those for whom the wait in the queue would not be worth it
unless they push in front, to do just that without attracting dirty looks from those behind
them.’

[42] This appears to me to be an unfair attempt by the applicant to push to the
front of the queue. The applicant was initially content to join the queue and now must
wait his turn to be heard in the absence of any compelling grounds of urgency.

[43] In coming to my decision, I make it plain that I have not determined the
merits of the various applications, whether stand alone or rolled up into the urgent
application, but have merely determined the issue of urgency. In doing so, I have
obviously been required to consider and assess the grounds of urgency, but I have
gone no further. However, it does appear to me that there are countless disputes of
fact on the papers that may render resolution thereof difficult , if not impossible , on
paper and in the absence of viva voce evidence.

[44] I am in the circumstances unpersuaded that grounds of urgen cy have been
established by the applicant.

Costs
[45] The applicant has litigated without concern for the Practice Directives of this
division. He has not disclosed any compelling grounds of urgency that warranted the
bringing of this application and has merely duplicated what has already been said by
him in each of the other applications that he has brought before the courts of this
division. On his own version, he acknowledges that the body corporate is financially
weakened, but he fails to recognise that he has contributed to this weakness by

10 Mlezana and Others v South African Civic Organisation [2018] ZAECGHC 114 para 5, quoting with

approval N Manoim ‘Principles Regarding Urgent Applications' in N Haysom and L Mangan (eds)
Emergency Law at 79.

14
bringing this frivolous and unnecessary application. In my view, a punitive costs
order is warranted in the circumstances.
Order
[46] I accordingly grant the following order:
1. The urgent application is struck off the roll for want of urgency.
2. The applicant shall pay the respondents’ costs on the attorney and client
scale.




_____________________________

MOSSOP J

15


APPEARANCES


Counsel for the applicant: Ms A R Coetsee

Instructed by: Hartley and Joubert Inc Attorneys
Pretoria

Locally represented by:

Stowell and Co
295 Pietermaritz Street
Pietermaritzburg

Counsel for the first to sixth respondents: Mr G E Ender

Instructed by: Talbot Attorneys
Suite 1 and 2 Shackleford Road
Pietermaritzburg