Matjila v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Others (2023/065385) [2025] ZAGPPHC 826 (15 August 2025)

73 Reportability

Brief Summary

In the case of Jila v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, the applicant, Frans Mabothe Mat Jila, a Flight Sergeant in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), sought a review of the decision not to appoint him as a Lieutenant following his completion of an officers' forming course. Jila had been promoted to Candidate Officer after successfully completing the course but was later informed that he would not be appointed due to prior convictions, which he contended had been cleared. He lodged a grievance regarding this decision, which was ultimately dismissed by the South African Air Force Grievance Committee, leading him to escalate the matter further within the Department of Defence. The court considered the respondents' late submission of their answering affidavit and granted condonation for the delay, despite the lack of a comprehensive explanation. The respondents defended their decision by citing provisions of the Defence Act, which stipulate the qualifications necessary for a permanent commission, including the requirement of a clean criminal record. The court's judgment focused on the procedural aspects of the grievance process and the validity of the respondents' decision, ultimately addressing the applicant's request for reinstatement as a Candidate Officer with full retrospective benefits.

Comprehensive Summary

Case Note


Matjila v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Others

(2023/065385) [2025] ZAGPPHC ___ (15 August 2025)


Reportability


This judgment is expressly marked reportable. It clarifies the statutory threshold for disqualification from commissioning in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) under section 54 of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 and, in doing so, contributes to the developing body of administrative-law jurisprudence on rationality, procedural fairness and the proper exercise of statutory power. The judgment is also significant because it pronounces upon the scope of the Chief of the SANDF’s administrative instructions vis-à-vis the President’s constitutional prerogative to confer commissions. Finally, it contains a useful discussion on condonation principles where the State is a litigant, providing practical guidance for future public-law litigation.


Cases Cited


The full text of the judgment refers generally to “authorities” but does not specify individual reported cases. No explicit case citations appear in the body of the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Defence Act 42 of 2002

Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000

Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995

Individual Grievance Regulations (promulgated under the Defence Act)


Rules of Court Cited


The judgment does not cite any specific Uniform Rules of Court.


HEADNOTE


Summary


The applicant, Flight Sergeant Frans Mabothe Matjila, successfully completed an officers’ forming course and was placed in the rank of Candidate Officer pending presidential commissioning as a Lieutenant. Two minor military offences—one for negligent driving and another for improper parking to purchase food—were later relied upon by the SANDF to refuse his commissioning and to instruct that he revert to the substantive rank of Flight Sergeant.


Matjila launched review proceedings in the Gauteng Division, Pretoria, attacking both the refusal to commission him and the consequential instruction to revert. He argued that the decision was ultra vires, irrational, procedurally unfair and taken without affording him an opportunity to be heard. The respondents opposed and relied principally on section 54(2)(f) and (g) of the Defence Act, contending that the applicant’s convictions for “multiple serious offences” rendered him legally disqualified.


Acting Judge HF Jacobs held that the offences in question were neither “serious” nor of a nature that automatically disqualified the applicant under section 54(2)(f). Moreover, the Chief of the SANDF had misconstrued an internal November 2022 instruction as creating a blanket bar, thereby fettering his discretion and usurping the President’s power to confer commissions. The failure to invite representations breached the audi alteram partem rule, rendering the decision unlawful under PAJA. The court reviewed and set aside the impugned decision, reinstated the applicant as Candidate Officer with retrospective salary and benefits, and remitted the matter for proper reconsideration.


Key Issues


• Whether minor military disciplinary convictions constitute an automatic bar to commissioning under section 54(2)(f) of the Defence Act.

• Whether the Chief of the SANDF acted ultra vires and irrationally in refusing to process the applicant’s commissioning.

• Whether procedural fairness required affording the applicant an opportunity to be heard before adverse administrative action was taken.

• Whether the late filing of the respondents’ answering affidavit should be condoned.


Held


The court held that the two convictions did not fall within the statutory disqualification contemplated by section 54(2)(f); that the decision was irrational and procedurally unfair; that the Chief of the SANDF exceeded his statutory powers; and that the matter must be remitted for lawful reconsideration. Condonation for the respondents’ late filing was granted in the interests of justice, but costs were awarded against them.


THE FACTS


The applicant has served in the South African Air Force since 1998, progressively rising through the ranks to Flight Sergeant. In 2017 he completed the officers’ forming course at the South African Air Force College, whereupon his substantive rank changed to Candidate Officer. He was posted to Air Force Base Zwartkop as a Technical Officer, awaiting the formal presidential commission that would confirm his elevation to Lieutenant.


Despite his successful completion of training and satisfactory performance, the commissioning process stalled. Matjila lodged an internal grievance on 20 June 2019 in terms of the Defence Act’s Individual Grievance Regulations. The grievance proceeded through the hierarchy, culminating in a December 2019 directive that he obtain SAPS confirmation of a clean criminal record, which he duly produced in August 2021. A further direction in June 2021 ordered an Inspector-General investigation, the outcome of which was never communicated.


In January 2023 the applicant received a written instruction that, because of “multiple serious offences”, he would not be appointed as an officer and had to revert to Flight Sergeant. The referenced offences were (i) negligent/reckless driving involving bumping a pole, punished by a R1 500 fine; and (ii) unauthorised use of public property, punished by a reprimand. These disciplinary matters stemmed from military proceedings, not civilian criminal courts, and carried no imprisonment. The applicant contended that he was never given an opportunity to address the impact of these offences on his suitability, and that the decision contravened section 54 of the Defence Act as well as administrative-law norms.


THE ISSUES


The court had to decide whether the decision to refuse commissioning and to demote the applicant constituted lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action as required by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. Central to this inquiry was the interpretation of section 54(2)(f) and (g) of the Defence Act: do minor disciplinary offences amount to disqualifying “convictions” or to proof that the applicant is not a “fit and proper person”? The court also had to determine whether the Chief of the SANDF’s internal November 2022 instruction could override the President’s statutory role, and whether the failure to invite representations violated the applicant’s procedural rights. Finally, the court had to consider whether to condone the respondents’ late filing of their answering affidavit.


ANALYSIS


The court began by examining section 54 of the Defence Act in its entirety. Subsection (2)(f) disqualifies a person who has been “convicted and imprisoned without the option of a fine” for a criminal offence. The applicant’s disciplinary offences resulted in neither civilian criminal convictions nor imprisonment; they were dealt with internally and attracted only a fine and a reprimand. On a plain-language reading, therefore, subsection (2)(f) could not apply.


The court then turned to subsection (2)(g), which requires an officer candidate to be a “fit and proper person” with an exemplary character. Here the respondents might arguably rely on the offences, yet they failed to undertake a contextual enquiry; instead they applied the November 2022 instruction as an inflexible rule. Acting Judge Jacobs held that such rigid application amounted to a fettering of discretion and an arbitrary exercise of public power. Moreover, the decision maker did not afford the applicant an opportunity to make submissions, violating the audi principle and rendering the decision procedurally unfair under section 6(2)(c) and (d) of PAJA.


The Chief of the SANDF’s reliance on the internal instruction also raised a separation-of-powers concern. Under section 54(1)(a) only the President may confer a permanent commission. By effectively refusing to process the applicant’s commission, the Chief usurped a power reserved for the President. This jurisdictional overreach, combined with irrational reliance on inconsequential offences, satisfied the grounds for review under section 6(2)(a)(i) and (e)(vi) of PAJA.


Addressing condonation, the court applied the “interests of justice” standard. Although the respondents’ explanation for late filing was “scant”, their participation nevertheless assisted the court in reaching a fully-informed decision. Condonation was therefore granted, but the respondents were mulcted in costs.


REMEDY


Invoking section 8(1)(c)(i) of PAJA, the court reviewed and set aside the instruction that the applicant revert to Flight Sergeant. It ordered his immediate reinstatement as Candidate Officer with full retrospective effect, including payment of all back-dated salary and benefits. The respondents were directed to rectify their records within fifteen days and to pay the applicant’s costs, inclusive of the condonation application, on the ordinary party-and-party scale.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


First, a disciplinary offence that does not result in imprisonment without the option of a fine does not trigger the disqualification in section 54(2)(f) of the Defence Act. The statutory text requires both a conviction and a sentence of direct imprisonment; lesser penalties fall outside the ambit of the exclusion.


Second, when applying section 54(2)(g)’s “fit and proper” standard, decision makers must undertake an individualized, contextual assessment. Reliance on an internal instruction as a rigid rule constitutes an unlawful fettering of discretion and may be struck down as irrational or arbitrary.


Third, administrative action affecting a person’s rank, remuneration and career progression in the SANDF is subject to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. The audi alteram partem principle obliges the decision maker to afford affected individuals an opportunity to make representations before adverse action is taken.


Finally, while courts may condone procedural non-compliance by the State where the interests of justice so require, inadequate explanations for delay will ordinarily attract an adverse costs order.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
( 1) REPORT ABLE : YES/N O
(2) OF INTEREST TO O THER JUDG ES· ES/N O
(3) REVISED : YES/NO
15 August 2025
In the matter between:-
FRANS MABOTHE MAT JILA
and
MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND MILITARY
VETERANS
CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL
DEFENCE FORCE
CHIEF OF SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE
SECRETARY OF DEFENCE
JUOGMENT
CASE Number : 2023/065385
Applicant
First Respond ent
Second Re spondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent

2
H F JACOBS , AJ
[1] The applicant is a non-commissioned officer employed by the South African
National Defence Force. He holds the rank of Flight Sergeant. The applicant joined
the South African Air Force in 1998 and advanced through the ranks of Airman,
Corporal, Sergeant, before being promoted to Flight Sergeant in 2009. His role is that
of a technician in the Air Force Mobile Deployment Wing (Ground Electronics Section).
The applicant has completed numerous courses while serving in the Air Force and
applied to his employer to attend an officers' forming course at the South African Air
Force College from 16 January 2017 to 15 June 2017. He successfully attended and
was awarded a certificate by the Chief of the South African Air Force confirming his
successful completion of the officers' forming course during that period.
[2] Upon completing the officers' forming course, the applicant's substantive
rank changed from Flight Sergeant to Candidate Officer, and he was issued a
certificate accordingly. A few months later, in November 2017, he was permanently
transferred from Air Force Base Waterkloof to Air Force Base Zwartkop to serve as a
Technical Officer, where he is currently employed. The applicant then worked at
Zwartkop Air Force Base with the rank of Candidate Officer while awaiting a
commission as a Lieutenant. However, the applicant's appointment as Lieutenant was
never granted, and he lodged a grievance with the respondents on 20 June 2019. The
grievance was lodged in accordance with the Individual Grievance Regulations issued
under the Defence Act, 2002. The applicant's grievance was escalated, and on 3
December 2019, he was informed that the Grievance Board had decided it was his
responsibility to visit Wynberg Police Station to clear his name and submit proof to the
Department of Defence that his name had been removed from records showing he
had been convicted of an offence. The applicant subsequently provided a clearance

3
certificate issued by the South African Police Service dated 19 August 2021, indicating
that no convictions for any crimes in the Republic had been recorded against his name.
[3] On 20 April 2020, the South African Air Force Grievance Committee
deliberated on the applicant's grievance. It concluded that the grievance was not valid
because the appointments did not fall under the South African Air Force. Dissatisfied
with the outcome of the process before the Grievance Board, the applicant escalated
his grievance to a higher level. On 30 June 2021, the Department of Defence issued
a letter stating that after due consideration of the Grievance Board's
recommendations, the Chief of the South African National Defence Force decided that
the Inspector General of the Department of Defence be instructed to conduct an
investigation regarding his selection and appointment, and to make a recommendation
on measures to be taken against anyone who condoned or connived in wrongdoing.
The applicant was to be informed of the outcome of the investigation once finalised.
[4] During January 2023, the applicant was informed that he " .... will not be
Appointed as an Officer in the SANDF as the Relaxation on the undermentioned
Offences that he was convicted for were not approved due to that he has multiple
serious Offences"; opposite this information, an entry was recorded showing "SEC 28
(A) NDC Negligent I Reckless Driving" and "SEC 27(8) NDC: Use I Take Public
Property"; and the applicant was instructed "to revert to their current substantive rank
(Flight Sergeant) and should be managed accordingly. "1
[5] Dissatisfied with the outcome, the applicant now applies for a review and
for the decision and/or instruction that he revert to the substantive rank of Flight
Sergeant to be set aside, and for an order that he be reinstated as a Candidate Officer
with full retrospective effect, including the retention of all salaries and benefits since
See annexure "FMM 9" at Caselines paragraph 003-15

4
his removal from the rank of Candidate Officer, as well as the rectification of the
respondents' records concerning the applicant accordingly.
[6] The respondents' answering affidavit was lodged late. They request
condonation for the delay and seek an extension of time to file it. Their application and
explanation for the tardiness are quite limited. They do not provide a full and clear
explanation of the delay, and there seem to be many gaps during the period of neglect.
At the start of the hearing, the condonation application was argued, and I decided that
condonation should be granted. My reasons for approving condonation will be
explained in this judgment. More about that shortly.
[7] The respondents oppose the application and challenge the applicant's right
to the relief sought. They submit that the impugned ruling and decision should be
upheld, as they were justified in the circumstances of the case within the framework
of section 54(2)(f) and (g) of the Defence Act, wh ich reads as follows:
"54 Commissioned officers in Defence Force
(1) (a) Subject to subsection (2), the President may confer a permanent
commission on any member of the Defence Force.
(b) A member upon whom a commission has been conferred, must be issued with
a Deed of Commission bearing the President's signature or a repHca thereof.
(2) In order to qualify for a permanent comm issioned appointment in the Defence
Force, a person must-
(a) swear or declare allegiance to the Republic;
(b) be a citizen;
(c) relinquish any other citizenship he or she may have;
(d) have served successfully on probation as an officer with a temporary
commission for at least one year;

5
(e) successfully complete specific prescribed training;
(f) never have been convicted and imprisoned without the option of a fine for a
criminal offence, except one for which he or she has been granted amnesty in
terms of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 (Act 34
of 1995);
(g) be a fit and proper person to serve and must have a trustworthy and exemplary
character; and
(h) comply with the prescribed security grading requirements.
(3) (a) Only the President may cancel a permanent commission, but such a
commission may not be cancelled without the holder thereof being notified in
writing of any complaint or charge made against him or her and of any action
proposed to be taken in respect thereof, nor without him or her being called
upon to show cause in relation thereto.
(b) Where the holder of a permanent commission cannot be traced after a diligent
search that is appropriate in the circumstances, the commission may be
cancelled without such notification.
(4) The Minister may confer a temporary commission in the Defence Force on
any person who is a member or who is eligible to become a member of the
Defence Force, if such person complies with the requirements for such
appointment and if there is an appropriate post in which such person can
serve.
(5) All persons given a temporary commission hold their commissions for such
period as the Minister determines."
(6) (a) An officer may by notice in writing request to be relieved of his or her
commission, and any such request takes effect three months after the date
upon which if is approved or on such earlier date as may be approved by the
Minister.
(b) A former officer is not, in consequence of the withdrawal of his or her
commission, exempt from-

6
(i) any service or training for which he or she may be liable in terms of this Act
unless exempted by the Exemption Board; and
(ii) the repayment of any money stipulated in a contract pertaining to any
education or training he or she may have undergone or may be in the process
of undergoing at State expense.
(7) The commission of any officer terminates and must be regarded as having
been cancelled-
( a) on the date on which a sentence of cashiering imposed on him or her is
confirmed;
(b) if any sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine is imposed on him
or her by a competent civilian court, and in the event of an appeal, upon the
confirmation of such sentence.
(8) (a) The appointment in the Defence Force of any person whose commission
has been cancelled in terms of subsection (7) must be regarded as having
been terminated simultaneously with such cancellation.
(b) The appointment in the Defence Force of any person whose commission has
been cancelled in terms of subsection (3), terminates on such cancellation if
such appointment was made by virtue of the commission conferred, and may
be terminated subject to any terms and conditions governing such
appointment, but nothing contained in this section may be construed as
relieving or exempting such person from liability to render service in terms of
this Act.
(9) Officers who have retired from the Defence Force and while still in service held
permanent commissions, may retain the use of their rank after they have so
retired and are no longer in service, but must append the appellation 'Rtd'
whenever it is used.
(10) Commissioned officers from other countries who are attached to the Defence
Force by means of temporary appointment in terms of this Act are entitled to
all privileges bestowed on comm issioned officers in the Defence Force by
virtue of their rank."

7
(8] The respondents rely on section 54(2)(f) and (g) to justify the decision and
recommendation under review. It turns on two defences, which they claim the
applicant committed. The first is for bumping into a pole, for which he was fined R 1,
500. 00. The second is for parking a vehicle on the side of the road to buy food, for
which he was reprimanded. The outcome communicated to the applicant on 12
January 2023 was that he would not be appointed as an officer in the Defence Force,
as he had multiple serious offences recorded against his name. These "multiple
serious offences" are the two mentioned above. During November 2022, the Chief of
the South African National Defence Force issued Instruction 4 titled" Appointment of
Members with military and civilian convictions as officers in the South African National
Defence Force, " which aimed to provide guidelines for managing members with
multiple and serious military and/or civilian offences. The rationality of the instruction
is not challenged in these proceedings, and at first glance, without making any finding
in that regard, it appears to be perfectly rational for the officer in command of the
Defence Force to publish such an instruction. I agree with the respondents' counsel
that the purpose of the instructions is to guide the management of members with
multiple and serious military and/or civilian offences when decisions are made
regarding the commissioning of members as officers. I disagree that the offences
mentioned are, without further enquiry, to be regarded as "serious. " It might seem
that, in certain circumstances, an offence or offences of the kind mentioned against
the applicant could be interpreted as serious within the context of the instruction, but,
in the present case, that has not been established. The applicant was never given the
opportunity to address or express his view regarding the respondents' application of
the guidelines to his application for permanent appointment as an officer. I am also not

the guidelines to his application for permanent appointment as an officer. I am also not
convinced that, based on the evidence before the respondents in these proceedings,

8
those offences are indeed serious and that the applicant's conviction or adm ission of
guilt wo uld serve as a disqualifying factor or factors under section 54(2) of the Defence
Act.
[9] Under the circumstances, the applicant could not have been disqualified,
as the respondents held him to be, for his conviction of the stated two offences.
[1 0] It is possible that his convictions are relevant and influence the
consideration of whether the applicant is a fit and proper person as outlined in section
54(2)(g) of the Defence Act. The applicant was not permitted to present evidence or
submissions to the respondents in this regard before they ruled and decided that his
application cannot be further entertained or recommended to the President in
accordance with section 54(1) of the Defence Act.
[11] A careful reading of the correspondence suggests that the respondents
interpreted the Chief of the Defence Force's instruction of November 2022 as a blanket
rule that, if broadly applied, would disqualify someone in the applicant's position. In
my view, such conduct constitutes an arbitrary decision and instruction, and the
decision and its outcomes were made in breach of the law. The specific circumstances
under which the alleged offences were committed were entirely overlooked. The
decision was not that of the Chief of the National Defence Force, but that of the
President, making it beyond his legal authority. The two convictions, in my opinion, do
not qualify as disqualifying offences under section 54(f). The respondents have never
determined, argued, or ultimately claimed that the applicant's convictions make him
unfit or unsuitable to be commissioned as an officer.
[12] In my view the decision and instructions of the respondents must be
reviewed and set aside in terms of sub-section 6(2)(a)(i), (c), (d), (e)(vi) of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000 and fall to be remitted for

9
reconsideration by the respondents as contemplated by section 8( 1 )( c )(i) of the same
act. I will now turn to the aspect of condonation.
[13] Counsel for the parties referred me to the authorities, correctly so, and
concluded with a subm ission that it is, on occasions of the kind afoot here, necessary
to determine what is in the interest of justice before a decision is made on the
condonation of the late filing of papers by administrators in the position of the
respondents. It is necessary to have the record and the views of the respondents
available to a court of law in considering an application for the relief sought by the
applicant in these proceedings. For that reason, I condone the late filing, although the
explanation for the lateness was scant.
[14] I make the following order:
1. The second respondent's decision and instruction that the applicant is to revert
to the substantive rank of Flight Sergeant is reviewed and set aside;
2. The applicant is reinstated as a Candidate Officer with full retrospective effect,
with retention of all salaries and benefits since the date of his removal from the
rank of Candidate Officer;
3. The rectification of the respondents' record about the applicant shall be effected
within 15 (fifteen) days from the date of this order;
4. The respondents shall pay the applicants' costs of this application, including the
costs of the application for condonation, wh ich costs shall be taxab on scale
c.
ACTING J
GAU
HF JACOBS
GE F THE HIGH COURT
DIVISION, PRETORIA

10
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties'
legal representatives by e-mail. The date and time for the hand-down is on the 15th of
August 2025 at 1 0h00.
Heard on:
Judgment:
APPERANCES
Attorneys for the Applicant :
Counsel for Applicant :
Attorneys for Defendants:
Counsel for Defendant:
11 August 2025
15 August 2025
Griese! van Zanten Attorneys
Email: jean@gvzinc.co.za
Adv J G C Hamman
Ema il: hamman @p talaw.co.za
The State Attorney, Pretoria
Em ail: lnkuna@i ustice.gov.za
Adv T Chavalala
Email: talenta@ law.co.za