IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) RE PO RT AB LE:¥ES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO O TH ER JUDGE S: ¥ES /NO
(3) R EV ISED
DATE · 12AUGUST 2025
SIG NAT UR E :.
In the matter between:
NAUDE, WYNAND
Case No. A262/2023
FIRST APPELLANT
NAUDE (WYNAND) INC. ATTORNEYS SECOND APPELLANT
And
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL RESPONDENT
Coram: Van der Schyff J et Millar & Labuschagne JJ

Heard on:
Delivered:
It is Ordered:
21 May 2025
12 August 2025 -This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded
to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLI I. The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 1 0H00 on 12 August
2025.
ORDER
2
[1) The appeal is upheld with costs on the scale as between attorney and own client.
[2] The order of the Court a quo is set aside and replaced with the following:
"The application is dismissed with costs on the scale as between attorney and
own client."
JUDGMENT
MILLAR J (Van der Schyff and Labuschagne JJ concurring)
[1] Honesty, integrity, hard work and dedication form the bedrock required to
establish a good name and professional reputation. Once attained, this is to be

3
jealously guarded by both the practitioner as well as the professional body under
whose aegis he conducts his practice.
[2] This is an appeal which lies against an order granted on 22 February 2023 on an
urgent basis in terms of which the first appellant (Mr. Naude) was suspended from
his 37-year practice as an attorney pending the finalization of the South African
Legal Practice Council's (LPC) application to strike his name from the roll of legal
practitioners.
[3] This appeal, which is with the leave of the Supreme Court of Appeal1 raises 3
issues for consideration. The first is the conduct of Mr. Naude which wa s said to
justify the bringing of the application, the second, the circumstances under which
the application for suspension was brought and the conduct of the LPC in doing
so and lastly, costs.
[4] Before dealing with each of these in turn, it is necessary to set out the
circumstances which brought Mr. Naude to the attention of the LPC .
[5] There were two complaints made against him. The first was in regard to certain
letters authored by him on behalf of his clienUs and the second in regard to what
was said to be his failure to comply with professional rules of practice.
COMPLAINT LODGED BY OPES PROPERTIES
[6] A complaint was lodged against the Mr. Naude arising from his representation of
Mr. Asfar, a Canadian who had decided to conduct business within the R epublic.
1 Leave to appeal to the Full C ourt was granted on 3 Augu st 2023, the C ourt a quo having refused leave
on 9 June 2023.

4
For this purpose, over the period 2015 to 2016, Mr. Asfar had caused R120 million
to be transferred into the trust account of Mr. Naude 's firm. He then registered
two companies through which he would conduct his business. These were Equity
Cheque Capital Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Equity Cheque Card Corporation (Pty)
Ltd (the Equity Companies).
[7] Mr. Asfar proceeded, through the Equity Companies, to enter into 2 lease
agreements with Opes Properties (Pty) Ltd (Opes). Besides the Equity
Companies entering the leases, Mr. Asfar also bound himself as surety for the
obligations of the Equity Companies to Opes.
[8] The first lease agreement was signed between Equity Cheque Cap ital
Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Opes On 7 April 2017 and the second, between Equity
Cheque Card Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Opes on 28 July 2017.
[9] The essence of the complaint lodged by Opes arises from letters written by Mr.
Naude after the conclusion of the respective leases. There is nothing to indicate
that the conclusion of the leases or the subsequent letters sent were, at the time,
contentious. It was only after the business dealings between Opes and the Equity
companies soured and Opes was unable to execute upon judgments it had
obtained against them and Mr. Asfar that these letters attained significance.
[1 O] It is not in issue that various letters were written by Mr. Naude to Opes or that in
them, the reference, in the heading of each as to who the client upon who se
behalf the funds were held, was not clear and unequivocal. In each letter, more
than one party was reflected as the client being variously Mr. Asfar and one or
other of the Equity Companies .

5
[11] This lack of clarity is the fulcrum of the complaint made by Opes. Mr. Naude for
his part contended that he had always acted for Mr. Asfar and that the funds,
albeit that he had indicated for whom they were available, were always the funds
of Mr. Asfar and subject to disposition on his instructions.
[12] Opes for its part contended that given the headings in the letters, the funds were
held in trust for the Equity Companies and that in consequence, the letters
constituted representations upon which Opes had relied. This reliance, so the
argument went, had been to its detriment.
[13] After judgment was granted, Opes attempted to execute by directing the Sheriff
to the office of Mr. Naude, as Opes claimed to be under the impression that his
firm was holding substantial funds in its trust account on behalf of the Equity
companies. The reason for such a belief was predicated solely on the letters that
had been written after the conclusion of each of the leases.
[14] When the sheriff attended the offices of Mr. Naude, he was informed that he held
no funds on behalf of the Equity companies.
[15] Opes then instituted action in the High Court. Various orders were granted, and
reasons thereafter furnished on 13 November 2020. In those proceedings, the
court held inter alia that:
"[7] Based on numerous representations made by Mr. Wynand Naude ("Mr
Naude ") an attorney and representative of the third respondent, the
applicant believed that the third respondent held in excess of R50m of
unencumbered cash on behalf of his client, Capital and the first and
second respondents.

And
And
6
[8] When the sheriff attempted to execute the warrant, the third respondent
advised that he/it never held any funds for Capital and Card, and no assets
could be located for them."
"[41] The applicant claimed that pursuant to enquiries made , the third
respondent's banker confirmed that an amount of R50m was invested with
First National Bank on behalf of their client, being the third respondent.
[42] The applicant feared that should the first respondent leave South Africa;
he would leave no assets behind to satisfy a judgment that could
potentially follow.
[43] The applicant claimed that both the first and second respondents resided
in rented properties, drove with cars that were not registered in their
names, and any payments made by them were done via the offices of the
third respondent. "
"[64] It was apparent from the record, that the FNB account of Wynand Naude
Inc reflected a credit balance of R50 050 000.00 as at 30 November 2017.
It was furthermore apparent that these funds were transferred into the
third respondent's bank account over a period as from the 24 August 2015
to the 15 December 2016.
[65] The second respondent contended that the third respondent's business
account statement, dated 26 January 2018, confirmed that the third
respondent made an onward swift transfer of R119 800 000.00 to
Worldwide Capital on the 27 December 2017 approximately 12 months
later".

7
[16] While Opes was aggrieved that it was unable to execute and satisfy the judgm ent
it had obtained against the Equity Companies and Mr. Asfar, it was simply not
open to it to assert to the LPC that Mr. Naude had "lied and brought the legal
profession into disrepute and furthermore caused damages to Opes Properties (Pty) Ltd
as a result if his fraudulent misrepresentation of the financial status of ECG ."
[17] What is clear is that none of the letters upon which Opes had based its claim of
a misrepresentation was in its terms an undertaking by Mr. Naude or his firm to
hold on behalf of Opes any of the funds that were in trust.
[18] It is evident from the subsequent investigation conducted by the LPC and as
found by the Court in the Cape, that at the time that the letters were written by
Mr. Naude , he indeed did hold the funds that he said he did in his firm's trust
account. Both of his letters were entirely accurate insofar as this aspect w as
concerned.
[19] It is to my mind a red herring whether the client of Mr. Naude , at the tim e that he
sent the letters, was either the Equity Companies or Mr. Asfar. It matters not with
regards to the subsequent disposition of the funds, for whom he acted.
[20] In view of the fact that none of the letters were or could be construed in any way
as undertaking an obligation by Mr. Naude or his firm or his client, whether it wa s
the Equity Companies or Mr. Asfar2 , there was no concomitant duty upon Mr.
Naude or his firm or his client to inform Opes of any instructions received to
transfer the funds held in his trust account on their behalf to a third party.
2 See for example the case of an adjectus solutionis causa distinguished from an ordinary agent in
Stupel & Berman Inc v Rode/ Financial Services (Pty) Ltd 2015 (3) SA 36 (SC A) at para (17).

8
[21] On 27 December 2017 and upon instructions of his client (whether it wa s one of
the Equity Companies or Mr. Asfar), the funds which had been in the trust account
and to which the letters had referred were all transferred to a third party. This
occurred some 6 months before the relationship between the Equity Compan ies
and Opes soured and some 15 months before Opes obtained judgment in its
favour on 4 March 2019.
[22] Put simply, he was bound to do what he had been instructed to do3 by his client
and he did so.
[23] The proceedings before the court in the Cape , were brought for the purposes of
trying to obtain information for Opes to execute upon its judgments. While it is
understandable that it embarked upon this course of action, it knew that M r.
Naude had not undertaken any legal obligation to it on behalf any client and
furthermore that there had been no "fraudulent misrepresentation." Opes knew
that the two leases signed with the Equity Companies had both been signed prior
to the letters having been sent by Mr. Naude. For Opes, the die had been cast
when the leases were signed.
[24] The proceedings in the High Court in the Cape , were for all intents and purposes
nothing more than a proverbial "fishing expedition" to try and find assets against
which execution of its judgment could be made . It yielded nothing of substance
to Opes save for a referral of Mr. Naude to the LPC .
ALLEDGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULES OF PRACTICE
[25] On 24 June 2020, Opes lodged a complaint with the LPC against Mr. Naude in
which it alleged that he had misrepresented that he was in possession of certain
3 Bloom 's Woollens (Pty) Ltd v Taylor 1962 (2) SA 532 (A) at 538H .

9
funds in his trust account. It was also alleged that had misrepresented that he
had never held any funds on behalf of the Equity Companies and that he had "lied
and brought the legal profession into disrepute and furthermore caused damages to
Opes Properties (Pty) Ltd as a result of his fraudulent misrepresentation".
[26] In addition, to the complaint lodged by Opes on 24 June 2020, when the reasons
given by the High Court in the Cape for the orders it had made were handed down
on 13 November 2020, this also contained a referral to the LPC.
[27] The High Court in the Cape found:
"[89] None of the bank statements provided by Mr. Naude on behalf of the third
respondent were endorsed as a trust account. "
[28] This was the basis upon which the LPC in Gauteng was to conduct its
investigation - pursuant to the referral by the Court.
[29] Upon receiving the complaint, the LPC embarked on an investigation against Mr.
Naude and his firm. An auditor, Mr. Nyali was appointed and commence d with
an investigation on 18 February 2021. The investigation by Mr. Nyali dealt only
with the books and records of the firm and did not take the form of a forensic audit
but was rather a "desktop evaluation".
[30] Mr. Nyali requested certain documents from Mr. Naude , these were furnished and
after consideration of these documents, a report was prepared. In the words of
Mr. Nyali "I did not perform any substantive audit procedures on the documentation and
accounting records presented." It is in this context that the report and findings of Mr.
Nyali are to be considered.

10
[31] Since the period that was being investigated, in part, pre-dated the com ing into
operation of the Legal Practice Act4 on 1 November 2018, it was necessary for
Mr. Nyali to also have regard to the Attorneys Act5, and Rules for the Attorneys
Profession which were applicable under that Act.
[32] Mr. Nyali formed the view that Mr. Naude did not comply with the Attorneys Act
and Rules in that he had:
[29.1] failed to obtain the client's written confirmation of the investment as
soon as reasonably possible or notify the client forthwith thereof in
writing (rule 35.16.2 of the Rules of the Attorneys' Profession) - the
first finding.
[29.2] failed to invest trust monies in an interest-bearing account that is
endorsed as a section 78(2A) investment (section 70(2A) of the
Attorneys Act) - the second finding.
[29.3] failed to promptly deposit the funds withdrawn from an investment
account into the trust account (rule 35.13. 7 .1.6 of the Attorneys rules)­
the third finding.
[29.4] failed to ensure that the total amount of money in the second
appellant's banking account at any date is not less than the total
amount of the credit balances of the trust creditors (rule 54.14.8 of the
SALPC rules) - the fourth finding.
4 28 of 2014.
5 53 of 1979.

11
[29.5] failed to immediately report in writing to the Council that the total
amount of money in the second appellant's bank accounts was less
than the total amount of credit balances of the trust creditors (rule
54.14.10 of the SALPC rules)-the fifth finding.
[33] Mr. Naude was not given an opportunity to address these findings. These were
addressed in the present proceedings.
RESPONSE TO THE COMPLAINTS RAISED IN MR. NY ALI'S REPORT
The first finding
[34] In regard to the finding that Mr. Naude had failed to obtain the client's written
confirmation of the investment as soon as reasonably possible, or notify the client
forthwith thereof in writing, this was dealt with by Mr. Asfar in an affidavit filed by
him in which he explained that Mr. Naude had explained to him that trust money
could be invested, but that depending upon the type of investment, the protection
of the Fidelity Fund may be lost. He also stated inter alia that:
"I, with the knowledge, consent and approval of m y brother, instructed the first
respondent verbally during April 2016 and again in writing by WhatsApp on 11
October 2017, to withdraw the monies paid into the second respondent's trust
account and to invest the monies in an interest-bearing account with FNB . Copies
of the WhatsApp instructions to the first respondent is annexed hereto ... "

12
The second finding
[31) In regard to the finding that Mr. Naude failed to invest trust monies in an interest­
bearing account that is endorsed as a section 78(2A) investment (section 70(2A)
of the Attorneys Act), this coincided with the finding made by the Cape H igh C ourt
that "None of the bank statements provided by Mr. Naude were endorsed as a trust
account."
[32] This was explained by Mr. Asfar on the basis that Mr. Naude had explained to
him that if the funds were to remain in trust and under the umbrella of protection
provided by the Attorneys Fidelity Fund, then interest would not accrue to Mr.
Asfar.
[33] This explains why some of the bank statements do record that the firm opened
accounts in terms of either section 78(1) - an ordinary trust account or, section
78(2A), a trust investment account.
[34] The investment made on behalf of Mr. Asfar, was accordingly not at the time of
the statements upon which the LPC relied in its application, subject to declaration
in terms of the Act. The position in this regard changed materially after the LPA
came into operation where in terms of section 86(4), even if a client wa nted to
earn the interest on trust investments for himself, a declaration to the Fidelity
Fund in this regard was required and they would sweep by EFT transfer a
percentage of the interest earned on those accounts.
[35] That all such investment accounts were disclosed on Mr. Naude 's applications
for a fidelity fund certificate is not in issue.

13
[36] In any event, since all accounts were properly disclosed, both in terms of the
Attorneys Act and LPA, nothing turns on the fact that a specific bank statement
may not have contained an endorsement as to the type of account which had
been opened. The description of the account contained on the printed statement
is something which is peculiarly under the control of the Bank concerned and any
oversight or omission is on their part and not that of Mr. Naude.
The third finding
[37] Regarding the finding that Mr. Naude failed to promptly deposit the funds
withdrawn from an investment account into the trust account, the finding by Mr.
Nyali in this regard was predicated on the fact that Mr. Naude had on the
instructions of the client closed certain investment accounts.
[38] The proceeds of those accounts had been paid into his firm's business account
and instead of immediately transferring those proceeds to the firm's trust account
and thereafter effecting onward transfer in terms of Mr. Asfar's instructions, he
had a few days later (a period of 5 days) then transferred the funds in accordance
with Mr. Asfar's instructions.
[39] This occurred on 22 December 2017. This was a Friday, and the onward
transmission occurred on the following Wednesday 27th December 2017. It must
be borne in mind that the 23rd and 24th of December 2017 fell on the weekend,
Monday 25th and Tuesday 26th were public holidays and thus the onward
transmission occurred on the very next business day.
[40] While it is technically correct for Mr. Naude to have transferred the funds
immediately into the trust account and thereafter for them to have been
transferred on, it would in the circumstances have been nothing more than paying

14
"lip service" to compliance. The single oversight in this regard is certainly not
sufficient for the LPC to have taken the view of it that it did.
The fourth and fifth findings
[41] Lastly, the findings that Mr. Naude failed to ensure that the total amount of money
in the second appellant's banking account at any date is not less than the total
amount of the credit balances of the trust creditors and failed to immediately
report in writing to the Council that the total amount of money in the second
appellant's bank accounts was less than the total amount of credit balances of
the trust creditors are simply not borne out by the facts.
[42] During his desktop evaluation, Mr. Nyali discovered what purported to be a trust
shortfall of R3 027 .27. This arose from a difference between what was reflected
in the bank statements as a trust credit balance and what was reflected in the
books of the firm as its trust credit liability. The balance in the trust bank account
was R52 360 126.23 (over R52million) and the balance in the trust ledger
R52 357 098.95. This related to the period ending 28 February 2021.
[43] Mr. Nyali engaged with Mr. Naude 's bookkeeper who informed him that the
discrepancy was possibly because of the firm having previously moved to a new
accounting system and there being the transfer of incorrect opening balances.
Mr. Naude 's bookkeeper was unable to take the matter any further.
[44] In the absence of a substantive forensic audit and given what is in its terms an
inconsequential discrepancy, this ought properly, at least at that stage, to have
been dealt with on the basis that it was "de minimis" and that it did not impugn
either the veracity of the information in the books of the firm or the integrity and
honesty of Mr. Naude.

15
[45] Subsequently, the firm's auditor in conducting the annual audit, ascertained that
there was in fact no trust shortfall at all. This is not in dispute. Had Mr. Nyali
conducted a proper audit this would no doubt have been discovered by him.
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE URGENT APPLICATION
[46] Mr. Nyali issued his report on 13 May 2022. This was just shy of two years after
Opes had lodged its complaint and 15 months after Mr. Nyali had been instructed
to proceed. On 20 June 2022, Mr. Nyali's report was furnished to Mr. Naude and
on 19 July 2022, referred to an LPC investigating committee. The report together
with the complaint of Opes was considered by the investigating committee on 23
August 2022.
[47] Somewhat surprisingly, Mr. Naude was not informed when the investigating
committee was to meet and consider the matter -nor was he invited to participate.
Had he been invited and had he presented what he was able to place before the
Court a quo, the decision taken would likely have been materially different.
[48] The LPC investigating committee such as it was, appears to have consisted of
only one member who also conducted a "desktop" evaluation of the matter. In
the memorandum of the investigating committee, the member accepted
uncritically and without more the reasons handed down by the Cape High Court
and concluded in interpreting those reasons that "the last sentence of the quoted
paragraph (78) is in my view a judicial pronouncement that the actions of the Respondent
(Naude) in regard to the RSOm was tantamount to fraudulent misrepresentation." It is
unfortunate that the sole member of the committee did not consider the entirety
of the body of evidence that was available or see fit to hear Mr. Naude.
[49] For the reasons set out above, there was neither a misrepresentation made by
Mr. Naude nor any actionable breach of the rules of professional conduct or

16
mismanagement of his trust account so as to justify the recommendation that was
made by the investigating committee that he be suspended from practice.
[50] Had the members of the Gauteng Provincial Counc il of the LPC properly
considered all the documents that were before them, they would have realized
that there was simply no case, prima facie or otherwise, for the suspension of Mr.
Naude. The failure on the part of the LPC to afford Mr. Naude a right to be heard
does not appear to have moved the members of the Council in their consideration
of the matter and this is a matter of concern.
[51] Although the events in question had occurred some five years previously and the
high watermark of the complaints, at least insofar as the protection of the public
was concerned, was the R3 027.00 discrepancy, the LPC took more than two
years to complete the investigation and reach its decision.
[52] There is no explanation what transpired between 23 August 2022 and 13 October
2022, when the decision to apply for his suspension was communicated to Mr.
Naude. It was also not disclosed to him that the LPC had also resolved to launch
such proceedings on an urgent basis.
[53] He was not furnished with any reasons for the decision either. It bears mention
that the report of the investigating committee did not find its way into the founding
papers when the application was issued and had to be elicited through a request
in terms of rules 35(12) and (14) of the uniform rules of Court.
[54] The LPC emailed its application to Mr. Naude on 21 November 2022. The
application indicated that it would be enrolled for hearing in the urgent court on 6
December 2022 some two weeks later.

17
[55] Having regard to what is set out above with regards to the lack of merit with the
Opes complaint and absence of any non-compliance with the rules that rose to
the level requiring suspension from the roll, the refusal to furnish a Fidelity Fund
Certificate for the following year placed Mr. Naude in an invidious position.
[56] Even though the founding affidavit deposed to on behalf of the LPC asserts on
no less than nine occasions that Mr. Naude was dishonest or had made himself
guilty of dishonesty, properly construed, these allegations were simply not
sustainable on the information that was before the Court.
[57] On 24 November 2022, a letter was addressed to the LPC on behalf of Mr. Naude
addressing the various issues raised in the application. In the letter, he undertook
inter a/ia to retire at the age of 66 and to dispose of his practice. He also
undertook to "sell his practice and transfer all trust monies to a colleague, who will also
take over his employees, and undertakes to the GPC {Gauteng Provincial Council of the
LPC] a closing auditor's report within the prescribed time period of 3 months thereafter,
before 31 May 2023."
[58] This drastic course of action was precipitated by the refusal of the LPC to issue
a Fidelity Fund Certificate, the consequence of which would be, if he continued
to practice without it, criminal conduct in terms of section 93(8)6 read with section
84(1 )7 of the LPA. The LPC for all intents and purposes ended the 37-year career
of Mr. Naude.
6 The section provides: " . . . that any person who contravenes section 84(1) or (2) or section 34, in
rendering legal services -
(a) commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding
two years or to both such fine and imprisonment;
(b) is on conviction liable to be struck off the Roll; and
(c) is not entitled to any fee, reward or reimbursement in respect of the legal services rendered."

7 The section provides that every attorney who practices for their own account or as a director of a juristic
entity "must be in possession of a Fidelity Fund Certificate".

18
(59] Despite the failure to properly investigate or consider the matter, the LPC
nonetheless decided to approach the Court on an urgent basis.
[60] Two postponements ensued to afford Mr. Naude an opportunity to respond
properly to the application. It bears mention that on no less than five occasions,
Mr. Naude sought an audience with the LPC to discuss the application that had
been brought against him and on each occasion was rebuffed. When the
application was eventually decided, it was done so in the Urgent Court before a
single judge.
(61] It is not in issue that applications for the suspension of errant practitioners are
inherently urgent. This is so because usually there is some pressing need for the
Court to suspend the practitioner to protect both the public and the profession at
large against either continued or possible future conduct. In the present matter,
there was simply no prima facie case against Mr. Naude.
(62] The LPC is, besides the statutory regulator of the legal profession, also the custos
morum or guardian of morals for the profession and its members. It is the duty of
the LPC, acting in this capacity, to safeguard both the profession as well as its
members 8. The LPC is obliged, once concerning conduct which represents a risk
or danger to either the public or the profession, to bring this to the attention of the
Court.9This is to be done responsibly10 and after due process has been followed.
(63] The LPC as custos morum is expected to exercise great caution and to avoid
recklessness or irresponsibility in its institution of proceedings for misconduct
against a legal practitioner. It is expected that it acts to the same standard and
8 Claasen and Another v Free State Law Society and Others 2020 JDR 0337 (FB) at para [12).
9 South African Legal Practice Council v Segaole 2024 JDR 5218 (GP) at para [1). See also Jiba and
Another v The General Council of the Bar of South Africa and Another 2019 (1) SA 130 (SCA) at para
[72) as

[72) as
10 Mavudzi and Another v Majola and Others 2022 (6) SA 420 (GJ) at para [34].

19
with the same degree of care to the Court as any of the legal practitioners whom
it regulates. This is so because besides its regulatory function over practitioners,
it is enjoined by section 5(i) of the LPA to enhance access to the legal profession.
[64] It is the role of the LPC to place facts before the Court which the Court is to
evaluate. In this regard it must place the totality of the facts before the court.
[65] The LPC sought to use its power to withhold the issue of a Fidelity Fund
Certificate against Mr. Naude to make him acquiesce to the course of action that
they had decided upon. It conducted itself, by all accounts, not as a custos
morum but rather as a litigant having a direct personal interest in the matter. This
is not its function.
[66] The way in which the LPC conducted this matter is to be deprecated. A proper
consideration of the facts would have made plain that there was no basis to apply
to Court for the suspension of Mr. Naude from the roll of attorneys and
conveyancers. In this regard, the present case is to be distinguished from cases
such as Botha v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 11 where it was found that
no order for costs should be made against the custos morum. The present case
is not one where the degree of severity is in issue and that there was an
unimpeachable justification for the bringing of the proceedings. Here there was
to my mind a manifest failure to properly consider what was before it and an
unnecessary and unjustified abdication of its own responsibility to the urgent
court.
COSTS
[67] In the same way that the LPC argues that it is acting in a wider interest and ought
in applications where an order for suspension or striking is granted, to be awarded
11 2009 (1) SA 227 (SCA ) at para (22].

20
punitive costs, so too should the same criteria apply when it fails in such
applications.
[68) There is no reason why Mr. Naude should be out of pocket at all. There was no
case against him and had the LPC conducted a proper investigation - both of his
records and of the complaint and afforded him a right of hearing, the application
against him could have been avoided altogether.
[69) In Seima NO and Others v Master of the High Court Johannesburg 12 it was held
that ''.An Officer of the Court may not simply convey allegations to a Court where there
is good reason to believe they are not truthful or factually based and this duty becomes
more acute where imputations of dishonesty are conveyed." On this score both the
investigating committee and the Gauteng Council of the LPC failed.
[70) It is for this reason that it is apposite that the order for costs to be made in this
matter is on the scale as between attorney and own client. For the assistance of
the taxing master, having regard to the provisions of the tariff, had the costs order
been made as between party and party, the scale of counsels' costs awarded
would have been on scale C.
ORDER
[71) In the circumstances, I propose the following order:
[71.1] The appeal is upheld with costs on the scale as between attorney and
own client.
12 2025 JDR 3026 (GJ) at para [30].

21
[71.2] The order of the Court a quo is set aside and replaced with the
following:
"The application is dismissed with costs on the scale as between
attorney and own client."
....
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
I AGREE AND IT IS SO ORDERED
I AGREE,
EVAN DER SCHYFF
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

HEARD ON :
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON .
COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS :
INSTRUCTED BY :
REFERENCE :
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:
INSTRUCTED BY :
REFERENCE :
21 MAY 2025
12 AUGUST 2025
ADV . HF GEYER
SMIT & MARAIS
MRJ SMIT
MS N COLLETT
ROOTH & WESSELS
MR. R STOCKER
22