REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA "
CASE NO.: 2025-073204
(1) REPORTABLE: NO i
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO 4
(3) REVISED: NO | "
Date: 4 August 2025 E van der Schyf :
In the matter between .
GEORGE HARROP-ALLIN ‘ FIRST APPLICANT
and
ANTON HARROP-ALLIN WN.O. FIRST RESPONDENT
ANTON HARROP-ALLIN SECOND RESPONDENT ,
PERRY GEUENS N.O. THIRD RESPONDENT
PERRY GEUENS FOURTH RESPONDENT
MICHELLE JOY HUBBARD FIFTH RESPONDENT
THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA SIXTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Van der Schyff J
Introduction
; 2
[1] The applicant seeks an interim interdict preventing the trustees of the Anton Harrop-
Allin Trust (‘the Trust’) from making any payments or effecting any transfers on the
Trust’s bank account either to themselves personally, or to any natural person or
juristic entity that is a related person to them as contemplated in section 2 of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008, any family member or any juristic person of which either
the first or third respondent isa director, member or employee. The interim relief is
sought to restrain any payment to any beneficiary of the Trust pending the final
determination of an application brought under case number 16556/2025, the so-
called ‘amendment application’, and the relief sought in Part B of the current
application, the ‘removal application.’ :
[2] The applicant is an erstwhile beneficiary of the Trust. His removal as beneficiary
through amendments to the Trust Deed is the subject of litigation in the amendment
application. The applicant seeks the court's urgent intervention because he believes
there is a risk of assets being dissipated if the application is not heard and granted.
In Part B of the application, the applicant seeks the removal of the first and second
respondents as trustees of the Anton Harrop-Allin Trust.
Urgency F
[3] Rule 6(12) provides that in urgent applications, a judge may dispense with the forms
and service provided in the rules. The decision to enroll any application in the urgent
court, however, has the consequence of requiring an applicant to make out a case
that it would not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.
[4] Rule 6(12)(b) prescribes that the applicant must set forth explicitly the circumstances
which are averred to render the matter urgent. A court must first condone the
applicant’s non-compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court before it proceeds to
decide on the remainder of the relief sought. ad,
[5] The question is then, did the applicant in this matter make out a case that it would
not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course if the relief sought is
not granted. To put this in simple terms, did the applicant make out a case that he
2
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would suffer harm or loss that cannot, in time, be adequately compensated if he is
obliged to wait for the matter to be dealt with on the ordinary motion roll, or that the
delay in having the matter heard if it is enrolled in the ordinary course would defeat
the very purpose of the relief sought?" ' :
[6] The question of urgency is intertwined with a consideration of the facts underpinning
the application. The timeline preceding an urgent application often informs the issue
of urgency. -
[7] In the current matter, the application was brought on a semi-urgent basis. The
applicants had due regard to the appropriate degree of urgency. The applicant
‘ ‘issued the application in May 2025. The timelines within which the respondents were
required to file opposing papers accord with the periods provided for in the Uniform
Rules of Court.
[8] The respondents deny that the application is urgent. They contend that the applicant
failed to show that the Trust is in the process of making disbursements to
beneficiaries, and aver that there is no evidence that the Trust intends to do so in
the near future. The deponent to the answering affidavit, the second respondent,
claims that the application is unnecessary. He unequivocally states that he:
‘confirm that the Trust has no intention of selling the shareholdings or
making any disbursements to any beneficiary in the near future.’
[9] If regard is had to this averment by the respondents, | find it strange that the parties
could not reach an agreement prior to the launch of this application that would have
eliminated the need for an interim order pending the finalisation of the removal
application. The urgent application could have been averted if the trustees had
provided the information and undertakings sought by the applicant prior to the
institution of the urgent application. Although he is not currently a beneficiary of the
Trust, his removal is the subject matter of the amendment and removal applications.
He has focus standi to approach the court for the relief sought in the amendment
1 East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others (11/33767)
[2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011).
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