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[1993] ZASCA 135
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Daniel v Boland Bank Ltd. (137/1992) [1993] ZASCA 135 (27 September 1993)
LL
Case No 137/1992
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA APPELLATE DIVISION
In the matter between:
FRANK WERNER DANIEL
Appellant
and
BOLAND BANK LIMITED
Respondent
CORAM
: VAN HEERDEN, VIVIER, EKSTEEN JJA,
NICHOLAS et HOWIE AJJA
HEARD
: 16 SEPTEMBER 1993
REASONS HANDED IN
: 27 SEPTEMBER 1993
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
VAN HEERDEN JA
:
2 During March 1990 the
respondent initiated motion proceedings in the Cape Provincial Division. It
sought an order provisionally
sequestrating the appellant's estate. In its
founding affidavit the respondent
inter alia
alleged that Dandev
(Eiendoms) Beperk ("Dandev") owed it an amount of more than R14 million; that
Dandev had been finally wound up
in January 1990, and that on 27 November 1987
the appellant and one Norwood had executed a written deed of suretyship
whereunder
they had bound themselves as sureties and co-principal debtors for
payment of the then existing and any future indebtedness of Dandev
towards
District Bank Ltd. (Subsequently- the assets and liabilities of this bank vested
in the respondent by virtue of ministerial
approval granted in terms of s 30 of
the Banks Act 23 of 1965.)
The application was opposed by the appellant but the court granted a
provisional sequestra-
3 tion order and issued the usual rule
nisi
.
Subsequently the appellant filed a further opposing affidavit. In it he relied
upon a defence not raised in his earlier affidavit.
His sole defence at this
later stage of the proceedings was that he had been released from his
obligations under the deed of suretyship
because of breaches of contract
committed by the respondent as against Dandev with the result that Dandev
suffered substantial losses.
The respondent filed a number of replying affidavits and on the extended
return day the matter was heard by Lategan J. Either before
or on that day the
respondent indicated that it would have no objection to the granting of a
postponement to enable the appellant
to reply to the allegations contained in
the replying affidavits. The appellant, however, rejected this offer and his
counsel instead
asked Lategan J to refer the dispute[s] for the hearing of
4
oral evidence. Since he was of the view that the balance of probabilities
favoured the respondent's denial of breach of contract,
Lategan J declined to
make the requested order and by confirming the rule
nisi
granted a final
order of sequestration of the appellant's estate.
The appellant lodged an appeal to a full bench of the Cape Provincial
Division. Shortly before the matter was to be heard one of the
judges caused the
attention of the parties' representatives to be drawn to the decision of this
court in
Fourie v Drakensberg Kooperasie Bpk
1988 (3) SA 466
(A). Up till
then the . appellant's representatives (and apparently also those of the
respondent) were under the impression that
the full bench was the proper forum
to deal with an appeal against the final sequestration order. In the event the
appellant withdrew
the appeal noted to the full bench and filed
5 a notice of
appeal to this court. This was inevitably lodged out of time and the appellant
therefore applied for condonation of
the late noting of his appeal. Since the
record and the appellant's power of attorney were also lodged out of time, and
security
for the respondent's costs of appeal consequently was not entered into
timeously, the appellant made a further application for condonation
of those
noncompliances with the rules of this court. The respondent opposed the two
applications on the sole ground that there were
no reasonable prospects of the
appeal being upheld.
The only reason I have dealt in some detail with the abortive appeal is to
explain why the matter came before us only some three years
after the
confirmation of the rule
nisi
.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that on the return day of a rule
nisi
in insolvency proceed-
6 ings a court is not entitled to decide a
material issue on a balance of probabilities only; at all events not if the
party against
whom such balance lies asks that the issue be referred for the
hearing of oral evidence. This submission cannot be faulted, and it
may even be
queried whether it is incumbent upon a respondent - against whom the balance of
probabilities lies - to apply for a referral
for oral evidence: cf
R Bakers
(Pty) Ltd v Ruto Bakeries (Pty) Ltd
1948 (2) SA 626
(T) 631 with
Ngqumba
NO v Staatspresident
1988 (4) SA 224
(A) 259-263. It does not follow,
however, that Lategan J erred in confirming the rule
nisi
.
The appellant's second affidavit is vague in the extreme, but the gist of his
grounds for denying liability under the deed of suretyship
may nevertheless be
summarised as follows:
(a) He originally approached District
7 Bank to provide the necessary finance to enable Dandev to
inter alia
purchase a spinning plant and "to secure a raw material source" overseas.
(b)
In order to procure the
materials it was necessary to establish credit
facilities.
(c)
District Bank undertook to
issue letters of credit to enable Dandev to obtain credit for the purchase of
the raw materials.
(d)
Although the bank knew
that the plant had to operate at a minimum of 90% capacity in order to be
competitive, it did not comply with
requests by Dandev for the issuing of
letters of credit. It
either failed to do so or
occasioned unwarranted delays. This caused a chain reaction: there was a
shortage of raw materials, hence
the plant operated way below the required
capacity, and this caused Dandev to incur heavy losses instead of operating at a
healthy
profit.
8
(e)
When the
appellant, on behalf of Dandev, complained he was assured that "all ...
[Dandev's] requirements in regard to importation
facilities would be
met."
(f)
When Dandev sought to obtain an
alternate source of funding for the importation of raw materials, Mr K van der
Merwe, an official
of the respondent, assured the appellant "that Dandev would
be given all the facilities it needed in respect of the importation of
raw
materials".
(g) Van der Merwe was, however,
directly
responsible for financially strangling Dandev. He
adopted the
attitude "that he would only open letters
of credit on a hand to mouth basis
and, in most
cases, for not more than about 60 per cent of what
was
required".
In a detailed replying affidavit Van der Merwe dealt fully with the
relationship between
9 Dandev and District Bank and later the respondent. (In
the papers in the court a
quo
and counsel's heads of argument no
distinction was drawn between District Bank and the respondent, and for
convenience I shall hereinafter
refer collectively to that Bank and the
appellant as "the bank".) It appears from his affidavit that through the years
Dandev made
various, and ever increasing, applications for facilities, including
the provision of funds for the issuing of letters of credit.
These applications,
or most of them, were approved of by the bank's directors. In each case the
directors placed a limit on the facilities
available to Dandev. Van der Merwe
specifically denied, however, that it had ever been agreed that the bank would
provide unlimited
facilities for the purchase of raw materials by Dandev.
The respondent also filed affidavits made
10 by one Kotze and one Dobbelsteijn, respectively the erstwhile financial
and general manager of Dandev. They alleged that one of
the main reasons for
Dandev's collapse was the appellant's unauthorised manipulation of its funds.
Dobbelsteijn also referred to
occasions on which the provision of letters of
credit was discussed between the appellant and himself, on the one hand, and
officials
of the bank, on the other, and he denied that on those occasions the
conclusion of an agreement providing for unlimited facilities
came under
discussion.
Relying mainly on the decision in
Minister of Community Development v 5 A
Mutual Fire And General Insurance Co Ltd
1978 (1) SA 1020
(W), counsel for
the appellant submitted that if in breach of agreement the respondent failed to
issue letters of credit, and if
Dandev resultantly suffered loss, the appellant
as surety would have been automatically
11
and fully discharged from his obligations. It does not appear
to me that that decision supports such a broad proposition. I shall
assume,
however, both that the decision cannot be faulted and that counsel's submission
is well-founded.
On the other hand counsel for the respondent in his heads of argument - he
was not called upon to address us - argued that because
of a provision in the
deed of suretyship the appellant was precluded from raising this defence. The
paragraph reads:
"I/we herewith declare that the degree,
cause and duration of the debtor's obligations will always be in the
discretion of the Bank ..."
Counsel contended that because of this
provision the appellant could not rely on a breach of
an agreement relating to the facilities which the
bank would provide to the main debtor, i e Dandev.
12 There may well be
substance in this argument but in the light of what follows I find it
unnecessary to deal with it.
The corner-stone of the appellant's disclaimer of liability appears to be
that right at the outset the bank agreed to provide letters
of credit for an
unlimited amount, and for an unlimited period, to enable Dandev to procure raw
materials overseas; in other words,
to make unlimited facilities available to
Dandev for that purpose. However, the notion that the bank would have entered
into such
an agreement is so highly improbable that it must be rejected. I say
so because it is inconceivable that the bank would have agreed
to provide
facilities on an ongoing basis no matter how much Dandev owed it, no matter
whether any repayments were made by that company,
and irrespective of Dandev's
financial position. Any agreement relating to the provision of
13
facilities must therefore have been subject to some conditions
and qualifications. The appellant mentions none, and it is therefore
impossible
to determine whether the conduct of the bank on which he relies constituted a
breach of such an agreement as might have
been concluded between Dandev and the
bank.
With one exception the respondent does not give any particulars of failures
of the bank to issue letters of credit in terms of the
alleged agreement or
agreements. He does not say when the applications were made, how that was done,
when the letters should have
been issued, what were the amounts involved, etc.
He also does not furnish any documentary proof of the breaches upon which he
relies.
True, he states that he does not have access to Dandev's documents
because they are in the possession of the liquidator, but it is
noteworthy that
he refrains
14
from saying that the liquidator was unwilling to permit him or
his attorneys to make copies of such documents.
I turn to the exception mentioned above. The appellant says, albeit rather
vaguely, that as far back as 1985 when the bank was requested
to provide forward
cover, it refused to do so, resulting in Dandev sustaining a loss of some R600
000. This must have occurred shortly
after the conclusion of the alleged
agreement, but the respondent fails to say that he, who at all times represented
Dandev, complained
about this refusal as constituting a breach of contract. Nor
does he explain why Dandev thereafter continued to deal with the bank.
And it is
not without significance that some two years later he was quite willing to sign
the deed of suretyship.
In the light of what has been said above I have no doubt that the grounds
upon which the
15 appellant disclaimed liability under the deed of suretyship
are so implausible that they must be rejected on his papers as they
stand.
There is, however, a further reason why the appeal must fail. It is this.
Even if one concedes the possibility that the bank foolishly
might have agreed
to make unlimited facilities available to Dandev, such a decision would have had
to be taken at a very high level.
The appellant does mention the name of one De
Kock with whom, on behalf of Dandev, he initially negotiated, and goes on to say
that
he also "dealt" with certain other named officials of the bank but does not
mention whether any one of them held a managerial position.
Be that as it may,
his second affidavit omits a vital allegation in that he does not aver that
whosoever concluded the alleged "unlimited"
agreement on behalf of the bank had
the necessary authority to do so. (According to Van der
16 Merwe all
decisions relating to financial assistance to Dandev were taken by the bank's
board of directors.)
In the result the court a
quo
was fully justified - albeit for the
wrong reason - in refusing the application for oral evidence to be heard, and in
confirming
the rule
nisi
. There were, indeed, no prospects of the appeal
being allowed.
For these reasons the following" order was made at the hearing of the
appeal:
"The applications for condonation of the late filing of the notice of appeal,
the record, the- power of attorney and the provision
of security for the
respondent's costs of appeal are refused, and the appellant is ordered to pay
the costs occasioned by those applications
as well as the costs of the
appeal."
17
H J O VAN HEERDEN JA
VIVIER JA
EKSTEEN JA
CONCUR
NICHOLAS AJA
HOWIE AJA