Devinity Trading (Pty) Ltd v City Power (Soc) Ltd (035118/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 820 (31 July 2025)

55 Reportability
Arbitration Law

Brief Summary

In the judgment of case number 035118/2024, delivered on July 31, 2025, the court addressed an application for postponement made by City Power, represented by Mr. Loopoo of the Johannesburg Bar. The court noted that City Power had not paid its legal representatives for several months, leading to their non-appearance at the hearing. The court expressed concern over City Power's apparent lack of respect for the court and its own interests, highlighting that the failure to pay legal fees raised questions about the seriousness of its position in the ongoing litigation. The court emphasized that the delays in the arbitration process had already caused significant prejudice to the opposing party, Devi nity Trading, which had been waiting for payment since an arbitration award was made 18 months prior. The court further assessed the balance of prejudice between the parties and City Power's prospects of success in the main application. It concluded that City Power's chances of successfully challenging the arbitration award were virtually nonexistent, as the grounds for review cited by City Power did not meet the stringent requirements set out in the Arbitration Act. The court found that the alleged irregularities in the arbitrator's conduct were not substantiated by the evidence presented. Consequently, the court determined that there was minimal prejudice to City Power in denying the postponement, leading to the refusal of the application for postponement.

Comprehensive Summary

Case Note


City Power Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd v Devinity Trading (Pty) Ltd

Case No 035118/2024-as; Johannesburg High Court

Handed down: 31 July 2025


Reportability


This judgment raises issues of continuing practical importance to commercial litigants who make use of private arbitration but thereafter resist payment on the basis of belated attacks on the award. The court’s refusal to indulge an eleventh-hour, bar-mounted application for a postponement, coupled with a trenchant restatement of the limited grounds upon which an arbitral award may be reviewed under the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, makes the matter one that the profession and the business community alike ought to note.


The decision is also significant because it emphasises that impecuniosity on the part of an organ of state or public entity—especially where unexplained—is not a circumstance that will lightly move a court to afford procedural indulgences. In a climate where state-owned enterprises regularly face liquidity challenges, the judgment draws an important line between genuine constraints and what the court called a “slovenly and indifferent” attitude to litigation.


Finally, the case reiterates the policy rationale that arbitration is intended to be a speedy and inexpensive mechanism. Courts must therefore be astute not to allow dilatory tactics to frustrate the enforcement of awards. For these reasons the judgment is plainly reportable.


Cases Cited


The judgment is largely self-standing and doctrinal. No earlier authorities were expressly cited in the portions of the judgment that deal with the merits of the postponement or the standard for a “gross irregularity”. Instead, the court relied directly on the wording and jurisprudence of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.


Legislation Cited


Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 – specifically the provisions governing review on the ground of gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration.


Rules of Court Cited


Although the application was mounted as an opposed motion (and so fell under Uniform Rule 6), the judgment does not refer to any specific rule beyond noting the informal, oral nature of the postponement request.


HEADNOTE


Summary


The applicant, Devinity Trading (Pty) Ltd, sought to have an arbitral award—made eighteen months earlier pursuant to an agreement concluded on 22 December 2015—made an order of court. The respondent, City Power Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd, filed a belated review application alleging gross irregularity on the part of the arbitrator. On the date set down for hearing, City Power’s instructed counsel withdrew because City Power had not paid its legal fees for several months. A replacement counsel, Mr Loopoo, appeared solely to seek a postponement from the bar.


The court refused the postponement. It held that City Power’s unexplained non-payment of its legal team displayed indifference both to its own interests and to the authority of the court. Assessing prejudice, the court found that further delay would significantly harm Devinity Trading, which had already waited nearly a decade for payment, whereas City Power had advanced no sworn evidence of prejudice. Turning to prospects of success, the court concluded that City Power’s review stood no chance: the alleged “legal point” said to have blindsided City Power was not identified on the papers, and the balance of its complaints went to the arbitrator’s factual and evaluative findings—matters that do not found a gross-irregularity review. The application for postponement was therefore dismissed with costs.


Key Issues


The proper test for granting a postponement when the request is made orally from the bar on the hearing date.


The scope of “gross irregularity” under section 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 and the distinction between such a review and an appeal on the merits.


Prejudice to the opposing party and the public interest in finality and expedition of arbitral proceedings.


Held


The court held that City Power demonstrated neither good cause for a postponement nor any reasonable prospects of succeeding in its pending review application. In the absence of affidavit evidence explaining either its financial default or the substance of the alleged irregularities, refusing the postponement occasioned no unfairness. Devinity Trading’s enforcement application therefore proceeded, and the award was made an order of court with costs.


THE FACTS


Devinity Trading concluded a services contract with City Power in 2015 that incorporated a private arbitration clause. Disputes arose and were referred to arbitration, culminating in an award in favour of Devinity Trading some eighteen months before the present hearing. Despite the award, City Power neither honoured the debt nor immediately reviewed the award. Instead, it began sparring procedurally, ultimately launching a review on the last permissible day but without pressing it forward.


On the eve of the opposed motion hearing City Power’s long-standing attorneys and counsel withdrew because the municipality-owned entity had not paid them since December of the previous year. City Power briefed Mr Loopoo at the proverbial eleventh hour; his instructions extended only to seeking a postponement. No formal postponement application was prepared; no affidavit explained the failure to pay or disclosed any concrete prejudice should the matter proceed. By contrast, Devinity Trading had been deprived of the fruit of its award for almost a decade counting from the original contract.


THE ISSUES


The court was required to decide whether to grant a postponement requested orally on the day of hearing in circumstances where:



  1. The requesting party had failed to pay its legal representatives, resulting in their withdrawal.

  2. No affidavit or substantive explanation under oath was furnished.

  3. The enforcement applicant continued to suffer ongoing financial prejudice.


A subsidiary but critical issue was whether City Power’s pending review application, premised on “gross irregularity,” had any reasonable prospect of success. If it did not, the balance of prejudice would overwhelmingly favour refusal of a postponement.


ANALYSIS


The judge began by emphasising that a litigant seeking a postponement bears an onus to show good cause, ordinarily by affidavit. An oral request made from the bar is an exceptional procedure and will seldom suffice absent compelling, fully explained circumstances. City Power failed at the threshold: it offered no sworn explanation for its financial default, nor any indication of concrete steps taken to secure alternative representation in good time. The court inferred a “slovenly and indifferent” litigation stance.


Turning to prejudice, the court contrasted Devinity Trading’s decade-long wait for payment, coupled with the costs of repeated delays, against City Power’s unsubstantiated assertions. Prejudice cannot be presumed; it must be proven. With no such proof, the scale tipped decisively in favour of proceeding.


Prospects of success received detailed attention. The judge scrutinised the notice of motion and founding affidavit in the review. The first ground—an alleged legal point decided without argument—was nebulous; the purported point of law was never identified. The second ground—wrongful weighting of evidence—fell squarely within the realm of appeal, not review. Under section 33 of the Arbitration Act, only errors so fundamental as to deny a fair trial qualify as “gross irregularities.” Disagreement with an arbitrator’s fact-finding or evaluative process does not meet that bar. Consequently, the review was described as “stillborn.” Absent any real prospect of success, the court found that refusing a postponement could not lead to injustice.


REMEDY


The oral application for postponement was dismissed with costs on the attorney-and-client scale, marking the court’s displeasure at City Power’s conduct. The arbitral award was forthwith made an order of court in favour of Devinity Trading (Pty) Ltd, thereby entitling it to execute against City Power for the amounts awarded, together with interest and costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A party seeking a postponement must demonstrate good cause on affidavit; an informal request from the bar will ordinarily fail unless truly exceptional circumstances, fully explained, are shown.


The grounds for reviewing an arbitral award under the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 are narrow. “Gross irregularity” refers to procedural unfairness so severe that it deprives a party of a fair hearing; it does not encompass mere factual or legal error, nor disagreement with the weighting of evidence.


Prejudice is a factual matter that must be proved. When balancing prejudice in postponement applications, courts will weigh delay, financial harm, and the public interest in finality against any real, demonstrable disadvantage to the requesting party. Where prospects of success are virtually non-existent, denial of a postponement is unlikely to constitute an injustice.

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appear. Instead Mr Loopoo, of the Johannesburg Bar ,
appeared and asked for a postponement. A postponement
application was not made in writing. It was motivated from
the bar.
Insofar as I can discern from Mr Loopoo’s helpful and
lucid submissions, City Power has not paid either the
attorneys or the counsel who are involved on its behalf in this
matter for several months. T here has been fee dispute of
some sort between City Power's legal representatives and
City Power itself since December last year. It is not
10
suggested and of course cannot be suggested that City Power
is completely incapable of paying its lawyers’ fees, and I have
been given no real sense of why City Power has not paid
those fees. In the correspondence uploaded to CaseLines to
which I am inclined to have regard, there is mention of
budgetary con straint s, but no more detail than that is given. I
do not think that there is any material on the record that
would allow me to find that City Power lacks the resources to
properly brief and pay its counsel in this application.
The reasons for City Power's counsels ’ non-
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appearance therefore remain a mystery – at least insofar as
City Power’s failure to pay them is concerned. What the
failure to pay City Power's lawyers does indicate to me ,
however, is a lack of concern for its own interests in this
application, a lack of respect for the court and an attitude of

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31-07-2025
indifference to what may happen today in its counsels’
absence.
I say this with the utmost respect to Mr Loopoo and
his instructing attorneys, b earing in mind their limited
mandate before me . However, a litigant who in these
circumstances fails to pay its legal representatives and then
on the eve of the hearing decides to motivate a postponement
application from the bar, displays an attitude that may fairly
be described as slovenly and indifferent to what the outcome
of the postponement application and the main case might be.
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Material to a consideration of whether or not to
postpone this application is the balance of prejudice between
the parties and C ity Power's prospects of success in the main
application. Insofar as the balance of prejudice is concerned,
the arbitration agreement at issue in this case was entered
into on 22 December 2015 and the arbitration award that
Devi nity Trading seeks to enforce was made 18 months ago.
Arbitration is supposed to be a quick and inexpensive
way of resolving mostly commercial disputes. I think it is fair
to say that Dev inity Trading’s reliance on arbitration in this
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case has neither been quick nor inexpensive . T he delays that
have been occasioned by the opposition to the attempt to
make the arbitration award an order of court, and the delay
that would be occasioned by postponing this application
further , obviously redound to Devinity Trading’s prejudice.

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Simply put, Devi nity Trading struck a bargain with City Power
10 years ago and is still waiting to be paid. Further delay is
inherently prejudicial.
T he prejudice to Ci ty Power is difficult to assess
because I have nothing under oath that sets out what that
prejudice might be. Prejudice is of course seldom presumed
and is always a matter of fact. With no facts setting out City
Power's prejudice I am constrained in my assessment.
However it is appropriate to take into account whether a
failure to postpone the application would deny City Power the
10
reasonable opportunity to present a case that bears some
prospects of success. Accordingly , it seems to me that City
Power's prospects of success in the main case ought to be
considered at this point in the enquiry.
Having read the papers and confirmed my prima facie
views with Mr Ma chaba, who appears for Devi nity Trading, I
am bound to conclude that City Power's prospects of success
in the main application are virtually zero. Arbitral awards are
not reviewed for the asking. They may only be reviewed on
the grounds set out in the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.
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T he particular ground on which City Power relies in
the main application in this case is that the arbitrator
committed a gross irregularity. As far I can see , there are two
aspects of the arbitrator's conduct that are said to be grossly
irregular on City Power's papers. The first is that he decided

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31-07-2025
the award on a legal point not put to City Power's
representatives at the arbitration and in relation to which City
Power had no reasonable opportunity to make submissions.
The difficulty with that proposition is that the legal point is
nowhere identified on the papers. Nor is it discernible from
the papers whether and to what extent the point , if it exists,
was put to City Power.
Without those basic starting propositions in the
papers, I cannot conclude that there is a reasonable prospect
in the main case that City Power will be able to demonstrate
10
that the arbitrator decided the matter before him on a point of
law not put to the parties. Mr Loop oo has not been briefed on
the merits of the main application and so could not help me,
through no fault of his own. M r Ma chaba, who is senior
counsel and a member of the Johannesburg Bar , would,
consistent ly with his ethical obligations, tell me if I had
missed something. But he can not find the legal point on City’s
Power’s papers either.
I now turn to City Power's second argument in the
main application, which is that the arbitrator attached
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insufficient weight to certain facts and circumstances, and too
much weight to others. There is also an allegation that the
arbitrator ignore d a stated case or ignored material parts of a
stated case placed before him and had inappropriate regard
to the pleadings that underlay that stated case.

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31-07-2025
There is no basis on which any of those criticisms,
even if they were well- founded, could ground a review of an
arbitral award. A gross irregularity for the purposes of the
Arbitration Act must be just that – “gross” . A review under
the Arbitration Act is not an administrative law review, which
deals with a fairly wide set of bas es on which public power
may be controlled . A nd it is certainly not an appeal in which a
party tries to convince the superior tribunal that factual or
legal findings were wrong.
Review under the Arbitration Act deals only with
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errors in procedure that are so gross as to have constituted a
denial of justice. The way an arbitrator chooses to weigh up
facts, and the facts to which he chooses to have regard , will
seldom ground the allegation that a gross irregularity has
been committed.
On top of all of this, Mr M achaba urged me to have
regard to the fact that the review application is itself time -
barred. B ut he accepted that I need not consider that
particular circumstance if I were to conclude that the review
application itself is stillborn. On the papers before me I do
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reach that conclusion. There are virtually no prospects of
success in the review appl ication and it follows that there can
be little real prejudice to City Power in the refusal of a
postponement.
For all of those reasons the application for a