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appear. Instead Mr Loopoo, of the Johannesburg Bar ,
appeared and asked for a postponement. A postponement
application was not made in writing. It was motivated from
the bar.
Insofar as I can discern from Mr Loopoo’s helpful and
lucid submissions, City Power has not paid either the
attorneys or the counsel who are involved on its behalf in this
matter for several months. T here has been fee dispute of
some sort between City Power's legal representatives and
City Power itself since December last year. It is not
10
suggested and of course cannot be suggested that City Power
is completely incapable of paying its lawyers’ fees, and I have
been given no real sense of why City Power has not paid
those fees. In the correspondence uploaded to CaseLines to
which I am inclined to have regard, there is mention of
budgetary con straint s, but no more detail than that is given. I
do not think that there is any material on the record that
would allow me to find that City Power lacks the resources to
properly brief and pay its counsel in this application.
The reasons for City Power's counsels ’ non-
20
appearance therefore remain a mystery – at least insofar as
City Power’s failure to pay them is concerned. What the
failure to pay City Power's lawyers does indicate to me ,
however, is a lack of concern for its own interests in this
application, a lack of respect for the court and an attitude of
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31-07-2025
indifference to what may happen today in its counsels’
absence.
I say this with the utmost respect to Mr Loopoo and
his instructing attorneys, b earing in mind their limited
mandate before me . However, a litigant who in these
circumstances fails to pay its legal representatives and then
on the eve of the hearing decides to motivate a postponement
application from the bar, displays an attitude that may fairly
be described as slovenly and indifferent to what the outcome
of the postponement application and the main case might be.
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Material to a consideration of whether or not to
postpone this application is the balance of prejudice between
the parties and C ity Power's prospects of success in the main
application. Insofar as the balance of prejudice is concerned,
the arbitration agreement at issue in this case was entered
into on 22 December 2015 and the arbitration award that
Devi nity Trading seeks to enforce was made 18 months ago.
Arbitration is supposed to be a quick and inexpensive
way of resolving mostly commercial disputes. I think it is fair
to say that Dev inity Trading’s reliance on arbitration in this
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case has neither been quick nor inexpensive . T he delays that
have been occasioned by the opposition to the attempt to
make the arbitration award an order of court, and the delay
that would be occasioned by postponing this application
further , obviously redound to Devinity Trading’s prejudice.
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31-07-2025
Simply put, Devi nity Trading struck a bargain with City Power
10 years ago and is still waiting to be paid. Further delay is
inherently prejudicial.
T he prejudice to Ci ty Power is difficult to assess
because I have nothing under oath that sets out what that
prejudice might be. Prejudice is of course seldom presumed
and is always a matter of fact. With no facts setting out City
Power's prejudice I am constrained in my assessment.
However it is appropriate to take into account whether a
failure to postpone the application would deny City Power the
10
reasonable opportunity to present a case that bears some
prospects of success. Accordingly , it seems to me that City
Power's prospects of success in the main case ought to be
considered at this point in the enquiry.
Having read the papers and confirmed my prima facie
views with Mr Ma chaba, who appears for Devi nity Trading, I
am bound to conclude that City Power's prospects of success
in the main application are virtually zero. Arbitral awards are
not reviewed for the asking. They may only be reviewed on
the grounds set out in the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.
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T he particular ground on which City Power relies in
the main application in this case is that the arbitrator
committed a gross irregularity. As far I can see , there are two
aspects of the arbitrator's conduct that are said to be grossly
irregular on City Power's papers. The first is that he decided
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31-07-2025
the award on a legal point not put to City Power's
representatives at the arbitration and in relation to which City
Power had no reasonable opportunity to make submissions.
The difficulty with that proposition is that the legal point is
nowhere identified on the papers. Nor is it discernible from
the papers whether and to what extent the point , if it exists,
was put to City Power.
Without those basic starting propositions in the
papers, I cannot conclude that there is a reasonable prospect
in the main case that City Power will be able to demonstrate
10
that the arbitrator decided the matter before him on a point of
law not put to the parties. Mr Loop oo has not been briefed on
the merits of the main application and so could not help me,
through no fault of his own. M r Ma chaba, who is senior
counsel and a member of the Johannesburg Bar , would,
consistent ly with his ethical obligations, tell me if I had
missed something. But he can not find the legal point on City’s
Power’s papers either.
I now turn to City Power's second argument in the
main application, which is that the arbitrator attached
20
insufficient weight to certain facts and circumstances, and too
much weight to others. There is also an allegation that the
arbitrator ignore d a stated case or ignored material parts of a
stated case placed before him and had inappropriate regard
to the pleadings that underlay that stated case.
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31-07-2025
There is no basis on which any of those criticisms,
even if they were well- founded, could ground a review of an
arbitral award. A gross irregularity for the purposes of the
Arbitration Act must be just that – “gross” . A review under
the Arbitration Act is not an administrative law review, which
deals with a fairly wide set of bas es on which public power
may be controlled . A nd it is certainly not an appeal in which a
party tries to convince the superior tribunal that factual or
legal findings were wrong.
Review under the Arbitration Act deals only with
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errors in procedure that are so gross as to have constituted a
denial of justice. The way an arbitrator chooses to weigh up
facts, and the facts to which he chooses to have regard , will
seldom ground the allegation that a gross irregularity has
been committed.
On top of all of this, Mr M achaba urged me to have
regard to the fact that the review application is itself time -
barred. B ut he accepted that I need not consider that
particular circumstance if I were to conclude that the review
application itself is stillborn. On the papers before me I do
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reach that conclusion. There are virtually no prospects of
success in the review appl ication and it follows that there can
be little real prejudice to City Power in the refusal of a
postponement.
For all of those reasons the application for a