THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
REPORTABLE
Case no: 2025 – 024810
In the matter between:
CITY OF EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY Applicant
and
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES & CIVIL SERVANTS UNION First Respondent
MEMBERS OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT Second to Further Respondents
WHOSE NAMES APPEAR ON ANNEXURE A
Heard: 23 July 2025
Delivered: 31 July 2025
Summary: Application for final order interdicting and restraining against strike
action. Application partially successful.
JUDGMENT
DANIELS J
2
Introduction
[1] On 25 February 2025, I granted the applicant a rule nisi and interim order ,
interdicting and restraining intended strike action by the respondents , pending the
return date. On 18 March 2025, the first respondent filed a supplementary answering
affidavit. The applicant filed a terse replying affidavit, but did not oppose the
admission of the supplementary affidavit. In the exercise of my discretion, I find that
it is in the interests of justice to admit the respondents’ supplementary answering
affidavit. The applicant seeks to confirm the rule nisi.
Material facts
[2] The facts are largely common cause:
2.1 The applicant is the City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (“the
City”). The City is established under the Local Government Municipal
Structures Act 1998 to provide various services to the residents within its
geographical boundaries.
2.2 The first respondent is a registered trade union (hereafter “MECSU” or
“the Union”) with members employed by the City, some of whom are engaged
in the provision of services designated as essential services.
2.3 On 29 August 2024, MECSU issued a strike notice giving the City
seven days’ notice of its members’ intention to embark on strike action. In the
notice, the Union identified seven disputes, grievances, or demands. They
related to: (i) grading of traffic wardens; (ii) the provision of a ceremonial pass
out parade for police trainees after their training; (iii) the implementation of a
four days on and four days off shift; (iv) encashment of annual leave days; (v)
the implementation of an acting allowance policy; (vi) retrospective pay for fire
fighters; (vii) insourcing of security and cleaners. (hereafter “the initial
demands”)
3
2.4 On 2 September 2024, under case number 2024 – 098847, the City
filed an urgent application seeking an order interdicting the strike. The City
argued that the respondents could not lawfully engage in strike action in
relation to initial demands. The application came before the learned acting
judge Khumalo AJ on 4 September 2024. The matter stood down. On 5
September 2024, Khumalo AJ interdicted the strike pending the hearing of the
application and stood the matter down again. The application was heard on 6
September 2024. Khumalo AJ reserv ed judgment and interdicted the strike
pending judgment. Judgment has yet to be delivered eleven months later.
2.5 On 8 October 2024, in relation to the initial demands, the Union issued
another strike notice. The City approached the court once again, for an urgent
interdict, under case number 2024 - 116893. The matter came before Snyman
AJ, who interdicted the strike pending the judgment of Khumalo AJ.
2.6 On or about 21 October 2024, the Union referred a dispute to
conciliation to the S outh African Local Government Bargaining Council
(hereafter the “referral”) . The referral made reference to four new disputes,
demands, or grievances (the “ second dispute”).
1 The issues in the second
dispute differed from the initial demands. Despite conciliation, the parties were
unable to settle the second dispute. The commissioner decided,
independently, that he would advise the parties whether the issues in the
second dispute could form the basis of protected strike action and therefore
instructed the parties to file submissions.
2.7 On 20 December 2024, the commissioner issued a ruling in which he
found that the issues in the second dispute were all matters of mutual interest.
The commissioner noted that the Union had submitted draft picketing rules to
him, which he would adopt pending comments by the City.
1 The second dispute includes four issues, demands, or grievances relating to: (i) the privatisation of
services rendered by permanent employees in the departments dealing with Waste Management,
Parks, Water, Roads, Fleet, and Energy (ii) the use of trucks from private companies in the Waste
Management department; (iii) the practice of providing PPE once or twice per year; (iv) the failure to
provide patrol cars to traffic wardens and officers of the E kurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department
(“EMPD”).
4
2.8 On 20 January 2025, the commissioner issued a certificate of outcome
of conciliation and issued “final” picketing rules.
2.9 On 29 January 2025, the Union issued a letter to the City informing it
that its members would picket on 30 and 31 January.
2.10 The City filed a further urgent application in this court, under case
number 2025 – 11786, to interdict the picket. The application came before my
brother Tlhotlhalemaje J who issued an order reflecting the parties’ agreement
that the Union would suspend its picket and the City would negotiate on the
second dispute.
2.11 The parties engaged at m eetings held on 6, 13, and 19 February 2025
(the “engagement meetings”) to discuss the second dispute. The issues
constituting the second dispute were discussed, but no agreement was
reached. During the meetings, the Union raised other grievances apart from
those in the second dispute. The applicant states that it remained willing to
negotiate, when it received a second strike notice on 19 February 2025.
2.12 On 19 February 2025, the Union issued a strike notice giving the City
forty-eight hours’ notice of strike action. The notice stated that the issues
giving rise to the strike were those raised at the engagement meetings and
the demands in the referral.
2.13 The applicant alleges that, during the engagement meetings , the Union
raised additional grievances including the outsourcing of work of employee
relations and legal services, the insourcing of security and cleaners, and the
absorbing of traffic wardens into the EMPD . The applicant alleges that the
grievances relating to the insourcing of security and cleaners, and the
absorbing of traffic wardens, form part of the issues to be considered by
Khumalo AJ.
5
2.14 The applicant alleges that the individual respondents are
“overwhelmingly employed” in designated essential services 2 but it does not
identify which of the individual respondents are engaged in which designated
essential service.
2.15 In relation to the second dispute, the following must be noted:
2.15.1 MECSU demands that the City stops the privatisation of services
currently rendered by permanent employees in the departments dealing with
Waste Management, Parks, Water, Roads, Fleet, and Energy. The City
alleges that the demand is unlawful because: (a) the City already has
contracts with service providers, and the demand would require the City to
cancel such contracts unlawfully, (b) the demand is socio-economic, (c) waste
management is a designated essential service.
2.15.2 MECSU demands that the City stops the use of trucks sourced from
private companies in the Waste Management department, and that the City
instead uses only the vehicles the City presently has (or will purchase) for
waste management. The City alleges that the demand is unlawful because:
(a) it will require the cancellation of contracts with service providers, (b) it is a
“socio economic” demand. The City states that much of the services provided
through or by the Waste Management department are not outsourced.
2.15.3 MECSU demands that the current practice of providing PPE
3 once or
twice per year is maintained. The City states that the issue is not “ strikable”
because it relates to a safety issue that is covered by the Occupational Health
and Safety Act 4 (“OHSA”) and the Union may report the issue to the
Department of Labour.
2 See para 50 Founding Affidavit, Case lines paginated page reference 002-21
3 This stands for “Personal Protective Equipment”
4 No. 85 of 1993 as amended
6
2.15.4 MECSU demands that the City address its failure to provide patrol cars
to the traffic wardens and officers of the EMPD who require them . The City
states, in broad terms, that the dispute is a “rights dispute” and the Union can
therefore not engage in strike action in relation to it.
2.16 The applicant suggests5 that the Bargaining Council’s main agreement
prohibits MECSU from bargaining with it at local level in relation to certain
issues and prohibits MECSU from bargaining with it at central level. The
applicant attaches the main agreement but refers to no clause of the
agreement.
2.17 The applicant contends the Union should obtain an advisory award in
terms of section 64(3) of the Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 (the “LRA”),
but it does not state that there is a refusal to bargain, nor does it state what
that refusal to bargain relates to.
Legal principles and analysis
[3] The applicant seeks final relief. An application for a final interdict must be
satisfied on three essential requisites
6 namely:
(a) a clear right of the party asserting it;
(b) an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and
(c) the absence of any other satisfactory remedy that may have been
available to the party seeking the interdict.
[4] The applicant relies, principally, on its argument that the strike would be
unprotected because some or all the members of the first respondent are engaged in
an essential service. In its founding affidavit, the applicant gives further reasons why
a strike would be unprotected, but it does not flesh these out.
5 Paras 63 – 67, Founding Affidavit, Case Lines page reference 002 – 27 to 002 - 28
6 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; Minister of Health v Drums & Pails Reconditioning CC t/a
Village Drums & Pails 1997 (3) SA 867 (N) at 872C
7
[5] The right to engage in strike action is a fundamental right enshrined in our
constitution. It is an individual right, though it may only be exercised collectively.
Given that the right to strike is a constitutional right our courts are enjoined to avoid
restricting the right more than is expressly required by the language of the LRA , and
any limitation must be strictly restricted to the achieving the purpose of the limitation.
[6] It was in this context that our apex court accepted that the strike notice must
identify the issue in the dispute with reasonable clarity .7 The strike notice dated 19
February referred to the second dispute (which had been referred to conciliation) and
the issues discussed at the engagement meetings. Besides the second dispute,
additional issues were raised at the engagement meetings. Accordingly, the strike
notice lacked reasonable clarity on the dispute to which the strike was related. In the
circumstances, the strike notice lacks reasonable clarity and is defective.
[7] In City of Matlosana v S outh African Local Government Bargaining Council &
others
8 Pillay J considered the meaning of the word “State” in section 64(1)(d) of the
LRA and found that it includes municipalities. The learned judge held that the word
“State” must be given a broader meaning than “public service” because essential
and necessary services are delivered to the public through the national, provincial
and local spheres of government. I see no reason to deviate. In the circumstances,
the first respondent was required to give the City at least seven days’ notice of the
commencement of its strike. For this reason too, the strike notice ( dated 19
February) is defective.
[8] The applicant contends that two of the demands concern “rights disputes” and
are therefore prohibited by section 65(1)(c) of the LRA. The demands are that: (a)
the City must provide patrol cars to the traffic wardens and officers of the EMPD, and
the City must provide patrol cars to the traffic wardens and officers of the EMPD, and
(b) the current practice of providing PPE once or twice per year must be maintained.
7 SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & others v Moloto NO & another (2012) 33 ILJ 2549 (CC) at
para 90. Importantly, in that matter, the apex court also endorsed prior judgments of our labour courts
which held that the strike notice need not specify the precise time of the day when the strike will start ,
that employees are not obliged to commence striking at the time indicated in the notice, that where
strikers have given insufficient time in their original notice that may be cured by a subsequent notice
and the time given in the two notices may be taken cumulatively.
8 (2009) 30 ILJ 1293 (LC)
8
The applicant’s contentions do not withstand scrutiny. The respondents do not allege
that the City is acting in breach of their conditions of employment nor do they seek to
assert any other right enforceable through arbitration or adjudication. In Department
of Home Affairs & another v Public Servants Association & others 9 the Constitutional
Court explained that matters of mutual interest includes both disputes of interest and
disputes of right.
[9] The applicant submits that the respondents are prohibited from striki ng over
health and safety matters which may be referred to the Department of Labour under
the OHSA. The applicant does not pertinently state that the issue in dispute may be
referred to the Labour Court for adjudication, as contemplated by s ection 65(1)(c). In
any event, I do not believe that this submission has merit. Firstly, the applicant does
not identify the dispute (which can presumably be referred to the court). Secondly,
the respondents do not allege that the applicant failed in its duties under the
OHSA.10 Thirdly, the individual respondents are not ‘entitled’ to PPE as of right, in
terms of the OHSA.
[10] There can be little doubt that health and safety is a matter of mutual interest.
In Pikitup (SOC) Ltd v SAMWU on behalf of members & others
11 the Labour Appeal
Court (“LAC”) considered whether the use of a breathalyser test by the employer
constituted a matter of mutual interest and whether a demand by SAMWU that the
employer desists from using the breathalyser was an unlawful demand. The LAC
found that the issue was a matter of mutual interest and the demand was not
unlawful. In para [64] of the judgment the LAC held: “The OHSA is underpinned by
cooperation between employer and employees. It should be viewed through the
prism of shared duties and responsibilities which can in most cases only be achieved
if the employees consent and buy -in to the measures. It does not exclude collective
if the employees consent and buy -in to the measures. It does not exclude collective
bargaining”. At para [67] the LAC held: “In my judgment, health and safety issues are
9 (2017) 38 ILJ 1555 (CC) at para 7
10 Section 8 of the OHSA places a duty on the employer to maintain as far as is reasonably
practicable a working environment that is safe and without health risks for its employees. Section 9
places a duty on the employer to conduct its business in such a manner as to ensure as far as
reasonably practicable that persons who are not its employees who may be directly affected by its
activities are not thereby exposed to health or safety hazards.
11 (2014) 35 ILJ 983 (LAC)
9
primarily the responsibility of the employer but they are matters of mutual interest
over which the parties may engage in collective bargaining and if they cannot agree,
the employees may embark on strike action in order to resolve the dispute.”
[11] The applicant contends that certain demands are “socio- economic” and
therefore cannot form the basis of protected strik e action. These demands are that:
(a) the City stops the privatisation of services ,
12 and (b) the City stops the use of
trucks sourced from private companies in the Waste Management department and
uses only those which the City has for waste management. This contention is not
fleshed out. Presumably what the applicant had in mind was that the demands relate
to the socio- economic interests of workers in general , as contemplated by the
definition of “protest action” in section 213 of the LRA.
[12] The definitions of “protest action” and “strike action”, when read together,
make it plain that strike action relates to disputes of mutual interest between
employer and employee( s) while protest action relates to socio- economic issues of
workers generally, such as Value Added Tax or unemployment.
[13] It is clear that these two demands relate to matters of mutual interest between
the City and its employees , and they are of no concern to workers generally . They
are not “socio-economic issues” as the applicant contends.
[14] It is trite that a strike demand must be lawful.
13 The City argues that two of the
demands are unlawful because they require the City to unlawfully cancel existing
contracts. This includes: (1) the demand that the City stops the privatisation of
services
14 currently rendered by permanent employees, and (2) the demand that the
City stops the use of trucks sourced from private companies in the Waste
Management department and instead use only the vehicles the City has for waste
management.
12 Which are currently rendered by permanent employees in the departments of the City dealing with
Waste Management, Parks, Water, Roads, Fleet, and Energy.
13 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v SA MWU & others (2009) 30 ILJ 2064 (LC) at
2069
14 In the City’s departments dealing with Waste Management, Parks, Water, Roads, Fleet, and Energy
10
[15] The applicant attaches a single contract, concluded between itself and Rua
Construction and Projects (Pty) Ltd. The applicant contends that it would be forced to
unlawfully cancel the contract with Rua Construction if it concedes to the demands of
the Union. However, in its founding affidavit, the applicant does not refer to any
clause of the contract. This is impermissible. 15 In any event, clause 6.2 of that
contract permit s the termination of the contract on thirty (30) days’ notice. The
applicant bears the onus of showing that the respondents’ demands are unlawful. To
achieve this, the applicant should have produced the contracts it alleges are
incapable of cancellation. The respondents’ demands do not refer to any period
within which existing contracts must be cancelled. In these circumstances, the City
has failed to show that it is incapable of lawfully terminating any existing contracts.
[16] The applicant states, in para 68 of its founding affidavit: “ As a further
alternative argument to the many points, I have raised above, the Respondents
should have obtained an advisory award in terms of section 64, but they did not .”
The applicant does not tell the court why the respondents were obliged to obtain an
advisory award nor does it allege that all , or some, of the disputes fall within the
ambit of section 64(3). In addition, the applicant does not engage with the fact that it
consented to a court order agreeing to negotiate on the second dispute, and it did
so.
[17] The applicant attaches the Bargaining Council’s main agreement, a document
over one hundred pages in length, to its founding papers. The applicant also
attaches various notices and circulars which allegedly make it clear that it is not
required, or permitted, to engage in bargaining with MECSU. However, it fails to
make a single reference to any particular clause of the main agreement, or any part
of the notices and circulars. This kind of lethargic drafting is impermissible in motion
of the notices and circulars. This kind of lethargic drafting is impermissible in motion
proceedings, where the affidavits constitute the pleadings and the evidence. In
Minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture and others v D & F Wevell Trust and others
16
15 Minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture and others v D & F Wevell Trust and others 2008 (2) SA
184 (SCA) at 200
16 Ibid.
11
the court held that: “ It is not proper for a party in motion proceedings to base an
argument on passages in documents which have been annexed to the papers when
the conclusions sought to be drawn from such passages have not been canvassed
in the affidavits. The reason is manifest - the other party may well be prejudiced
because evidence may have been available to it to refute the new case on the facts.”
[18] It is correct, as a general proposition, that employees who ar e engaged in an
essential service are prohibited from embarking on strike action.
17 On 12 September
1997, the Essential Services Committee (the “ESC”) designated the following
services as essential services:
18
(a) municipal traffic services and policing;
(b) municipal health;
(c) the supply and distribution of water;
(d) the generation, transmission and distribution of power;
(e) firefighting.
The following parts of the sanitation services: –
(a) the maintenance and operation of water borne sewage systems,
including pumping stations and the control of discharge of industrial effluent
into the system;
(b) the maintenance and operation of sewage purification works;
(c) the collection of refuse of an organic nature;
(d) the collection of infectious refuse from medical and vet erinary hospitals
or practices;
(e) the collection and disposal of refuse at a disposal site; and
(f) the collection of refuse left uncollected for 14 (fourteen) days or longer,
including domestic refuse and refuse on public roads and open spaces.
(hereafter “designated essential services”)
17 Section 69(1)(d)(i) of the LRA
18 GG 18276, GN 1216. Whether an employee is “engaged” in a designated essential service must be
considered in light of the judgment of SAPS v Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union & another (2010) 31
ILJ 2844 (LAC) . An essential service, as designated, must be restrictively interpreted, where this is
possible.
12
[19] While it may be relatively easy to discern the designated essential services, it
is somewhat more difficult to identify which employees are “ engaged” in the
designated essential services.19 To resolve this issue, the applicant referred a
dispute to the ESC. In the ESC ruling issued under case reference ES817, dated 30
June 2025, it avoided determining whether positions, and employees, of the City, are
engaged in the designated essential services. At paragraph 2 of the ruling, the ESC
found that it need not deal with these issues because the referral had not been made
in terms of section 72 read with section 73(1)(c) and (d) of the LRA. At paragraph 17
of its ruling , the ESC stated that this issue must be determined through a minimum
service agreement, whether negotiated by the parties, or determined by the ESC in
terms of section 73(1)(c) and (d). The parties would be well advised to refer a
dispute to the ESC in terms of section 72, read with section 73(1)(c) and (d).
[20] It is disputed that all the individual respondents are engaged in the designated
essential services. In this regard, the following must be noted:
20.1 In its founding affidavit, at paragraph 9, the applicant alleges that all the
members of the first respondent are employed in designated essential
services. However, at paragraph 50, the applicant contradicts itself and
alleges that the individual respondents are “overwhelmingly” employed in
designated essential services. In its answering affidavit, the first respondent
simply notes both paragraphs.
20.2 The applicant attaches a list of the second to further respondents,
whom it seeks to interdict, to its notice of motion. It identifies the department,
and the position occupied by each of them. Among these, the applicant
identifies individuals occupying the following positions: (7) EMPD :
Administrative Officer: Enquiries and Receiving, (16) Real Estate Department:
Printing Assistant; (60) Finance Department : Administrative Officer, Customer
Printing Assistant; (60) Finance Department : Administrative Officer, Customer
Care and Finance; (117) Finance Department: Administrative Officer, Capture
Movements and Leave Enquiries; ( 296) Sports, Recreation and Culture:
19 It is unclear, on the pleadings in this matter, whether the whole of the applicant’s Waste
Management Department is “engaged” in the essential services. It is also unclear whether the whole
of the EMPD is “engaged” in municipal traffic services and policing (the essential service).
13
Library Assistant; (393) Water and Sanitation Department : Cleaner and Tea
Maker. Plainly the applicant did not bother to identify which of MECSU’s
members were engaged in the designated essential services.
20.3 In its supplementary affidavit, the first respondent alleges that certain
services
20 are not part of the designated essential services. In addition, the
first respondent denies that all the individual respondents are engaged in the
designated essential services and identifies, in a schedule attached to its
supplementary affidavit as annexure AC, those who are not engaged in the
designated essential services. To these allegations, t he applicant responds
with a bald denial.
[21] In Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another
21 the
Supreme Court of Appeal held as follows:
“12] Recognising that the truth almost always lies beyond mere linguistic
determination the courts have said that an applicant who seeks final relief on
motion must in the event of conflict, accept the version set up by his opponent
unless the latter’s allegations are, in the opinion of the court, not such as to
raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact or are so far -fetched or
clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the
papers: Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984]
ZASCA 51 ; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E -635C. See also the analysis by
Davis J in Ripoll-Dausa v Middleton NO [2005] ZAWCHC 6; 2005 (3) SA
141 (C) at 151A-153C with which I respectfully agree. (I do not overlook that a
reference to evidence in circumstances discussed in the authorities may be
appropriate.)
[13] A real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the
court is satisfied that the party who purports to raise the dispute has in his
affidavit seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed.
20 For example traffic wardens, maintenance of infrastructure, and waste collection. See also para 9.8
and 10 of first respondent’s supplementary affidavit.
21 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA)
14
There will of course be instances where a bare denial meets the requirement
because there is no other way open to the disputing party and nothing more
can therefore be expected of him . But even that may not be sufficient if the
fact averred lies purely within the knowledge of the averring party and no
basis is laid for disputing the veracity or accuracy of the averment. When the
facts averred are such that the disputing party must necessarily possess
knowledge of them and be able to provide an answer (or countervailing
evidence) if they be not true or accurate but, instead of doing so, rests his
case on a bare or ambiguous denial the court will generally have difficulty in
finding that the test is satisfied. I say ‘generally’ because factual averments
seldom stand apart from a broader matrix of circumstances all of which needs
to be borne in mind when arriving at a decision. A litigant may not necessarily
recognise or understand the nuances of a bare or general denial as against a
real attempt to grapple with all relevant factual allegations made by the other
party. But when he signs the answering affidavit, he commits himself to its
contents, inadequate as they may be, and will only in exceptional
circumstances be permitted to disavow them. There is thus a serious duty
imposed upon a legal adviser who settles an answering affidavit to ascertain
and engage with facts which his client disputes and to reflect such disputes
fully and accurately in the answering affidavit. If that does not happen it should
come as no surprise that the court takes a robust view of the matter.”
(own emphasis)
[22] To summarize: the applicant makes a broad allegation that all (though this is
contradicted later) the individual respondents are engaged in the designated
essential services but does not identify the service in which each of the respondent s
is allegedly engaged. When this is disputed by the respondents, the applicant replies
is allegedly engaged. When this is disputed by the respondents, the applicant replies
with a bald denial. The only detail in this exchange comes from the respondents . It
must also be noted that the applicant had four months (between 18 March 2025,
when the supplementary answering affidavit was filed, and 23 July 2025, the return
date) to provide the court with some basis for its allegation that all the respondents
are engaged in the designated essential services. It is important to remember that
this information is known to the applicant, and it bears the onus. It was necessary for
15
the applicant to provide reasons why each of the individual respondents, identified in
annexure AC as “non- essential” are engaged in the designated essential services.
The applicant has therefore not made out a case that all the individual respondents
are engaged in the designated essential services.
[23] The applicant did not argue that the denial, by the first respondent, that all its
members are engaged in the designated essential services fails to raise a real,
genuine or bona fide dispute of fact, or is so far -fetched, that it may be dismissed on
the papers. In the circumstances, insofar as any of the individual respondents
dispute being engaged in the designated essential service s, I must decide the issue
on the basis of the respondents’ version.
22
Costs
[24] The parties appear to have a healthy and ongoing relationship. The applicant,
though not fully successful, simply seeks to protect its operations. In addition, there
are still underlying disputes that need to be resolved. Mulcting a party with costs can
strain the relationship, and hinder the resolution of the underlying dispute. Finally, I
am guided by the judgment in Zungu v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu- Natal &
others
23 that, in employment matters, costs do not automatically follow the result.
Exercising my wide discretion in terms of section 162(1) of the LRA, I believe that no
costs order is appropriate.
Conclusion
[25] The strike notice dated 19 February 2025 is defective, for the reasons set out
in paragraphs 6 and 7 above. Those of the second to further respondents who are
engaged in the designated essential services may not engage in strike action.
However, thos e of the respondents , identified in annexure AC to the respondents’
supplementary affidavit, as “non- essential” may engage in strike action in relation to
the second dispute, provided that a compliant strike notice (a seven- day strike notice
the second dispute, provided that a compliant strike notice (a seven- day strike notice
22 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E-635C
23 (2018) 39 ILJ 523 (CC) at para 25
16
is required which id entifies the second dispute as the basis for the strike) is first
given.
[26] In the result, the following order is made:
Order
1. Those individual respondents identified as “non- essential” in annexure
AC (to the supplementary affidavit) may engage in protected strike action -
provided a strike notice is issued by the first respondent which complies with
section 64(1)(d) of the LRA,
2. Apart from those individual respondents referred to in para 1 above, all
the other respondents are interdicted and restrained from engaging in the
strike action,
3. There is no order as to costs.
R Daniels
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant:
Adv S Sibisi
SGV Attorneys
For the Respondents:
Union Official